2Q. Ta per pepixOar, Ta Se Kexpdofar. xpaors is properly a kind of pigis, the wigis of liquids (Zap. 122% 26-31). gigs is probably here used in a narrower sense = the chemical mixture of solids.
33. Ta TO pGAdov, i.e. those that are characterized by degree, the aby ray aiePyray, cf 21-25.
1043* 2. # odoia airia tod etvar, cf Z. 17.
4-5. odcia pey ody... ékdete. IT.e. none of these differentiae is substance either (1) when taken by itself or (2) when coupled with matter; but it is what is analogous to substance in each case. The differentiae mentioned are in categories other than substances—in that of é exew (cvvdeces, Sexpds, KoAAy, aanrken)s of xetrGar, of xorg, of rov, or of rowy (ra ray aicfyray wefy). They indicate not the inmost nature of that to which they belong but a mode of arrangement or other characteristic which may be “only temporary. Therefore the things characterized by them—(r) artefacta, (2) states of a substance (xeveradAor, and perhaps rredna, cf. Meteor. ti. 4), (3) parts of living things—are not substances but only analogous to substances in that they contain elements answering to matter and form. For the exclusion of (x) from the dignity of substance cf Bar, Z. r04r 29, and for the exclusion of (3) cf. Z. 1og0°6. The reason for the exclusion of (3) is stated there.
7. paddwora, Loe. it is more truly évépyeca than anything else in such definitions is.
230 Commentary
21. Archytas, one of the most famous members of the Pythagorean school, and a contemporary of Plato. We have no further light than that which this passage offers,on his doctrine of definition. The type of definition he approved is identical with Aristotle’s nominal definition of attributes per genus et subtectum, the dpirpos which is cvprépacpa. te drodetEews (An. Post. 75» 32, cf. 93% 22, 94° 7):
28. For the corruption of kat into 67 cf. N. 1089" 35 n.
Distinction between concrete substance and actuality or form. The Sormer is generated and destroyed, the latter not. Analogy between Sorm or definition and number (ch. 3).
1043 29. Sometimes it is not clear whether a word means the con- crete substance or the actuality, e. g. ‘house’, ‘line’, ‘animal’.
36. The two meanings have a common reference, if not a common definition. The question of the two meanings does not affect the in- vestigation of sensible substance; for the essence plainly attaches to the form. For ‘soul’ and ‘to be soul’ are the same, while ‘man’ and ‘to be man’ are different, unless the soul can be called man. Fs
b4. The syllable does not consist of the letters + composition ; for the composition is not derived from the things compounded. The position is not derived from the threshold, but w7ce versa.
10. Man is not animal + two-footed ; if these are the matter of man, there must be something apart from these—neither an element nor a compound but the substance. Those who describe man as animal +two-footed are omitting this, and stating the matter. If, then, this is the cause of man’s being, and that is the substance of man, they will not be stating man’s very substance.
(14. This is either eternal, or perishable and generable without ever being in process of perishing or becoming. It is not the form but the concrete thing that is generated. .Evidently the substances of some perishable things cannot exist separately, viz. those that cannot exist apart from the particular instances, e.g. house. Perhaps these, and
_jndeed all things that are not formed by nature, are not substances ; the nature in natural objects is the only substance in perishable things.)
23. Thus there is some point in Antisthenes’ problem; he said you cannot define what a thing is (definition being simply circumlocution), but can teach what sort of thing it is (e. g. that silver is Zeke tin),
28. so that composite substance, whether sensible or intelligible, can be defined, but its elements cannot, since definition predicates one thing (form) of another (matter).
32. If numbers are substances, it is in this way and not as assem- blages of units ; for (1) definition is a sort of number, being divisible, and divisible into indivisibles,
36. (2) Definition, like number, loses its identity if anything be subtracted from or added to it.
