and Plato. For Plato in the Philebus mentions two Craters, the one Vuleanian, but the other Dionysiaeal. And Oifdieus knm united of the Crater of Bacchus , but he also establishes many others about the solar table. Ami with respect to Homer, does lie not represent IIebe as pouring out wine, and Ynlcan drinking from a bowl, and distributing nectar to all the Cods 1 These things however, require a more abundant discussion. But what has been said will be sutlicient for the pre¬ sent purpose, since in another work, we shall inv« stigate a more perfect devclope- ineiil of each particular, if it pleases the Cods.
Some one however, may doubt, through what cause Plato, wlien generating the soul ot the univi rse, makes no mi ntion ot the Crater, but only of the mixture and commixture ; but in the gent lation ot partial souls, he at the same tune mentions it, and reminds us of the mixture ot the soul of the universe 9 In answer to this, it must lie said, that in the first place divine souls in proceeding, abide in the ( rater, ami do not depart from their fountain ; but partial souls are separated from, and frequently proceed out of it, through verging to generation. In the former then-fore, is lieing vehemently uniti d, he does not separate the Crater from the mixture. I lence some appreht ml that the soul of the universe is the first sou! ; and others denominate it .Itmo, not being able to diviih it from its proper foun¬ tain. But in these [i. e. in partial souls], as being separated from the Crabr, Plato disjoins the cause [i e, the Crater] from the things posterior to it. In the se< olid place, it must be said, that the w hole of the ps\ eliii al ordi r is constituted by both, v i/. by the miugler and the (’rater ; but since one part of this order abides, but the other proceeds, and one rejoices in union, but the other is a friend to division, hence, the Ih-iuiurgiis in a greater degree constitutes tin* former, than the Crater; but the latter as being more material, is more allied to the prolific cause [i. e. to the Ciati-r]. On this account, in the former, the whole is attributed to the I)< imiirgus ; but in the generation of partial souls, the (.'rater is assumed. I he tables ot the Creeks also assert things of tins kind. I or they say that Julio is the cause of insanity, lint Jupiter of temperaiici ; and the former, of labours about generation ; but the latti r, of an eh-valiou from it. Fur Juno excites all things to progression, multiplies them, and causes them by h< r illuminations, to be prolific. And thus much m answer to the doubt.
But 1 think it fit that the divine Iatnblicus should look to these words of Plato, and assume from them, that Plato constitutes the soul of the world, and not the siijierceh stial soul, from tin* mixture of the middle genera. For how, as his design was to constitute the universe, could lie opportunely make mention of the .super- mundanc Mud, since w heu he mentions time, which is allotted a supermundane order, he at the sain< time co-arranges it with the universe * For lie says that
Book T.]
Tim/Fa’S of Plato
lime was generated together with the heaven. And Unis nnirii for this admoni- tion. Hut whether Plato know, or did not know that there are supermundane sord", is to he investigated. Tor it is worthy of inquiry, since lie nowhere clearly says that lh< re is a soul of this kind. And to those w ho do not admit that then* are supermundane souls, it must he said, that it is requisite there should he souls of this kind, which are impartiripahle, hut understand transitively, and in this dif- i« r from intellect ; and which likewise intellectually perceive more than one tiling at a time, and m this transcend mundane souls. For the progression is not col¬ lectively, from imderstandin" all things at once, to the intellectual perception of one tiling at a time ; hut is through the perception of more things than one, vet not of all things at once. It follows therefore, that those w ho through these reasons admit, that there are souls prior to the world, should show how these souls are media between the impartible and partible essence, and if they are partible, what this partibility is, and if they are distributed into parts, and similar!v fashioned with mundane souls, by what contrivance they are prior to these, when they do not at all dither trom them according to livposlasis ?
If also it he requisite that 1 should pay some attention to my own oracle, I should say, that each of these supermundane souls has the intellectual nature, which it participates lor the impartible which is above it. For that supermundane intellect is primarily participate. Facli likewise, has the partible nature not simply, hut so tar as the multitude 01 mundane natures i" suspended from them. Hence, they are more impartible than partible, just as on the contrary, the last of souls are more partible than impartible, because the partible and not the imparti¬ ble, is the peculiarity of their « sseiice. I h nee too, eai h of these is the peculiarity' of the souls that subsist between the supermundane and the last of souls. For the impartible is peculiar to them, because a peculiar intellect is established above each of them ; and also the partible, because a peculiar body is suspended from each. And as in the latitude of souls there are so many differences, these diffe¬ rences cause tin* soul either not 1 always to abide oil hi^h, or to abide and be supermundane, or to abide and be mundane. By conceiving therefore, the soul wliii h ranks as a medium between these, to be a tiling of this kind, we shall not wonder if souls were generated equal accordin'; to section, but that some of them have their boundaries as far as to superficies, and others, as far as to solids ; w Inch also makes the latter to Ik* mundane, and to proceed into bodies; but preserves the former prior to the world, and w ithout any contact with body. Perhaps too, some of them proceed as far as to linear boundaries, but others as far as to su¬ perficies. Jlence, some of them arc alone supermundane, but others are media
1 Ov is omitted here in the original.
.WO L’ROCLUS ON THE [book v.
between supermundane and mundane souls, just as superficies are media between linear Itouiularies and solids.
