dividing nature. And the former belongs to the co-ordination of sameness, but the latter to that of difference. And the former is the cause of simplicity, but the fat- ter of variety to things. As the artiticer therefore of the universe found, that among things naturally visible, the intellectual is more beaatifal than that whieh is dest- tute of intellect, thus also he thought that the similar is better than the dissimilar. For in intelligibles, similitude is better than dissimilitude, in powers, πὶ intellectual perceptions, and in productions. Whenee also some one may wonder at those Platonists, who admit that difference is better than) sameness, though Plato says that the similar is infinitely more beautiful than the dissimilar, At the same time, also, dissimilitade is ima certain respect secretly introduced into beings from matter, but similitade accedes from forms alone, and intellizible causes. Sinilitude, therefore, is infinitely better than dissimilitude ; 50 that sameness is also more excellent than difference. ‘This is the judgment of Jupiter. Through this, also, in the universe the similar is better than the dissimilar, in essences, in motions, in figures, and in all other things. For the progression of things Is very properly effected through the similitude of productions to the cause of the produc- tion; and again, conversion is the primary leader of another similitude. Very properly therefore is the world, on account of these things, under the dominion of similitude, being a God according to form itself. Hence Plato also endeavours to show what the figure of the world is, from similitude, and the Py thagoric Timeus himself, assigns this as the first cause of its fisure, in conjunction with making a physical mention of it. “ For a sphere alone, says he, both when it is quiescent, and when it is moved, is capable of bem co-adapted in the same place; so as never to fail nor receive another place.” Aristotle likewise after finn, well knew, that with whatever other figure you may surround the universe, you will make a vacuum, through the alternate mutation of the angles, and the une- qual distance of the extremes from the middle.
“He also accurately elaborated the external circumference of the uni- verse, and rendered it smooth, for the sake of many things.”
Some one may think that the same thing which was before asserted, is again here repeated. For in what docs this smouthness differ from rotundity, or what mutation is there of similitude? In acertain respect, therefore, this universe com- prehends what has been said about similitude; but at the same time, there isa difference between surveying what the nature is of the whole figure which per-
Bookiii.] Tim £Us of Plato. 153
vades as far as to the centre of the earth, and alone considering itself by itself, the most external superficies of the universe. And what is here said about smooth- ness, conteads as it appears to one thing, viz. to show that the universe is neither in want of gnostic, nor of partible motive organs, for the purpose of acting upon, orsuflering from other things ; introdaciny this as the fifth deminreie cilt to the world. What is said, therefore, about the sindothness, is a medium between what is asserted respecting the bulk, and the soul of the universe. For the proximate boundary of body is smoothness 3 but the exempt boundary is soul, and prior to soul, intellect. For this is the boundary of soul itself. And prior to intellect, the one deity which connects the whole mundane multitude, is the boundary of the body of the world. You may therefore speak after this manner.
But you may also say, according to a more perfect mode, that. the universe being a luminous whole, it is most Juminous according to its external superticies, and is full of divine splendour. For on this account also poets place Olympus on the summit of the world, being wholly luminous, and light itself.
Nor clouds, nor rain, nor winter there are found," But dazziing spleodour spreads its radiance round.
Of this luminous subsistence, smoothness is a symbol. Why therefore are the summits of the universe smooth? Plato says, for the sake of many things. For they are so, in order that it may be spontaneously conjoined with soul and intel- lect, and may be adapted to supermundane lights, through a similitude to them, Smoothness, therefore, is sixnificant * of the highest aptitude, through which the uni- verse is able to receive the illaminations from iniclicca and soul ; in the same manner as mirrors receive the representations of things by their smoothness. Formerly also by theologists, a mirror was assumed as a symbol of aptitude, to the intellec- tual completion of the universe. Hence they say, Vulean made a mirror for Di- onysius, or Bacehus, into which the God looking, and beholding the image of himself, proceeded: into the whole partuble fabrication of things. You may say therefore, that Plato reminds os of this catoptnc apparatus, ino what he now says of the sniouthness of the external superiicies of the world, Hence the corporeal
* fom, Odyss. vi, v. 45. Butin Proclus for ava bad \or aibon, read a\\a μαλ᾽ αιθρη.
ἢ For συμμακτικη here, read σημαντικη.
ie, PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ 111.
