intellect however contains multitude uniformly, or according to the form of one ; for multitude preexists in the intelligible according to cause. But the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual intellect, has indeed secondary measures of union, but is exempt from all perfect separation, abiding in the first principles of wholes. And intellectual intellect is the source of all division, and of the subsistence of partial natures ; since it preestablishes in itself all the multitude of forms, and this not tetradically only, as intelligible intellect, but it possesses one all-perfect intellectual cause of all forms. It is necessary therefore that the whole demiurgic principles should pertain to this intellect, that all the demiurgic Gods should proceed from this one third father, and that this should be the demiurgus of wholes. For as the first of paradigms co-subsists in intelligible intellect, and in the third triad and the first father, so likewise we must place the first demiurgic monad in intel- lectual intellect, and the third father of the intellectual Gods. For on this account also the demiurgic is conjoined with the paradigmatic cause, according to the analogy which each is allotted among ths fathers; one indeed in intelligibles, but the other in intellectuals. For one is the boundary of the intelligible, but the other of the intellectual order. But this is evident from what has been before said.
Farther still, fabrication being fourfold, and one indeed adorning wholes totally, another adorning wholes but partially, another adorning parts, but totally, and another weaving parts together with wholes, partially, — this being the case, it is evident that the cause of wholes which is the cause of them uniformly and indivisibly, is the most ancient of all the causes. It is necessary however, that this cause should either be prior to, or in, or posterior to the intellectual Gods. Where therefore shell we place it ? For all the parts which are constituted by intellectuals are more partial than the one and total fabrication. For the division of wholes into three, and the leaders of divisible production, present them- selves to the view in these orders. The natures therefore, that are prior to intellectuals, are defined according to other peculiarities of the Gods, as was before shown, and in short, they subsist according to union, and are expanded above the separation of intellectual forms.
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It remains therefore that the one demiurgus of wholes must be arranged in intellectuals. But if indeed, he is the first father, he will be intelligible, will contain his progeny in himself, and will be the collector of separation. How therefore, does he divide the worlds? How does he generate the multitudes of mundane natures? How does he speak to all the junior demiurgi at once ? For the first father is uncoordinated with the whole number of mundane natures, and also converts his first progeny to himself, flying as it were from multitude to union, and hastily with- drawing himself from all-various separation into intelligible transcen- dency. But if the one demiurgus of wholes is the vivific order, all things indeed, will be full of life, on account of the whole demiurgus. And the cause of souls, according to a probable reason will here become apparent subsisting prior to multitude. But how will he convert all things to himself? How is he called demiurgus and father? For the vivific deity, herself by herself, has a maternal dignity among the Gods, and is the supplier of progression to all things. But to produce forms, and to convert, are the illustrious and peculiar good of intellect. Neither therefore, is the demiurgus of wholes in the supermundane order. For all the natures there arc partial, and either partially preside over wholes, or comprehend the productions of parts totally. Nor is he in intellU gibles. For all the Gods there are fathers ; and no one there is called * demiurgus and father. But the divine orders antecedently comprehend all things in a manner perfectly occult and uuical. Not is he in the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order. For to collect, connect, and perfect multitudes, is uot the province of the demiurgic peculiarity. For this is the source of separation, and the production of forms, glittering with intellectual sections. But the iutclligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, extend intellectual multitudes to the
1 For itiynrai, H appears to me that we should read i*u $if^rai.
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union of intelligibles. Nor again, is it possible to admit that the demi- urgic cause is in the first or second order of intellectuals. For the summit of intellectuals is imparticipable by mundane natures, and is rather proposed to them in tbe order of the desirable; but is not productive of them. Hence, all the Gods in the world are elevated to the Saturnian place of survey ; but proceed from another secondary principle, and through it are converted and conjoined to the exempt kingdom. And the middle centre being vivific, is not defined according to the paternal characteristic. For the generative very much differs from the paternal, arid the vivific from the demiurgic genus ; so far, I think, as the principles of the whole orders, I mean bound and infinity, differ from each other. For the demiurgic and paternal order is referred to bound ; but all vivific and generative power, to infinity.
