participant of time; this being tin* case, it is necessary that this soul, should receive the Mimic form and measure* of time. I fence it is necessary, that the soul of the universe alone should energize through the whole of time, hut other souls according to a part of this whole, conformably to which their apocatastasis is defined ; [in the same manner as may 1>C seen to he the case in other forms. For w hateier participates of a certain form, primarily* is seen to receive the whole of it.] Supermundane souls therefore , if there are such, though they perceive intellectually with transition (for ex cry snul understands after this manner, according to which also, intellect and soul dijjir) ;/<t they apprehend more than one object of intellection. For as they arc nearer to intellect, which intellectually perceives all things at once, it is necessary that they should at once understand more than one thing. But the soul of the universe, is the first which intellectually perceives one dyed only at once, u'hich makes it to he mundane. In this respect therefore, all mundane differ from supermundane souls. Hence, the soul of the universe, understanding one thing at once, has its apocatastasis according to the whole of time, which compre¬ hends the period of the divinely generated nature. And according to the former indeed, it is inferior to supermundane ; hut according to the latter, it transcends all mundane souls, l’or all these have their npoeatastatic periods in some part of the whole of time; 1 hut the soul of the universe, intellectually perceiving the one intelligible world,* and running as it were round it, completes its period m the whole of time. For it i* necessary, being the soul of the world, that its mundane [intellect] should evolve the whole intelligible world, and that on this account it should make the intellective apocatastasis of its mundane period, according to the perfect number, conformably to which it makes the whole corporeal period. For this universe, imitates the invisible period of the mundane soul, through its own proper circulation, and makes its apocatastasis locally In conjunction with the apocatastasis of the soul, which is accomplished intellectively. And this is tin 1 illustrious peculiarity of the mundane soul, which Plato unfolds in what lie now says to those who are able to apprehend his moaning. After this manner therefore, his words are to be understood.
‘ The words rai o\oe moron rov prrpov, are omitted in ihe original, but are supplied from the version
of Thomaus.
1 The words within the brackets, are also omitted in the original, and are added from (he version of Thoma;us, except the word primarily, rpwrwi, which u not in his sersion, but ought to be inserted.
1 In the original «»• ptpn rov trot, t* -y Tam yjx>* y, which is evident!} erroneous ; but ought to be conformably to the version of Thomrcus, and the above translation, tv nn rov nXo* ypovov ptptt.
* 1 have here also followed the version of Thomaeua. For the original is, i j it rvtpa, rov <n>i rov/iov
room.
Proclus on Ti1e
Again however, it must l>e investigated, what it is which produces in the sou! a transitive motion, and an intelligence not fixed like that of intellect, and also time instead of eternity? In answer to which.it must lx? said, that as th»* sou! has a partible essence, so likewise it lias a life not one, hut co-ilivided with its essence, and this is also the case with its intelligence. For the soul instead of being essence, is esseiitialhzed, instead of life, is vitalhzed, and instead of intellect, is inti llrctiiallized ; participating of these primarily, in consequence of their bring prior to the soul. In inti llect therefore, the essence is one, and the life is one, ami the intelligence of essence is impartible, in the same manner as the essence, and being adapted to it, like a point to a point, has no transition. The intelligence of the soul however, is not impartible alone, but as we have said, is also partible, and not having suflicieiil strength to l>e adapted to the impartible, but distributing itself about the impartibility ofintel- ]n t, u alwavs applies another and another part of itsi If to intellect which is fixed, in order that it mav wholly apprehend that whieh is established prior to tin? whole of itself. After this manner therefore, it produces a transition of energy, that whieh is partible in it, evolving itselt about the impartible, and tog» (her with the transition, it generates time. Its transition liowi vrr is efh-eted in .1 two-fold wav, eitln r by being evolved about the one, ami according to all the paits of itself ha\ ing the one; for into as many p irts as it is divided in so many ways the esst utial, the same, and the difler* lit are contained in it. Applying itselt there¬ for*; to the one, by eat li of its parts, and frequently coming into contact with it, it introduces transition to its intellection, 111 order that the who e of it may 1 lit*T lectually pereeive that which is prior to it. Hut in another way, its transition is effected, by each part of it energizing about all things. Tor every part of it has these three, viz. essence, the same, and the dillert ut. IS'ot In inj; adapted theic- fore to the whole of each, it wholly applies itself to eat h, so far as it partit ipatos of each; to essence indeed, through that w hich is partia l) a thing ol this kind, and to other tilings after a similar manner. 1 hits therefim we solve the tlouht.
In addition to this also, it may he inquired l,ow Plato not having yet delivered to us the generation of time, now says that the soul lives through the whole of tune? To this inquiry likewise it must be said, that hr delivers the geneiation of that time, of which the animal nature of tin world participates. Tor he says, that the father oil beholding tin* universe moving and living, constituted time, for the purpose of measuring the motion in it. Sine* tin refore. this life, and this motion to the universe which has a Imdy, is adventitious, so likewise, time is imparted by its generator, from whom it has life and motion through soul. Hut the soul also lias these from the fatln r, I mean life, and tin* motion which ts
BOOK in.]
