I] Nature and Thought 5
are_exBressibl e in thou ght without reference to mind,
that is, withouLl^erence either to ae nse-awarene ss ore
to ihoughL- Furthermore, I do not wish to be under- ;
stood as implying that sense-awareness and thought are
the only activities which are to be ascribed to mind.
Also I am not denying that there are relations of natural .
entities to mind or minds other than being the termini
of the sense-awarenesses of minds. Accordingly I will
extend the meaning of the terms 'homogeneous
thoughts' and 'heterogeneous thoughts' which have
already been introduced! We are thinking ' homogene- '
ously' about nature when we are thinking about it
without thinking about thought or about sense-aware-
ness, and we are thinking ' heterogeneously ' about
nature when we are thinking about it in conjunction
with thinking either about thought or about sense-
awareness or about both.
I also take the homogeneity of thought about nature
as excluding any reference to moral or aesthetic values
whose apprehension is vivid in proportion to self-
conscious activity. The values of nature are perhaps the
key to the metaphysical synthesis of existence. But such
a synthesis is exactly what I am not attempting. I am
concerned exclusively with the generalisations of widest
scope which can be effected respecting that which is
known to us as the direct deliverance of sense-awareness.
I have said that nature is disclosed in sense-percep-
tion as a complex of entities. It is worth considering
what we mean by an entity in this connexion. 'Entity'
is simply the Latin equivalent for ' thing ' unless some
arbitrary distinction is drawn between the words for
technical purposes. All thought has to be about things.
We can gain some idea of this necessity of things for
6 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [cH.
thought by examination of the structure of a proposi- tion.
Let us suppose that a proposition is being communi-
cated by an expositor to a recipient. Such a proposition
is composed of phrases ; some of these phrases may be
demonstrative and others may be descriptive.
By a demonstrative phrase I mean a phrase which
makes the recipient aware of an entity in a way which
is independent of the particular demonstrative phrase.
You will understand that I am here using 'demonstra-
tion' in the non-logical sense, namely in the sense in
which a lecturer demonstrates by the aid of a frog and
a microscope the circulation of the blood for an ele-
mentary class of medical students. I will call such
demonstration 'speculative' demonstration, remember-
ing Hamlet's use of the word ' speculation' when he
says,
There is no speculation in those eyes.
Thus a demonstrative phrase demonstrates an entity speculatively. It may happen that the expositor has meant some other entity — namely, the phrase demon- strates to him an entity which is diverse from the entity which it demonstrates to the recipient. In that case there is confusion ; for there are two diverse propositions, namely the proposition for the expositor and the pro- position for the recipient. I put this possibility aside as irrelevant for our discussion, though in practice it may be difficult for two persons to concur in the con- sideration of exactly the same proposition, or even for one person to have determined exactly the proposition which he is considering.
Again the demonstrative phrase may fail to demon- strate any entity. In that case there is no proposition
I] Nature and Thought 7
for the recipient. I think that we may assume (perhaps rashly) that the expositor knows what he means.
A demonstrative phrase is a gesture. It is not itself
a constituent of the proposition, but the entity which it
demonstrates is such a constituent. You may quarrel
with a demonstrative phrase as in some way obnoxious
to you; but if it demonstrates the right entity, the
proposition is unaffected though your taste may be
offended. This suggestiveness of the phraseology is part
of the literary quality of the sentence which conveys
the proposition. This is because a sentence directly
conveys one proposition, while in its phraseology it
suggests a penumbra of other propositions charged with
emotional value. We are now talking of the one pro-
position directly conveyed in any phraseology.
This doctrine is obscured by the fact that in most
cases what is in form a mere part of the demonstrative
gesture is in fact a part of the proposition which it is
desired directly to convey. In such a case we will call
the phraseology of the proposition elliptical. In ordinary
intercourse the phraseology of nearly all propositions
is elliptical.
Let us take some examples. Suppose that the ex-
positor is in London, say in Regent's Park and in
Bedford College, the great women's college which is
situated in that park. He is speaking in the college hall
and he says,
'This college building is commodious.'
The phrase ' this college building ' is a demonstrative phrase. Now suppose the recipient answers,
* This is not a college building, it is the lion-house in
the Zoo.'
'Then, provided that the expositor's original proposi-
8 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [cH-
tion has not been couched in elHptical phraseology, the
expositor sticks to his original proposition when he
replies,
'Anyhow, it is commodious.'
Note that the recipient's answer accepts the specula- tive demonstration of the phrase ' This college building.' He does not say, ' What do you mean ? ' He accepts the phrase as demonstrating an entity, but declares that same entity to be the lion-house in the Zoo. In his reply, the expositor in his turn recognises the success of his original gesture as a speculative demonstration, and waives the question of the suitability of its mode of suggestiveness vnth an 'anyhow.' But he is now in a position to repeat the original proposition with the aid of a demonstrative gesture robbed of any suggestiveness, suitable or unsuitable, by saying,
'It is commodious.'
The 'W of this final statement presupposes that
thought has seized on the entity as a bare objective for
consideration.
We confine ourselves to entities disclosed in sense- awareness. The entity is so disclosed as a relatum in the complex which is nature. It dawns on an observer because of its relations ; but it is an objective for thought in its own bare individuality. Thought cannot proceed otherwise ; namely, it cannot proceed without the ideal bare 'it' which is speculatively demonstrated. This setting up of the entity as a bare objective does not ascribe to it an existence apart from the complex in which it has been found by sense-perception. The 'it' for thought is essentially a relatum for sense-awareness.
