Again. tin* In nr it subsists, is there according to the differences of participations. For many things participate differently of the same jicculiarity. Tims for instance, permanency paiticipatcs of sammess, and motion also participates of it, yet not after the same manner, hut the former more, and the latter less. In the orders of forms likewise, intelligible* participate in one way o (the one, or of essence, hut intellectuals in another w ay, and of these some differently from others, according to the measures of the essence of each. Hence the how it subsists is there. Hut the xchen i> there, either according to the operations of intelligible* on sublunary natures ; for these sometimes participate of them, and they become sometimes parlicipahle by certain things; or it is there, according to the intellections them¬ selves of the soul. For the soul applying itself at different times to different forms, at one time, intellectually perceives these, hut at another those. And eternal being sometimes accedes to it, in the same manner as sometimes the intel¬ ligible. Each thing likewise i- there, r nth rcjcrcncc to each, so far as all things are in ear h other, and proceed through each other, and all things are allied ami adapt¬ ed to all ; or so far as they are suspended from a certain one, or so far as one is cause, hut another the thing caused ; or so far as in some wav or other they sul>- sist dilli rently. Ami to suffer is there, so far as they are filled from each other, and all things impart to all their own peculiarities. For Plato frerpientlv mani¬ fest spartii ipation by the word suffering, as we may learn in the Snphista. For he there says, that uhole is the sufficing one [or that which is passive to the om], hut is not the one itself, Irecause it participates of the one. These things therefore, are in intelligible* and in sensible*, because both in the latter and m the former, it happens that each exists and suffers with reference to each. Plato therefore, [as I have said,] is accustomed to indicate participations by sufficing, and as we have said, to call every thing which participates, that which suffers the thing' of which it participates.
In short, the soul of the universe speaks through the whole of itself according to one knowledge, both of generated natures, and of those which possess an eter¬ nal sameness of being, and asserts of each what that is with which it is the same, ami from which it is different, and how each subsists according to existence, or ac¬ tion, or passion. For both among real beings, and generated natures, one tiling in a greater degree suffers from another, and one thing in a greater degree acts on
* For miw litre, it it rcijuiMte to rcavl »ti»ov.
Proceus on the
another; all which the soul intellectually perceiving, asserts some indeed through the circle of the same, but others through the circle of the different, Tor it ante¬ cedently comprehends all sensibles, anil their actions and passions. For since the universe is one animal, it is copassive with itself, so that all generated natures are parts of the life of the universe, as of one drama. Just as if a tragic poet should compose a drama, in which the gods and heroes, and other persons, are introduced, and in which also he assigns to su< li of the players as are willing the utterance of heroic or certain other speeches ; the poet himself in the meantime comprehending the one cause of all that is said. It is requisite therefore, to con¬ ceive a thing ot this kind in the whole soul of the universe. For giving subsistence to all the life of the world, which is one and v arious, like a many headed animal speakingwith all its heads, and uttering partly (irecian and partly Barbaric lan¬ guage, this soul comprehends the causes ot all generated natures; and knows particulais by universals, accidents by essences, and parts by wholes. But it knows all things simply according to its divine part. For a (Jod so tar as a(»od knows things partial, and preternatural, and in short all things, even though you should adduce matter itself. For every thing, whatever it may lie is one, so fur as it is h um the one. The knowledge therefore of all things simply and immedi¬ ately, is div ine.
“ Hut reason becoming true according to same, and also being conver¬ sant with different, and revolving about same without speech and sound, m that which is moved by it."
Atticus by raison here, understands the attentive power of the soul; but Por¬ phyry, the cliarioti-er, moving the twofold horses; and lamblichus the whole soul. For the soul movesthe whole of itself, and through the whole of itself is the reason of beings. And all the interpretations indeed, appear to exhibit the meaning of Plato, but that of Porphyry i-' mon concordant, both with what is here and else¬ where said. For this reason which is now assumed, is neither that which is essential, nor that which subsists in energy, but that which is as d>** one power of the essence of souls, according to which also the soul is one, just as it is Informed according to sameness and dillcrence. Or why were there not three circles, one according to each of the elements which are three, lint two only, unless there is one essence in both } 'Flic power therefore of this one essence, is ibis reason, which is neither i ssence itself, nor the energy from essence having the third order. Hence this reason Ix-ing one, knows according to the same. I pV it does not sometimes know the intelligible, and sometimes the sensible, like our reason, winch is not able to apprehend both according to the same. This reason
hook in.] TIM.IX'S OF PLATO. 105
therefore, knows at once both same and different about the intelligible, and about the sensible essence, not being true, like intellect, but becoming true about both, on account of the transitive nature of its knowledge of both. So that the words according lo same, signify the difference between the knowledge of a divine soul, ami our knowledge; but the word becoming signifies the difference between psychical and intellectual knowledge. This reason therefore, knows inlclligibles and sensibles, by coming into contact with intelligible and sensible sameness and difference; but it passes through the whole soul, here indeed, moving the circle of the same, but tin re, the cin le of the different; and by the one surveying in¬ telligible*, but by the other sensible*. In this respect likewise, it adumbrates the whole Demiurgus, concerning whom it is said, [by the Chaldean Oracles] “ by in¬ tellect he possesses intelligible*, but he introduces sense to the worlds.” For thus also the psychical reason, b< ing borne along in the soul so as to move both itself and the w hole soul, about intelligible and sensible sameness and difference, at one time produces opinions and persuasions, but at another, intellect and science, becoming indeed, and not being true, in the same manner as intcllci t itself. For in¬ tellect i* really true, and i* true according to same ; either a* at once know ing both beings and generated natures, or as always being such, and not sometimes, like the reason ofpartinl souls. For tin* i* not always invariably true, h< ing fill* d with error and ignorance through generation. Or this reason is becoming to be true, as being transitive in it* twofold knowledg ■; but is true according to same, as always comprehending the a hole form of each object of knowledge, and not conformably to our reason, evolving t m h of the forms which it beholds, but surveying at once the whole of • very thing which it sees. For we meeting with a different part of the same thing, do not see aeeording to same, but we perceive each thing partially. Or it mav be said, that this reason is according to same, when conversant with sameness and difference. Incoming simply after the same manner true, both about the intelligi¬ ble and the sensible, a* knowing both at once, so far as same, and so fir a* dif¬ ferent, that it may see and tell that the one lias it> progression from the other.
