Again therefore we assert from the beginning that it is necessary the demiurgic principle should either be one, or many, or one, and many. But if indeed, it is one alone, and the multitude in the world, and the different order which it contains subsist similarly from one demiurgic principle, how are mortal and immortal natures the progeny of the same cause without a medium ? For all the natures that proceed from the one fabrication are immortal. But if the demiurgic principle is many only, whence is the common form of hyparxis communicated to the multitude, if it does not originate from one? For as the final cause is one, viz. the good, as the paradigmatic cause is one, viz. animal itself, and as the world is a generated one, thus also after the same manner, the demiurgic cause is one. But if there are one and many demiurgic principles, whether does the one principle belong to partial or to total genera? If however, it belongs indeed to partial genera, how is it extended to the first and intelligible paradigm? For the supermundane genera subsist about the intellectual Gods, and according to intellectual paradigms. For being partial, they entirely assimilate the natures posterior to themselves to intellectuals, co-ordinately to themselves. Or how will it any longer preserve the union of total fabrication which produces wholes totally ? For a thing of this kind pertains to no partial nature ; but it belongs to a partial principle, to produce parts either totally ' or partially, as we before observed. But if the demiurgic principle belongs to the total orders, it is necessary that it should either be intelligible or intellectual, or intelli- gible and intellectual. If however, it is of an intelligible nature, how is
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Chap. Xiv. of Plato. 345
it divisive of wholes? How is it co-arranged with mundane natures? How is it said to fashion the universe? How from the genera of being does it produce soul, and the natures posterior to soul ? For [on this hypothesis] we must admit that all these are in intelligiblcs, viz. figure, the genera of being, and these divided, the similar and the dissimilar, and other things through which the demiurgic principle constitutes the whole world. But if the demiurgic principle is of an intelligible and at the same time intellectual nature, how does he produce participated intellect? How does he separate the multiform orders of souls? How docs he divide the pai ts, or the circles that are in them ? For that which is generative of participated intellect, is imparticipable intellect. And that which has the power of dividing multitude .will not [on this hypothesis] differ from that which connects the total genera of the Gods. And in short, the demiurgus of wholes, is called byTiimeus intellect, and is frequently said to see, to discover, and to reason, but he is no where denominated by him intelligible and at the same time intellectual. For the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, divide all things triad ically. But the demiurgus, at one time indeed, divides the world into five parts, and at another divides the circles of the soul into hebdomads, that he may generate either the celestial spheres, or the seven parts of the soul. We must say therefore, that he is entirely secondary to the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, and he is the cause of secondary goods to the world. But we must refer to those Gods the cause of united forms and reasons. That the demiurgic intellect however, is an intellectual God, is I think through these things sufficiently apparent at present.
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Bett Plato appears to me to have indicated the peculiarity of this- God in a remarkable manner, by calling him intellect, and asserting that he sees intelligible*, but admitting that they are visible to him according to nature, for that which is truly intellect, and which establishes itself according to this hypantis, is intellectual intellect. For intelligible intel- lect also, is indeed simply intelligible, and is of that allotment ; but is said to be intellect, as being the cause of every intellectual nature. And the intellect of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, has out its own nature un mingled with the intelligible. But intel- lectual intellect alone, is peculiarly intellect, being allotted the intellec- tual itself in intellectuals; just as the most principal of inlelligibles, is* primarily, the first, and the highest intelligible, which wc denominate the one being, and that which is occultly being. This therefore is that which is simply intelligible. But that which is simply intellect is intellec- tual intellect. For the intelligible indeed possesses the summit, but intellect the end of wholes. And the intermediate natures partly pertain to the intelligible, and partly to intellect, and the intellectual nature. And the intelligibles indeed, that are primarily so, possess intellect ac- cording to cause; but the first of intellectuals have the intelligible according to participation ; and the natures that are collective of these, conjoin the intelligible and intellectual peculiarity together. Since, therefore, Timaeus also calls the demiurgus intellect indefinitely, and neither denominates him life, nor intelligible, in consequence of his pecu- liarity being alone intellectual, it is certainly necessary that he should be established at the end of the intellectual Gods.
