lime was generated together with the heaven. And Unis nnirii for this admonition. Hut whether Plato know, or did not know that there are supermundane sord", is to he investigated. Tor it is worthy of inquiry, since lie nowhere clearly says that lh< re is a soul of this kind. And to those w ho do not admit that then* are supermundane souls, it must he said, that it is requisite there should he souls of this kind, which are impartiripahle, hut understand transitively, and in this difi« r from intellect ; and which likewise intellectually perceive more than one tiling at a time, and m this transcend mundane souls. For the progression is not collectively, from imderstandin" all things at once, to the intellectual perception of one tiling at a time ; hut is through the perception of more things than one, vet not of all things at once. It follows therefore, that those w ho through these reasons admit, that there are souls prior to the world, should show how these souls are media between the impartible and partible essence, and if they are partible, what this partibility is, and if they are distributed into parts, and similar!v fashioned with mundane souls, by what contrivance they are prior to these, when they do not at all dither trom them according to livposlasis ?
If also it he requisite that 1 should pay some attention to my own oracle, I should say, that each of these supermundane souls has the intellectual nature, which it participates lor the impartible which is above it. For that supermundane intellect is primarily participate. Facli likewise, has the partible nature not simply, hut so tar as the multitude 01 mundane natures i" suspended from them. Hence, they are more impartible than partible, just as on the contrary, the last of souls are more partible than impartible, because the partible and not the impartible, is the peculiarity of their « sseiice. I h nee too, eai h of these is the peculiarity' of the souls that subsist between the supermundane and the last of souls. For the impartible is peculiar to them, because a peculiar intellect is established above each of them ; and also the partible, because a peculiar body is suspended from each. And as in the latitude of souls there are so many differences, these differences cause tin* soul either not 1 always to abide oil hi^h, or to abide and be supermundane, or to abide and be mundane. By conceiving therefore, the soul wliii h ranks as a medium between these, to be a tiling of this kind, we shall not wonder if souls were generated equal accordin'; to section, but that some of them have their boundaries as far as to superficies, and others, as far as to solids ; w Inch also makes the latter to Ik* mundane, and to proceed into bodies; but preserves the former prior to the world, and w ithout any contact with body. Perhaps too, some of them proceed as far as to linear boundaries, but others as far as to superficies. Jlence, some of them arc alone supermundane, but others are media
1 Ov is omitted here in the original.
.WO L’ROCLUS ON THE [book v.
between supermundane and mundane souls, just as superficies are media between linear Itouiularies and solids.
Moreover, it is not at all wonderful that the harmony should be dilli-rent from tlie threegenera of modulations in sensibles. For it is not necessary that there should Ik* only three harmonies, but that this number of them should be apprehended in sounds commensurate w ith sense. It is not however impossible that there may be certain harmonies more excellent than these, since these three genera are not assumed from division, but from experiment and sense. These also may lie admitted to exist in su|w-rmmu!ane sends, by the insertion of two media as far as to linear boundaries, and as far as to superficies, in the first duple and triple alone, or in the intervals that follow, and in these producing two circles. Ihrc likevvise, cutting the internal circles onlv in half; for there are two intervals; but t/n re, into three parts. For so many are the intervals of the five boundaries. 1 leiice Jure, on* and three are generated, but tfurc one and five, just as IMato in tin* mundane souls, makes one and seven. According to all tilings tin rclure, it is possible for those supermundane to differ from mundane souls, and according to the medium and the multitude of circles. The ratios of IMato also, have that widt h is common, and which extends to every psyehical essence, elevating us from the psyehogony which proceeds into solid numbeis, to that which is inort simple than this, and proceeds as tar as to superficies, and from this to that vvhith proceeds only as far a* to lines. They also produce three psyehogonies, which accoril with the three genera of souls. For the progression from ail essence* perfectly impartible, into that which is distributed at cording to all imnibers, is not without a medium; but here likewise, as in all oilier things, the progression is through media. It however, this lx- the case, it is not at all vvoiideifid, that partial souls, m which the partible nature immediately exists, but the impartible through other media, which are elevated prior to them to intellects, should cause the divisions to become more numerous with the partible nature, and these to Ik* more than with the impartible. I mean, for instance, that the sesquioctaves should Ik* divided with the apotoma* and tin* leiiumas, and that this same diatonic genus should he in them, with two intervals, but which as it wa re define the diatessaron and diapeiite, the same ratios living preserved in the extremes ; so that in these abo, the psy chogoiiir ratios take place, lint with a more abundant difference, For of the middle genera, essence predominating, makes a divine soul, sameness a da-moniaeal, and difference, a partial soul. These likewise predominating according to different modes, many divine, many da uiouiaeal, and liuuiy partial souls, are cunstiliiled ; as IMato also indicates, when he says, that the Fb miurgiis assuming the second and third gradations of the mixture, gavo nooK v.]
TIM AX'S Of PLA'IX).
