The bifurcation theory however dies hard. The reason is that there really is a difficulty to be faced in relating within the same system of entities the redness of the fire with the agitation of the molecules. In another lecture I will give my own explanation of the origin of the difficulty and of its solution.
Another favourite solution, the most attenuated form
Ii] Theories of Bifurcation of Nature 45
which the bifurcation theory assumes, is to maintain
that the molecules and ether of science are purely
conceptual. Thus there is but one nature, namely
apparent nature, and atoms and ether are merely names
for logical terms in conceptual formulae of calculation.
But what is a formula of calculation ? It is presum-
ably a statement that something or other is true for
natural occurrences. Take the simplest of all formulae,
Two and two make four. This — so far as it applies to
nature — asserts that if you take two natural entities,
and then again two other natural entities, the combined
class contains four natural entities. Such formulae
which are true for any entities cannot result in the
production of the concepts of atoms. Then again there
are formulae which assert that there are entities in
nature with such and such special properties, say, for
example, with the properties of the atoms of hydrogen.
Now if there are no such entities, I fail to see how
any statements about them can apply to nature. For
example, the assertion that there is green cheese in the
moon cannot be a premiss in any deduction of scientific
importance, unless indeed the presence of green cheese
in the moon has been verified by experiment. The
current answer to these objections is that, though atoms
are merely conceptual, yet they are an interesting and
picturesque way of saying something else which is true
of nature. But surely if it is something else that you
mean, for heaven's sake say it. Do away with this
elaborate machinery of a conceptual nature which
consists of assertions about things which don't exist in
order to convey truths about things which do exist.
I am maintaining the obvious position that scientific
laws, if they are true, are statements about entities
46 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [ch.
which we obtain knowledge of as being in nature ; and Jih^t, if the entities to which the statements refer are 'not to be found in nature, the statements about them have no relevance to any purely natural occurrence. TThus the molecules and electrons of scientific theory are, so far as science has correctly formulated its laws, each of them factors to be found in nature. The elec- trons are only hypothetical in so far as we are not quite certain that the electron theory is true. But their hypo- thetical character does not arise from the essential nature of the theory in itself after its truth has been granted.
Thus at the end of this somewhat complex discussion, we return to the position which was affirmed at its beginning. The primary task of a philosophy of natural science is to elucidate the concept of nature, considered as one complex fact for knowledge, to exhibit the funda- mental entities and the fundamental relations between entities in terms of which all laws of nature have to be stated, and to secure that the entities and relations thus exhibited are adequate for the expression of all the relations between entities which occur in nature.
The third requisite, namely that of adequacy, is the
one over which all the difficulty occurs. The ultimate
data of science are commonly assumed to be time, space,
material, qualities of material, and relations between
material objects. But data as they occur in the scientific
laws do not relate all the entities which present them-
selves in our perception of nature. For example, the
wave-theory of light is an excellent well-established
theory; but unfortunately it leaves out colour as per-
ceived. Thus the perceived redness — or, other colour —
has to be cut out of nature and made into the reaction
of the mind under the impulse of the actual events of
ii] THEORIES OF BIFURCATION OF NATURE 47
nature. In other words this concept of the fundamental
relations within nature is inadequate. Thus we have
to bend our energies to the enunciation of adequate
concepts.
But in so doing, are we not in fact endeavouring to solve a metaphysical problem? I do not think so. We are merely endeavouring to exhibit the type of relations which hold between the entities which we in fact per- ceive as in nature. We are not called on to make any pronouncement as to the psychological relation of subjects to objects or as to the status^of either in the realm of reality. It is true that the issue of our endeavour may provide material which is relevant (evidence for a discussion on that question. It can hardly^ail to do so. But it is only evidence, and is not itself the metaphysicd discussion. In order to make clear the character of this further discussion which is out of our ken, I will set before you two quotations. One is from ScheUing and I extract the quotation from the work of the Russian philosopher Lossky which has recently been so ex- cellently translated into English^ — ' In the "Philosophy of Nature" I considered the subject-object called nature in its activity of self -constructing. In order to under- stand it, we must rise to an intellectual intuition of nature. The empiricist does not rise thereto, and for this reason in all his explanations it is always he himself that proves to be constructing nature. It is no wonder, then, that his construction and that which was to be constructed so seldom coincide. A Natur-philosoph raises nature to independence, and makes it construct itself, and he never feels, therefore, the necessity of opposing nature
1 The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge, by N. O. Lossky, transl. by Mrs Duddington, Macmillan and Co., 1919.
48 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [ch.ii
as constructed {i.e. as experience) to real nature, or of correcting the one by means of the other.'
