In what is here said, the philosopher refers to two causes all this tumult, viz. to the nutritive anil sensitive hie. But these causes are that which is oreetic, and that which is gnostic, in the vv hole of the irrational nature ; into which also we are accustomed to divide all the powers of the soul, asserting that some of them are vital, hut others gnostic, l or the nutritive life, verging to bodies, produces an abundant tlux in them ; through their moisture indeed, emitting an abundant material etllux, but through vivilic heat, receiving all influx of other things. But the scnsitivi life Millers by tlie bodies of fire, larth, air, and water, falling on it. Conceiving likewise all these passions to be great through the vileness of its life, it occasions tumult and perturbation in the soul. And to those indeed, who have arrived at maturity, all these have become habitual; but to such as have lieen recently born, the smallest things, through being unusual, lieeome the causes of astonishment. For what a great tire is to the former, that thesnufl of a candle is to the latter. What the magnitude likewise of very lofty mountains is to tlie former, that the smallest ol stones is to the latter. For this is sullicienl to give them pain, and by ini[Hibng llietr energies, to eal! forth taeir tears. And what stormy winds, and streams of water from the heavens, are to adults, that a small motion of the air, or a slip through a little moisture, is to infants. For sense l*eing agitated through the percussion of all these, astonishes the soul of those that are recently born, and leads it into ditliculty and tumult. Tin >e therefore, are in short, the causes of the perturbation of souls, viz. the motion of tin nutritive power, and the |n rcussioiis of sense. We must not however, fancy that the soul sutlers any thing through these. For as if sunn one standing on the margin of a liver, should heboid the image and form ufhims. if in the floating stream, lie indeed will preserve his fare unchanged ; hut the stream being all variously moved, will chaie-e the image, SO that at different times a will appear to him difli rent, oblique, and erect, and |M ihaps divulsed and continuous. [ A t us suppox too, tli.it such a one, through Ireing unaccustomed to the spectacle, should think that it was himself that sutlered this distortion,' in consequence ot surveying his shadow in the water, and thus thinking, should he alihc ted and disturbed, astonished and impeded. Alter the same manner, the soul, beholding the image of herself in body, borne along in the river of gt ueration, and variously disposed at diflcrent times throii'di inward passions and external impulses, is indeed herself impassive, but thinks that she sutlers ; and hung ignorant of, and mistaking her image for, herself, is disturbed, astonished, and perplexed. 1 I Iris passion however particularly exists llurc is .m IimIus lure in 1 he ordinal, win,), may be filled up by adding alar roe .o^cra the * Fur (b um-pciw lit IT, lead «
p. 445
HOOK V. ] TIM .TIL'S OI PI.ATO.
in children recent Iv horn ; Iml it also exhibits ilsdt in dreams in adults. 1 inis win n sum' nni*. in riinsoijuenei- oi nature being latigucd in lIn* concoction «»1 tiie fin id, I a tines hi a dream tli.it lie is weary, that lie is journey mu through a (hi limit road 111 at lie is < a it v inn burdens, or sutlers mhiicIIiiic * lse nt tin* like kind, t lien tills pa**mn Inti lilies appan lit. And it Is possible tidlii these tilings In survey tllC nature of the passions of children.' And thus mudi may suffice at present as to these particular*.
It is iviiuisiti however, to proreed to the words ot Plato and to say, that the T cares manifest not the externally blow in" wind, as some assert, lint the congregated folly * existing in vonth, and the ahumlaut intlux and elllux. Hut the //miniulwn signifies. 111 the lir*t plan-, that the pneumatic vehicle is agitated and made heavier; for it is this, which exhibits in itself stains and vapours; and in the second place, the soul, for it is disturbed by congregated impulses.
“And on this account all these were then, and are still now'denominated senses.”
According to Plato, the senses receive their appellation from passion. If therefore, we should say, that the senses are motions placed inwardly, the assertion would hr attended with much 1 accusation, from grammatical* observation. But if we should say, that the *i uses are mingled from inw ard motions and passion, perhaps am n nt usage would testily in lavour ot the assertion. l‘or sense (aurOr.iri^) with four sylhihh i* a certain ooVirTic,
O s’ (3; 5 j u* a*7u> (lege says Homer. But the word •jiiVJtjtu', will be from arm*,* and ^ 3 erij’, T sensible object* indei d being moved externally, but the motions tending through the hodv to the soul, and producing as Plato says, sensations. Aery properly therefore, did tho*c who first pereeived the nature of the passion, and those in the present period, who did not entirely perceive it, thus denominate the senses. And those who now still gne this apjwllation to the senses, do it because there is similarly
’ Instead of t r?*>r iii llu place, it is necessary to read xai&*r.
* Fur n^rorj'Ttt here, it is requisite to read n^joeijoie.
1 For ifc.Wni'i here, it is ncccssaiy to read irvXvi.
* For ynn/jfimji here, reail
1 i. e. " He "roan'il, and breathed his Iasi.” 11. xvL ▼. 408.
6 The verb aitrnr, is from aiw, which not only signifies to bear, and to blow away, but also to understand and know.
f i. e. Position.
PltOCLUS ON THE
[book ▼.
44fi a complication lit them of passion ami judgment, or of motion and position. For the motion of the soul itself alone, is impassive; lint that which pervades from the body to tlie soul, is accompanied with passion.
