^ i. e. If totally and essentially by very nature evil with respect to themselves. In so far as they continue to exist they are good with respect to themselves.
2 Evil is the contrary of the Good. Hence since the Good is by Its very nature productive, evil must be destructive. Hence the devils, if essentially evil, must be essentially destructive. Now they are not essentially self-destructive, for, were they such, they could not exist. Therefore, if essentially evil, they must under ail circumstances be destructive of other things.
* The essence of (^. ^^.) an apple-tree is self-identity ; its faculty is its latent power of producing leaves, apples, etc. ; its activity is the actual production of the leaves, apples, etc.
* ( I ) The devils do not destroy all things {c. g. they do not annihilate the human soul). Therefore they are not essentially evil. Evil passions are good things misdirected. (2) Often the destruction of a thing is beneficial {e.g. the falling of the faded leaf). In fact, nothing could be
Tttk Divine Names 12i
the weakness is not complete ; for, were it complete,
it would have annihilated both the process of destruc-
tion and the object which suffers it : and such a
destruction as this must be self-destructive. Hence
such a qualit}' is not evil but imperfect good ; for
that which is wholly destitute of the Good can have
no place among things that have being.^ And the
same is true of destruction when it works upon a I
faculty or activity. Moreover, how can the devils be
evil since they are sprung from God ? For the Good
produceth and createth good things. But it may -be j^
said that they are called evil not in so far as they
exist (for they are from the Good and had a good l,
existence given them), but in so far as they do not ''
exist, having been unable (as the Scripture saith) to ^
keep their original state. For in what, pray, do we
consider the wickedness of the devils to consist except
their ceasing from the quality and activity of divine
virtues? Otherwise, if the devils are naturally evil,
they must be always evil. But evil is unstable."
Hence if they are always in the same condition, they
are not evil ; for to remain always the same is a
property of the Good. But if they are not always
evil, then they are not evil by their natural constitu-
tion, but only through a lack of angelic virtues.^
Hence they are not utterly without the Good, seeing
that they exist and live and form intuitions and have
destroyed if it had not grown feeble and so become worthy to be destroyed. (D. here, in his zeal to explain evil away, countenances the ])ase doctrine that might is right. What is wrong with the whole system of the universe is that its underlying law is the survival of the fittest. The enlightened conscience of humanity rebels against this law. )
^ The weakness is an imperfect good, and therefore the process of destruction which co-operates with the weakness is an imperfect good.
- The (jood is permanent. Hence its contrary must be unstable.
^ Evil is essentially a negative and self-contradictory thing. Its very permanence would be opposed to its own nature and would be due to an element of the Good within it.
112 DlONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE
within them any movement of desire at all ; but they are called evil because they fail in the exercise of their natural activity. The evil in them is therefore a warping, a declension from their right condition ; a failure, an imperfection, an impotence, and a weakness, loss and lapse of that power which would preserve their perfection in them. Moreover what is the evil in the devils ? Brutish wrath, blind desire, headstrong fancy. But these qualities, even though they exist in the devils, are not wholly, invariably, and essentially evil. For in other living creatures, not the possession of these qualities but their loss is destructive of the creature and hence is evil ; while their possession preserves the creature and enables the creature pos- sessing them to exist. Hence the devils are not evil in so far as they fulfil their nature, but in so far as they do not. Nor hath the Good bestowed complete upon them been changed ; rather have they fallen from the completeness of that gift. And we maintain that the angelic gifts bestowed upon them have never themselves suffered change, but are unblemished in their perfect brightness, even if the devils themselves do not perceive it through blinding their faculties of spiritual perception.^ Thus, so far as their existence is concerned, they possess it from the Good, and are naturally good, and desire the Beautiful and Good in desiring existence, life, and intuition, which are existent things. And they are called evil through the deprivation and the loss whereby they have lapsed from their proper virtues. And hence they are evil in so far as they do not exist ; and in desiring evil they desire that which is non-existent.
24. But perhaps some one will say that human
^ There is a timeless ground in all personalities, and this ground is good. Eckhart and Tauler say that even the souls in hell possess eternally the divjne root of their true being. Ruysbroeck says, this divine root does not of itself make us blessed, but merely makes us exist.
The Divine Names 123
souls are the seat of evil. Now if the reason alleged
is that they have contact with evil temptations when
they take forethoii<;ht to preserve themselves there-
from, this is not evil but i^ood and comcth from the
Good that turns even evil into good. But if we mean
the depravation which souls undergo, in what do they
undergo depravation except in the deficiency of good
qualities and activities and in the failure and fall
therefrom due to their own weakness ? Even so we
say that the air is darkened around us by a deficiency
and absence of the light ; while yet the light itself is
always light and illuminates the darkness. Hence
the evil inhereth not in the devils or in us, as evil,
but only as a deficiency and lack of the perfection of
our proper virtues.
25. Neither inhereth evil in the brute beasts. For
if you take away the passions of anger, desire, etc.
(which are not in their essential nature evil, although
alleged to be so), the lion, having lost its savage
wildness, will be a lion no longer ; and the dog, if it
become gentle to all, will cease to be a dog, since
the virtue of a dog is to watch and to allow its own
masters to approach while driving strangers away.
