Bz. accepts Trendelenburg’s emendation adAus 8 (7) evepyeia Kal dvvaper Stabéper Gv. But this ignores the evident correspondence be- tween dAdws here and ddAws in |. 6, and the opposition between dAAws 8 here and é éviows pev in]. 6. Aristotle has said that the distinction of dvvayus and évépyea belongs to different things in different ways. He has stated one way in ll. 6-11; he now has to state the other. ‘The distinction in virtue of actuality and potency is present in another sense in things which’, &c.
12-13. Gv...Uhy, Gv... étepov. It is to be noted that the negative in
364 Commentary
the first clause is jn, in the second otc. The two clauses are there- fore not of the same nature, The first gives the essential nature of a certain class; the second states an additional fact about it; ovd« in fact shows that the second dy might be replaced by kat rovrwv. This pre- vents us from interpreting the two clausés-as meaning ‘things which have neither the same matter nor the same form’ (Alexander, Tren- -delenburg), or ‘things which have not the same form differ from things which have not the same matter’ (Bz.).
The meaning of these clauses may be ascertained by observing what Aristotle goes on to say. He proceeds to distinguish the following causes of a man:
(rt) the elements present in him, i.e. (a) fire and earth, the matter of which he is made, and (4) his peculiar form,
(2) an external (proximate efficient) cause, his father,
(3) an external (remote efficient) cause (the sun and the ecliptic) ‘which is neither (1 @) matter nor (14) form (nor privation, which is included in form above), nor (2) of the same species as the pro- duct’.
Aristotle has shown above (1. 6) that the existence évepyeia. of a thing may be contrasted with its own previous existence duvdpe. He seems to be now saying (though the expression is very obscure) that dvvayus and évépyeva may be applied to different individual things, in the sense that one has the power to produce the other, i.e. dvvayus may be ap- . plied to the father and to the sun, évépyeia to the child which together they produce. Now both the father and the sun have a different matter from the child, and the sun has also a different form (ovre dpoedés, 1. 16).
In view of the whole context, it seems that we must insert éviwy after the second dy, and translate as follows: ‘The distinction in respect of * potency and actuality is present in a different sense in the case of causes which have not the same matter as their effects, some of them indeed not having the same form either’.
If we emphasize i8tov efdos (1. 14) we may say that even the father has a different (individual) form from the child, and then éviwy will be unnecessary. But the distinction between the relation of the father, and that of the sun, to the child, is emphasized, and is expressed by saying that the latter, unlike the former, is not 6oevdés with the child, so that 70 aird <idos probably means the same speczfic form or kind (as in |. 27), and this would involve éviwy. The addition of this word does a good deal to diminish the harshness of the two juxtaposed dy clauses. In view of the similarity to y of one of the abbreviations of ey in manuscripts (Bast 762) vAywverwy would not unnaturally become vAnwv by haplography.
There is no great probability in Christ’s conjecture that dozep ... kwodvra (Il. 13-17) should be placed after zdvra in 1070 35. dAAws
. . €repov would then be as difficult as ever.
14. The orovyeia (or évurdpxovra) are evidently being distinguished
from the external causes (éru 71 dAAo ééw). Form, then, is included
6T. ALBERTS CO! LECE LIBRARY A. 5. 10718 14-24 re
among the orovxeia, aS in 1070 11, 25. The comma usually printed after JAn must therefore be removed.
15. 6 Atos Kat 6 Aofds kdKAos. Aristotle’s meaning appears from De Gen. et Corr. 336 31, where he says that it is not the primary movement (the diurnal apparent movement) of the sun that is the cause of generation and decay, but % xara tov Aogov kixAov. If the sun had but one movement, this might explain generation or decay, but not both. The inclination of the ‘oblique circle’ to the equator brings the sun nearer to us at one time (sc. when he is in that part of the ‘ oblique circle’ which is north of the equator, i.e. in the summer), and removes him farther away at another (when he is south of the equator, i.e. in winter), and generation and decay take place accord- ingly (3366, 17). Cf. 10728 ro—-12.
