know the colorrs and the sounds of sensibles, but the essence of all of them, so far as it ® material and undivided. Hence also it has a sensible essence, and essentialty, but not according to accident, sensible. For as that which is always intelligible, is not in a certain respect intelligible, and ina certain respect not, but is wholly intelligible, though not to those beings whose intellectual perception is partible, but to a divine intellect; after the same manner the venerated sensible nature, is not in a certain respect sensible, and in a certain respect deprived of sense, but is wholly sensible, not to us whose sensible perception is partible, but to ¢o¢al animal, in which also there is a total sense. For as the in- tellectual perception of the Gods is of one kind, but that of men of another, thus also the sense of Gods is different from that of partible animals; the former having a knowledge of partial essences, but the latter of things alone pertaining to essences. The world therefore, has the first sense, Which is immutable, united to the object of knowledge, and all-perfect according to energy. But total animals, which are purified from generation, are allotted the second form of sense. For because indeed, they are parts of the universe, the sense of them proceeds to the whole ; for there is also something of them which is external, But because they are exempt from generation, they comprehend that which is sensible impassively and energetically. And such partial animals as have communication with gene- ration, and employ as organs, luciform vehicles, possess sense mingled from passion and knowledge. But there are also certain iast animals, such as plants, which participate of a vestige only of life and sense; one kind of sense being total, another partible, another knowing the essences, and another the images of sensibles.
It is not proper, therefore, to be disturbed, because Plate takes away from the world, all partible organs. For hearing is not divided in it from sight 3 since neither, as we say, is the one divided from the other, in our spirit, but there are init, as Aristotle says, one sense which is truly so called, and one principal sen- sorium. Hence the world is neither in want of eyes extended to things out of itself, nor of ears,’ to receive information externally, but it is itself both eye, and that which is visible, ear, and that which is audible ; and the one sense in it knows all sensible natures. For whence also is the one sense in us which is prior to the many senses derived except from the universe? The world therefore, knows all the beauty that is in itself, through sight; and through the hearing all the har-
* Instead of ovrey here, it is obviously necessary to read wre.
Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 3M
458 PROCLUS ON THE [Boom 111.
mony which pervades through wholes. Hence it neither requires eyes in order to see, nor ears in order to hear. It possesses also this eyeless peculiarity according to the image of the intelligible God,’ to which it is assimilated. For Orpheus says that this God has eyeless Love,
In his breast feeding eycless, rapid Love.
Thus therefore, the universe is conjuined through fove to the natures prior to itself, and beholds the beauty which is in them through that which is in itself; and this not by perceiving with paruble senses.
“Nor was it invested with surrounding air, that it might be in want of respiration. Nor again, was itin want of any organ, through which it might receive nutriment into itself, and discharge it when concocted. For there was no possibility that any thing could either accede to, or depart from its nature, since there was nothing through which such changes could be produced. For indeed, the universe affords nutriment to itself through its own consumption; and being artificially fabricated, suffers and acts all things in itself, and from its own peculiar operations. For its compo- sing artificer thought that it would be much more excellent, if sufficient to itself, than if in want of other things.”
Through what is here said, Plato takes away two other senses from the universe, the smell and the taste. The former indeed because it is without respiration, For not every thing which respires isin want of smell, though every thing which has smell respives.” But that which respires is more perfect. Phis therefore, he takes away from the universe, Hle also takes away the taste, because the universe is not nourished, Por the animal which is nourished, is in want of the taste. Again therefore, how shall we say? Must it not be thus, that these partible senses are notin the universe, but that it contains one simple sense in itself, which has a knowledge of all colours, sounds, juices, spirits, and qualities, the sensivle essences themsclyes existing in the universe as in a subject. For if the one
* i. δ. Phanes, or animal itself, the exemplar of the universe. * Tnstead of ro yap avaxveur δειται rns cogonoews, εἰ καὶ μὴ παν TO EXOY οσῴρησιν, ἀαναπνένστικον ἐστι, in
this place, it seems requisite to read, ov yap παν αϑαπνγεον δειται rns oogpnoems, εἰ και παν TO ἐχον κι Δ.
Book 111.] Tim.£Us of Plato. 459
[common] sense which is in us, uses all the partible senses, and knows all things according to the same, how much more must the world know at once all the variety of sensibles, according to one reason, and one sense? As therefore, it is one in essence, and as it is allotted a uniform figure, thus also it has one sense, comprehending in itself all sensibles. For it likewise contains one nature, which connects and vivifies all bodies. And these are the dogmas respecting the universe.
