32. Bz.’s addition of yadxp between % and odaipa is not necessary. The bronze circle has been mentioned already (1033? 30 ff.), so that xaAxn can easily be supplied in thought.
33. 6 KadAtas, cf. A. 9812 8n.
ba. 6 Kad éxacta, cf. B. 999? 26n.
5. 7) wavta 7) eva. The last differentia of a species is logically neither prior nor posterior to it (1038% 19); all the other elements in the species are prior to it.
4. The insertion of 6 seems necessary.
14. 7} wdvta 4 eva, cf. 1. 5n.
14-27. This is to be treated as one sentence, the apodosis beginning not with éore (J. 18) but, as often in a long sentence, with pév ody (I. 22).
18. 5 odx Umdpger dveu aicPycews, sc. ‘and therefore involves soul ’.
IQ. 4 mdvyta 7 eva, cf. 1.5 n. The elements of the form other than the last differentia are prior to the materiate universal, as they are to the form ; the last differentia is ‘ simultaneous’ with both.
kal Ka0 éxactov 8) Spoiws. Al, 508. 8 interprets this as meaning ‘and as with animals, so with other concrete wholes’. Aristotle’s way of expressing this would probably be épuotws 8¢ kal éritav dAAwy. The meaning is ‘and as the parts of the soul are prior to the concrete animal as such, the parts of Socrates’ and Callias’ souls are prior to Socrates and Callias, the concrete individuals ’.
23. éotw ds, éott 8 ws ov. The parts of the body are prior to the
Z. 10. 1035% 21 — 1036% Io 199
concrete whole of form and matter as the element is prior to the com- pound, but not prior in the sense that they can exist apart from it. When they are separated from it they remain the same only in name.
25. eva S€ duo, These supreme parts are of course prior to the concrete whole in the sense in which a finger is so (cf. previous note), but in the sense in which the finger is posterior to the concrete whole these are neither prior nor posterior to it; they cannot exist without it nor it without them. Cf. A. 10249 23-28.
26. Kkapdia 7 éyképados, cf, A. 1013% 5n.
29. ovk éotw otcia. This may be compared with the view of the Categories that these things are devrepar odotar.
30. &s xaOddou goes, I think, with ripodt tis drys, ryodi THs VAs as kafoXov being opposed to ris éoxdrys VAns.
33. Bz.’s addition of a second kat ris bdns is required to account for air#s. But it is hard to see how Aristotle could distinguish parts of the matter from parts of the concrete thing; the third alternative is probably added simply for the sake of naming all the logical possibilities.
10362 4. otov = ‘i.e.’ _
Tods padnpariKous, i. e. the plurality of circles which many geometrical propositions imply, different on the one hand from ‘the circle’ or circularity, on the other from material approximate circles.
5. peta vonoews 7 atoOycews, not exclusively by rational intuition or by perception, but by discursive thought with the aid of them. Cf. Plato’s description of sensibles as apprehended d0€ per’ aicOyoews (Zim. 52 A).
6. _é« Tis évrehexetas, the activity of intuition (vdyo.s) or of percep- tion, according as the individuals in question are intuitable or perceptible.
8-9. 4 8 thy... attHv. Aristotle has pointed out that pure form is definable and that the concrete individual is grasped (@) in its individuality, with the aid of yénows or aicPyows, and (4) so far as its universal nature goes, by definition. He now adds that substance in the third of the senses recognized in 1029 2, 3, 1035%2, viz. bare matter, is not knowable at all.
g-10. The phrase vA7 voyry occurs, in Aristotle’s works, only here and in 1037" 4, H. 1045 34, 36. Prima facie it has different meanings in the two books. In Z it is something which exists in individuals (103721, 2)—in non-sensible individuals (1036 35) or in sensible individuals not considered as sensible (1036 11), and the only instances given of these individuals are mathematical figures (103644, 12, 1037%2). It seems to be equivalent to 4 7dv pabnpatidy try of K. 105915. Alexander accordingly identifies it with extension (510. 3, 514. 27), and as far as Z goes this interpretation would be satisfactory. But in H it is the generic element in a definition, and therefore (1) is present in the nature of a species (there is no reference here to individuals), and (2) has no limitation to mathematical objects. It is not likely, however, that Aristotle would have used the phrase in two quite unconnected senses, and it is noteworthy that
200 Commentary
the instance of it given in H is a mathematical one; ‘plane figure’ is the tA vont? of the circle. It would seem, then, that either the wider conception was already in his mind when he wrote Z, and extension is merely given as an instance of dAy vonry, or (which seems more probable) he generalized the notion when he came to write H. If we are right in connecting the two uses, Ay vonry in its widest conception is the thinkable generic element which is involved both in species and in individuals, and of which they are specifications and individualizations.
It is evident from ]. 11 that in Aristotle’s view everything that has sensible matter has intelligible matter, while the converse is not the case. Similarly everything that has tAn yervyti kat POapry has vA torucy and the matter involved in growth and in alteration (H. 1042» 3), whereas vAy tomky, at any rate, can exist without tAn yervyryn (1042) 4, 10444, ©. 1050” 17, A. 1069» 25). So also can the matter involved in alteration (®. 1050 17). It is further stated that vAy tomy implies none of the others (H. 1044» 7, @. 1050 21, Phys. 260% 28), Further, alteration presupposes local movement (260 4), and growth presupposes altera- tion (260% 29)—and therefore local movement (H. 1042) 4n.). Cat. 14, which asserts the independence of the different kinds of change, is probably not by Aristotle.
