1065* 21. 16 8 ds dAnOes dv Kat Kata cupBeByKds. The insertion of py after kai in most of the manuscripts and Alexander is doubtless due to the previous corruption of dAnOés into dAyGas. uy Kata cupB_ByKds would be a proper synonym for the latter. Strict grammar would require 76 kata ovpP_Byxds, but for the omission of the article cf. Pol. 1280) 15, Poet. 1459 2, 37, &c. ‘There is no reason to suspect, with Bz., that the true reading is 76 8 ws dAnOes dv Kal pn, Kal TO Kare oupeBinxés.
24. é. Cf. BE. 10282 n. ;
26-> 4. The excerptor now supplements the account of the acci- dental in the preceding part of the chapter by an account of chance derived from PAys. ii. 5, 6.
28. toUtTwy, i.e. Tov Gvexd Tov. It is hard to see how something that is for a purpose can happen by accident or incidentally. The context in the Physics shows that Aristotle means by something évexa tov something that might naturally result from the unconsciously teleo- logical action of nature or from the consciously teleological action of man (Zor, 8 vexd tov dca te ard diavoias dv mpayGein Kal doa dd icews, 196» 21); i.e. something that fulfils an actual or possible pur- pose, whether it happens for a purpose or not. Cf. rod KxopicacOou
324 Commentary
évexa in 196» 35, where actual purpose is expressly excluded, and the use of réAos in 197%1 of what would naturally be an end of action. Where a result is produced ‘accidentally that would normally be pro- duced by purposive action, it is said to be dao rvxns ; where a result is produced accidentally that would normally be produced by nature, it is said to be dé rabroudrov. To say that A produces B xara ovpBeBnxds means (1) that A has a concomitant C which produces B, or (2) that A produces C which has a concomitant B. But xara ovp,BeBnxds must be understood also in the light of the explanation of it given above in ]. 1; to say that A produces B accidentally is to imply that it produces it rarely.
Torstrik (Hermes ix. 425-470) has tried to show that Aristotle repre- sents chance results not as those which might naturally be produced by purposive action, but as those which are actually though incidentally so produced. But the evidence to the contrary in the Physzcs is too strong. Cf. 196 22 ay mpaxbetn (cf. 197% 35, 198%6), 196” 33— 197° 5, 197” 21 (where rv mpoaperav must mean ‘natural objects of choice’, not ‘things acquired as the result of choice’), » 30-32. Torstrik has to have recourse to emendation to prove his point; he has to read zpax67 in 196» 22 and to excise Tod KopioacOas evexa ib. 35.
31-32. 81d... Sidvorw, This serves to distinguish téyy from ratro- patov. tvxn is to purposive thought as ratrdéuaroy is to the uncon- scious purposiveness of nature.
bo-4. émel 8 ... pious. 70 Kata cupP_eByKds is always an indirect relation of A to B which implies direct relations of A to C and of Cto B. rvxy is just the production, by reason, of effects concomitant with its intended effects, and tairémarov is the production, by nature, of effects concomitant with those which it constantly tends to produce. Thus réyn presupposes reason, and ratrouarov presupposes nature. Aristotle’s attack here appears to be directed mainly against the Atomists. Cf. Phys. 196% 24, Simpl. 331. 16.
Torstrik has grammatical correctness on his side in inserting rév after od@év, But probably kara cupB_Byxds is used practically as an adjective.
3. el dpa TUXN 7 TO adTéparTov altLov Tod odpavod, This is a clear in- dication that the latter part of K is an excerpt from the Physics, not notes preliminary to it. The excerptor is plainly referring to a previous passage of the PAyszcs which does not occur in K, viz. eiot dé twes of kal Tovpavod TovdE Kal THY KdcpwWY TavTWY aiTLOVTAaL TO avTOpaToV KTA. (196% 24-35). The reference is apparently to Democritus,
Potency, actualizgation, movement (ch. 9).
1065» 5. A thing may be, either actually or potentially or both actually and potentially, a substance, a quantity, or in one of the other categories.
7. There is no motion apart from things; for it is with respect to the categories that change occurs, and there is nothing common over these. In substance there are form and privation, in quality white and black, in quantity complete and incomplete, in place up and down, so that there are as many kinds of change as of being.
14. The distinction of potentiality and actualization exists in each class of things, and motion is the actualization of the potential as such ; e.g. when the buildable as such actually exists, it is being built, and this is the process of building. Motion takes place when the actualization itself exists, and neither before nor after.
21. Thus the actualization of that which is potentially, when it exists actually, not as itself but as movable, is motion. The bronze is poten- tially a statue, but the actualization of the bronze as dronze is not motion, for it is not. the same thing to be bronze and to be a certain potentiality.
28. This can be seen from the case of contraries ; to be capable of health and of disease is not the same thing (if it were, health and disease would be the same thing), but the substratum of health and of disease is the same.
32. Motion, then, is the actualization of the potential gua potential. That motion is what we have defined it as being, and exists only when the actualization itself exists, is clear. For the actualization of the buildable as such must be either the act of building or the house ; but when the Aouse exists it is no longer buildable; on the other hand it zs the buildable that is the object of the act of buclding. Therefore the actualization of the buildable is the act of building ; and this is
a movement. 106627. That we are right is shown by what others say about
motion, and by the difficulty of defining it otherwise. It cannot be placed in any other genus; others say it is otherness, inequality, or not-being, but none of these need be moved, nor are they the terminus or starting-point of motion any more than their opposites.
