He likewise cuts off parts from thence, places tliem in that which h between these, and again separates parts from the whole, and thus the mixture from which he had cut off these parts, was now wholly con- sumed. Is it therefore any longer wonderful that the framers of fables should denominate the divisions of the intellectual leaders, sections, since even Timaeus himself who does not devise fables, but indicates the essential progression of souls into multitude, uses as a sign the word section ? And does not also Plato in the greatest degree accord with the highest of theologists, when he delivers to us the demiurgus glittering with intellectual sections ? As therefore the demiurgus, when producing the essence of souls, constitutes it according to true being, when gene- rating life, he generates it according to the life which is in real beings, and produces the intellect which is in souls according to the intellect which is in himself, — thus also when cutting the essence of the soul from itself, and separating it, he energizes according to the sections and separations which are in the intellectual order, and according to the one and intellectual cause of them. According to Plato, therefore, there is a first monad of the total divisions in intellectuals, and together witb the twofold triads, I mean the paternal and the undefiled, it gives completion to the whole intellectual hebdomad. And we, following Plato, and other theologists, concede the same things.
Let us now, however, return to the beginning, and demonstrate that Parmenides delivers the same things concerning this intellectual heb- domad, and that he produces this hebdomad ic aibn {eternity) and the peculiarity of the Gods which is intellectual alone, in continuity with.
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414 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
the triple orders of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual Gods. And, in the first place, let us survey what he says concerning the father of the intellectual Gods, and the undefilcd power which is co-arranged with him. For after the threefold figure, and the order of the Gods which perfects all things, that which is in itself and in another, becomes apparent. These things, however, are demonstrated to be signs of the intellectual summit of the intellectual monads. For the first father of the Gods in this order, at one and the same time is allotted a paternal transcendency with respect to those posterior to him, and is the intellect of the first intelligibles. For every imparticipable intellect is said to be the intellect of the natures prior to itself, and towards them, from whom it is produced, it has an intellectual conversion, and in theni as first-effective causes it establishes itself. Whence also the demiurgic intellect is the intellect of the natures above itself, and proximately indeed of its own father, from which likewise it proceeds, but eminently of the intelligible unities beyond [Saturn].
The first king, therefore, in intellectuals, is both an intellectual father, and a paternal intellect. lie is, however, the intellectual father indeed of the Gods that proceed from himself; but he is the paternal intellect of the intelligibles prior to himself. For he is indeed intellectual essentially ; but he has an intelligible transcendency in intellectuals ; because he is also established analogous to the unknown order of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods, and to the occult order of the intelligible triads. And as they are expanded above the triadic hypostases of the Gods posterior to themselves, thus also the father of intellectuals, is a father expanded above the whole intellectual hebdomad, in consequence of being a paternal intellect. And analo- gously to the above-mentioned orders of Gods, he establishes himself in them, and is filled from them with paternal and intelligible union. On this account also, he is occult, shuts in himself the prolific powers of himself, and producing from himself total causes, he again establishes them in, and converts them to himself.
' For w ovnp, it is necessary to read n tam*.
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Chap. Xxxvii
These things, therefore, Parmcnides also indicating, magnificently celebrates this order by these twofold signs, and characterizes the first king and father of the intellectual 1 Gods through these peculiarities. For he is in himself, and in another. For so far indeed as he is a total intellect, his energy is directed to himself, but so far as he is in the intel- ligibles prior to himself, he establishes in another the all-perfect intelli- gence of himself. For, indeed, this subsistence in another, is more excellent than the subsistence of a thing in itself ; since, as Parmenides himself concludes, the subsistence of Saturn in another, pertains to him according to whole, but the subsistence of him in himself, according to parts. Where, therefore, does the another pre-exist? And to what order of the Gods prior to Saturn does it belong? Or is not this also divinely unfolded by our preceptor? For he says that this another, remarkably pertains to that order, according to which the power of difference first shines forth, being the progeny of intelligible and paternal power. Hence in the first triad the another was occultly, so far as power also had there an occult subsistence ; but it particularly shines forth in the first order of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods. For there the first difference, the feminine nature of the Gods, and the paternal and unvocal power subsist.
[Saturn therefore] who is the first of the intellectual fathers being intelligible, so far as he is a whole, establishes himself in the intelligible triads prior to himself, from which also he is filled with united and occult goods. And on this account he is said to be in another. With respect to those triads indeed, the another is occultly and according to cause in the intelligible [i. e. in the first triad] of intelligibles ; but according to essence in the intelligible of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods. All intelligibles therefore are united ; the intelligible indeed of the intelligible and intellectual Gods being united to the intelligible of the intelligibles prior* to intellectuals; but the intelligible of intellectuals, to both. And the subsistence indeed in another, adheres
* For voir*,, it U olmotwly neceiwry to read >«pw>.
* For rpmrm, it U neceswry to read *?o row.
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416 on the Theology
ROOK V.
to the difference which is according to uuical number. But unical number is suspended from the occult union of the one being; on which account also it is unical.