We thusget a.scaleof matters, each of which implies all that precede it:
(1) vAn vonry,
(2) try aicOnrn,
(a) kwyry (tomy),
(4) dAAowT 7H,
(c) adgyri cat bOiry,
(2) yevvynth kal pOaprn, which is tAy pdduora Kal Kupiws (De
Gen. et Corr. 320° 2).
II. } év Tots aicOntots bmdpxouca ph 7 aic@y7d. For Aristotle’s view of the mode of existence of ra palnuarixd cf. M. 2, 3:
16. dt. odx dds, ‘ that neither can be said without qualification to be prior’.
17. {Gov % Eppuxov should be read, with the best manuscripts. ‘If (not only the concrete whole, but) even the soul may be said to be the animal or (to put it more widely so as to include plants) the living thing.’
19-23. Aristotle’s answer to the question of priority is as follows:
(1) Some wholes are posterior to some parts ; viz., the particular or materiate right angle (whether its matter be sensible or intelligible) is posterior (@) to the elements in the definition, and (4) to the parts of a particular right angle (whether sensible or intelligible).
But (2) the immateriate right angle, while (a) posterior to the parts of the definition, is (4) prior to the parts of the particular right angle.
According to this interpretation trav év ro Adyw Kai Tivds dpOjs answers to twos in]. 19, and kal yap... tats Ka? éxaora answers to tt. I take xat twos dpO7s as = kal trav twos 6pOjs. But this is very doubtful Greek, and 7éy should perhaps be inserted.
Zo. 10569 1 1=2 3 201
pera THs Uys, 4} xadxq 6pOy isa perceptible right angle with per- ceptible matter (cf. ll. 4, 10) ; 4 év tats ypappats tals kal éxaora is an intelligible right angle with intelligible matter (cf. ll. 3, 11).
Which parts are parts of the form, which of the concrete whole ? (ch. 11).
10362 26. Which parts are parts of the form, which only of the concrete thing? Until we know this we cannot define anything, for definition is of the form.
31. When the form supervenes on specifically different materials (e. g. the circle on bronze, stone, wood), the materials are evidently no part of the form; but when this is not so, it is hard to eliminate the matter in thought.
> 3. E. g. the form of man is always found in flesh, bone, &c.; are these, then, parts of the form, or parts of the matter but difficult to eliminate because the form never supervenes on other materials?
7. Some have suggested that lines are to the circle as flesh to man; they reduce all mathematical objects to numbers and say the definition of the line is the definition of ‘two’.
13. Some Platonists say two is the line itself; others say it is the Form of the line, holding that, while two is the same as its Form, the line is not the same as its Form.
17. It would follow that (1) there is one Form of many things which evidently have different forms; (2) at this rate there may be one supreme Form, the others not being Forms at all; but thus all things will be one.
21. We have stated the difficulty about definitions, and its reason. It follows that it is a mistake thus to eliminate matter; some things are essentially ‘this form in this matter’ or ‘ these things in this state’.
24. The comparison of ‘animal’ to ‘circle’ used by Socrates the younger is misleading; it implies that man can exist without his parts as the circle can without bronze; but the animal is a sensible object and cannot be defined apart from movement, i. e. apart from its parts, and these in a certain state; for it is only the hand which can do its work, i.e. which is alive, that is a part of a man.
32. Why is not the definition of the semicircles included in that of the circle? Not because they are sensible objects, for they are not. But in truth some non-sensible things have matter; every individual thing has matter, intelligible if not sensible. The semicircles are not parts of the universal circle, though they are of particular circles.
202 Commentary
10372 5. Soul is the primary substance; the body is matter; man is the unity of the two taken universally. Socrates may perhaps be identified either with his soul or with the concrete unity; but if only with the latter, the particular (Socrates) answers to the universal (man).
10. Whether there is another matter apart from the matter of such substances, and another substance, must be considered later. It is with a view to this that we are examining sensible substances, which belong in a sense rather to physics, since physics must study the substance as defined, even more than it studies matter.
17. How the elements in the definition are parts of it, and what constitutes the unity of definition, must be examined later. The thing evidently is one, but what makes it so?
21. We have stated generally (1) what essence is and in what sense it is self-subsistent, (2) why the definition of some things contains the parts of the things while that of others does not,
24. (3) that the material parts are not present in the definition (for they are not parts of the substance as defined but of the concrete substance, which in its union with matter cannot be defined but can only be defined according to its primary substance, the indwelling form, e. g. hollowness as opposed to snubness); but in the concrete substance (e.g. the snub nose) there is matter ;
33. (4) that primary substances (i.e. those which do not imply the presence of something in something else which is its substratum), e. g. crookedness, are the same_as their essence, while concrete things involving matter, and unities of substance with an accident, e. g. Socrates + musical, are not the same as their essences.
1036? g. adhedeiv todtoy, cf. ddaipety tiv BAny, |. 23.