universe is a thing of this kind, externally smooth, according to which also, it ix connascent with its own intellect, and with the Demiurgus, Henee tov, pocts establish the Demiurgus on the highest summit of the world; it being allotted so great an aptitude from him, to the participation of intelligible causes,
If you are willing, also, according to another mode, smoothness itselfis a symbol of the divine and simple life in the world. We, therefore, since we havea partible life, have also the parts of the body multiform, and variously mixed, because different things are prepared by nature for a different life, But the universe has one and asimple Jife. For it is purified from those things of which terrestrial animals are in want, through a material: and partible life. Menee it is. the reei- pient of one life, butis exempt from a various life. Itis also prepared for one, but is unreceptive of a divided life. On this account, it is said τὸ be accurately elaborated eaternally, and rendered smooth, because it is fitly adapted by the demiurgic cause, to the reception of one life, being constructed as the orzan of such a life. What follows, however, is shgmiticant of this,
“Nor was the addition of eyes requisite to the universe: for nothing visible was left external to it. Nor was hearing necessary : for there was nothing externally audible, Nor was itinvested with surrounding air, that it might be in want of respiration,”
Through these things, Plato appears to do nothing clse, than to take away a partible life from the universe, and the partible organs, which are suspended from us, when we descend intu generation, For while we abide on high, we are not at ail in want of these multiform lives, and partible organs. But the luciform vehicle is sufficient, which possesses all the senses unitedly. If, therefore, we are purified from every !ife of this hind, when we are liberated from generation, what ought we to think respecting the universe? Ts it not, thatit has one simple life, thatitis wholly vigihintly excited to it, and is equally in every part prepared for the completion of one Lite? Or taust we not in a much greater degree admit) hese things of the universe! Por wholes are more divine than parts, and comprehending than comprehended natures, And thas much as to the cotmmon conception of the things proposed,
Since, however, in whatis now said, and in what follows, Plato takes away
nooK 111. TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 455
all sense from the world, viz. sceing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, let ug in the first place consider this, whether the universe is sensitive or not. For of the ancients, some were led to one, and others to another opinion on this sub- ject. We indced hear theologists speaking of the fountain of sense, and asserting of the father [i. ον of the Demiurgus] that he possesses intelligibles through intel- lect, but introduces sense to the worlds."| And again, we hear from the Greeks,
Sun who see’st all things, and dost all things hear,”
Seeing and hearing not existing in him partibly, as in us, but according to one life, and one subject. Since in us also, Aristotle proclaims, that there is princi- pally one sense, and one principal sensorium. Nor were the wise men among the Greeks ignorant that there are divine senses, nor did they refuse to assert of the Demiurgus himself,
The undecaying royal ether forms
Hlis intellect from falsehood free; by which
He all things indicates and knows; nor voice, !
Nor sound, wor rumor can Jove's cars clude.
And why do I speak of theologists, when Plato himself says that the universe is an animal, and that animal is characterized by sense? So that asserting likewise that a plant is an animal, he immediately imparts to it a certain other sense. On hearing therefore, as [have said, these things, we are unwilling to admit that the universe is without sensation. For in the Theetetus, sense is said to be the frus- tration of truth ; and it is universally agreed that its knowledge is passive, and conversant with the images of things. lence, it is better, in order that we may be in the middle of both these, to take away from the universe every sense of this kind, and to give to it another more excellent than this, and more adapied to the Gods. What, therefore, is this sense, and after what manner may it be assumed? That the universe, indeed, is sensitive, we may render manifest from its being an animal, and from the soul of it being dianoetic and doxastic, and imparting to the mun- dane body a participation of both these, which participation is an image of dia-
Ὁ This is asserted in the Chaldean Oracles. * Cayss. XT. v. 108. * Foravéa here, read avéq; nod for mAvOer im the foliowing line, ἡ ληθει. These verses are Orphic.
456 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 11}.
ποῖα and opinion ; and this we say is the mundane phantasy itself, adumbrating
intelligence, and possessing invisible sensations * of the sensibles which exist in
every period. It is possible, therefore, from these and many other arguments, to be persuaded that the universe possesses sensation. Batit requires an appropriate
inspection, to know what sense it possesses. Tsay then, that of sense, the first
and most principal kind, is that which imitates intellect. For every where things | that rank as first, have an imitation of the natures prior to them. Hence, this sense is conjoined to things that are first, comprehending in itself the sensible object of its perception, and neither passing from some things to others; for this is the
province of sense distributed into various parts; nor proceeding outwardly 5 for this is imperfect ; but it possesses the whole of what is sensible in itself, and 13, as it were, rather consciousness than sense. The second kind of sense after this, 1s that which proceeds indeed outwardly, but according to a perfect energy, which every where always apprehends the whole object of its knowledge with invariable
sameness, and is purified from all passion, and from all the imbecility which 18
adapted to partible and material organs. But the third kind of sense is that, which suffers from externals, and is mingled from passion and knowledge; be- ginning indeed from passion, but ending in knowledge. And the last kind of sense is that with which the most obscure knowledge is present, which ts full of passion, and proximate to physical sympathy, so as not to have a kuowledge of the forms
of sensibles. Thus, for instance, it does not know that the thing which acts on it is hot or cold, but alone perceives that what falls on it is pleasant or painful, Por Timzus farther on informs us that the sense of plants is a thing of this kind, being an apprehension alone of the pleasing and the painful from sensible ob- jects.
Sense, therefore, thus procceding supernally, the world, indced, 1s sensitive according to the first kind of sense. For according to the whole of itself itis the thing seen, and the eve [by which it is seen]; since we also say that the sun, and each of the stars, is aneye. Phe whole world therefore is sight and that which 15 visible, and is truly comprehensible by sense and opinion, Hence the knowledge in itis all-perfect, its sense is tudivisible, and itis itself all things, viz. that which is sensible, the senusorium, and sense; just as the Demiurgus of it, 15. intellect, intelligence, and the intelligible. As, likewise, it comprehends in its whole body partial bodies, so inits fofal sense it contains many senses. And it does not
» αισθησεις is omitted in the original.