but secondarily in intelligibles and intellectuals ; and according to a third diminution, in intellectuals. In intelligibles however, being is according to essence ; for there intellect is primarily according to cause. But in intellectuals, intellect indeed, is according to essence; but the natures prior to intellect, are according to participation. Since therefore, life is surveyed in a threefold respect, in intelligibles indeed according to cause; but in intelligibles and intellectuals, according to hvparxis; and an intellectuals,' according to participation, it is indeed necessary that the life which is in the intellectual order, should both be life, and participate of the causes generative of life prior of itself. The one therefore of the intellectual Gods which is arranged in the middle, is not motion, but that which is moved. For prior to this, it has been demonstrated by Plato, that all life is motion. For soul is self-motive because it is self-vital. And intellect is on this account moved, because it has the most excellent life. The. first vivific cause, therefore, of the intellectual Gods, is primarily allotted motion. If, however, it was the first-effective and highest life, it would be requisite to denominate it motion, and not that which is moved. But since it is life as in intel- lectuals, but is filled from exempt life, it is at the same time motion, and that which is moved. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides demonstrate that the one in this order is moved, because it proceeds from the causes of all life that are placed above it, and is analogous to the middle centre of intelligibles, and to the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals. Hence also, Socrates in the Phaedrus calls this middle triad Heaven ; for the whole of it is life and motion. Hut that which is moved, is the middle in intellectuals, as being filled from it, [i. c from the life in the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals;.] since eternity also, which is arranged according to the intelligible wholeness, is all-perfect life, and all life, according to Plotinus. There, however, the middle is life according to cause ; but in intellectuals, it is life according to participation ; and in the order between these, it is life
• la the original, alter n U wi* m/Toi; mi it it nemury to supply *mf vwmtfir, rv I, nif
»«ip»S, *. r. X.
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boor r.
according to essence, proceeding indeed from intelligible life, (as Par men ides also manifests, characterizing both according to wholeness, though the ' wholeness in intelligibies is different from that which is in intelligibles and intellectuals, as we have before observed,) but producing after this, intellectual life. For that which is moved, is indeed entirely allied to the circulation of the Heaveu, and to intellectual and -intelligible life:
Moreover, the permanency which is coordinate with this motion, is not one certain genus of being,. as neither is motion. For beings indeed are naturally adapted to participate of the genera > of being; but the super- essential goods of the Gods, are expanded above the order of beings. If, ■ therefore, Parmenides here* assuming the one itself by itself, surveys in this motion and permanency, he evidently does not attribute the ele- ments of being to the Gods, but assigns to them peculiarities appropriate* all-perfect, and transcending wholes* And thus asserting that Me owe is moved and stands still, according to motion, indeed, he delivers the vivifie hyparxis of the Gods, the generative fountain of wholes, and the leading cause of all things. But according to permanency, he delivers the un- polluted monad coordinated with motion, and which connectcdly-contains the middle centres of the guardian triad. For as the summit of the guardian triad, is united to the first lather, according to the first hypos- tasis, thus also the deity who contains the middle bond of the unpolluted leaders, is by a congeniality of nature consubsistent with the motive cause of all the Gods, which moves wholes, and is primarily moved from itself. And through this deity, the prolific power of this Goddess [[ Rhea} is firmly established in herself. Producing likewise, and multiplying all things, she is [through this deity] exempt from wholes, and inflexibly exists prior to her progeny. With respect, therefore, to motion here and permanency, the former indeed is the fountain of the life and generative power that proceeds to all things ; but the latter,' establishes the whole vivifie fountain in itself, but is from thence filled with the prolific rivers of life. Parmenides, therefore, delivering to us these things, and the pro- gression of them, demonstrates that that which is moved is generated from that which is in another, but that which stands still, from that which,
' In the original * U is omitted.
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CHAP. XXXIX. OF PLATO.
is in itself. For the first monad of the paternal triad constitutes the natures posterior to it. And after the same manner, the highest of the unpolluted triad, and which is intelligible as in this triad, imparts at one and the same time the middle and last monad of the triad. On this account, also, motion here is better than permanency. For as a subsist- ence in another is according to cause more ancient than the subsistence of a thing in itself, so likewise that which is moved, is causally more ancient than that which is permanent. For the unpolluted Gods, are in power subordinate to the fathers, and are comprehended in them.