3«l subsistence to partial souls. For l*y assuming m these that which is similar to tins, wo shall ho ahlo to assign tho dillercnee.s ot’ them with reference to all tho luitldlo ami tho lir-t souls, ami likewise to ■ tho following < oimnoii definition of all of th< m. Soul is an essence, which is a medium l>» tween truly-existing i*sseneo amt generation, being mingled from tho middle genera, divided into essential number, hound together hy all the middles, diatonirally harmonized, living one ami a twofold lift*, and being gnostic in one, and also a twofold manner. For hv adding to this definition the peculiarities, we shall ha\e the projier numhers of divine or da-tnoniacal, or partial souls, from the essential hypostasis of each. Wo shall likew ise lie very far from saying, that soul is the cutttccheia of the hodv, or of the physical organ hav ing life in capacity. For this definition, neither in asserting that soul pertains to a certain tiling, says what it is, nor does it comprehend every soul. For div ine souls are not the souls of organic bodies ; nor does this definition avoid comprehending in itself the tiling defined, l or that whirl i lives in capacity, has soul incapacity; all which inconveniences are avoided hy the definition gmn hy 11 s above, which is truly a definition, powers that which is common, ami which extends to all the genera of souls, explains its middle essence, and hy no means makes the object of investigation a part of the definition. We have however, been thus prolix, for the purpose of giving complt tion to the parturitions of our soul, though Flafo should not speak of the supermundane soul.
Hut if some one should doubt, why Plato does not mention other souls, the di\ ine, and t lie da iiiouiacnl, it must he said to him in reply, that Plato assumes the same mixture in tiie>e. I'or though ihenioniacal diller from divine souls, yet he survevsas one, ail the until filed genus of souls, w hen compared w ith the genesiur- L \c sold. At the same time also, 11 ir*»ii"h making mention ot the souls that exists as extremes, and asserting that they derive their suhsistenre from the Crater, he manifests that the form of all the middle -amis i> from thence, lint I mean hv the extremes, the soul of the universe, and partial souls. For that he gives peculiar souls to the stars, and to the sublunary Cods, is evident Ironi what is said in tiie Laws. For he there says, that we do not see the soul, hut we siv* the body of them; and he inquires, how the soul itself moves the body? It is likewise ev ident from what has been l>efore said by him in tins dialogue. For lie calls the stars div ine animals. Whence therefore, do they possess the divine nature, and whence their peculiar motion ? For if some one should say, that a divine animal does not at all diller according to the partible life, from the vilest animals on the. earth, it would alone receive an entcltcficia Irom the universe. Shall we not however, give souls to the sublunary Gods, who are the progeny of
p. 382
PROCIX'S ON THE
[noon v.
Hi >aven anil Earth, anil of Ocean anil Tethys? Hut in this case, how will they any longer be («ods ? For they will either lie more excellent than souls, or they will have souls. But if they are mundane ( Hods, divine souls will !*e susi>ended from them. Anil the same reasoning applies to ihemons. If however, as we ha\e said, Plato does not now mention these, it is not wonderful, l or the mode of subsistence in them, is not similar to that of partial souls. For to all their souls, the immutable, the uninelining, and the not proceeding out of inti lligibles, are common; but propensity to the realms of generation, audacity and a dcfluxlon of the wings, originate from the souls that are now produced.
It'also, we should again impure, in what divine, da-moniacal, and partial souls, differ from the mundane soul, according to the psychogonic diagram ; tor it i- not possible that secondary souls 1 should entirely consist of the same things as those that are prior to tin m 1 We must .-ay, in answer to this inquiry, that the same ratios an- in all of them. For Plato makes mention of the same as existing likewise in partial souls, such fur instance, as se-quioetaves, sesquitertian, and sesquialter ratios, llut the terms or boundari* s, m which the ratios are contained, are difft r« lit. For the terms wliii l» are assumed, in all the psyehogouie diagram of the nniiulane soul, are primary ratios. Nothing therefore hinders then* being duple ratios in divine souls, and that there should l*e an increase of these, if it should so happen in d emoniacal soul-, after another inanm-r. For progression increases multitude. There will cither therefore he a dillm-nre in the terms, or in the* ratios. But this is impossible ill the latter. For, as we have already observed, lie mentions these, as also existing in partial souls. 1 lenee, a difference must I»e assumed in the terms; just as there is a difference in partial souls with reference- to these, not only in the terms, but also in the divisions of certain ratios; so that the ratios are common, but the terms dilh-rent. Impartiality therefore, or an exemption from the distribution into parts of partial souls, will be common to all da tnoniaeal souls. But an increase of the number of the ratios in partial souls, causes them to be in a greater degree partible than ihemons, and to descend, instead of abiding on high. And such as arc the decisions of my oracle concerning these particulars.
What however, is the meaning of the words, "mingling he tempered?" Shall we say, that the union in those lives ha- an arrangement more ancii lit and venerable than division ? And how is it possible we should not assert this to be the case } For mixture is in things which are divided, and separation is consequent
‘ Instead of ran hvTtpau in this place, ll is necessary to read, rat ttirffiut.
hook v.]
TIM.TXS or PLATO.
p. 383