Moreover, it is not at all wonderful that the harmony should be dilli-rent from tlie threegenera of modulations in sensibles. For it is not necessary that there should Ik* only three harmonies, but that this number of them should be appre¬ hended in sounds commensurate w ith sense. It is not however impossible that there may be certain harmonies more excellent than these, since these three genera are not assumed from division, but from experiment and sense. These also may lie admitted to exist in su|w-rmmu!ane sends, by the insertion of two media as far as to linear boundaries, and as far as to superficies, in the first duple and triple alone, or in the intervals that follow, and in these producing two cir¬ cles. Ihrc likevvise, cutting the internal circles onlv in half; for there are two intervals; but t/n re, into three parts. For so many are the intervals of the five boundaries. 1 leiice Jure, on* and three are generated, but tfurc one and five, just as IMato in tin* mundane souls, makes one and seven. According to all tilings tin rclure, it is possible for those supermundane to differ from mundane souls, and according to the medium and the multitude of circles. The ratios of IMato also, have that widt h is common, and which extends to every psyehical essence, ele¬ vating us from the psyehogony which proceeds into solid numbeis, to that which is inort simple than this, and proceeds as tar as to superficies, and from this to that vvhith proceeds only as far a* to lines. They also produce three psyehogo- nies, which accoril with the three genera of souls. For the progression from ail essence* perfectly impartible, into that which is distributed at cording to all imni- bers, is not without a medium; but here likewise, as in all oilier things, the pro¬ gression is through media. It however, this lx- the case, it is not at all vvoiideifid, that partial souls, m which the partible nature immediately exists, but the impar¬ tible through other media, which are elevated prior to them to intellects, should cause the divisions to become more numerous with the partible nature, and these to Ik* more than with the impartible. I mean, for instance, that the sesquioctaves should Ik* divided with the apotoma* and tin* leiiumas, and that this same diatonic genus should he in them, with two intervals, but which as it wa re define the dia- tessaron and diapeiite, the same ratios living preserved in the extremes ; so that in these abo, the psy chogoiiir ratios take place, lint with a more abundant dif¬ ference, For of the middle genera, essence predominating, makes a divine soul, sameness a da-moniaeal, and difference, a partial soul. These likewise predo¬ minating according to different modes, many divine, many da uiouiaeal, and liuuiy partial souls, are cunstiliiled ; as IMato also indicates, when he says, that the Fb miurgiis assuming the second and third gradations of the mixture, gavo
nooK v.]
TIM AX'S Of PLA'IX).
subsistence to partial souls. For l*y assuming m these that which is similar to tins, wo shall ho ahlo to assign tho dillercnee.s ot’ them with reference to all tho luitldlo ami tho lir-t souls, ami likewise to ■ tho following < oimnoii definition of all of th< m. Soul is an essence, which is a medium l>» tween truly-existing i*s- seneo amt generation, being mingled from tho middle genera, divided into essential number, hound together hy all the middles, diatonirally harmonized, living one ami a twofold lift*, and being gnostic in one, and also a twofold man¬ ner. For hv adding to this definition the peculiarities, we shall ha\e the projier numhers of divine or da-tnoniacal, or partial souls, from the essential hypostasis of each. Wo shall likew ise lie very far from saying, that soul is the cutttccheia of the hodv, or of the physical organ hav ing life in capacity. For this definition, neither in asserting that soul pertains to a certain tiling, says what it is, nor does it comprehend every soul. For div ine souls are not the souls of organic bodies ; nor does this definition avoid comprehending in itself the tiling defined, l or that whirl i lives in capacity, has soul incapacity; all which inconveniences are avoided hy the definition gmn hy 11 s above, which is truly a definition, powers that which is common, ami which extends to all the genera of souls, explains its middle essence, and hy no means makes the object of investigation a part of the definition. We have however, been thus prolix, for the purpose of giving com- plt tion to the parturitions of our soul, though Flafo should not speak of the super¬ mundane soul.
Hut if some one should doubt, why Plato does not mention other souls, the di\ ine, and t lie da iiiouiacnl, it must he said to him in reply, that Plato assumes the same mixture in tiie>e. I'or though ihenioniacal diller from divine souls, yet he survevsas one, ail the until filed genus of souls, w hen compared w ith the genesiur- L \c sold. At the same time also, 11 ir*»ii"h making mention ot the souls that exists as extremes, and asserting that they derive their suhsistenre from the Crater, he manifests that the form of all the middle -amis i> from thence, lint I mean hv the extremes, the soul of the universe, and partial souls. For that he gives peculiar souls to the stars, and to the sublunary Cods, is evident Ironi what is said in tiie Laws. For he there says, that we do not see the soul, hut we siv* the body of them; and he inquires, how the soul itself moves the body? It is likewise ev ident from what has been l>efore said by him in tins dialogue. For lie calls the stars div ine animals. Whence therefore, do they possess the divine nature, and whence their peculiar motion ? For if some one should say, that a divine animal does not at all diller according to the partible life, from the vilest animals on the. earth, it would alone receive an entcltcficia Irom the universe. Shall we not however, give souls to the sublunary Gods, who are the progeny of
Procix's on the
[noon v.