The difference stated in 1. 7 between art as an dpyi) Kwyoews ev @\Xw and nature as an dpyiy év aird is Aristotle’s usual distinction between them. It is appropriate to most natural processes, where a living being produces changes in itself, but is not appropriate to generation, where the change produced is év 4\Aw. The definition of nature really breaks down in the case of generation, but Aristotle would presumably seek to justify it by saying that in some sense the parent and the offspring, being members of the same species, are the same, or that in some sense the offspring is a part of the parent (cf. £. N. 1134" 11, 1161 18),
8. dvOpwmos yap dvOpwrov yevva. ‘This is, as we have seen, not a good illustration of nature as an dpyy év até, and Alexander sup- poses that these words go with éxdory ex cvvwvipou yiyverat ovoia (1. 5). But if placed after these words they would break very awkwardly the connexion between these words and ra. yap picet otoiat al ra GAAa. It seems better to suppose (r) that Aristotle wrote them carelessly as an illustration of the dpyy ev atré, or (2) that a copyist borrowed them from |. 27 below. The fact that the words already existed in their present place in the time of Alexander (cf. Alexander apud Averroem 82. 3) makes one hesitate to adopt this otherwise attractive supposi- tion.
ai 8é€ owmat airiar (sc. TUN Kal TavTdpaTov) aTepyoets ToUTwY. tovToparor is strictly the generic term, including all cases in which (1) something that is normally produced directly by the unconscious teleo- logy of nature is produced as a merely incidental result of a natural pro- cess, or (2) something that is normally produced directly by purposive human agency (here rather narrowly described as réyv7) is produced as a merely incidental result of a purposive act (PAys. 197) 18, ® 36); while rvx7 is confined to the second type of case (PAys. 1977 36, » 2, 20). Sometimes, however, riyn and rairdéuarov are used without dis- tinction in the general sense, and sometimes (as here) tattépuatov tends to be confined to the first type of case, t¥yn being the orépyors téxvys and rairdéuarov the orépyois picews.
Aristotle has said that all substances are produced ék cvvwvvpov, and that some are produced by rvyy or tavropatov. But he does not mean that these are produced éx ovvwvdmov; spontaneously produced animals are produced ov dm ovyyevav (H. A. 539% 22), and in chance events the art which is ‘synonymous’ with its product is lacking. He views chance and spontaneity, which are the negations of art and nature, as the exceptions that prove the rule. The words ‘chance’ and ‘spon- taneity ’, being meant merely to indicate the absence, in certain cases, of artistic or natural action, indicate that such action, with the ‘ synony- mity’ which it implies, is the normal thing.
Q. ovoiar Sé tpeis, cf. Z. 10299 2.
Aa2
356 Commentary
10. Td8e TL oda TH patvecOar. None of the attempts at emending this phrase seems at all successful. It is possible to make something of it as it stands. Ps,-Alexander interprets ro daiveoOor as kara pav- taciav, and Bz. follows him in supposing that the meaning is that matter is a ‘this’ to the eye of imagination, since it has the power of becoming a ‘this’.- This interpretation of +d gaivecOa1, however, seems impossible, and it is better to adopt the simpler interpretation which, with others, is given by Alexander as quoted by Averroes, viz. ‘which is a “this” in appearance’, I.e. to outward appearance the material parts of a whole as they lie side by side look like an indi- vidual thing, but if the organic unity is not there the appearance is deceptive (dca yap apy kal py cupdtoe, vAn Kal doKeipevov). Cf. Z. 1040 5 rav doxovady elvan obordv ai wAciorar Suvdpets iol, Ta TE popta Tov Cow... Kal yy Kal wdp Kal dnp.
It must be admitted, however, that this interpretation of otca To daiver Oar as = dhawvopeévn civat is not altogether satisfactory.
10. For cupopice cf. Z. 1040) 15, n.
11. The vulgate reading % d& pious Tdde Tu Eis HY Kat Eis Tus is intoler- ably harsh, and it seems best to read, as Alexander apparently did (676. 30), 4 d& vous 76de 71 (sc. ota from |. 10) Kal és Tus els HY (Sc. » yeveois éorw). For the description of the form as a ‘this’ cf, A. 1017) 25 n.
13. 76 708e tL, ‘the individual character’, i.e. the form, which has already been called réde ru in 1. 11.
14. et py H Téxvy, i.e. the form of the house has no existence separate from the house except as the art of house-building ; cf. Z. 1034? 24 7) yap Téxv7n TO «loos.
15. 008 éote yéveors kat pOopa tovTwy kth. Aristotle is not referring to the general fact that forms come into being not by a process but instantaneously (Z. 10335), but to some mode of ‘being and not being without generation and destruction’ which is peculiar to the forms of arfefacta. This can only be the artist’s instantaneously think- ing of them and ceasing to think of them. So Alexander interprets the words.
17. G\N’ elwep, emt tav ducer. This goes back in sense to éml pev ovy tTivav KTA. (I. 13), ll. 15-17 being parenthetical.
Aristotle does not think that the form of living things (ra @¥cet), i. €. their soul, is in general capable of separate existence. Cf. Phys. 193% 4, De An. 403°16, It is only reason that can exist apart (De An. 413) 26, 430917, G. A. 73799, £. WV.1178% 22). Herevhe simply says that at any rate the forms of lifeless things canmof exist apart.
18. For Plato’s limitation (though not in the dialogues) of the Ideas to natural objects cf. A. 991» 6n. It is noteworthy that the doctrine is ascribed to Plato himself and not merely to the ‘ believers in Ideas’, But Alexander as recorded by Averroes read ot ra cidy riBepevor épacav, and Themistius seems to have had the same reading (8. 13).
