19-' 34. That the intermediates are compounded out of contraries is proved (cf. > 2-4) by three premises, (1) that all intermediates are in the same genus as their extremes (I. 19) (which is itself proved-by two premises, (a) that intermediates lie on the path of change between ex- tremes (J. 21),(2) that change from one genus to another is impossible (1. 26)); (2) that all intermediates are between contraries (which is proved by two premises, (a) that intermediates are between opposites (1. 30), (6) that they cannot be between any kind of opposites except contraries (I. 33-1)). (3) Intermediates between contraries in the same genus, i.e. between contrary species, presuppose intermediates between contraries not in the same genus, i.e. between contrary differentiae (4-22); and since there is an intermediate differentia compounded out of the contrary differentiae, and if any of the intermediates is composite they all must be, all must be compounded out of the contraries (» 22-32).
27. Kad cupPeBykés, otov ék xpwparos cis oxqpo. A red thing may become round, but it does so not gua red but gua having some figure other than the round.
33-'1. Of the four kinds of opposites, viz. contradictories, relatives, privatives, contraries, Aristotle shows that the first two cannot have intermediates, and he infers that intermediates must be between con- traries. He says nothing of privatives, for contrariety is the extreme form of privation (1055? 35, @. 1046” 14), so that any privation short of complete privation falls between contraries.
300 Commentary
37. Tov S€ mpds TL doa ph evavtia, cf, 1056) 35.
b17. edn ds yévous, i.e. edy in the sense of species of a genus, not in the sense of Platonic Forms, cf. A. 991731 n.
8. 75 pév Siaxpitexdy xpdpua, Plato’s definition of white, Zim. 67 E 76 pv Suaxpitixov THs dwews AevKdv. Fine particles penetrate and dilate the visual stream, large particles compress it, and this produces white and black colour respectively (67 p).
II. GANG phy Td ye evavtiws Stapépovra paddov évavtia is very diffi- cult. Bz. takes it to mean ‘but the contrary differentiae must be more contrary than the contrary species’, since they are what make the latter contrary (cf. a. 993» 24). But (1) ra évavriws duadépovra is a strange way of expressing ‘the contrary differentiae’, and (2) this would be a mere repetition of the previous clause. 7a évaytiws diahépovra would more naturally mean the species that differ by having contrary differen- tiae, and Aristotle’s point may be that though the differentiae are in some sense prior contraries, the species are more properly called con- traries. Cf. Cat 6217 7a wActotov dAAjAwv Stet yKkoTa TOV ev TO AITO yéve. (we may illustrate this by white and black as opposed to dvaxpere- xév and ovyxpitixdv, Which are pi év yever, |. 20) évavria dpilovrar, and De Gen. et Corr. 324% 2. Even this interpretation, however, is not very satisfactory.
12. Td Aowwd Kal Ta petaéd, ‘the others, i.e. the intermediate species’.
20-22. ‘For the contraries which are in the same genus must be compounded out of (the genus and) the differentiae which are not themselves compounded with the genus (i.e. in which the genus is not an-element as it is in the species),—or else be uncompounded (which is incompatible with their nature as species).’
26. petags dpa éorat kal TodTo Tay évaytiwy, ‘ wherefore this differen- tia also comes between the contrary differentiae, as the intermediate species come between the contrary species’.
31-32. dote... €covtar. This seems to say that each extreme species as well as each intermediate species is compounded out of both the extreme differentiae. E.g. white would have to be to some extent ‘compressing’ as well as ‘dilating’, But this is not in itself a likely doctrine, and it can hardly be said to be proved in the present passage ; the meaning probably is that each extreme species contains one of the extreme differentiae as a logical element (the other element being the genus), while each intermediate species contains both the differentiae.
Otherness in species (ch. 8).
1057” 35. That which is other in species is different from something in something, and this must belong to both the terms that are other than
one another. They must therefore be in the same genus, for a genus is that which each of two things differing fer se is said to be.
igs 1057" 27-——8. 105898 301
105872. For not only must something common belong to both, but it must be different for each of them. The differentia must be an otherness of the genus; for a differentia of a genus is an otherness that makes the genus itself other.
8. This otherness must be contrariety. For all division is by opposites, and contraries are in the same genus, since contrariety is complete difference and difference in species is always difference from something in respect of something and this something is identical and is the genus that embraces both terms. Hence all contraries that differ in species and not in genus are in the same category, and have the utmost difference and are incompatible.
17. To be other in species, then, is to be in the same genus, con- trary, and indivisible (and to be the same in species is to be indivisible and have no contrariety)—for there are also contrarieties in the inter- mediate stages of division before we come to the indivisibles.
21. Therefore no species is either the same in species as or other in species than its genus (for matter is made known by negation, and the genus is matter of its species), nor with things not in the same genus; it differs in genus from them, in species from things in the same genus. For the difference must be a contrariety to that from which the given species differs in species, and contrariety exists only within a genus.
1057 35. From 1058412 it would seem that ri is ‘accusative of respect’; ‘other in some respect’. The same meaning is some- times conveyed by the dative, cf. 1054 25 1d dé dudhopov rivds Tut duaopov.
38. pi kata cupBeBnkds Exov Siapopdv. Cf, the rule that a genus must be divided according to its oixefa diaipeois (Z. 12, I. 10584 377).
105871. etre ds UAy oy, cf. A. 1024? 8.
4. €tepov &\Ajhwy, ‘different for one from what it is for the other’.