6 AofSs KUkdos. The expression is a frequent one for the ecliptic, otherwise called 6 da péowy trav Cwdiwy Kixdos (107319). It seems to have been first called 6 éxXeurrixds by Hipparchus about 150 B.c. The discovery of the obliquity of the zodiacal belt or of the ecliptic to the equator is probably due to Oenopides, an older contemporary of Philolaus (Eudemus as quoted by Theo Smyrnaeus, Diels.? I. 11. 17). In 1073>20 we learn that Eudoxus, whom Aristotle follows, believed the sun to move not in the direction of the zodiacal belt but at an angle to it (xara Tov NeAogwpévoy ev TG wAATEL TOV Cwdiwr), but the obliquity referred to in the phrase Aoges xvkdos is that of the sun’s supposed path not to the zodiacal belt but to the equator.
17. 17a pev KaOddou ot eimety, ‘some causes may be stated univer- sally (sc. the causes of certain types of product), while others cannot (sc. those of particular products)’. The cause of man is man, but the cause of Achilles is Peleus (1. 21).
18-20. Christ suggests with some probability that these two clauses should be transposed, and that dé should be read for 6y (so Alc), Then 8¢ would answer to pév odv, which otherwise must be taken as marking a transition to a new point, as in 4. A. 608» 19, Poet. 14608 11.
18. 7d évepyeta mp@rov Todi Kat aAXo 6 Suvdper, i.e. the individual actually existing efficient cause, and the potentially existing matter. Cf. det €x rod Suvdper dvros yiyveras TO evepyeia bv 76 evepyeia. OvTos, O. 1049? 24.
To évepyeta mp@tov Todi seems to mean ‘the “this” which is first in actuality ’, i.e. which is not only prior to the product but (in Aristotle’s view) prior also to the potentially existent matter. For this view cf. @. 1049” 24-25 n.
IQ. éxetva . . . TA KaOddou, the universal causes referred to in 1. 17. éxeiva may also suggest ‘the famous universals of the Platonists’ ; cf. Kiihner ii. 1. 650. 13. For the non-existence (more properly the lack of independent existence) of universals cf. Z. 13, 16.
24. The manuscript reading éreira eldn (or 75y) Ta THY ovordy does not give a satisfactory sense. If ein be kept, it is at least necessary to insert rd before it, with Christ. In that case we may (1) understand,
366 Commentary
with Bz., opay de? from |. 17, so that the general sense would be ‘that we may judge rightly whether all things have the same causes (cf. 1. 29 70 dé Cyreiy kth.) we must attend to the different species of things as well as to the different individuals ’,—for which v. Il. 20-24. But the ellipse of épav det after such an interval is.difficult. Or (2) we may with Alexander understand airid éoru, taking €meita «rd. to be opposed to ravrwv On TpGta apyai,]. 18; but this also is not very satisfactory. The right solution seems to be provided by Rolfes’s reading «i 8y, though in other respects his interpretation is questionable. If ez 64 be read, a comma instead of a colon must be read after otaovdv. Then the sense is: ‘Further, if the causes of substances are (as Aristotle has shown in 1070? 36—1071 2) the causes of all things, yet differ- ent things have different causes and elements’. For dé adversative in the apodosis of a conditional sentence cf. Phys. 21515, Pol, 1287» 13, B. 999% 27 n.
25. domep édéxOy, 1070? 17.
Tv ph ev tadTo yéver is contrasted with ray ev raird elder |. 27, so that yévos and eidos do not mean genus and species but are used in- differently for ‘kind’. For the promiscuous use of the two words cf. Bz. Index 1814 57-56, and I. 1058” 28 n.
28, For édNo where dAAov dAAo might be expected cf. 1069) 25 érépay = Erepa Erépay.