1044*2. (3) A number must be something by virtue of which it is one—else it is a mere aggregate ; a definition also is one; but the principle of unity in both is commonly missed. This is natural, for substance has the sort of unity that a number, not a unit, has; it is an actuality and a definite nature.
g. (4) Formal substance, like number, does not admit of degree ; if any substance does so, it is concrete substance.
We have shown, then, in what sense generation and destruction of so-called substances is possible, and have dealt with the reduction of substance to number.
This chapter is a collection of ill-connected remarks on various topics relating to essence and definition.
10437 29-4 is a note on the ambiguity of words like ‘house’, ‘line’, &c. At» 4 Aristotle returns to the main subject.
33. wétepov Suds év pyxer 7 [Str] Buds. Cf. Z. 1036 13-17 n.
34. ot, as Bywater pointed out, is doubtless an emblema from ll. 31, 33. For the intrusion of ori cf. Z. 1041» 30 (Ab), N, 1089? 7, Prodi. 962% 2 and possibly @. 10507 14, 1051 30.
37. @s mpds ev, cf. T. 10037 33 n.
be, uxt ev yap kat puxy etvat tadtdy. Aristotle has tried to prove this in Z. 6.
4. Twt péev twit 8 od. I.e. ‘being man’ will be the same as man in the sense of ‘the human soul’, but not as man in the sense of ‘the complex of soul and body’.
4-8. The reasoning is inconsecutive. ‘The syllable does not con- sist of the letters+their composition. This is natural because the composition doesnot consist of the letters.’ The second sentence contains a suggestion which is quite different from that contained in the first, and ydp is unjustifiable. Aristotle rejects both suggestions ; the form is oUre orovxetov ovr éx ororxeiov (1. 12). Bz. takes éx rovrwv (I. 7) to mean ‘one of the things’, but the use of é« in two quite different senses is most improbable.
Q. «i 6 00dds Oe, cf. 1042» 19.
Q-I0. otk ék Tod ob800. .. éxetyns. ‘The position is not made up out of the threshold’ (i.e. out of the material parts of the threshold, cf. 1. 7 ék tovrwv dy éori otvOecrs), ‘but rather the threshold is constituted by the position’.
11. Usually the genus is described as matter, the differentia as form, cf. A. 1024» 8, Z. 103876, 19. To treat genus and differentia
232 Commentary
as if they existed side by side like material elements and required a third thing to unite them is un-Aristotelian. Cf. Z. 12, H. 6, where Aristotle makes the unity of essence depend on the fact that genus has no existence apart from differentia. Dittenberger therefore would omit ovde.. . . Séovy as an interpolation due to a misunderstanding of ch. 6, and treat éuows .. . éxetvys (8-10) as parenthetical. He has, however, misunderstood what Aristotle says.-‘Man is not €dov+dérovv but fGov dirow (Z. 1037 12-14). To describe him as Lov + Strovr i is to treat these as the materials of which he consists, and if these are mere materials, /hen there must be something else which is neither an element nor composed of elements but the substance; this they omit, and mention only the matter, if they describe man as {gov + déouv.’
12, éfa.podvtes, according to Al. 553. 7, governs ryv vAnv. Cf. Z. 1036” 23 ddawpety tiv tAnv. ‘Which people name when they eliminate the matter.’ What people? Alexander suggests the Platonists. But a reference to them is out of place. Aristotle is dealing in this chapter with the common tendency to describe a whole as a sum of parts or materials, omitting the principle of unity; cf. 104473, 6. Lines 10-14 form a much more consecutive piece of reasoning if e€apodytes be taken to govern 6. Cf. fin a similar context) De Gen. ef Corr. 335” 35 aaipodo. yep TO TL HV elvar Kal THY poppy.
13. Bz.’s kat otctas, todro adriv xrX., though it derives some support from Al. 553. 11, is not really needed. The reading of E*JIT gives a good argument :
The principle of union is the cause of being.
This (the cause of being) is substance (cf. 4 2).
.. In omitting the principle of union and naming only the matter they will not be naming the substance itself.
