telligible and eternal beings, as farms' in the Demiurgus, hut other essences pos¬ terior to him, if soul has the same ratio to all generated natures, that the Demiur¬ gus has to eternal beings. And must either make him look to things posterior to him, though in Ins speech to the junior Gods, when he commits to them the fabrication of mortal natures, he orders them to imitate his power about their generation, lie does not, therefore, fabricate immortal animals, b\ imitating things posterior to him. but things entirely prior to him, m the same manner a.s he wishes the junior finds to fabricate mortal natures by imitating him. Or if we avoid this inconvenience, we must admit that there are many intelligible Gods, though they are posterior to the Demiurgus, which those above alluded to. will not grant Will it not therefore be better to assert, either that the soul is said by Plato, to belong to int« lligibles and < ternal beings, as being the best of ge¬ nerate!] natures, and as truly both impartible and partible, in ennsei|uence of its middle subsistence between the two ; or that because he says it participates of rational energy and harmony, it In longs to [or primarily partieipali s of] int« lligi¬ bles and perpetual beings? For the harmony which is in it is generated, not being harmony' itself, but harmonized. And its rational energy is not eternal being, but has generation, as subsisting according to tune, anil being transitive, llow therefore does tin soul participate of the rational energy and harmony ? And how does it happen, that harmony and the rational energy, arc not primarily in the soul, but a< cording to partii ipation 1 I answi r, because these have a prior subsistence ill the Demiurgus. For he produces the .Muses, and A/nusagctcs [or the leader of the Muses, Apolloj, ami also the Mercurial series. lienee the ra¬ tional d< miurgie energy and harmony, subsist in him primarily; the former being Mercurial, but the latter Apolhmiaral. And the soul being filled from these, partieipali - of the rational t nergy, and of harmony. And if it lx* requisite to speak clearly, what appears to me to be tlie case, harmony must be conceived to have a three¬ fold subsistence; so as to be, either harmony itself, or that which is first harmonized; Leing a thing <j this kind according to the whole of itself; or that a hich is secondarily harmonized, and in a certain refect participates of harmony. And the first of these must be assigned to intellect; the second to soul; and the third to body. The rational likewise, or reasoning cm rgy, Inis a three-fold subsistence; the first lieing prim¬ ordial, the second according to participation; and the third according to re¬ presentation or resemblance. For there is aKo a certain vestige of the rational energy, in some irrational animals. Me likewise understand essence, figure, and power, in a three-fold respect. For essence, according to its primary subsistence.
* For «« v »i hire, it u neccsrary to read «• itj.
l’HOCLUS ON TI1K
[dock mi.
ami the first figure, ami the first power, are in intelligibles. But that which partici¬ pates in a certain respect of all these is the corporeal nature, l or there is also something [i. c. matter] which is unfigured, unessential, ami powerless. 1 he soul, however, has each of these according to participation ; but wholly participates of them according to the whole of itself. For it is wholly corroborated, is wholly i.nestcd with figure, ami wholly ’ ess. ntialli/ed. For the unfigurcd in it, does not precede the figured ; nor the powerless, power; nor the unessential, essence : since if tliev did, it would not at all ditler from material bodies. The soul therefore, participates'of the reasoning energy, „f harmony, figure and power, and wholly participates of each of these ; but body participates of them partially. \gain also, from these things, the middle nature of the soul presents its. If to the view, and it is also , \ file lit that IMato very properly says, that it w as generated by the best of causes, the first and he-t of gene rate it natures, and that it is invisible, but the first participant of intelligible harmony.
“ Since therefore the soul was mingled from these three, viz. from the nature of same and ditferent, and from essence, and was distributed into parts, and bound according to analogy, itself at the same time returning bv a circular energy to itself; hence, when it touches on a certain thing possessing a dissipated essence, and when on that which is impartible, it then speaks concerning it, being moved through the whole of itself.”
We divide the energies of the soul in a twofold way, the first of which is into the motive and gnostic energies ; for both these are adapted to the soul, as the da-moniaeal Aristotle also says. Of the motive energies however, we find some inherent in the soul itself; others, proc eeding into the universe; and others, sub¬ sisting between both these. Fur those indeed whic h extend through the whole- world, from the middle to the extremity of the univi r>e, are mundane alone. But those which convolve the soul, are alone separate. And those that circularly cover the universe as with a veil, are separate and at the same tittle inseparable, abiding and proceeding about the universe. But of the gnostic energies, some pertain to the first of things ; others, to those of a middle nature ; and others, to the last of tilings. For the soul knows itself, and the natures prior to, and posterior to itsc If; since it is the image of things prior, hut the paradigm of things posterior to itself, lienee perceiving itself, and evolving itself, it knows all things, not at all departing from its own proper power. For it is not proper that it should recur
1 For fictvt in this place it is necessary to read o\wi.
nnoK in.]