Ig. elwep Eotw eiSn GAAa ToUTwy gives a good sense, ‘if there are
Forms distinct from the things here on earth’ (rév dedpo Kal aicOyrav Al.). tatra does not seem to be used in this sense elsewhere by Aristotle, but it is by Plato (Parm. 133 p 3, Phil. 5885, 62A9). If we adopt this reading we must suppose with Alexander that ofov . . teXevraia (Il. 19-20) is out of place, and is really a note to doa. . dzroKel- pevov (Il, 10-11). Bz.’s interpretation, ‘if there are Forms other than these things, i. e. than fire,’ &c. gives an unnatural sense.
If we read add’ od to’twv, we should have to interpret rovrwy as referring forward and as explained by oiov rip oapé kepady. But (1) Tovrwy otoy in this sense is very unnatural, and (2) the denial of Forms . of fire, flesh, or head does not agree with what we know of Plato’s theory. otov...teAevrata would come in much more naturally in ], 11, and it must be remembered that the first five chapters of A pre- sent, more perhaps than any other part of the AZetaphysics, the appearance of a rather hastily put together series of notes, in which mis- placements are likely to have occurred. Cf. note on 1069? 35,
19-20. Fire, being a drAotv cpa, is the sort of material out of which flesh, a djovopepés, is made. Flesh is the sort of material out of which the head, an dvopovopepés, is made. The head is the sort of material out of which a living body, which is a substance in the full sense, ismade. Cf. G. A. 715%9—-11, Z. 1040? 5-10,
21-26. This passage has been used by Brentano as one of the main arguments for his view that the human reason, though imperishable, is not pre-existent from eternity, but is created by God at some point in the development of the embryo. This view is opposed not only to the explicit statement that reason is eternal (De An. 430% 23), but to the principle that what cannot perish cannot have been generated (De Caelo 282° 31, 283%29, » 19). Aristotle’s assertion that the formal cause is simultaneous with its effect (I. 22) implies, no doubt, that it not only is when its effect is, but comes into being when its effect comes into being (Az. Post. 95% 22). But that of which Aristotle says that it may persist after the effect (the living body) has perished (Il. 24—- 26) is not the same thing which is described as coming into being when the living body does. The soul as a whole comes into being with the body and (J. 26) perishes with it; but something (ru ]. 24), i.e. some element of the soul, may persist, viz. the reason, or more definitely the vots mountixos (De An. 430%17); and this Aristotle cer- tainly conceives as existing before birth no less than after death. ‘The soul is both generated and perishable, but there is 71 rs Wuxjs which is neither.
The reference to the eternity of reason is parenthetical ; the main point of the passage is to set aside the Platonic notion (cf. 1. 18) that Forms exist apart from and independently of the things whose Forms they are. Rather, they exist only when the concrete things do so, and only as elements in them. Further (Il. 26-30), separate Forms are not-necessary in order to explain generation; in natural production the cause is an individual parent, in artistic production it is the art, which must be present in the mind of an individual artist.
358 Commentary
For the uselessness of the Forms in explaining generation cf. Z. 1033? 26. QI. T& pev ody KivodvTa aitia (sc. airid éotiv) OS Tpoyeyeyneva. OvTa,
In what sense all things have the same causes (chs. 4, 5)»
1070* 31. (A) The causes of different things are different, but (2) analogically all are the same.
35. (A) (1) What could be the common cause of relations and substances? There is nothing common to the several categories and prior to them; nor can substance be an element in relations, nor vice versa.
b4. (2) No element can be the same as the complex which includes it (nor, therefore, can any of the intelligibles such as being or unity be the common element, for these are predicable of concrete things). Therefore no element is either substance or relation; but there is nothing else it can be.
10. (B) But (1) all sensible bodies have a form (e.g. heat), a priva- tion (e.g. cold), and a matter. All things have by analogy the same elements, in that they all have form, privation, and matter; but these are different in detail for each different class of things.
22. Besides the internal causes or elements there is an external moving cause. There are three elements but four causes. The immediate moving cause, like the other immediate causes, is different for each different thing.
go. In nature the moving cause is a similar individual, and in art it is the form (or its contrary), so that as the efficient cause = the formal, we may say either that there are three or that there are four causes. Besides these there is the first mover, which is common to all things.
36. (2) Things which can exist apart are substances; the causes of all things are the same because affections and movements cannot exist without substances. These causes are, perhaps, soul and body (or reason, desire, and body).
1071* 3. (3) In another sense all things have the same principles analogically—viz. potentiality and actuality—though these are different in different cases, and apply in different ways.
6. They apply in different ways; for (a) in some cases the same thing is at one time actual, at another potential. This distinction can be brought into line with the previously named causes; the
form (if it is separable), the concrete product, and the privation exist actually, the matter potentially.
11. (4) The distinction of potentiality and actuality takes a different shape where cause and effect have not the same matter (the form also in some cases being different). The causes of a man are not only (as in (a))
(i) his matter (fire and earth) and his peculiar form, but also
(ii) his peculiar external cause (his father), and
(iii) the sun and the ecliptic, which are neither the matter of the man nor his form nor the privation of his form nor identical in form with him, but the efficient causes,
17. Some causes can be stated universally, others cannot. The primary causes are the individual moving cause and the matter. The universals do not exzs¢. Man is the cause of man, but there is no uni- versal man, It is Achilles that exists, and his cause is Peleus.