The other quotation is from a paper read by the Dean of St Paul's before the Aristotelian Society in May of 1919. Dr Inge's paper is entitled 'Platonism and Human Immortality,' and in it there occurs the following statement: 'To sum up. The Platonic doctrine of im- mortality rests on the independence of the spiritual world. The spiritual world is not a world of unrealised ideals, over against a real world of unspiritual fact. It is, on the contrary, the real world, of which we have a true though very incomplete knowledge, over against a world of common experience which, as a complete whole, is not real, since it is compacted out of miscellaneous data, not all on the same level, by the help of the imagination. There is no world corresponding to the world of our common experience. Nature makes abstractions for us, deciding what range of vibrations we are to see and hear, what things we are to notice and remember.'
I have cited these statements because both of them
deal with topics which, though they lie outside the range
of our discussion, are always being confused with it.
The reason is that they lie proximate to our field of
thought, and are topics which are of burning interest
to the metaphysically minded. It is difficult for a
philosopher to realise that anyone really is confining
his discussion within the limits that I have set before
you. The boundary is set up just where he is beginning
to get excited. But I submit to you that among the
necessary prolegomena for philosophy and for natural
science is a thorough understanding of the types of
entities, and types of relations among those entities,
which are disclosed to us in our perceptions of nature.
Chapter Iii
Time
The two previous lectures of this course have been mainly critical. In the present lecture I propose to enter upon a survey of the kinds of entities which are posited for knowledge in sense-awareness. My purpose is to investigate the sorts of relations which these entities of various kinds can bear to each other. A classification of natural entities is the beginning of natural philosophy. To-day we commence with the consideration of Time.
In the first place there is posited for us a general
fact: namely, something is going on; there is an oc-
currence for definition.
This general fact at once yields for our apprehension two factors, which I will name, the ' discerned' and the 'discernible.' The discerned is comprised of those elements of the general fact which are discriminated with their own individual peculiarities. It is the field directly perceived. But the entities of this field have relations to other entities which are not particularly discriminated in this individual way. These other entities are known merely as the relata in relation to the entities of the discerned field. Such an entity is merely a 'something' which has such-and-such definite rela- tions to some definite entity or entities in the discerned field. As being thus related, they are — owing to the particular character of these relations — known as elements of the general fact which is going on. But we are not aware of them except as entities fulfilling the functions of relata in these relations.
Thus the complete general fact, posited as occurring, comprises both sets of entities, namely the entities
W.N. 4
50 THE CONCEPT OFl^ATURE [ch.
perceived in their own individuality and other entities merely apprehended as relata without further definition. This complete general fact is the discernible and it comprises the discerned. The discernible is all nature as disclosed in that sense-awareness, and extends beyond and comprises all of nature as actually discriminated or discerned in that sense-awareness. The discerning or discrimination of nature is a peculiar awareness of special factors in nature in respect to their peculiar cha- racters. But the factors in nature of which we have this peculiar sense-awareness are known as not comprising all the factors which together form the whole coniplex of related entities within the general fact there for discernment. This peculiarity of knowledge is what I call its unexhaustive character. This character may be ^metaphorically described by the statement that nature as perceived always has a ragged edge] For example, there is a world beyond the room to which our sight is confined known to us as completing the space-relations of the entities discerned within the room. The junction of the interior world of the room with the exterior world beyond is never sharp. Sounds and subtler factors disclosed in sense-awareness float in from the outside. Every type of sense has its own set of discriminated entities which are known to be relata in relation with entities not discriminated by that sense. For example we see something which we do not touch and we touch something which we do not see, and we have a general sense of the space-relations between the entity dis- closed in sight and the entity disclosed in touch. Thus in the first place each of these two entities is known as a relatum in a general system of space-relations and in the second place the particular mutual relation of
Ill] TIME 51
these two entities as related to each other in this general system is determined. But the general system of space- relations relating the entity discriminated by sight with that discriminated by sight is not dependent on the peculiar character of the other entity as reported by the alternative sense. For example, the space- relations of the thing seen would have necessitated an entity as a relatum in the place of the thing touched even although certain elements of its character had not been disclosed by touch. Thus apart from the touch an entity with a certain specific relation to the thing seen would have been disclosed by sense-awareness but not otherwise discriminated in respect to its individual character. An entity merely known as spatially related to some discerned entity is what we mean by the bare idea of 'place.' The concept of place marks the dis- closure in sense-awareness of entities in nature known merely by their spatial relations to discerned entities. It is the disclosure of the discernible by means of its relations to the discerned.
This disclosure of an entity as a relatum without further specific discrimination of quality is the basis of our concept of significance. In the above example the thing seen was significant, in that it disclosed its spatial relations to other entities not necessarily otherwise entering into consciousness. Thus significance is re- latedness, but it is relatedness with the emphasis on one end only of the relation.
For the sake of simplicity I have confined the argu-
ment to spatial relations; but the same considerations
apply to temporal relations. The concept of 'period of
time ' marks the disclosure in sense-awareness of entities
in nature known merely by their temporal relations to
52 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [ch.