Wherefore 'tis not evil for a creature so to act as
preserveth its nature undestroyed ; evil is the de-
struction of its nature, the weakness and deficiency
of its natural qualities, activities, and powers. And
if all things which the process of generation produces
have their goal of perfection in time, then even that
which seemeth to be their imperfection is not wholly
and entirely contrary to nature.^
26. Neither inhereth evil in nature as a whole. For
if all natural laws together come from the universal
system of Nature, there is nothing contrary to Nature. ^
^ /. e. That which is imperfect in them is capable of being made perfect.
^ The sum total of natural laws comes from the ultimate unity of
124 Dionysius the Areopagite
'Tis but when we consider the nature of particular
things, that we find one part of Nature to be natural
and another part to be unnatural. For one thing
may be unnatural in one case, and another thing in
another case ; and that which is natural in one is
unnatural in another.^ Now the evil taint of a natural
force is something unnatural. It is a lack of the
thing's natural virtues. Hence, no natural force is
evil : the evil of nature lies in a thing's inability to
fulfil its natural functions.^
27. Neither inhereth evil in our bodies. For ugli-
ness and disease are a deficiency in form and a want
of order. But this is not wholly evil, being rather
a lesser good. For were there a complete destruc-
tion of beaut}', form, and order, the very body must
disappear. And that the body is not the cause of
evil in the soul is plain in that evil can be nigh at
hand even without a body, as it is in the devils.
Evil in spirits' souls and l3odies is a weakness and
lapse in the condition of their natural virtues.
28. Nor is the familiar notion true that " Evil
inheres in matter qua matter." For matter, too,
hath a share in order, beauty, and form. And if
matter is without these things, and in itself hath no
quality or form, how can it produce anything, since
in that case it hath not of itself even the power of
suffering any affection? Nay, how can matter be
Nature, which comes from tlie Good. Thus the sum total of natural laws is not, as such, opposed to the ultimate unity of Nature, and therefore is not as such opposed to the Good. It is not esseniially evil.
^ Cf. Section 30.
2 The argument of the whole passage is that evil is not inherent in the essential nature of things as a whole or of any particular thing. It arises in particular things (accidentally, as it were) through their failure to fulfil their true nature. But what of this accident? Is it inherent? Perhaps we might answer, "Not inherent because capable of being eliminated."
The Divine Names 125
evil ? l^or if it hatli no being whatever, it is neither
good nor evil ; hut if it hath a kind of being, tlien
(since all things that have being come from the
Good) matter must come from the Good. And
thus either the Good produces evil (/. ^. evil, since it
comes from the Good, is good), or else the Good
Itself is produced by evil {i.e. the Good, as coming
thus from evil, is evil). Or else we are driven back
again to two principles. But if so, these must be
derived from some further single source beyond them.
And if they say that matter is necessary for the
whole world to fulfil its development, how can that
be evil which depends for its existence upon the
Good ? For evil abhors the very nature of the Good.
And how can matter, if it is evil, produce and nourish
Nature ? For evil, qua evil, cannot produce or nourish
anything, nor create or preserve it at all. And if
they reply that matter causes not the evil in our
souls, but that it yet draws them down towards evil,
can that be true ? For many of them have their
gaze turned towards the Good. And how can that
be, if matter doth nothing except drag them down
towards evil ? Hence evil in our souls is not derived
from matter but from a disordered and discordant
motion. And if they say that this motion is always
the consequence of matter ; and if the unstable
medium of matter is necessary for things that arc
incapable of firm self-subsistence, then w/ij' is it that
evil is thus necessary or that this necessary thing is
evil ? 1
29. Nor is the common saying true that Deprivation
or Lack fights by its natural power against the Good.
For a complete lack is utterly impotent; and that
^ Matter, it is argued, is evi/ because the discordant motion of the soul springs from matter. But, replies D., matter is necessary for certain kinds of existence. Hence it follows that evil is necessary. But this is impossible.
126 Dionysius the Areopagite
which is partial hath its power, not in so far as it
is a lack, but in so far as it is not a perfect lack.
For when the lack of the Good is partial, evil is not
as yet ; and when it becomes perfect, evil itself utterly
vanishes.
30. In fine. Good cometh from the One universal
Cause ; and evil from many partial deficiencies. God
knows evil under the form of good, and with Him
the causes of evil things are faculties productive of
good. And if evil is eternal, creative, and powerful,
and if it hath being and activity, whence hath it
these attributes? Come they from the Good.'* Or
from the evil by the action of the Good ? Or from
some other cause by the action of them both? All
natural results arise from a definite cause; and if
evil hath no cause or definite being, it is unnatural.
For that which is contrary to Nature hath no place
in Nature, even as unskilfulness hath no place in
skilfulness. Is the soul, then, the cause of evils, even
as fire is the cause of warmth? And doth the soul,
then, fill with evil whatsoever things are near it? Or
is the nature of the soul in itself good, while yet in
its activities the soul is sometimes in one state, and
sometimes in another?^ Now, if the very existence
of the soul is naturally evil, whence is 'that existence
derived ? From the Good Cieative Cause of the
whole world? If from this Origin, how can it be,
in its essential nature, evil ? For all things sprung
from out this Origin are good. But if it is evil merely
in its activities, even so this condition is not fixed.
Otherwise [i. e. if it doth not itself also assume a
goo4 quality) what is the origin of the virtues ?2