TIM T.US OF PLATO.
lo anv other place, in order to perceive beings, but that it should intellectually see itself. Fnough therefore, has In en said concerning the motive energies of the soul. But here, audio what follows, be speaks concerning its gnostic energies. And that the soul indeed knows lieings, and especially the soul of the universe, is evident; since we see that they are also apprehended by our soul. If however it knows, it remains to be considered how it knows, and after what manner it knows intelligihles, and after what manner scnsibles, whether bv the same, or by dillercnt powers, and whether by looking to itself, and the reasons it contains, or by being extended to the objects of knowledge themselves, just as the sight to that which is visible, and which is external to it.
In short therefore, Plato denominates these gnostic motions of the soul, con¬ tacts with the objects of knowledge; indicating by this, the immediate nature of their apprehension, and their impartible communion with the things known. If, however, eai h knowledge is a contact, the soul will come into contact with hotli intelligihles and scnsibles. according to an appropriate application of itself to them, yet not so as to apprehend both by the same projecting enemy. For it dors not come into contact with scnsibles, through its application of itself to intelligihles, nor with intelligihles through its application to scnsibles. Both these however, vi/.. to tom b and not to touch, arc the pi culiaritics of the liberated Gods, as we learn from tin* Parmenides. IIenee, we before rightly asserted, that the soul ac¬ cording lo the gnostic enemies which it possesses essentially, and through which it knows tilings prior and posterior to itself, is assimilated to those Gods. As PI ito therefore, in what be now sii'-, sp* ahs concerning tin si* energies, be first wishes to remind us of w hat lias bi*eu before said, the mention of w hich is nut siipeiihioiis, but contributes to what follows. I'or from these and those, the discussion will have an appropriate explication. The particulars however, of which lie had before spoken were, concerning the essence, concerning the har¬ mony, concerning the form, and concerning the powers of the soul. Hence Plato recapitulating say s, that the soul is entirely mingled from three parts, essence, same, and dillereiit. And it has been shown what the mixture is, and that it is vivific. For the uniform cause of souls, constitutes the soul in conjunction with the Dnniurgus. Ii has likewise lieen show n how the triad pertains to the soul, and from what genera, and that it is from the middle genera. The soul also, was divided by the duple intervals according to the geomi trie middle, and was again bound through the remaining middles. For he called them bonds. A circular motion likewise, was given to it, through the circles, which comprehend its har¬ mony, and its form. For in the harmony, the distribution into parts preceded the analogy, and in the form, the division preceded the contact. That which
Proclus on Thr
remains however, is in each. For the colligation has a representation of the solu¬ tion; since binding pertains to things which are loosened. The distribution also of the colligation is analogous. For analogy, as we have liefore ohserved, is the most l»eautiful of honds. And tin* soul is divided Titannicallv, hut is adapted harmonically, and is mingled vivitieally. I other still therefore, in the third place, it is divided into those powi rs in it, according to which it returns bv a cir¬ cular energy to itself. For tin* twofold circles an* the powers of it. Hence these things I icing premised, that which follows must he demonstrated.
Since therefore the soul consists of three parts, essence, same and dillerent, and has these genera, as m< dia between impartible and partible n itures, it knows both through them, l or it is the image of the former, but the paradigm of the lat¬ ter. lienee as Hmp« dot les says,
Watii In Hater, carlli liv eaillilv sight,
I .tlu l divine He M-e biillur’s light;
1 ire Hi r '|>ii mini \vc disu in In lire ;
\ ievv love by love, by >-11111 conleiilioii dire.
After the same manner, we also s ty, that the soul by its essence, knows all the essences from which it is derm-d, and all those which it essentially precedes. But by its sameness, it know s the sameness subsisting in all intelligible, intellec¬ tual, and sensible natures. And by its dilli relict', the ddh reiice which proceeds through all things. .Since likewise it is essentially harmonized, it knows through its own proper harmony, both intelligible and sensible harnionv. .Since lot), it has inti llectual powers, through these it knows power wherevt r it exists. From what has lit en betore said tin retore, the discussion of the gnostic energies of the soul is remh red manliest. I or the soul, Iroiu the things w hich it possesses essen¬ tially, knows both the paradigms, and the images of them. And through the reasons which the Deiniurgus imparled to it, it intellectually perceives both the natures that are prior, and those that are posterior to itself. For returning by a circular energy to itself, it conies into contact, as Timaiis savs, with both im¬ partible and partible essences; and entering into itself, finds itself to be the rea¬ son of all things. For all knowh dge derives its completion through a similitude of that which knows to the thing known. And similitude is completed |>v the communion of one lorm. Hence, there is one reason in that w hich know s and the thing known, and being the same, it conjoins these to each other. Since how¬ ever, the reasons in gnostic essences are different, 1 according to the tneustm s and diminutions u! the essences, on this account knowledge receives an all-various
* for fia^Lywj litre, road fuiyopuc and lor yrwirrurqt shortly after, read yiuicniui.
difference. For intellectual knowledge is imparlililc and eternal, because the reasons in it of things ;u* of this kind. Hut. psychical knowledge is evolved, and subsists in discursive energies ; because the reasons of the soul, through which it knows things, have an « volved nature.