TIMiEUS OF PLATO.
according to time. Since however, it has something self-suhsistcnt, it co-intro- dure> something to tlit* progression of itself into existence from its generator. As the Detniiirgiis therelore, moves tiie mmiI, and it is also self-motive, after the same manner, tin? soul likewise is the cause to itself of being moved according to time. Hence before the Detniurgus gave to this universe time, the soul is said to be moved through the w hole of time. For thus it gi\cs subsistence in conjunction with the Demiurgus to animal time, just as in conjunction with him, it constitutes the life, according to which* motion subsists. It also governs according to nature, that w hich lives and is moved through it, and has not as it were, a casual inspection of it, imparting nothing to that which it governs. Concerning time however, we shall again speak.
But from these things, thus much may be summarily collected, that the soul of the universe, moves indeed the universe, establishing in the middle of it guardian powers, tilling the whole of it with vivification, and intellectually containing it externally ; imitating in this respect its cause which generates three principalities of Cods, \i/. the guardian, the vivitic, and the demiurgic. The soul, however, by a much greater priority moves itself dhinely, beginning from its first energies; and on this account moves both itself ami the universe incessantly. Hence like¬ wise it conducts itself, and all heaven wisely. Again, the soul making the one extension of time the measure of its proper period, convolves the universe with invariable sameness. For the universe accomplishes its apocatastasis in conjunc¬ tion with the apoc-atastasis of the soul. For it does not accomplish this prior to the apocatastasis of the soul; since the same things taki place again and again in tin* world,* and generated natures are produced according to the intellections of the soul ; nor posti rior to it, in order that this restitution to its pristine state may not be without a cause. For what else but the period of the soul will comprehend the w hole of it. If, however, we assert these things rightly, again the soul will have that which is divim* from the one being, the unceasing from eternity, wis¬ dom from intellect, and all things from the one cause of all.»
“Ami the body of the universe indeed, was generated visible; but the soul is invisible, participating of the rational energy and harmony, and pertaining to intelligibles anti perpetual beings, being generated by the best of causes, the best of generated natures.”
• Tor knff ir lirrr, it n tircr««ary to read r >ilf tjv.
* Inarnd of r » ifi; *uXi» <r ry to<7/ity, in tin* jti ice in the original, it i* nece»»ary to read, trniif iraXiv ini iraXir 1 1 ry irooyjy.
' The version of I.conicus Thomxui ends here.
Tim. Plot. Vol. II.
Proclus on Tiir
[Book Iii-
Since Plato gives to the soul afterwards, all such tiling as he Iteforc gave to the !*o<lv, viz. essence, harmony, figure, powers, ami motion, and conjoins both to the completion of one animal; in order that you may not ignorantly suppose that hoily ami soul are of a similar dignity, being ileceiveil by homonymous appella¬ tions, he concisely reminds us of the dilli retire between the two, and does not .sujiertluously say, that body i- visible, but the soul invisible; and shows that body is the object of opinion, because it is sensible and generated, but that the s«,ul is linbegotten, as with reference to the body, but generated, as vv ith reference to intellec t, Tor it belongs at one and the same time to eternal beings, and gene¬ rated natures, but is tin- !u>t of the former; since time lias now a place in it. And that indeed, which is primarily eternal bung, is in both respects eternal, viz both according to essence, and according to eiieigy. 1 or it lias not an i u< i ;y different from its essence. lint that vvhirli is generated, is in both respects generated, always hecomiug to be, and always energizing, as being in genera¬ tion according to time. The soul, however, ill a certain lespri t partieipates of eternity, and ill a certain respn-t of generation; hut it energizes temporally. And the extremes indeed, ji r eternal beings and generated natures, are in one wav only pi rprtual, the one . ternally, but tin- ollii r temporally. Ihit tin* medium between the two, is perpetual in a twofold re>peet, as bring Inform, d, and on this account, of an ambiguous nature; not only aeeording to the partible and uupar- tiljle, and according to its two nr. h s, hut also according to |n rp« tual being, and that xxlilt'll is generated lienee it belongs to eternal beings, ami is the In st of generated natures, being produced by tlie best ot causes. And again you s. r, the differi me of the soul with reference to body l'or l’lato had In lore called Imdy the most In-antifiil of generated natur. s; but now lie calls the soul the In st of things generated, lint it is i oinmoii <o both to have In i n generated by the most excellent cause. The soul howevi r, as being nearer to its maker, is the hat; but body, ns being more remote from him, is indeed most beautiful , yet not the best. Tortlie must beautiful, is secondary to the best, in the same manner as beauty to the go ml .
In what is h. re said, however, Plato may seem to call the Duniurgtis the best of intelligible and eternal beings, in the same manner as lie calls the soul the In st of generated natures; ami thus to hear witness to those who make one (iod prior to the world. 1 But if some one should thus understand the words, by inverting them, yet at the same time it is evident from analogy, that we must not [dace in-
1 l'rotlu* ill what he litre alludes to the Chriilians.
TIM.T'US OF PLATO.
l.V»