15. atte. The editors since Brandis read atré and take the clause to mean that the sphere of the fixed stars will cause both its own motion and that of the supposed other. But in Aristotle’s view the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars is not self-caused ; it is caused by God. It is therefore better to read atv with Alexander and take it to refer to the sun. Since we cannot suppose the motions, parallel to the equator, (a) of the fixed stars and (4) of Saturn and the sun, to be unconnected, we should have to suppose the motion of the fixed stars to be the cause of the motion of Saturn and therefore, in- directly, of the motion of the sun.
15-16. otxodv BéAtioy 75 mp@tov .. . doattws. The principle is: If B causes C, but A causes B, A is more truly than B the cause of C. Cf. a.994*11. There is a further advantage in regarding the sphere of the fixed stars as the cause of the sun’s daily motion; it has already been shown to be the cause of the uniformity in the uni- verse (kai yap airiov hv xrA.), so that if we assign to it also the causation of the sun’s daily motion we shall be practising se in explanation.
17. ovKody otTws Kat €xoucwv at KU ELS. Theory requires the ac- count given in ll. g—17, and accordingly the actual motions are found to be such as have been described.
18. d&ddas.. . dpxds, sc. like the Platonic Ideas, cf. 1071» 14.
Nature and mode of operation of the first mover (ch. 1).
1072°19. There must, then, be something that is in incessant, and therefore in circular, motion, and this is actually observed to be the case. The first heaven, then, must be eternal. Therefore there must also be something that moves it. Since that which is moved and moves is a middle term, there must be an extreme which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.
26. The object of desire and that of thought move thus. And in their primary forms they are identical. ‘The object of desire is the good or the apparent good. Now desire depends on thought rather than thought on desire. And thought is moved by its object, and the terms in the column of positives are fer se objects of thought, and
in this column substance, and among substance that which is simple and actual, comes first. But the good and desirable belongs . to the same column, and the first term in this column must be most good.
by, A final cause in the sense of that whose good is aimed at cannot be found among unchangeable things, but a final cause in the sense of the good aimed at can; it moves by being loved, while all other things that move do so by being moved.
4. That which is moved is capable of being otherwise than as it is, so that if its activity is the primary (i.e. circular) motion, it has con- tingency in this sense—liability to spatial motion, though not to change of substance. The unmoved mover, on the other hand, has no con- tingency ; it is not subject even to the minimal change (motion in a circle), since this is what it originates. It exists therefore of neces- sity ; its being is therefore good, and it is in this way that it is a prin- ciple of motion. (The necessary in the sense of the non-contingent must be distinguished from the necessary in the sense of what is con- trary to natural impulse, and from the necessary in the sense of the sine qua non).
1g. On such a principle, then, the physical universe depends. It is a life which is always such as ours is at its best. Its very activity is pleasure—just as waking, perceiving, thinking are most pleasant because they are activities.
18, Thought which is independent of lower faculties must be thought of the best object. Now thought does think itself, because it shares in the intelligibility of its object. It becomes intelligible by contact with the intelligible, so that thought and object of thought are one,
22. Activity rather than potentiality is the divine thing in thought— actual contemplation the pleasantest and best of all things. If God is always in that good state which we sometimes reach, this must move our wonder ; and if his state is even better, this must move our wonder yet more.
26. God must also have life, for the actuality of thought is life and God is that actuality. God therefore has, or rather is, life continuous and eternal.
30. Those who, like the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, think the good is not a first principle because the developed living thing is better than the germ from which it comes, are wrong, for the germ comes from prior developed beings.
10732 3. It is clear, then, that there is a substance eternal, im- movable, separate from sensible things: We have shown that it
374 _ Commentary
must be without magnitude; it cannot have finite magnitude, for then it could not have the infinite power which it displays by causing motion eternally, and it cannot have infinite magnitude be- cause there is no such thing. It must-also be free from change of quality, for the other-sorts of change presuppose locomotion.
1072° 19. ék vuktds éotat, cf. 1071) 27,
20. Kal ék py Ovtos, cf. 1069) 19.
21. aity 8 4 Kukda, cf. 1071» 10-11 n.
23. 6 mp@tos otpavds, the sphere of the fixed stars, cf. De Caelo 288*15, 292b22. This is ‘first’, counting from the outer edge of the universe.
éott Tolvuy Te kat 6 Kuvet. From the existence of a xwovpevoy there cannot be inferred the existence of something which it moves, but only the existence of something that moves it. 6 therefore is sub- ject of xweé as in |. 25.
24. The traditional reading evel d€ ro Kwovpevoy Kal Kwodv, Kat pécov tow éori 7m gives an unsatisfactory sense; the unmoved mover is not a pecov. Nor does it mend matters if we punctuate after pecov instead of after xwodv. ore d€ Kal TO KivoUpevov povus cannot as Alexander. suggests be understood, and roi cannot begin a clause, nor is kat pécov intelligible. «ac must in any case be excised ; we may then read for rowvvv éori either €or toivuy oF Kwodv éort or simply éor. The argument then is as follows: Aristotle has just remarked that there must be something that moves the det xwovpevoy Of |, 21. This xuvoby may be (a) kwovpmevov or (d) od Ki- vovpevov. Buta _ Kuvoupevov kal kwvobdv is something intermediate, which presupposes te 6 od Kwovpevov xwet, For the description of the x:- vousLevov kal kwovv as a pecov cf. MZ. A. 70325, and for the argument cf. Phys. 256» 20 ff.
