A multiplicity merely enters into process through its individual members. The only statements to be made about a multiplicity express how its individual members enter into the process of the actual world. Any entity which enters into process in this way belongs to the mul- tiplicity, and no other entities do belong to it. It can be treated as a unity for this purpose, and this purpose only. For example, each of the six kinds of entities just mentioned are multiplicities (i.e., not the individual entities of the kinds, but the collective kinds of the entities). A multiplicity has solely a disjunctive rela- tionship to the actual world. The ‘universe’ comprising the absolutely initial data for an actual entity is a mul- tiplicity. The treatment of a multiplicity as though it
The Categorical Scheme 45
had the unity belonging to an entity of any one of the other six kinds produces logical errors. Whenever the word ‘entity’ is used, it is to be assumed, unless otherwise stated, that it refers to an entity of one of the six kinds, and not to a multiplicity.
There is no emergent evolution concerned with a mul- tiplicity, so that every statement about a multiplicity is a disjunctive statement about its individual members. Entities of any of the first six kinds, and generic contrasts, will be called ‘proper entities.’
In its development the subsequent discussion of the philosophy of organism is governed by the belief that the subject-predicate form of proposition is concerned with high abstractions, except in its application to subjective forms. This sort of abstraction, apart from this excep- tion, is rarely relevant to metaphysical description. The dominance of Aristotelian logic from the late classical period onwards has imposed on metaphysical thought the categories naturally derivative from its phraseology. This dominance of his logic does not seem to have been characteristic of Aristotle’s own metaphysical specula- tions. The divergencies, such as they are, in these lec- tures from other philosophical doctrines mostly depend upon the fact that many philosophers, who in their explicit statements criticize the Aristotelian notion of ‘substance,’ yet implicitly throughout their discussions presuppose that the ‘subject-predicate’ form of propo- sition embodies the finally adequate mode of statement about the actual world. The evil produced by the Aris- totelian ‘primary substance’ is exactly this habit of meta- physical emphasis upon the ‘subject-predicate’ form of proposition.
Some Derivative Notions
Tue primordial created fact is the unconditioned con- ceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects. This is the ‘primordial nature’ of God. By reason of this complete valuation, the objectification of God in each derivate actual entity results in a graduation of the relevance of eternal objects to the concrescent phases of that derivate occasion. There will be addi- tional ground of relevance for select eternal objects by reason of their ingression into derivate actual entities belonging to the actual world of the concrescent occasion in question. But whether or no this be the case, there is always the definite relevance derived from God. Apart from God, eternal objects unrealized in the actual world would be relatively non-existent for the concrescence in question. For effective relevance requires agency of comparison, and agency belongs exclusively to actual occasions. This divine ordering is itself matter of fact, thereby conditioning creativity. Thus possibility which transcends realized temporal matter of fact has a real relevance to the creative advance. God is the primordial creature; but the description of his nature is not exhausted by this conceptual side of it. His ‘consequent nature’ results from his physical prehensions of the deriv- ative actual entities (cf. Part V).
‘Creativity’ is another rendering of the Aristotelian
‘matter,’ and of the modern ‘neutral stuff’ But it is
divested of the notion of passive receptivity, either of
‘form,’ or of external relations; it is the pure notion of
the activity conditioned by the objective immortality of
Some Derivative Notions 47
the actual world—a world which is never the same twice, though always with the stable element of divine order- ing. Creativity is without a character of its own in exactly the same sense in which the Aristotelian ‘matter’ is without a character of its own. It is that ultimate notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality. It cannot be characterized, because all characters are more special than itself. But creativity is always found under conditions, and described as conditioned. The non- temporal act of all-inclusive unfettered valuation is at once a creature of creativity and a condition for creativ- ity. It shares this double character with all creatures. By reason of its character as a creature, always in con- crescence and never in the past, it receives a reaction from the world; this reaction is its consequent nature. It is here termed ‘God’; because the contemplation of our natures, as enjoying real feelings derived from the timeless source of all order, acquires that ‘subjective form’ of refreshment and companionship at which reli- gions aim.
This function of creatures, that they constitute the shifting character of creativity, is here termed the ‘objec- tive immortality’ of actual entities. Thus God has objec- tive immortality in respect to his primordial nature and his consequent nature. The objective immortality of his consequent nature is considered later (cf. Part V); we are now concerned with his primordial nature.
God’s immanence in the world in respect to his pri-
mordial nature is an urge towards the future based upon
an appetite in the present. Appetition is at once the
conceptual valuation of an immediate physical feeling
combined with the urge towards realization of the datum
conceptually prehended. For example ‘thirst’ is an
immediate physical feeling integrated with the concep-
tual prehension of its quenching.
Appetition * is immediate matter of fact including in itself a principle of unrest, involving realization of what
1 Cf. Leibniz’s Monodology.
48 Process and Reality
is not and may be. The immediate occasion thereby conditions creativity so as to procure, in the future, physical realization of its mental pole, according to the various valuations inherent in its various conceptual pre- hensions. All physical experience is accompanied by an appetite for, or against, its continuance: an example is the appetition of self-preservation. But the origination of the novel conceptual prehension has, more especially, to be accounted for. Thirst is an appetite towards a dif- ference—towards something relevant, something largely identical, but something with a definite novelty. This is an example at a low level which shows the germ of a free imagination.