The chances are that the dialogue as to the college building takes another form. Whatever the expositor
I] Nature and Thought 9
originally meant, he almost certainly now takes his
former statement as couched in elliptical phraseology,
and assumes that he was meaning,
'This is a college building and is commodious.'
Here the demonstrative phrase or the gesture, which demonstrates the 'it' which is commodious, has now been reduced to ' this ' ; and the attenuated phrase, under the circumstances in which it is uttered, is sufficient for the purpose of correct demonstration. This brings out the point that the verbal form is never the whole phrase- ology of the proposition ; this phraseology also includes the general circumstances of its production. Thus the aim of a demonstrative phrase is to exhibit a definite ' it ' as a bare objective for thought; but the modus operandi of a demonstrative phrase is to produce an awareness of the entity as a particular relatum in an auxiliary complex, chosen merely for the sake of the speculative demon- stration and irrelevant to the proposition. For example, in the above dialogue, colleges and buildings, as related to the 'it' speculatively demonstrated by the phrase 'this college building,' set that 'it' in an auxiliary complex which is irrelevant to the proposition
' It is commodious.'
Of course in language every phrase is invariably highly elliptical. Accordingly the sentence
' This college building is commodious ' means probably
'This college building is commodious as a college building.'
But it will be found that in the above discussion
we can replace 'commodious' by 'commodious as a
college building' without altering our conclusion;
though we can guess that the recipient, who thought
lo THE CONCEPT OF NATURE L*^"-
he was in the lion-house of the Zoo, would be less likely to assent to
* Anyhow, it is commodious as a college building.
A more obvious instance of elliptical phraseology
arises if the expositor should address the recipient with
the remark,
'That criminal is your friend.'
The recipient might answer,
'He is my friend and you are insulting.'
Here the recipient assumes that the phrase 'That
criminal' is elliptical and not merely demonstrative. In
fact, pure demonstration is impossible though it is the
ideal of thought. This practical impossibility of pure
demonstration is a difficulty which arises in the com-
munication of thought and in the retention of thought.
Namely, a proposition about a particular factor in nature
can neither be expressed to others nor retained for
repeated consideration without the aid of auxiliary com-
plexes which are irrelevant to it.
I now pass to descriptive phrases. The expositor says,
* A college in Regent's Park is commodious.'
The recipient knows Regent's Park well. The phrase 'A college in Regent's Park' is descriptive for him. If its phraseology is not elliptical, which in ordinary life it certainly will be in some way or other, this proposition simply means,
'There is an entity which is a college building in Regent's Park and is commodious.'
If the recipient rejoins,
' The lion-house in the Zoo is the only commodious building in Regent's Park,'
he now contradicts the expositor, on the assumption that a lion-house in a Zoo is not a college building.
t] NATURE AND THOUGHT ii
Thus whereas in the first dialogue the recipient
merely quarrelled with the expositor without con-
tradicting him, in this dialogue he contradicts him. Thus
1 descriptive phrase is part of the proposition which it
helps to express, whereas a demonstrative phrase is not
part of the proposition which it helps to express.
Again the expositor might be standing in Green Park — ^where there are no college buildings — and say,
'This college building is commodious.'
Probably no proposition will be received by the recipient because the demonstrative phrase,
'This college building'
has failed to demonstrate owing to the absence of the
background of sense-awareness which it presupposes.
But if the expositor had said,
'A college building in Green Park is commodious,'
the recipient would have received a proposition, but a
False one.
Language is usually ambiguous and it is rash to make
general assertions as to its meanings. But phrases which
commence with ' this ' or ' that ' are usually demonstrative,
whereas phrases which commence with 'the' or *a'
are often descriptive. In studying the theory of pro-
positional expression it is important to remember the
wide difference between the analogous modest words
'this' and 'that' on the one hand and 'a' and 'the'
on the other hand. The sentence
'The college building in Regent's Park is com- modious '
means, according to the analysis first made by Bertrand Russell, the proposition,
' There is an entity which (i) is a college building in Regent's Park and (ii) is commodious and (iii) is such
12 THE CONCEPT OF NATURE [ch.
that any college building in Regent's Park is identical with it.'
The descriptive character of the phrase ' The college
building in Regent's Park' is thus evident. Also the
proposition is denied by the denial of any one of its
three component clauses or by the denial of any
combination of the component clauses. If we had
substituted 'Green Park' for 'Regent's Park' a false
proposition would have resulted. Also the erection of a
second college in Regent's Park would make the pro-
position false, though in ordinary life common sense
would politely treat it as merely ambiguous.
* The Iliad ' for a classical scholar is usually a demon- strative phrase ; for it demonstrates to him a well-known poem. But for the majority of mankind the phrase is descriptive, namely, it is synonymous with * The poem named "the Iliad".'
Names may be either demonstrative or descriptive
phrases. For example 'Homer' is for us a descriptive
phrase, namely, the word with some slight difference
in suggestiveness means 'The man who wrote the
Iliad.'
This discussion illustrates that thought places before itself bare objectives, entities as we call them, which the thinking clothes by expressing their mutual rela- tions. Sense-awareness discloses fact with factors which are the entities for thought. The separate distinction of an entity in thought is not a metaphysical assertion, but a method of procedure necessary for the finite expression of individual propositions. Apart from entities there could be no finite truths ; they are the means by which the infinitude of irrelevance is kept out of thought.