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The Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor (1820)

Preserved in the archive of the housea source of Proclus

Sense is of flic present, in the same manner as memory is of die past, hut hope of the future. Hence both then, and at present, sense moves the soul, in con¬ junction with the nutritive power, which through influ.xions, affords a remedy to the etlluxions of tin* body, and again combines what it bad analyzed, conforma¬ bly to the web of Penelope. 1 or this is “ (he incessantly fltr.fi n" stream ," which is very properly called a stream, Itecause it is a part of the whole river of genera¬ tion, which, as was before observed, is abundant Together with this therefore, sense disturbs, and causes a tumult m the periods or circulations of tin* immortal soul; and fetters indeed the period of tbe circle ol the same, but agitates the jierind of the circle of the different, lor as there are twofold circles in it, in imi¬ tation ot divine souls, the circle which surveys intelligildcs, and which is the ilia- noelir circle, is onlv restrained in its energy, but sustains no distortion. Hut tbe duxaslic circle is distorted, and this follows very properly. For it is possible to opine not rightly, but it is not possible to know .scientifically, falsely. Ifliow- evt r someone should say, that the dianoelic part of the soul may be ignorant in a twofold respect, and that the thing which sutlers this wi I be distorted, let such a one learn from us, that twofold ignorance* does not simply pertain to ilunima, but liegins indeed from thence, and is implanted in tbe doxastic part. For twofold ignorance, so far as it is ignorance, and a privation of science, so far, in coiiseipu nee of being an immobility of tbe scientific power, it originates from dianoia. For ignorance subsist* about that, about which science subsists. But so far as tins ignorance also adds a false suspicion of knowledge, it subsists

1 Id tlie tililinns of llif Timauis vr limJ xnpiyofittat in tins plan - ; but il esidcntly ought to

be, av iu llie leil ol 1’iot In-, «... ,.< v « at »u.

* Twofold ignorance is, when a man is not only ignorant, but is ignorant that he is ignorant. And this is the disease of the multitude.

TIM i; IN or I* LA YU.

in the doxastic part. l or lli.it w lufli is nothing more Ij an a falsi* suspicion of knowledge, is tins. Ami ignorance indeed. i>« only tin* privation of intelhct in tlianoia lettered,' and concealing its productive powers ; lint «nr l «ri > -, or a I 'a 1st* suspicion of knowledge, is the privation of intellect in opinion, being a certain (Iistortioii of it. I or In mg false, it injures its possessor. Iui uhut ini is in action, thiil the fal*c is in

I lie period in the circle of the .same therefore, i» alone letti red, and resembles those that are in captivity, and on this account, are prevented from energizing. This circulation however, remains in the souls that are hound without h. ini; dis¬ torted . 1 lint the period of the circle of the t/Jf ruit is agitated, being tilled with false dogmas. For the proximity ol this circle to irrationality, causes it to receive a certain passion from externals. From these things however, we are impelled to speak freely in opposition to Flotmus and the great Thcndnrus, who preserve in us something impassive, and which always perceives intellectually. For Plato assumes only two circles in the essence of the soul, one of which is according to him fettered, hut the other is agitated ; and it is not possible for either that vv Inch is fettered, or that which is agitated, to energize intellectually. Ilightly therefore, does the divine lamhlichus contend against those who adopt this opinion. For what is it, that is faulty in us, when we recur to an intemperate imagination, through the excitation of the irrational nature? Is it not our deliberate choice? And how is it possible it should not he this ; since according to this, we differ from those who imagine precipitately? But if the deliberate choice is faullv, how can the s ( ,ul he guilth ss ? W hat also is it which makes the whole of our life to he happv * Is it not Iwcansr* reason possesses its proper virtue? W e say enlirelv so. But if when that which is most excellent in us is perfect we are uholh / happv, what hinders all of us from lie ini; now happy, if the summit of our nature al wavs perceives intellectually, and is always with the (jiods ? For if this summit is [wholly] intellect, it is nothing to* the soul; hut if it is a part of the soul, the rest of the soul also will lx* happy. Who likewise is the charioteer of the soul ? Is it not that which is most delightful to us, and as some one may say most capital 1 And how i« it possible not to admit this, if it is the charioteer who governs the whole of our essence, who raises Ins head to, and surveys the supercelestial place, and is assimilated to the gr< at leader [Jupiter], who drives a winged chariot, and is the first charioteer that proceeds into the heavens? But if that which is the summit in us is the charioteer, and he, as it is said in the Pha*drus, at one time

1 Instead of here, it is nrrejyary to rrad

* For attairrprxjHHt here, read aharrpo^wi.

IMtOCl.l N ON THE

[OOOK ▼.

sublimely tends to the place beyond the heavens, at another time enters into the heavens, and at another Incomes lame, an I sutlers a drthixion of his wm?i, it evidently follows, that the summit of our nati re subsists differently at different times. This therefore, the reader will find elsewhere more copiously discussed.

