^ D. is no pantheist. According to Pantheism God is equally present in all things. Thus Pantheism is a debased form of the hnmanence doctrine, as Calvinism is a debased form of the Tran- scendence doctrine. In the one case we get Immanence without Transcendence : in the other Transcendence without Immanence. D. holds a Transcendent Immanence (cf. Bradley, Appearance and Reality ^ rebutting cliarge of Pantheism).
2 e. g. The cruelty of Nature seems to show Intelligence ; and Intelligence per se is a good thing.
Tiik Divine Names 115
boldly spccik the truth, even the thini^s that fii^ht ay;ainst It possess throui^h Its power their beini; and their capability to flight. Or rather, U) speak shcjrtly, all creatures in so far as they have beini^ are good and come from the Good, and in so far as they are deprived of the Good, neither are good nor have they being.^ For in the case of other qualities, such as heat or cold, the things which have been warmed have their being even when they lose their warmth, and many of the creatures there are which have no life or mind ; and in like manner God transcendeth all being and so is Super-Essential ; ^ and generally, in all other cases, though the quality be gone or hath never been present, the creatures yet have being and can subsist ; but that which is utterly bereft of the Good never had, nor hath, nor ever shall have, no nor can have any sort of being whatever. For instance, the depraved sinner, though bereft of the Good by his brutish desire, is in this respect unreal and desires unrealities ; but still he hath a share in the Good in so far as there is in him a distorted reflection of true Love and Communion.^ And anger hath a share in the Good, in so far as it is a movement which seeks to remedy apparent evils, converting them to that which appears to be fair. And even he that desires the basest life, yet in so far as he feels desire at all and feels desire for life, and intends what he thinks the best kind of life, so far participates in the Good. And if you wholly destroy the Good, there v/ill be neither being, life, desire, nor motion, or any other thing. Hence the birth of fresh
^ All evil things contain the seed of their own decay, and so tend to non-existence. The arrogance and cruelty of the Germans has been their weakness, as discipline and self-sacrifice has been their strength.
* God exists without Essence, as an object can exist without this particular quality or that.
^ D. is thinkinsj; especially of carnal sin. Such sin is a depraved form of that which, in its true purity, is a mystery, symbolizing the Unitive Life.
ii6 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE
life out of destruction is not the function of evil but is the presence of Good in a lesser form, even as disease is a disorder, yet not the destruction of all order, for if this happen the disease itself will not exist.^ But the disease remains and exists. Its essence is order reduced to a ininiuium ; and in this it consists. For that which is utterly without the Good hath neither being nor place amongst the things that are in being ; but that which is of mixed nature owes to the Good its place among things in being, and hath this place
' amongst them and hath being just so far as it partici-
pates in the Good. Or rather all things in being will
have their being more or less in proportion as they
participate in the Good. For so far as mere Being is
concerned, that which hath not being in any respect
will not exist at all ; that which hath being in one
respect but not in another doth not exist in so far as
it hath fallen away from the everlasting Being ; while
in so far as it hath a share of being, to that extent it
exists ; and thus both an element of existence and an
element of non-existence in it are kept and preserved.
So too with evil. That which is utterly fallen from
Good can have no place either in the things which are
more good or in the things which are less so. That
which is good in one respect but not in another is at
war with some particular good but not with the whole
of the Good. It also is preserved by the admixture
of the Good, and thus the Good giveth existence to
the lack of Itself through some element of Itself being
present there. For if the Good be entirely removed,
there will not remain aught at all, either good or
mixed or absolutely bad. For if evil is imperfect
Goodness, the perfect absence of the Good will
^ remove both the perfect and the imperfect Good, and
evil will only exist and appear because, while it is evil
in relation to one kind of good (being the contrary
^ A diseased body siill lives, Death ends the disease.
The Divine Name.^ 117
thereof), yet it depends for its existence on another
kind of c^ood and, to that extent, is jrood itself. 1^'or
things of the same kind cannot ^ be wholly contra-
dictory to one another in the same respects. ^ Hence
evil is Non-Existent.
21. Neither inhereth evil in existent creatures.^
For if all creatures are from the Good, and the Good
is in them all and embraces them all, either evil can
have no place amonij^st the creatures, or else it must
have a place in the Good."* Now it cannot inhere in
the Good, any more than cold can inhere in fire ; just
so the quality of becoming evil cannot inhere in that
which turns even evil into good. And if evil doth
inhere in the Good, what will the mode of its inher-
ence be? If you say: It comcth of the Good, I
answer : That is absurd and impossible. For (as
the infallible Scriptures say), a good tree cannot bring
forth evil fruit, nor yet is the converse possible. But
if it Cometh not of the Good, it is plainly from another
origin and cause. Either evil must come from the
Good, or the Good from evil, or else (if this is
impossible) both the Good and evil must be from
another origin or cause. For no duality can be an>/
origin: some unity must be the origin of all duality.
And yet it is absurd to suppose that two entirely
^ Exuberant vitality is per se a good thing and the more exuberant the better, though, like all good things, it is dangerous, and unless properly directed is disastrous.
2 If good and evil are both existent, they are, to that extent, both of the same kind ; which is impossible.
3 So far D. has been showing that evil is not an ultimate principle, being neither (i) identical with the Good, nor (2)self-subsistent. Now he argues that it is not a necessary element in any created thing : neither in their existence as such, nor in any particular kind of creature.