The third, therefore, to the Saviour, as they say, and let us direct our attention to the demiurgic monad, unfolding itself into light together with tl»e coordinate Gods it contains. In the first place, then, here also the communion of the one with other things, is apparent, and we must no longer consider the one alone by itself, but according to its habitude towards other things. Because, therefore, the demiurgic order produces wholes from itself, and arranges and adorns a corporeal nature, it also generates all the second and ministrant causes of the Gods. For what occasion is there to say that the term other things, is a sign of a corporeal condition of being, since formerly the Pythagoreans thought fit to cha- racterize an incorporeal nature by the one, but indicated to us the nature which is divisible about body, through the term others f In the second place, the number of the conclusions [in this part of the Parmenides} is doubled. For the one is no longer demonstrated to be alone same, or different, as it is to be in itself, and in another, or to be moved, and stand still, but it is demonstrated to be the same with itself, and different from
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422 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
itself,' and to be different from other things, and the same with other things. But this twice appeared to us before to be entirely adapted to the demiurgic monad, both according to other theologists, and to Socrates in the Cralylus, who says that the demiurgic name is composed from two words. In the third place, therefore, the multitude of causes is here separated, and all the monads of the Gods present themselves to the view, according to the demiurgic progression. For the demiurgic order is apparent, the prolific power co-ordinate with it, the undefiled monad the cause of exempt providence, and the distributive fountain of wholes ; and together with these, as I may say, all the orders about the demiurgus are apparent, according to which he produces and preserves all tilings, and being exempt from the things produced, is firmly established in himself, and separates his own kingdom, from the united empire of his father.
How, therefore, and through what particulars do these things become apparent ? We reply, that the same with itself (for this Par men ides first demonstrates) represents to us about the nature of the one, the monadic and paternal peculiarity, according to which the demiurgus also subsists. Hence, likewise, the one is said to be the same with itself. For the another is in the demiurgus according to the transcendency of different causes ; but the same, appears to be a sign of his proper, viz. of his paternal, hyparxis. For being one, and the exempt father and demi- urgus of wholes, he establishes his proper union in himself. And in this one, Parmenides in a remarkable manner shows the uniform, and that which is allied to bound. But the same with other things, is the singular good of prolific power, and of a cause proceeding to, and pervading through :dl tilings without impediment. For the demiurgus is present to all things which he produces, aud is in all things the same, which he arranges and adorns, pre-establishing in himself the generative essence of wholes. If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, bound and infinity subsist in him demiurgically. And the one iudeed is in the sameness which is separate from oilier things, but the other is in the
• After %K\x in the original it i* necesnrr to wpply the word* xai twtov Mrm», %%i ir«for mvtki.
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power which generates other things. For every where power is prolific of secondary natures. But the principle which subsists according to bound, is the supplier of an united and stable hypostasis.
Moreover, the different from other things, manifests his undefined purity* and his transcendency which is exempt from all secondary natures. For the first intellect was on this account pure and incorruptible, as Socrates says in the Cratylus, because it is established above coordination or communion ' with all sensible natures. For as some one of the Gods says, he does not incline his power to matter, but is at once exempt from all fabrication. But the demiurgic intellect receiving from thence total power, and a royal dominion, adorns indeed sensibles, and constitutes the whole of a corporeal nature. Together however, with prolific abundance, and the providential attention to secondary natures, he transcends his progeny, and abides in his own accustomed manner, as Timneus says, through the inflexible guard which subsists with him, and the power imparted to him from it, which is uncontaminated with other participants. Hence, through the never-failing supply of good, and providential energies, and the generation of subordinate natures, he is the same with then. For he is participated by them, and fills his progeny with his own providential care. But through his purity, undented power, and inflexible energies, he is separate from wholes, is disjoined from them, and is im participate by other things. And as the first king of intellectuals is allotted his non-inclination to matter, through the guard which is united to him, and through the undented monad ; and as the vivific goddess possesses her stable and indexible power from the second cause of the guardian Gods ; thus also the demiurgic intellect preserves a transcendency exempt from other things, and a union separated from multitude, through the third monad of the leaders of purity. For the cause of separate providence is a guard coordinate with the deiniurgus, who hastens to produce' all things, and to pervade through all things. But the guard which is the supplier of stable power,
• For xtwavuo, it is necessary to read xonwv.aj.
1 The word ra^ayup is omitted in the original, but ought doubtless to be inserted.
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BOOK r.
is coordinate with the vivific deity, who is moved to the generation of wholes. And with the intellect that is multiplied according to intellec- tual conceptions [i. e. with Saturn,] the guard is coordinate, that imparts an undented union of the conversion of all his energies to himself. The monad, therefore, remains, which is arranged as the seventh of these intellectual monads, which is present with, and energizes with all of them, but particularly unfolds itself into light in the demiurgic order, and which Par men ides also producing for us together with the whole demiurgus, defines it in difference, in the same manner as he does the undefined cause in the demiurgus. He says however, that this difference separates the demiurgic moo ad itself from itself. For we have before observed that this order is the supplier of separation to all the Gods. As therefore, the demiurgus is the same with himself, through the pater- nal union, after the same manner he is separated from himself and his father through this difference. Whence therefore, does he derive this power? From being in himself, says Parmcnides, and in another. For these were indeed unitedly in the first father, but separately in the third. Separation therefore, preexisted there according to cause; but in the demiurgus k shines forth, and unfolds the power of itself.