lo be therefore, according to same, manifests that tins reason is gnostic, according to one projecting energy, both of that which is truly different, and that which is truly same. For possessing at once a transitive know ledge of these, tins reason is becoming to be true, anti of wInch the energy is to speak of that which is truly same, and of that w hich is truly different, in the intelligible, 1 and in the sensible nature. For the work of this reason is to see in what intelligible^ differ from sensibles. For it is necessary that there should lie a certain thing
1 There is uu omission here in llie original of row cr ry rotjry.
HMi
I'ROCMIS ON tin:
[nuOK in.
which is gnostic of both, in order that it may sav intelligible ■ are one thing, but sensible another. But “ it is borne alum' m that which is moved by it," as proceed¬ ing into the twofold circles, and turning both itself and them. For the bit ion manifests the progression from one knowledge, ditided into a twofold knowledge. This reason itself however, is a uniform knowledge [or a knowledge hating tin: form ot the one], both ot liitelhgibles and seiisibles. dr it may be said, that it speaks in tin* soil!, because the intelligible is one thing and the sensible another' or that it knows 1 both, being prior to both the circles, which know intelligibles and seiisihles m a divided manner. I or since the soul is both a monad ami a duad, according to one knowledge, it unitedly comprehends intelligibles and setisibles ; and again, it comprehends some things according to the circle of the Siime, but others, according to the « ircle ot tin* diffti cut. As therclore, ill essence, the monadic precedes tin Informed, and this is also the case m harmony, in torm, and in powers, thus also in gnostic energii s, the one reason is the primary leader of distributed knowledge. These things howeier, have been frequently repeated hv me, through the ainbiguitv in which the interpreters aie mvulved in explaining them.
Plato therefore, indicating these particulars, says that reason itself becoming true is borne along [i. e. re\ol\esj about both the intelligible and the sensible, in that w hich is moved by it, i. e. in each of the circles. But it is borne along with¬ out sjiecch and sound, l'or inward reason is not at all in want of either ot these; but thev are requisite to that reason wl icli proceeds through the mouth. So that it is just as if lie had said, that this reason has a motion more perfect than every 1 energy which proceeds externally , loir sound and yoice are assumed as symbols of sensible motions. Inward reason therefore, as being the charioteer, and moving in its course each of the circles, produces in ih a twofold kuoyy ledge, yvluch Plato delivers in yyhat follows. But if yye read, as \ye find it y\ritten in the most accu¬ rate manuscripts, in that which is nun til by itst/J, and not, in that which is min ed by it, viz. by reason, this will manifest the vvhole soul, signifying it from its definition. For the tiling defined, is in a certain respect the same vuth the definition of it. Jteason therefore, being borne* along in the soul; for it is the soul which is moved by itself; at one time knows the same and different of sensibh s, but at anotlii r, of intelligibles. And it seems that same and different especially characterize know¬ ledge, in the same manner as motion and p< rinanency characterize life*. Hence
* I\>r uno/rci in litis it t> nc< i-ssarv lo read imjru.
1 1 or iila here, read ttbui.
J 1 s»r irnffae in tlio |il.ue, it is olniotiilv neeejsary lo rea l iraoiji.
hook in.]
TIM Til'S OF lM,\TO.
Hi7
also, Plato particularly makes mention of these, because all knowledge has an nlliance to them.
“ When it is conversant with a sensible nature, and the circle of the (afferent proceeding with rectitude, enunciates uhat it perceives to the whole soul; then stable and true opinions and belief arc produced.”