Farther still, we also say, that there is a twofold conversion in those orders, the one indeed being towards themselves, but the other towards the causes of them, (for it neither was nor will be lawful for divine natures, to convert themselves in any respect to natures posterior to themselves). And the intelligible Gods generate all things stably ; but the intelligible and intellectual Gods who illuminate imparticipable life, impart the original cause of progression to all things; and the intellectual Gods arrange and adorn wholes according to conversion. Hence, it is indeed necessary that the summit of iutellectuals which pours forth from itself the whole and all-perfect form of conversion, should be characterized by both the couvertive symbols, and should be at one and the same time converted to itself, and to the natures prior to itself. Hence, because indeed, it is converted to itself, it is in itself; but because it is converted to the intelligible orders beyond itself, it is in another. For the another is more excellent than the whole intellectual order. As, therefore, the summit of intelligiblcs primarily subsists according to the intelligible peculiarity itself, and is firmly established above wholes; and as the summit of intelligiblcs and intellectuals primarily unfolds the peculiarity of this order, subsisting according to divine diversity, and being to all things the cause of all-various progressions ;— thus also the intelligible deity of intellectuals, exhibits from himself according to union the twofold forms of conversion, being indeed in another according to the more excellent form of conversion, but in himself according to the less excellent form. For to be converted to himself is inferior to the conversion to more excellent natures.
Again, therefore, the subsistence in another, is the illustrious prero- gative of the intelligible aud paternal peculiarity. For the another is intelligible, and difference was the power proceeding from the intelligible fathers, and from the natures firmly established in them. Hence, that which is comprehended in this power, and is fdled from it, is paternal and intelligible. But the subsistence of a thing in itself is the proper
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Chap. Xxxvii. of Plato. 417
sign of the unpolluted monad. For as we have before observed, the summits of the two intellectual triads are conjoined. And the monad .of the guardian triad has eternally established itself iu the paternal •monad, and again establishes in, and converts to itself the natures which ;have proceeded from itself. And the first intellectual father is indeed father on account of himself, but on account of the unpolluted [monad,] ihe comprehends in himself the genera of himself, stably recalls them j[when they have proceeded from him] to himself, and in his own allness ' contains the intelligible multitudes of intellectuals in onpro- rceeding* union with their monad.
The first leader, therefore, of the guardian order subsists in conjunction with the father. And the father indeed comprehends the unpolluted cause, but is comprehended by the first intelligibles. And as he is intelligibly established in them, so likewise he has established in himself, and constituted about himself, the one summit of the inflexible Gods. Id the Parmenides, therefore, also the same God appears to us to be a pure intellect. Because, indeed, he is intellect, being extended to the intelligible place of survey, and on this account being in another, so far as he is wholly established in it. But again, because he is pure and immaterial, being converted to himself, and shuttiug in himself aH his own powers. For the parts of this wholeness, are more partial powers, which hasten indeed to a progression from the father, but are on all sides established and -comprehended by the wholeness. And the whole- ness itself is a deity, connectedly containing in itself intelligible parts, toeing parturient indeed with intellectual multitude, generating all things stably, and again embosoming and collecting to itself its progeny, and us the more tragical fables say* absorbiug and depositing them in itself. For the progeny of it are twofold; some indeed, being, as it were, analyzed -into it; but others being divided from it. And some abiding in it •through the first unpolluted monad ; but others proceeding according to the prolific cause of the intellectual Gods, surmounting the union of the
' for sauToniTi read rarontrt. * For ik^t** teU «**4«,nfwu
Proc. Vox. I. 3 G
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418 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
father, and being the primary leaders of another order, and of the arrangement and ornament of secondary natures. The first order there- fore of the intellectual Gods, is thus delivered to us by Parmenides.
Th£ second order however, after this, is that which comprehends the middle genera of wholes, is the cause to all things of progression and prolific power, and is in continuity with the first order of ihe intellectual Gods. What else therefore than life is every where in continuity with the intelligible and true being? For it is the medium between intellect and the intelligible, conjoining intellect to the intelligible, and expressing the intelligible power which collects together the one and being. As the intelligible therefore is to the one and hyparxis, so is life to power, and intellect to being. And as in intelligibles, the one is the object of desire, but being aspires after the participation of the one, and power collects being to the participation of the one, and the one to a communion with being, (for the one here is notimparticipable, and exempt from all power) so likewise the intelligible is the object of desire to intellect, but iuteUect is filled with it. And life binds indeed intellect to the intelligible, but unfolds the intelligible to intellect. Whence also, I think, those who are wise in all divine concerns, call the one and hyparxis intelligible. But that which is primarily being, they call' the first intellect, conformably to this analogy. Life therefore, is the medium between being and intellect, in the same manner as power subsists between the one and being. And all these, viz. the intelligible, life, and intellect are primarily in intelligibles ;
' For anOuorrts, it is necewary to read «i«x«cAowmf.
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CHAP. XXX VIII.