* D. rambles characteristically, but the general argument is plain. All existence is from the Good. Hence, if evil is inherent in the nature of existence, evil is from the Good. Thus D. meets again and ]:)roceeds to lay the ghost of a theory which he has already elaborately slain in the previous section.
ii8 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE
opposite things can owe their birth and their being
to the same thing. This would make the origin itself
not a simple unity but divided, double, self-contra-
dictory and discordant. Nor again is it possible that
the world should have two contradictory origins,
existing in each other and in the whole and mutually
at strife. For,^ were this assumed, God ^ cannot be
free from pain, nor without a feeling of ill, since there
would be something causing Him trouble, yea, all
things must in that case be in a state of disorder and
perpetual strife ; whereas the Good imparts a principle
of harmony to all things and is called by the Sacred
Writers Peace and the Bestower of Peace. And hence
it is that all good things display a mutual attraction
and harmony, and are the offspring of one I.ife and
are disposed in fellowship towards one Good, and are
kindly, of like nature, and benignant to one another.
And so evil is not in God,^ and is not divine. Nor
Cometh it of God. For either He is not good, or else
He worketh goodness and bringeth good things unto
^ Having just given a metaphysical argument for the non-existence of evil, D. now gives an argument drawn from the actual nature of the universe and of God's creative activity.
Tliis argument is not so satisfactory as the metaphysical one, for, under all the harmony of the world, there is perpetual strife, and the Cross of Christ reveals God as suffering pain. " Christ is in an agony and will be till the end of the world " [Pascal).
The metaphysical argument is sound because metaphysics deal with ultimate ideals, and evil is ultimately or ideally non-existent. The argument from actual facts is unsound because evil is actually existent. Much wrong thinking on the subject of evil is due to a confusion of ideal with actual non-existence. D. here seems to fall into this mistake.
* D. here uses the name " God " because he is thinking of the Absolute or the Good, not in Its ultimate Nature, but in Its emanating or creative activity, in which the Personal Differentiations of the 'I'rinity appear. See II. 7.
' i. e. Evil does not arise through the passage of the (jood from Suj)er-I']ssence into Essence. It is not in the Good through the Good submitting to the conditions of existence (O. has already shown that evil has no place in the ultimate Super-Essential Nature of the Good).
Ttte Divine Names 119
existence. Nor acts lie thus only at some times and
not at others, or only in the case of some thinj^s but
not of all. For were He to act thus, He must suffer
a chani^e and alteration, and that in respect of the
divincst quality of all — causality. And if the Good
is in God as His very substance, God must, in chani;-
ing from the Good, sometimes exist and sometimes
not exist. Doubtless if you feign that He hath the
Good by mere participation therein, and derives It
from another, in that case He will, forsooth, sometimes
possess It and sometimes not possess It.^ Evil, there-
fore, doth not come from God, nor is it in God either
absolutely or temporally.^
22. Neither inhereth evil in the angels. ^ For if the
good angel declares the Divine Goodness, he is in
a secondary manner and by participation that which
the Subject of his message is in a primary and causal
manner."^ And thus the angel is an image of God,
a manifestation of the invisible light, a burnished
mirror, bright, untarnished, without spot or blemish,
receiving (if it is reverent to say so) all the beauty
of the Absolute Divine Goodness, and (so far as may
be) kindling in itself, with unallowed radiance, the
Goodness of the Secret Silence. Hence evil inhereth
not in the angels ; they are evil only in so far as they
must punish sinners. But in this respect even those
who chastise wTong-doers are evil, and so are the
priests who exclude the profane man from the Divine
^ This is a reductio ad absurdnm. D. considers it obvious that God possesses the Good as His Substance and not by participation. The Persons of the Trinity are not products of the Absolute but Emanations or Differentiations of It.
* The argument is as follows : No evil is from God. All existence is from God. Therefore no existence is evil.
•* Having shown that existence as such is not inherently evil, D. now takes various forms of existence and shows that none of them is, as such, inherently evil.
* Cf. Old Testament title, " Sons of God," and D. on Deification. Cf. also " I have said, Ve are Gods."
120 Dionysius the Areopagite
Mysteries. But, indeed, 'tis not the suffering of the
punishment that is evil but the being worthy thereof;
nor yet is a just exclusion from the sacrifices evil,
but to be guilty and unholy and unfit for those pure
mysteries is evil.
23. Nor are the devils naturally evil. For, were
they such, they would not have sprung from the
Good, nor have a place amongst existent creatures,
nor have fallen from Goodness (being by their very
nature always evil). Moreover, are they evil with
respect to themselves or to others.-* If the former^
they must also be self-destructive ; if the latter, how
do they destroy, and what do they destroy P^ Do
they destroy Essence, or Faculty, or Activity?^ If
Essence, then, first, they cannot destroy it contrary
to its own nature ; for they cannot destroy things
which by their nature are indestructible, but only
the things which are capable of destruction. And,
secondly, destruction itself is not evil in every case
and under all circumstances. Nor can any existent
thing be destroyed so far as its being and nature act ;
for its destruction is due to a failure of its natural
order, whereby the principle of harmony and symmetry
grows weak and so cannot remain unchanged.* But