The Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor (1820)

In what is here said, Plato sjieaks about the knowledge of sensible*, and how the reason in the soul of the universe generates tlnn knowledge, \ i/. bv moving tlie circle of the different, and the reasons in it which preside over the orderly distri¬ bution of whole*, ami I y preserving tlu^ circle m a state of undeviating rectitude. For rectitude manifests n^/it ojuuinu, as Poiphyry interprets, and lamhlielms ailmits. It likewise manifests tlie untamed ami the non-verging in provideutial energies. For unwearied, and rapidly-nmv ing power, are adapted to intelligence ; hut tlie indexible, and the uiiinelined, to provident e and prolitic energies. And to the impaitihle essem e indeed, purity 1 of int< lligenee, i> adapted ; hut to the partible essence, umleliled energy. Porphyry then-lore, considers the circle which is moved witn rectitude to be impartible; but that which is not accurately a circle, but in a certain respect participates of a right line, to be partible, For the knowledge of seiisihles lends to external*, and is attain reflected to the soul itself. Hence, that w Inch is not accurately a circle in the soul, is neither a right line alone, stu h as is the know h dge of sense, nor a riri le, such as is the know ledge of diauoia. lamhlielms however, rejects all this, as pertaining to human, and not to divine knowledge. When therefore, the charioteer moves tlie circle of the different, lint this remaining umlev kiting and eonverted to itself, excites the reasons of sen-ihles, and announces to the whole soul the quality of each sensible object ; (since the whole soul knows according to this, every tiling si iisihle; for tin* circle of the same when it beholds intelligible*, knows also seiisihles as from cause, hut the circle of the differtnt knows them immediately, and as it were in a eo-ordinate manner)—when tins is the case, then stable and true opinions and lieiii-f, arc generated m it. For the more divine soul judiciously approving, or rather, im¬ parting by illumination, a more intellectual energy to the doxastie circle, this cir¬ cle possesses with purity its own proper life, and the knowledge in it is rendered stable, antecedently comprehending in itself in a stable manner things that are locally moved, hut such as arc flowing and contingent, faithfully and stably.

* For kn(kifioTtjT»t here, it is necessary to read «n0op jtij»

Proci.Us on T1if

[ROOK III.

urn

For opinion indeed, it the energy and knowledge of the Jams tic soul ; but faith is the stable a n dundeviating judgment of opinion. Ami thus much concerning this par¬ ticular.

It deserves to lx* investigated however, how the circle of the different is, as has lictMi said, gnostic of every thing sensible, anil the circle ot the same, is gnostic of intelligible*, as will lie said. For though by dividing the motive powers from each other, one of the ciri les is tin* < anse of motion to the right hand, lint the other of motion to the left, vet the gnostic povw rs must not he separated after the same manner, hut it must he admitted that they have a knowledge of setisihles or intelligible*. Mav it not therefore he said, that the vital motions pertain to progressions, hut the gnostic to regressions ? And the circle of the same, indeed, as lieing proximate to int» Iligihhs, proceeding from thence, is by proceeding moved vitally, forms hv its progression the first period, and through it moves the whole world, l’or the less principal follow the more principal periods. The assettioii of Aristotle also is true, that generation is moved according to both ; possessing the invariable from the motion to the right hand, hut tlit variable from the circulation to the left hand. The circle of tin same then lore, is converted to the intelligible; and on this account is gnostic ot intelligihles. lienee it is neces¬ sary that everv vvhere conversion or regression should follow permanency. But the circle of the different, abiding in the circle ot the same ; for it is proximately comprehended in this, just as this is by intellect; proceeds through vital motion, to the second thing, vv huh is moved hv it, I mean to the second circulation;' and through this also moves generation, just as tin* cir< le ot the same, through the iner- ratic spin re, moves the universe, lb ing converted hnvvi ver, or returning through knowledge, it is converted to the vital motion ot the circle of the same which is proximately above it. But returning to it through know ledge, it is gnostieally converted to that which the vital motion of the circle ot the same administers vitally And thus it obtains a knowledge of the whole world, conjoining the regression of itself to this circ le of sameness, which abides prior to it. Thus too, the one circle becomes gnostic of inti lligiblcs, hut the other of sensible*. I'or it the latter moves the period of the different, it is necessary that it should know this period and also the things of vvliit h it is the leader, and what being a medium it follows; just as it is necessary that the circle of the same, if it moves the universe, should know to vv hat lieing assimilated, it lives this life. So that to the one of these circles the regression is through a part to the whole; hut to the other,

* viz. The tiriuldhon of 1 tie [ibnilarv spheres.

Tim/Elis of Plato

i «at

through a whole to another whole. * Ami thus much has been said by us in answer to this inquiry, which demands profound consideration.