Let us however, discuss the particulars of what is here said by Plato. In the first place therefore, he admirably refers the use of the smell to respiration, but not to the discrimination of fragrances ; giving us the more comprehensive cause, as existing in respiring natures. For when we have a sensible perception of fragrant or fetid substances, we respire; but when we respire, we have not entirely a sensation of them. For respiration is more natural, and more comprehensive than the proper subjects of the smell; since such animals as have the sense of smelling, but do not respire, in consequence of not having lungs, are more imperfect than those that do respire. Very properly therefore, does he frame his argument from more perfect animals, that if the universe had the sense of smelling, it would be requisite that it should have it accompanied with respiration, in the same manner as the more perfect of smelling animals. But in the second place, he refers the use of the taste, to nutriment. For nature formed this as a criterion of juices, through which nutriment and increase snbsist. For that which is without moisture has the power of manifesting this. The world however, is not in want of nutriment externally, but imparts it to itself, increases itself, and is the cause of its own consumption. And in the first place, if you are willing, it effects this, according toa division into two; the heavens augmenting and changing all things, but the sublunary regions being increased and consumed. For the gene- ration of one thing is the corruption of another. But of each of these,’ the motion of the heavens is the cause. In the second place, the world eflects this from the heavenly bodies themselves, receiving by their motions an analogous increase and consumption, according to their risings and settings, their visibilities and occulta- tions, their elevations and depressions, their illuminations, and mutations of light; through which the celestial bodies receive and lose a certain thing, in the same manner as sublunary natures. For from these, generation also is changed.
' For exarepas here, it is requisite to read ecarepwes.
460 PROCLUS ΟΝ THE [βοοκ 111.
And again you see that the natures which are above the moon, have increase and consumption according to analogy only; but that sublunary natures are essentially the recipients of both these. But the moon is between these, and is truly an isthmus, exr- hibiting in herself the beginning of mutation according to an increase and diminution of lisht. For in the bodies prior to it the same form perfectly remains, in their increase and consumption; and in the bodics posterior to it, their very existence is naturally adapted to reciprocate. But in the moon the essence remains, but the light is changed evternally according to daninution and increase, which is not the case with the lumina- ries that are above it. WWence it is not proper to say, that the heavenly bodies are nourished from exhalations, as some fancy they are. For things which are in want of an intlux externally, and receive addition and ablation, have not indisso- luble bonds. Hence the celestial bodies remain immutable ; as of the ancients Proclus, Mulotes, and Philonides assert, and of those that are more modern, al! the Platonists from DPlotinus. For as Plato has not yet delivered to us the generation of the heavens and stars, how could he speak about the nutriment of them? And it seems, that now gencrating the elements alone, and perceiving that these proceed through each other, and that all are in all, he calls this mutual transition, the nutriment of the universe, of itself by itself; since it both acts upon anid suffers in itself, by imparting to all things, all the things of whieh it consists. Hence When he likewise constitutes the other natures (i. 6. the celestial), then he intro- duces their iluminations, and the communion of all of them with each other, through these. Alone therefore, directing his attention to the composition of the four elements of the universe, and perceiving that in these, there are certain com- munications with each other, he says, that the consumption of some, is the nutri- iment of other parts of the universe. But it is not yet manifest what each of these may be. Now however, thus much is evident, that all the parts confer something on each other, in order that the universe may become one, and are in each other, so as to nourish each other, and this without any diminution of themselves. For all things of which the universe consists, are in the earth, and ἃ} of them are hkewise in the middle elements; and thus the whole world is nourished by itself, from its own parts, having all things in all.
Farther sull, this also may be said, that if nothing proceeds to the universe, there is no body external to it, and that if nothing departs from it, there is no vacuum out of the world. For it would be in vain not being the recipient of any thing, as that is which receives the world: which things were particularly em-
Book 111.] Tim-Eus of Plato. 401
braced by Aristotle, who subverts the existence of a vacuum in energy, and preserves the world only-begotten, But that nothing departs froin, or accedes to the universe, Plato infers, the latter indeed, becanse there is nothing external to it, and the former, from the universe making the consumption of itself, its proper nutriment. As therefore, not having the organs of nutrient in itself, it has nutri- ment, and is that which itself nourishes itself, and is at the same time nourished ; thus also, not having senses extended outwardly, it possesses sense in itself, and is itself sensible to itself. And that Plato intended the latter should be inferred as well as the tormer, I think he clearly manifests by saying, that “ the universe suffers and acts all things tn itself, and from its own peculiar operations.” But if all that is gencrated, is the consequence of the universe acting on and suffering from itself, it must not be said, that either consumptions or corruptions are simply evils. For neither does a worthy man, and much less the universe, do any evil to him- self. And this indeed, is a divine corollary, which is to be assumed from what Plato says.