8. évavtiwots Toivuy gota atty. That the differentiation of a genus must be by contraries is by no means proved by what has gone before ; nor does what follows bear any resemblance to an éraywyy. It seems better therefore to take djAov Se Kat ex rHS éraywyhs as parenthetical (cf. Phys. 185? 13, 224% 30, De Caelo 276°14), and what follows as justifying evayriwots toivuy éorat atry. Even so the justification is far from complete. Aristotle merely points out that all division is by opposites, and that contraries are in the same genus. He does not show that they are the ov/y opposites which are in the same genus (which alone would prove that all differentiation is by contraries). Yet he could almost prove this. For contradictories are not in the same genus, since they together embrace the whole universe; nor are relative terms necessarily in the same genus (10572 38). Privatives and contraries alone remain, and these are very closely bound up together (10572 33” 1 n.).
302 Commentary
Though Aristotle says that differentiation is by contraries, he does not in practice confine himself to division by dichotomy; e.g. in Café. 14> 347 he divides animals into wrryvov, reCov, evvdpor.
Il. déSerxrar, ch. 4.
Hv, 1055% 16,
4 8é Sradopa 7 eiSer maca tivds ti, ‘specific difference is always from something in something’.
13-14. TH adTH ouoToXia ... THs KaTnyopias, cf 1054°35 n., A, 1016 33 n.
17-19. Both indivisible species and individuals may be called aroya (Bz. Index 120° 58, 48). But the aroua which are said to be the same in species must be individuals, since two species are not the same in species. If, then, there is to be a proper opposition between the definitions of a TO dba and ravra 76 elder, aroua in], 18 as in l. 19 must refer to individuals. But since in ll. 21-26, it is species that are described as different in species from other species, aroma in }, 18 probably refers to indivisible species as well as individuals.
18-19. tadta , . . dvta is parenthetical. The next words justify the insertion of the previous éroua évra; in dividing a genus, we find contrarieties even in the previous stages (kal év rots peragv), 1. €. be- tween classes higher than the infimae species, but these constitute otherness in genus rather than in species; it is only between dtopa elon that there is otherness in speczes.
ai. 75 Kahovpevoy yévos, SEAN, to14b 9 7a Kadovpeva yery, The technical meaning of yévos and idos is not quite familiar, and xadov- pevoy introduces ‘it with some diffidence. In chapter ro we shall find yévos and etdos used quite untechnically. Bz.’s conjectural emenda- tions here are unnecessary.
22. ws yévous, cf. A. 991° 31 n.
Christ was right in reading mpooynkévtws. It is the reading of A as well as of E.
24. pi ds Td TOv “Hpaxderddy, cf, A. 10242 32,
ON’ ds 76 ev TH doer, ‘but in the sense of the genus which is an element in the nature of a thing’, Cf A. 10244 6 déyerar ev 7G TH > aA ve €OTL, TOUTO yevos.
27. 08 Siadeper = zpds Todro ob Siadéper Te
What contrarteties constitute otherness in species (ch. 9).
1058* 29. Why does not the female differ from the male in species, when female and male are contrary and the differentia is a differentia of animal as such?
34. This is much the same as the question why one contrariety (e.g possession of feet and of wings) makes things other in species, and another (e.g. whiteness and blackness) does not. The reason is that
only the former are affections proper to the genus, Contrarieties in the definition make a difference in species, those in the concrete whole do not.
bg. Hence whiteness does not make a differentiation of man; for colour belongs to man on his material side, and matter does not make a differentia. Individual men are not species of man, though their flesh and bones are different ; the concrete whole is other, but not other in species because there is no contrariety in the definition. Man is the last, indivisible species; Callias is definition + matter, and so too is ‘the white man’, since ‘the man’ is only white per accidens because Callias is white.
12, Hence a bronze and a wooden circle are not other in species; and a bronze triangle and a wooden circle are other in species not because of their matter but because there is a contrariety in their definition.
15. But perhaps where the matter is other in a particular way it makes the things other in species in a sense, Why is this horse other in species than this man, though their definitions involve matter ? Because there is a contrariety in their definitions. A white man and a black horse are other in species not gua white and black, for they would have been so even if they had both been white.
21. Male and female are affections proper to animal, but not in virtue of its essence but in its matter (and hence the same seed can become male or female).
1058) 2. -1@ cuverAnppevy TH Oy, cf. E. 1025? 32.
304 Commentary
5. s Ody yap 6 avOpwmos, ‘for when we distinguish the white man from the black man we are considering man on his material side’.
Q. todTo & éori 1d Ecxatov Gropov, ‘and this—that in whose defini- tion no contrarieties are included—is the ultimate indivisible species *. For aropoy cf. 2 17-19 n.
II-I2. xai 6 \eukds . .. GvOpwros...* The white man, then, is also definition + matter, for it is the individual Callias that is white; man, then, is white only incidentally {or per accrdens).’
1g. The substitution of a colon for a comma before ovdé does away with any need for Bz.’s emendation, HAwov tpiyevoy for EiAwos. ‘The bronze circle and the wooden circle, then, do not differ in kind; nor do the bronze triangle and the wooden circle differ in kind be- cause of their matter, but because of the contrariety in their defini- tions’, i.e. between triangle and circle.
17. tovdt dv6pa7ov would (I think) be unparalleled in Aristotle, and the addition of rod is necessary.
The perishable and the imperishable differ in kind (ch. 10).