29. T6...{ntelv isa nominativus pendens ; the sentence does not end as it was meant to end. For a similar anacoluthon cf. Phys. 222> 11 70 6é"Ihuov paver On EarAwKéevar od €yopev.
ZI. Todhaxds ye heyowevor eotw éExdorou, i.e. roh\Naxds ye Aeyopevwv TOV OTOLXElwy TatTd éoTL TA OTOLXELa Exdorov. So long as the names of the elements are used ambiguously, i.e. so long as we say ‘matter, form, privation, mover’ without specifying the particular matter, &c., we may say everything has the same elements.
In view of the frequent confusion of ye and re in manuscripts (cf. E. N. 1099% 22, 11018, 1113917, 112429, 117818, Pol. 1291 17, 1339 29, and Bast 710)we need not hesitate to accept Christ’s ye for re.
33. #81, in the senses mentioned in ll. 33-36, i.e.
(1) the causes are the same or analogous because matter, form, privation, and mover are causes of all things,
(2) the causes of substances are causes of all things,
(3) the first mover is the cause of all things.
The sense requires traira 7) Td dvddoyov; cf. N. 10893 76 airo kal TO dvddoyov. 71 dvddoyov has come in from I. 26.
33. Ott Un, eidos, orépyors, 76 Kivodv, cf. 1070? 18, 22.
34. Kal G8t Td TOy odcvv aitia. Bz. thinks that we should perhaps read dru for &d/, as Them. (13. 5) may have done. But dd is quite right, being explained by 67 dvaupetrar dvatpovpevwv. Themistius paraphrases the passage very briefly, and it cannot be said with any certainty that he read 6ru.
70, Tay ovata aitia ds aitia mdévTwy, Cf. 1070? 36—10712 2.
35. &s aitia mévtwv. The superfluous ds is difficult. Perhaps dé-
yerax is to be understood, in which case the phrase would be parallel to 60a A€yerau ws Saxpva, Meteor. 388” 19, cf. Phys. 200° 31, Meteor. 379? 26.
St. dvatpetra. avatpoupevwy, ‘because when substances are removed all the other categories are removed’.
36-1. S31 8e... Gra. ‘But in the following respect there are different first causes, i.e. there are first causes as numerous as the contraries which are neither generic nor ambiguous terms ; and further the matters are different for different things.’
mp@ta here means ‘proximate’, while zpGrov earlier in the line meant ‘ultimate’. In using the word in the latter sense, Aristotle seems to have been reminded that it has also the former, and forth- with points this out. For the inconsistent use of zpéros in a single context cf. 1070? 27, 35, H. 10442 16, 18.
Aristotle has just said (I. 34) that matter, form, privation, and moving cause are causes common to all things. He presently points out (Pr) that nevertheless different things have different matters. Probably therefore in doa 74 évaytia ... toAAaxads déyerau he is saying as in 1070 rg that different things have different forms and different privations, the difference of the moving cause being omitted for the moment though it has been pointed out in 1070? 27, 10712 28.
37- & pie ds yévn Néyerau pyre wohhaxds A€yerar. Aristotle indi- cates that he does not mean (1) contraries stated generically, e. g. white and black, which are the contraries involved in the whole genus of colour (1070 20), nor (2) contraries stated still more widely, even am- biguously, i.e. form and privation, which are the contraries involved in all sensible things alike (107017, 10712 31-34), He must mean, then, the individual form and the individual privation which are differ- ent for each individual thing, cf ll. 24-29. xal ére ai tAa then will mean not that different kinds of thing have different kinds of matter but that different individual things have different individual matters (cf. 4 28).
There must be an eternal prime mover (ch. 6).
1071» 3. We must now speak of the unchangeable substance which is distinct from the two natural substances. ‘There must be an eternal substance, for if all substances are perishable, all things are perishable ; but motion or time cannot be generable or perishable. For there can- not be a before or after where there is not time, and time is either = motion or an attribute of it, so that motion must be continuous as time is, and if so it must be local motion, and in a circle.