It is not proper therefore, to think th.it the soul of the universe receives the knowledge of sensibles externally, or that it is m want of organs to the apprehen¬ sion of them. For these things pertain to partial souls. But we ought to con¬ ceive, that being converted to itself, it has tin* reasons of sensibles, produced in energy from itself. Hence also, Plato accurately says, that the circle of the ilitli rent energizes about that which is sensible, but not towards the sensible essence, in order that he might indicate the causal comprehension of sensibles in the reasons of the soul, but not a knowledge co-ordinate with sensibles, ami firmly established in them. And thus much concerning the tilings themselves. The words however, “ enunciates to the xiholc soul,' arc concordant with the words, “ it speaks, being moved through the whole <f itsilf." But they indicate, that the circle of the different, proxiinately comes into contact with sensibles; and that through this the w hole soul obtains a knowledge of them. The word aorov how¬ ever [i. e. of i/] may, as Porphyry also has observed, be multifariously inter¬ preted, but ought rather to l>e attributed to reason. For opinions, and the belief of the circle proceeding with rectitude, and enunciating sensibles, are the progeny of reason. For opinions and lielief are in the doxastic part of the soul indeed, but pertain to reason, so far as they are moved, excited, and contained by it. And thus much concerning the co-arrangement of reason with the circle of the different. But in the next place, Plato speaks of its co-arrangement with the circle of the same, adding as follows :

“ But when again, it is conversant with the logistic * power, and the circle of the same revolving with facility indicates its pereeptions, then intellect and science are necessarily produced.”

Plato entirely opposes 1 the rational to the sensible, the revolving with facility to the straight or right, the is to the generated, indication to enunciation, intellect to opinion, and science to faith. The logistic however, is not that which reasons, as some one may suppose, hut the intelligible itself. For this he opposes to the sensible, because reasoning there is more divine than in the soul, as we have

1 i t. The repression of the circle of the some, is through the world to it* paradigm: each of these being a vholr, but the former a sensible, and the latter an intelligible tc/wle.

* lor Xfiyuor litre, it is necessary to read \cynmmy.

* Instead of nrrftiprcr 10 tbit place, read aereOijser.

Tim. Plat. Vol. II.

[book 11).

frequently observed, ant! in intelligible* always subsists in energy. Ami it seems that he thus denominates the rational the logistic, just as lie afterwards calls the sensible the sensitive. Tor tin sensible is motive of sense, ami the intelligible of the reasoning of the soul. Hence the logistic’ will lie that which is compre¬ hended by the reasoning of the soul; and this antecedently comprehending cause, is liomonyniously to reasoning called logistic. But he cal w the intellectual voluble, as having the unimpeded in transition, and also the circular, and the flourishing, likewise perfection in intellections, the energizing about divinity, the boniform, ami the revolving about tin* intelligible as a centre, “ hastening to conjoin yourself to the centre of resounding light,' says some one of the Hods. Hie word being likewise signifies that wlm h is tilled with truly existing Wings and is united to them. But the word indicates signifies, to untold as it were into light, to teach, and to product* from that which is arcane, hart her still, by intellect here, niu.-t be understood the intellect which is ai cording to habit. For intellect has a threefold subsistence ; the Jirst indeed, being divine, such as is tin demiurgic intellect; but the second, being that which is participated by soul, and is essential and se-U'-perfect; and the Hind, that which subsists according to habit, and on account of which tin* soul is intellectual. And science is tin* tir>t knowledge which is filla.-d from inlclligibh ■>, ami exists with an unincliiiing, non-verging, and immu¬ table energy. But it differs from intellect, * so lar as the latter i* surveyed in the simple projections alone of the soul. For through it the soul at once intellec¬ tually jierceivcs the whole of each object of intellection; since the at-once- cullected in energit s, is the peculiarity ot intellect. But science is surveyed in the knowledge from cause. For this is the peculiarity of science as is also the composition and division of forms. For it is evident, that having a knowledge of beings, it also know*, which among them have the order of causes, and which of effects. But all know ledge of this kind is called science, just as the simple appre¬ hension oj each object of intellection is called intelligence. And such is our expla¬ nation.

landilichus however, conceives this intellect to lie more ancient than soul, supernally containing, and giving perfection to it. He also contends against those, who either immediately conjoin the soul to all-pcrfrcl intellect, (tor it is necessary that the transition should not 1 h* immediate from exempt natures to participants, but that there should he middle essences co-arraiiged with the things that participate) or who suppose intellect to he a habit of the soul, lor it is ne-

* litre also fur X. -/<». », read XoytaTtKuy.

1 Non is omitted here iu the original.

Rook 111.]

TIM.LUS or PLATO.