If however, these things are true, it i> very propeilv said, that the period ot the circle of tin mint, as it «uveriis and proceeds, is lettered. 1 or having a twofold

perfection, prartir and theoretic, it is deprived id each. For it is neither aide to

rule over the natures subject to ifs eommaml, thr«»ii”!i their unstable motion, nor to proceed, i. e. to perceive intellectually. For to proceed is the eiienry ot a circu¬ lation, and to proceed diauoetically, is the energy ot dianoetie natures. I lie senses therefore, strike against this circulation, and tinning in a direction contrary to it, as tending inwardlv from outward ohjects, they impede tin intellectual energy. II. •nee the- period of the c ircle ot the mint is deprived both of ac tion and conte mplation. \\ hat then, someone may s.iv, is it immovealde } .And how can the soul Iw immovealde' May we not sav in answer to this, that it is moved indeed by itself, but neither with a corporeal motion, tor it is incorporeal; nor

with a phanta-tic motion, fur it is imligured ; nor with a gnostic motion, for it

is i ,r noraut of itself; but with an essentially vital motion. For as to perceive intellectually, is the energy of intellect, and to exist is the energy of being ; thus also to live, i> the energy of life, l’or it dews not possess an adventitious energy of *ife, hut ch lives it from itself. For it is life generating itself, and producing its. It. 13ut all life is motion. So that if every thin- which lives is moved, that which lives from itself will he- moved, and that whie li always lives will always he move d, vitally, hut not intellectually. II. nee the soul is always moved, and yet not always. For it it intellect in ctijmcity, hit hfe iu energy. And another third tiling i. e. matter is in capac ity only, but is not in energy. Since the relbre, there is a triple order in us, v i/. according to e ssence, according to power, and according to energy, our I'scnce indeed, remains entirely the same, as being essence, as living, and *~s intellectual. For being the [first] image cd intelh*el, it is intellectual ; just as the first image of .soul is animated. Hut tlw powers indeed, of dianoia are lettered, and those of opinion are agitated. And since the powers are analogous to tin* live s, the power of one of the lives [viz. of the intellectual life] is r. strained, hut another is shaken. For the* essential hfe is always in motion. M ith respec t to the* energies however, those of dianoia are taken away, hut those ot opinion an* distorted. And as these are analogous to that whic h is intellectual, it is evident that the soul is pre¬ vented from perceiving intellectually. 1 he essence ol tin; soul therefore, is per-

1 For cuv'o licre, it is ne cessary to read caery.

nook \.]

T1M.LUS OJ PLATO.

petually vital ami perpetually nxacd ; 1 »ut 1 lie powers and energies, pertaining to its Lie and intellect, are naturally adapted to err.

“ So that they turn with every kind of revolution, each of the three intervals of the double and triple, together with the media and conjoining bonds of the sesqnitertian, sescjuialter, and sesrpiioctave ratios which can¬ not he dissolved hy any one, except by him by whom they were bound. And besides this they introduce all the fractures and diversities of circles, which it is possible to eti’eet.”

All things are in all souls, hut appropriately in each, in some divinely, in others d.ciuoui.K ally, and in others partially. l*or the media, the scsquialtor, the ses- quitertian, and the scsquioclave ratios, together with the lcimina, are in all souls 1 or how could tin* soul otherwise know total h u nion \, and procreate ratios so heautilul, oxet pt she contained in herself the causes of them, heing herself, accord¬ ing to her ow n order, a certain harmony of harmonies ; not consisting of things harmonized, since a haimony of this kind is in another thing, is alter-motive, and is susp< tided li'oin another niotne cause ; hut of that which harmonizes itself, and is harmonized hy wholes? lienee, it has all harmonized ratios, and besides these, die divisions info se\» n of the circle ot the ddlerenl. I*or tin* demiurgic section ' begins superfluity irom divine souls, and proceeds as far as to the most partial souls ; and besides this, sueli other tilings as we have survevi <1 about the soul of the universe. The mode of interpretation likewise is the same, except that we must add the peculiarity in each, adjoining, in some souls the divine, in others the (hriuoniacal, ami in others the partial peculiarity. We have however l>cfore observed, that though all the ratios are m all souls, viz. the divine, the darmonia- cal, and the partial, alter the mundane soul, it is not at all wonderful that the hounding t< mis should difler, by each lieing more multiplied in the subordinate souls, than hi those prior to them. Lor those of the soul of the universe were primary, or radical terms, (truOju.m*\) yet nothing hinders their being afterwards, the duple, or triple, or in short, multiples ot these, winch through diminution are multiplied in orderly ratios, as far as to partial souls. Amlin some of these, they are more multiplied than in others. For neither are all divine souls of equal dignity, nor all demoniacal after these, nor all partial souls. And thus they have some things common to all of them, but others di tiering accord mg to essence

1 Instead of to fur in this place, it is necessary to read

Tim. Flat.

[book t.

itself. It is also necessary to reint mber the**e tilings, not carelessly, in order that we fnay he able to assign the all-various differences in the generation of souls; of the mundane indeed with re--q»<*e-t to the supermundane, according to the mul¬ titude, or diminution of parts; amt aUo m the generation of the mundane, divine, demoniacal, anil partial souls, according to the terms themselves, which are either radical, or more remote from those that are radical, the same ratios remaining.