13. These thinkers define motion thus because it is thought to be indeterminate and the principles in one of the two columns are inde- terminate because they are privative; none of them is in any one of the categories.
17. Motion is thought to be indeterminate because it cannot be classed either with potentiality or with actualization, since neither that which can be, nor that which is, of a certain size need be moved. Motion is thought to be actualization, but incomplete, because that whose actualization it is is incomplete. It is difficult to grasp the nature of motion because it cannot be classed either as privation, as
326 Commentary
potentiality, or as unqualified actualization. It must, then, be actualiza- tion, and the actualization we:have defined ; it is difficult to grasp but capable of existing.
26. Clearly motion is in the movable ; for it is the actualization of this: by that which has the capacity to set in motion.’ And the actualization of the latter is none other; it must be the complete reality of both. The mover is movent by virtue of its capacity, but moves by virtue of its activity, and it is on the movable that it has the power of acting, so that the actualization of both is one, as the interval from one to two and that from two to one, or the uphill and the downhill slope, are one, their being not being one.
The excerptor now passes to the discussion of movement, and gives extracts on it from PAys. iii. 1-3.
Aristotle begins his account of movement by referring (1065» 5-7) to the distinction of potentiality and actuality, which is implied in the definition of movement he is about to give. After pointing out (ll. 7-14) that movement is always in respect of one or other of four categories—substance, quality, quantity, or place—and is movement between the opposite poles, so to say, which exist in the several cate- gories, he formulates (1. 16) his definition—movement is the actuality or actualization of that which exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially. I.e. movement is not the actualization of the whole character of that which is moved. Building is not the actualization of the buildable gua bricks and stones; the buildable is actually bricks and stones before the building process begins. Building is the actualization of the buildable gua buildable, and in general of the movable gua movable. I.e. part of the character of the bricks and stones is their capacity of being arranged into the form of a house, and the process or movement of building is the actualization of this capacity (Il. 23-33). That it is so is confirmed (ll. 20-21, 34— 1006* 7) by the fact that the building process exists just when the actualization exists. Prima facie either the building process or the house might be regarded as the actualization of the buildable. Lut when the house has come into being, the buildable has ceased to be; on the other hand the buildable exists throughout the building process, since this implies at each moment that there is still something buildable and not yet built, some material that has not yet received the last touch from the builder’s hand. The process, therefore, rather than the pro- duct, is the actualization of the buildable, and what is true in this case is true in all cases. Movement is always the actualization of a latent capacity (10663 2-7).
1065" 5. 76 pev évepyela pdvoy, i.e. pure intelligences; 1d Sé Suvdper, i.e, such things as the infinite and the void, cf. ©. 1048) 9 ; 7 Sé Suvdper kat évepyeta, i.e, physical objects comprising both matter and form ;
gua having form they are already actually something, gua having matter they are potentially something which they are not yet.
6. 75 pev dv. For dy in the sense of substance cf. Phys. 1917 12, De Gen. et Corr. 314 28,
7. petaBddder yap del kata Tas Tod dvtos KaTHYopias, i.e. change is kat ovotayv, the generation or destruction of a substance; kara, roar, growth or diminution; xara, roudv, alteration; or kata rézov, loco- motion.
14. tocar el8y doa Tod dvros. This is not strictly true, since there is (according to Aristotle) eraBoAy in respect of only four categories (substance, quality, quantity, place) and «vyots in respect of only three (quality, quantity, place); cf. 106849.
14—1066# 7. An aggregate of bricks, stones, &c., may be regarded (1) as so many bricks, stones, &c., (2) as potentially a house, (3) as potentially being in course of being fashioned into a house. The movement of building is the realization not (1) of the materials as those materials (they are, previously to the building, already actually these materials), nor yet (2) of their potentiality of being a house (the house is the realization of that), but (3) of their potentiality of being fashioned into a house (7 oixodojntdv). Similarly every movement is a realization-of-a-potentiality which implies a further potentiality and only exists while the further potentiality is not yet realized. Hence it is dreAys (10664 21) and, though in a sense an évépyeza, is distinct from an évepyeva in the narrower sense in which évépyea implies that no element of dvvapus is present at all.
16. 4 Tovodréy éorw, i.e. ‘in that respect in which it exists poten- tially’. Cf. 9 rod duvatod kat 7 duvaroy evredéxesa, |. 33.
1g. kai xvAuus (A>) is awkward, the other words in the list not being joined by xa. These two words, which are not foundin EJTT, seem to be a late importation from the Physics, where «ai occurs throughout the list.
22. It seems quite possible to understand évreAdyeva after dvros, and we therefore need not read it (with Bz.), against all the manuscripts both of the Physzcs and of the Metaphysics.
22. Of the variant readings, 7 air 7} dAdo introduces. an irrelevant distinction, that between self-moving things and things which move others. That the true reading is o8x 7 adtd ANN 7 KUvyTév is Shown by the explanation of 7 which follows in ll. 23-33.
28-32. The distinction between the substratum (e.g. house) and the capacity (e.g. the capacity for being shaped into a statue) is here brought out by pointing to the fact that a single substratum combines opposite capacities in itself. The capacity for health is obviously not the same as the capacity for disease, but one and the same substratum has both.
gl. <i Gyporys cl atuo, The first view is that of Hippocrates, the founder of the humour-pathology, and of Plato in the Zzmaecus (81 =—86 a), the second probably that of Empedocles (cf. Diels’ i.