For there intellect is intellect itself, and is not such an intellect as the Saturnian is. For Saturn also is intellect, but he is a pure and incor-
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ruptible intellect, which manifests his supreme empire in intellectuals, transcending the whole intellectual Gods. But the dcmiurgus is simply intellect. As therefore, the simply intelligible is the first of intelligibles, so that which is simply intellect, is the last of intellectuals. For all things are in each of the orders. For in intelligibles life and intellect preexist ; and in the breadth of life, there are similarly life and intellect And in intellectuals there is each of the rest. But in intelligibles indeed, being is according to essence, but life and intellect are according to cause. In intellectuals, intellect indeed is according to essence, but being and life are according to participation. And in the intermediate natures, intellect is according to cause, but being is according to participation, and life according to essence. As therefore, that whjch is most vital in life is the middle, and as that which is especially intelligible is the summit in being, so in intellectuals, the extremity is that which is most intellectual. Hence if there is a certain intellect which is simply intel- lect, and a perceiving intellect, this is intellectual intellect, which Plato denominating the demiurgus unfolds to us the most manifest order, which it is allotted in intellectuals. On this account also, prior to all other things, the demiurgus constitutes participated intellect, as Timsus says. For placing intellect in soul, and soul in body, he fashioned the universe. Energizing therefore, according to his own essence, and producing by his very being, he constituted the intellect of the universe prior to all other things. For every participated proceeds from imparticipable intellect. Hence, as if Plato had said, that the generative cause which gives sub- sistence to participated intelligible, is that winch is primarily being, so since the demiurgus first produces intellect from himself, he will be im- participable and intellectual intellect. From these things therefore, it is evident what the hyparxis of the demiurgus and father is, and what order it is allotted in intellectuals according to Timasus.
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Chapter Xvl
Let us however after another manner syllogistically collect the pecu- liarity of the dciniurgus, receiving from the Timaeus the principles of the- arguments on this subject. This therefore is known to every one, that Timaeus calls the whole demiurgus fabricator and father, in the beginning of what he says concerning him. For lie says, " It is difficult to discover the fabricator and father of this universe, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men." Hence, he does not think fit to call him either father alone, or fabricator alone, nor again connecting the two, father and fabricator, but on the contrary, he places the fabricative prior to the paternal. Now therefore, we must show in the first place, in what respect fabricator and father differ from each other ; and in the next place, in addition to this, who the fabricator alone is, and who father and fa- bricator is, and how the fabricative and at the same time paternal pecu- liarity, is considered by Plato as adapted to the demiurgus.
If therefore, Ave divide all things into the Gods, and the progeny of the Gods, and tliis is the same thing as to divide them into superessential monads, and the progressions of beings, father indeed will be generative of the Gods and superesseutial unities ; but fabricator will give subsist- ence to essences and beings. For again, according to this reason Timaeus says, that the natures which are generated by the demiurgus are equal to the Gods ; for the demiurgus is not only fabricator, but also father; but that those which are produced by the junior Gods, are allotted a mortal nature. For these Gods are alone producers and fabricators of things which participate of existence alone, and not of the superessential pecu- liarity. Hence through that by which they suffer a diminution with re- spect to the demiurgic monad, through this they are not allotted a power generative of things equal to the Gods. And through that by which the
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intellectual deraiurgus is expanded above the junior Gods, through this he binds to himself the generations of all mundane natures.
But if again, we divide beings into the total and partial, father indeed, •will appear to us to be the hypostatic cause of wholes, but fabricator of partial natures. For the former is the cause exemptly of things that are generated ; J but the latter proximately. And the former, produces indeed by his very being, energy giving perfection to his hyparxis ; but the latter produces by energizing, his hypostasis being fixed according to energy. If also we again separately divide the generations of perpe- tual and mortal natures, we must refer the generation of perpetual na- tures to the paternal cause, but the generation of mortal natures to the fabricative cause. For the fabricator indeed produces that which is ge- nerated from non-being to being. For the Elean guest defines the effective art to be this. But the father constitutes things posterior to himself consubsistent with himself. For he is father by his very being, and has the power of generating united with himself. Each therefore, I mean the paternal and the effective or fabricative, is assimilated to the principle of bound. And the former indeed is the cause of union, but the latter of the production of forms. And the former is the cause of wholes, but the latter of an extension as far as to parts. And the one indeed, is the primary leader of simple, but the other of composite na- tures. Again however, in these the generative cause, and the cause which is productive of life, are opposed to each other ; because the paternal cause indeed is connascent with generative powers, but the effective with vivific powers. Ami as the paternal and the effective causes pertain to the coordination of bound, so every thing prolific and vivific, pertains to vivification, and the first infinity.
These things, however, being thus divided by us, it is evident that the paternal indeed, is itself by itself primarily in the intelligible Gods. For they are the fathers of wholes, being fixed according to supreme intelligi- ble union. And on this- account, Plato also calls the first God father, from the natures which are proximately established after him, transfer- ring to him the appellation of father. For every where indeed, it is usual with Plato to introduce names to the ineffable from secondary causes,