26. wet Sé GSe 7d dpextov Kal TS vontdv’ Kiel od Kivodpeva. In general, according to Aristotle, there is no xwely without dvrixvel- aba (G. A. 76818); the action of an object of desire is the only exception to this rule. On the dpexrov or dyafdv as the motive power in the world of nature cf. PAys, 192°16, De Gen. et Corr. 336% 27,
ef FO72™ 19—27 375
De Vila 469° 28, P. A. 687215, /,.A.704¥ 15. The doctrine becomes very prominent in Theophrastus; cf. his fragment on Metaphysics, SOOO RS tOnIOAT Ineo, 312. 4,315. 05, 327.20, ne doctrine that the motions of the stars were due to the desire to imitate the perfection of the divine nature lasted long. There was much dis- cussion among theologians of the question whether the stars are conscious. St. Thomas ’(.S. 7. 1% qu. 70) sums up by saying that Origen and Jerome held them to be conscious, Basil and John of Damascus denied them consciousness, and Augustine was neutral. He himself concludes that corpora coelesha non sunt animalia eo modo quo plantae et animalia, sed aeqguivoce, i.e. the consciousness to which the motion of a star is due is not its own form but the in- telligence to which it is subject. Cf. Webb, Studies in the Hist. of Vat. Theol. 243 f. Kepler argued against the Ptolemaic theory on the ground, among others, that it implied that the planets know mathematics; but he himself thought that the sun apprehends the harmonies of number which regulate the planetary orbits.
The colon after vonrov gives a better sense than Bekker’s full stop after de or Bz.’s comma after dpexrov (with xwovpevov for kwovpeva). For ode referring backwards cf. > 26, Kiihner i, p. 646.
Aristotle is not here expressing the view that dpegis and voids are independent sources of acton or local movement, the view stated provisionally in De An. 433413 and set aside in 433%21 in favour of the view that dpegis is the only direct principle of action. Line 30 here indicates that his meaning with regard to 76 voyroy is that it stimulates ¢hought without being itself stimulated.
27-1. The argument for the identity of the zpa@rov dpexrov and the mpatov vontov is as follows: The actual object of desire is either the apparent or the real xaddv, so that the primary object of desire is evidently the kaAov. (Aristotle next observes that the desire of it presupposes the recognition of it as xadov. This remark makes the transition from desire to thought but is not meant to prove the identity of their primary objects; the proof of that comes in what follows.) Now the proper object of vots is the assemblage of positive enti- ties () érépa cvororxia), negatives being known only as the opposites of positive entities (cf. ®. 104611). Substances are the first members of this assemblage, prior to positive gualztes, and simple immaterial substance is prior to substance which includes matter as well as form. Hence immaterial substance is the zparov vonrov. But 76 xadov, which was shown to be the zpérov épexrov, is something positive and therefore also belongs to the positive assemblage. This Aris- totle takes to imply that the positive assemblage is the assemblage of xaAa. And if so, immaterial substance, which is the first member of the assemblage, and therefore contains in the highest degree the character of all members of the assemblage (a. 99324), must be the dpucrov Or mp@rov dpexrov, while it has already been shown to be the zpérov vonrov.
27, toUTwy Ta mp@ta 7a adté. Alexander points out that some
376 Commentary
6pexta are NOl voyta, e.g. a loaf, and some vonra are not dpexrd, e.g. evil things.
27-28. émOupntov...dvKaddoy. Aristotle establishes that the rpdrov dpextov is the kaddv by considering the species of dpegis. There are in all three species—érufupiia, Ovpds, Bovdnois(De An, 414>2, M.A. 700b 22); but Aristotle has also a tendency to divide dpegs simply into that which is rational (GovAyo.s) and that which is against reason (ériOupia) (De An. 433% 22—26), and these two he is satisfied to mention here.
ZI. 4 érépa cuoroyia, ch A. 986423n., K. 1066815, Phys. 2o1b25. Not only is cvorouxia used of the Pythagorean list of opposites, but Aristotle himself recognizes a positive ovorouxia or column including such terms as being, unity, substance, and a nega- tive cvorouxéa including not-being, plurality, not-substance (I. 1004? 27, De Gen. e¢ Corr. 319215, De Sensu 447° 30, 448°16, P. A. 670» 21). In each case the negative is known not fer se but as the negation of the positive term.
32-34. Alexander thinks this note on the difference between ‘ one’ and ‘simple’ is meant to meet the objection that if the primary un- moveable substance is simple it must be one, whereas Aristotle be- lieves in a plurality of such substances (the beings that move the spheres, 1074°15). Rather, Aristotle seems to be intent on explaining what he means by ‘simple’, without any further motive.
33. Td pev yap ev pérpov onpaiver, cf. A. 1016) 18,
16 8€ dmAodv THs Zxov adté, ‘One’ denotes that a thing is the measure of something, the unit used in counting an assemblage; ‘simple’ denotes that a thing is zse/f in a certain condition, i.e. unmixed.
385-P 1. kal €ottv...mp&tov. The first term in a series is the best term, if this description of it is appropriate (as it is in this case, since TO kaAédv is in the series); or if it is not, then the first term may be said to be ‘analogous to the best’. Thus circular movement may by analogy be called the best movement, to take Alexander’s example.
Christ’s addition of kai twos (rwds AP) after évexa (I. 2) is amply justified by De An. 4152 76 8 of vera dirrdv, 7d pev ob 70 8 @ (cf. ib. 20, Phys. 194235). G. A. 742% 22, which Christ quotes, is not
A. 7. 1072% 27— 1072h 5 377
a parallel, for the true reading there is not 7d ob évexa but 76 rovrouv eveka,