I wonder therefore, at those interpreters of Plato, who do not make one fabrication but many, who assert that there are three demiurgi of wholes, and pass at one time to the second, and at another to the third dcraiurgus ; and who divide what is said in the Timaeus, and think fit to refer some of the assertions to one, but others to another cause. For that there is a demiurgic triad, and another multitude of Gods characterized according to the producing cause, I also admit, and think it will be granted by Plato. It is necessary however in each order prior to the triad, and prior to every multitude, that there should be a preexistent monad. For all the orders of the Gods originate from a monad; because each of the whole orders is assimilated to the whole progression of the Gods. As therefore the subsistence of the Gods has the cause of its generation from the imparticipable one, thus also it is necessary that the perfect orders in the Gods, should have a preexistent monad, and a first-eflective principle. According to the same reasoning, all the vivific
progressions are suspended from one vivification, and the demiurgic orders are extended to one fabrication. And it is not proper that there should be multitude without the monad. For there will neither be co*arrangement, nor a division of multitude according to intellect, unless the one and whole preexist. For on this account prior to all the divine progressions, the order of wholeness subsists, in order that it may compre- hend parts, and may define them in, and about itself.
How therefore neglecting whole in fabrication, can we survey demiurgi divided according to parts? Though Plato himself thinks with respect to the paradigm of the universe, that the world should not be assimilated to any thing which naturally subsists in the form of a part, but to all perfect animal ; and on this account he demonstrates that the world is only- begotten, because its paradigm is one. For if it were not one, but many paradigms, again it would be necessary that there should be another animal about it, of which it would be a part, and it would be more right to assert that the world is no longer similar to the many paradigms, but to that which comprehends them. For it is necessary that the one paradigm should precede the many, in the same manner as the one good subsists prior to participated goods, and that the whole world should be the image of one paradigm prior to many. For whether it is alone the image of many paradigms, whence will the world be one and a whole ? And how is it possible it should not be more dishonourable than its parts? For these indeed, are assimilated to intelligibles, but the whole world is similar to no one of real beings. Or whether all the world subsists from a certain intelligible paradigm, if indeed there are many paradigms of one world, these also will be similar to each other, if they are the causes of the same image. It is necessary therefore, that sameness should be communicated to these from one form ; or again, the world will be more venerable than its paradigms according to union. But if the paradigm is one, after the same manner also the demiurgic cause is one. For as there is one image from one paradigm, thus also the progeny being one, derives its subsistence from one demiurgus and father. For it is necessary that the paradigmatic cause should either be the same with the demiurgus, and should be established in him, or that it should be prior to
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or PLATO.
the demiurgus, as we say it is, or that it should be posterior to the demiurgus, as some think proper to assert.
If however, the paradigm and the demiurgus are the same, the demiur- gus will be one according to Plato. For the paradigm is only-begotten, as he demonstrates. But if the demiurgus exists prior to the paradigm, which it is not lawful to assert, but the paradigm is one, much more will the demiurgus be one. For the causes which are more elevated are allotted a more uniform hypostasis ; since also the first cause of wholes is one. And if the paradigmatic cause has indeed the first order in beings, but the demiurgic cause the second order, and this universe the last order, being the resemblance of the former, and the progeny of the latter, how is it possible since the extremes are monadic, the middle multitude should be without the monad ? For it is necessary that the paradigm being intelligible, should impart by illumination a greater degree of union to the universe than the demiurgic cause. And as the paradigm being only-begotten, comprehends in itself the first paradigms, after the same manner it is necessary that the demiurgic monad should be compre- hensive of many demiurgi. For if the world derives its only-begotten subsistence from the paradigm, but through the demiurgus, the demi- urgus also is indeed entirely one.
Farther still, I think that those who are the patrons of this opinion should direct their attention to that assertion of Socrates, that it is every where fit the many should be comprehended in the one. For on account of tliis we admit the hypothesis of forms [or ideas], and prior to other things we preestablish intellectual monads. How therefore are intellec- tual forms extended to one principle, and how do each of them proceed from one demiurgic cause, but the whole demiurgic form is multiplied, and divided prior to the indivisible monad ? For it is necessary that as all equals, whether they are intellectual, or psychical, or sensible, should be suspended from one first equality, all beautiful things, from beauty itself, and the many every where, from primary beings, thus also it is necessary that the multitude of demiurgi should be suspended from one fabrication, and should subsist about one demiurgic monad. For how can it be lawful to leave the one in forms rather than in the Gods ? For
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forms indeed, liavc their hypostasis mingled with multitude ; but the Gods are defined according to union itself. If therefore all the multi- tudes of forms arc the progeny of monads, much more are the orders of the Gods allotted peculiarities which originate from monads, and which through monads are inherent in multitudes. But if this be the case, it is necessary that the whole demiurgus should subsist prior to the multitude of demiurgi, and that the three demiurgi should distribute the one cause of the generation of the universe.