“And these indeed, Noth then ami at present, receiving 1 the most abundant and greatest motion, and bein',' moved together with that incessantly flowing stream, and vehemently agitating the circulations of the soul, they entirel y letter the circulation of the same , flowing in a direction contrary to it, and restrain its energies, as it rules and proceeds; but agitate tbe circulation of the different."
Sense is of flic present, in the same manner as memory is of die past, hut hope of the future. Hence both then, and at present, sense moves the soul, in conjunction with the nutritive power, which through influ.xions, affords a remedy to the etlluxions of tin* body, and again combines what it bad analyzed, conformably to the web of Penelope. 1 or this is “ (he incessantly fltr.fi n" stream ," which is very properly called a stream, Itecause it is a part of the whole river of generation, which, as was before observed, is abundant Together with this therefore, sense disturbs, and causes a tumult m the periods or circulations of tin* immortal soul; and fetters indeed the period of tbe circle ol the same, but agitates the jierind of the circle of the different, lor as there are twofold circles in it, in imitation ot divine souls, the circle which surveys intelligildcs, and which is the ilianoelir circle, is onlv restrained in its energy, but sustains no distortion. Hut tbe duxaslic circle is distorted, and this follows very properly. For it is possible to opine not rightly, but it is not possible to know .scientifically, falsely. Ifliowevt r someone should say, that the dianoelic part of the soul may be ignorant in a twofold respect, and that the thing which sutlers this wi I be distorted, let such a one learn from us, that twofold ignorance* does not simply pertain to ilunima, but liegins indeed from thence, and is implanted in tbe doxastic part. For twofold ignorance, so far as it is ignorance, and a privation of science, so far, in coiiseipu nee of being an immobility of tbe scientific power, it originates from dianoia. For ignorance subsist* about that, about which science subsists. But so far as tins ignorance also adds a false suspicion of knowledge, it subsists be, av iu llie leil ol 1’iot In-, «... ,.< v « at »u.
1 Id tlie tililinns of llif Timauis vr limJ xnpiyofittat in tins plan - ; but il esidcntly ought to
* Twofold ignorance is, when a man is not only ignorant, but is ignorant that he is ignorant. And this is the disease of the multitude.
HOOK V.]
TIM i; IN or I* LA YU.
p. 447
in the doxastic part. l or lli.it w lufli is nothing more Ij an a falsi* suspicion of knowledge, is tins. Ami ignorance indeed. i>« only tin* privation of intelhct in tlianoia lettered,' and concealing its productive powers ; lint «nr l «ri > -, or a I 'a 1st* suspicion of knowledge, is the privation of intellect in opinion, being a certain (Iistortioii of it. I or In mg false, it injures its possessor. Iui uhut ini is in action, thiil the fal*c is in
I lie period in the circle of the .same therefore, i» alone letti red, and resembles those that are in captivity, and on this account, are prevented from energizing. This circulation however, remains in the souls that are hound without h. ini; distorted . 1 lint the period of the circle of the t/Jf ruit is agitated, being tilled with false dogmas. For the proximity ol this circle to irrationality, causes it to receive a certain passion from externals. From these things however, we are impelled to speak freely in opposition to Flotmus and the great Thcndnrus, who preserve in us something impassive, and which always perceives intellectually. For Plato assumes only two circles in the essence of the soul, one of which is according to him fettered, hut the other is agitated ; and it is not possible for either that vv Inch is fettered, or that which is agitated, to energize intellectually. Ilightly therefore, does the divine lamhlichus contend against those who adopt this opinion. For what is it, that is faulty in us, when we recur to an intemperate imagination, through the excitation of the irrational nature? Is it not our deliberate choice? And how is it possible it should not he this ; since according to this, we differ from those who imagine precipitately? But if the deliberate choice is faullv, how can the s ( ,ul he guilth ss ? W hat also is it which makes the whole of our life to he happv * Is it not Iwcansr* reason possesses its proper virtue? W e say enlirelv so. But if when that which is most excellent in us is perfect we are uholh / happv, what hinders all of us from lie ini; now happy, if the summit of our nature al wavs perceives intellectually, and is always with the (jiods ? For if this summit is [wholly] intellect, it is nothing to* the soul; hut if it is a part of the soul, the rest of the soul also will lx* happy. Who likewise is the charioteer of the soul ? Is it not that which is most delightful to us, and as some one may say most capital 1 And how i« it possible not to admit this, if it is the charioteer who governs the whole of our essence, who raises Ins head to, and surveys the supercelestial place, and is assimilated to the gr< at leader [Jupiter], who drives a winged chariot, and is the first charioteer that proceeds into the heavens? But if that which is the summit in us is the charioteer, and he, as it is said in the Pha*drus, at one time
1 Instead of here, it is nrrejyary to rrad
* For attairrprxjHHt here, read aharrpo^wi.
4 48
IMtOCl.l N ON THE
[OOOK ▼.
sublimely tends to the place beyond the heavens, at another time enters into the heavens, and at another Incomes lame, an I sutlers a drthixion of his wm?i, it evidently follows, that the summit of our nati re subsists differently at different times. This therefore, the reader will find elsewhere more copiously discussed.