14. The omission of od in AP Al. is due to the misunderstanding of 0 é€arpodvres THY VAnv A€yovow (1, 12).
14-16. 7 didiov... yiyveoOar. Cf. E. 10242 29n., Z. 1033) 5-6 n.
16, év d&ddous, Z. 8.
I7. TWovetTar Tose, ylyvetar Sé TO ex ToUTwy is pleonastic, and there is a good deal to be said for Bz.’s woul eis rode. Cf. Z. 1033 10.
18. TovTwy, i.e. matter and form, cf. ll. 11, 12.
18-19. ci 8 eiot...890v. In the long run it appears that for Aristotle reason is the only ywpicroy «idos. Every other form is the form of a certain kind of matter and inseparable from it.
19-21. whi... oxedos. Cf. Z. 1033) 19-21.
21-22, ore TL... ouvéornkey. Cf. @ 4-5 n., Z. 1041? 29 n.
23-25. date 7 dtopia... exer Td Karpov. Aristotle has said (ll, 10-14) that if the genus and differentia are treated as the matter of the thing defined, the definition must miss the essence of the thing defined. ‘Thus’, he continues, ‘ there is a certain timeliness in the Antisthenean doctrine that definition is impossible, that any definition must miss the essence of its object.’ Lines 14-23 must be regarded as a digression.
24. ol “AvticPéverot Kal ot orws AmalSeuror, cf. A. r024? 32-34 Nn. The view of the Antistheneans seems to be that which is referred to
H. 3. 1043 12 — 10448 2 By
in Pl. Zheaet. 201 E-202 ¢, viz. that simple entities cannot be defined but only named, and that complex entities can only be defined to the extent of naming their simple elements, i. e. by a definition which con- tains indefinables. Definition is an dvoudrwv cvprAoKky. It explains its subject only by reference to elements themselves dAoya kai dyvwora, and is thus but a Adyos paxpés, a diffuse and evasive answer to a ques- tion. (For Adyos paxpds cf. N. 10917 n.) Hence simple entities (of which silver is taken as an example) cannot be defined at all, but only described as /zke certain other simple entities.
29. THs ouvOdrou, edv Te aicOnrh édv te vonth W. What is definable must in any case be a universal. The definable senszble composite will be a term like ‘man’, which is analysable into a certain form and a certain kind of sensible matter (Z. 103529). The definable z/elligzble composite will be a term like ‘line’, which is analysable into the form : bs and the intelligible matter ‘length’ (Z. 1036 13-17, cf. 1035 20N.),
The analysis of ‘man’ into ‘ two-footed’ and ‘ animal’, also, would be an analysis into form and ‘intelligible matter’, in another sense of that term (1045 34).
édv Te aloOnTh edv te vont 7. It is certain that Antisthenes, who was an out-and-out sensationalist, meant by a complex a thing which could be divided into senszdle parts or elements, Cf. Zheaef. 201 E ta TpOTa otovrepel oroixela, ef dv pels Te ovyKeieOa Kal TaAAG. Aristotle interprets him in the light of his own doctrine of tAy voyrn.
31-32. 75 pev, the genus; 716 8¢, the differentia, Cf. A. 10248, Z. 103876, 19.
32—1044714. This is a section, not closely connected with what precedes, in which Aristotle, while pointing out that substances are not numbers in the way in which he thinks the Platonists supposed them to be so, shows that there are certain analogies between substances and numbers. They are, he thinks, mere analogies, but they account for the attractiveness, to some minds, of the reduction of substance to number.
33. obrws eiot xth., i.e. they are not simply aggregates of units but have a principle of unity which keeps their parts together.
84. ds twes Aéyouor, sc. the Pythagoreans and Platonists. Cf. M. 6,7. Aristotle seems rather confused about the view he is attack- ing. He here describes it as the view that substance is like an aggre- gate of units ; in 1044? 8 he describes it as the view that substance is a sort of unit (unless indeed he is there referring to the view of some other thinkers, perhaps a different set of Platonists).