In what sense can unrealized abstract form be rele- vant? What is its basis of relevance? ‘Relevance’ must express some real fact of togetherness among forms. The ontological principle can be expressed as: All real togeth- erness is togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality. So if there be a relevance of what in the tem- poral world is unrealized, the relevance must express a fact of togetherness in the formal constitution of a non- temporal actuality. But by the principle of relativ- ity there can only be one non-derivative actuality, unbounded by its prehensions of an actual world. Such a primordial superject of creativity achieves, in its unity of satisfaction, the complete conceptual valuation of all eternal objects. This is the ultimate, basic adjustment of the togetherness of eternal objects on which creative order depends. It is the conceptual adjustment of all appetites in the form of aversions and adversions. It constitutes the meaning of relevance. Its status as an actual efficient fact is recognized by terming it the ‘pri- mordial nature of God.’
The word ‘appetition’ illustrates a danger which lurks
in technical terms. This same danger is also illustrated
in the psychology derived from Freud. The mental poles
of actualities contribute various grades of complex feel-
ings to the actualities including them as factors. The
Some Derivative Notions 49
basic operations of mentality are ‘conceptual prehen- sions.’ These are the only operations of ‘pure’ mentality. All other mental operations are ‘impure,’ in the sense that they involve integrations of conceptual prehensions with the physical prehensions of the physical pole. Since ‘impurity’ in prehension refers to the prehension arising out of the integration of ‘pure’ physical prehensions with ‘pure’ mental prehensions, it follows that an impure men- tal prehension is also an ‘impure’ physical prehension and conversely. Thus the term ‘impure’ applied to a prehension has a perfectly definite meaning; and does not require the terms ‘mental’ or ‘physical,’ except for the direction of attention in the discussion concerned. The technical term ‘conceptual prehension’ is entirely neutral, devoid of all suggestiveness. But such terms present great difficulties to the understanding, by reason of the fact that they suggest no particular exemplifica- tions. Accordingly, we seek equivalent terms which have about them the suggestiveness of familiar fact. We have chosen the term ‘appetition,’ which suggests exemplifica- tions in our own experience, also in lower forms of life such as insects and vegetables. But even in human experience ‘appetition’ suggests a degrading notion of this basic activity in its more intense operations. We are closely concerned with what Bergson calls ‘intuition’ —with some differences however. Bergson’s intuition is an ‘impure’ operation; it is an integral feeling derived from the synthesis of the conceptual prehension with the physical prehension from which it has been derived according to the ‘category of conceptual reproduction’ (Categoreal Obligation IV). It seems that Bergson’s term ‘intuition’ has the:same meaning as ‘physical pur- pose’ in Part III of these lectures. Also Bergson’s ‘intui- tion’ seems to abstract from the subjective form of emo- tion and purpose. This subjective form is an essential element in the notion of ‘conceptual prehension,’ as indeed in that of any prehension. It is an essential ele- ment in ‘physical purpose’ (cf. Part III). If we con-
50 Process and Reality
sider these ‘pure’ mental operations in their most intense operations, we should choose the term ‘vision.’ A con- ceptual prehension is a direct vision of some possibility of good or evil—of some possibility as to how actualities may be definite. There is no reference to particular actualities, or to any particular actual world. The phrase ‘of good or of evil’ has been added to include a reference to the subjective form; the mere word ‘vision’ abstracts from this factor in a conceptual prehension. If we say that God’s primordial nature is a completeness of ‘appe- tion,’ we give due weight to the subjective form—at a cost. If we say that God’s primordial nature is ‘intui- tion,’ we suggest mentality which is ‘impure’ by reason of synthesis with physical prehension. If we say that God’s primordial nature is ‘vision,’ we suggest a maimed view of the subjective form, divesting it of yearning after concrete fact—no particular facts, but after some actu- ality. There is deficiency in God’s primordial nature which the term ‘vision’ obscures. One advantage of the term ‘vision’ is that it connects this doctrine of God more closely with philosophical tradition. ‘Envisage- ment’ is perhaps a safer term than ‘vision.’ To sum up: God’s ‘primordial nature’ is abstracted from his com- merce with ‘particulars,’ and is therefore devoid of those ‘impure’ intellectual cogitations which involve proposi- tions (cf. Part III). It is God in abstraction, alone with himself. As such it is a mere factor in God, deficient in actuality.
The notions of ‘social order’ and of ‘personal order’
cannot be omitted from this preliminary sketch. A
‘society,’ in the sense in which that term is here used,
is a nexus with social order; and an ‘enduring object,’
or ‘enduring creature,’ is a society whose social order
has taken the special form of ‘personal order.’
A nexus enjoys ‘social order’ where (i) there is a common element of form illustrated in the definiteness
Some Derivative Notions 51
of each of its included actual entities, and (ii) this com- mon element of form arises in each member of the nexus by reason of the conditions imposed upon it by its pre- hensions of some other members of the nexus, and (iii) these prehensions impose that condition of reproduction by reason of their inclusion of positive feelings of that common form. Such a nexus is called a ‘society,’ and the common form is the ‘defining characteristic’ of the society. The nation of ‘defining characteristic’ is allied to the Aristotelian notion ‘substantial form.’
The common element of form is simply a complex eter- nal object exemplified in each member of the nexus. But the social order of the nexus is not the mere fact of this common form exhibited by all its members. The repro- duction of the common form throughout the nexus is due to the genetic relations of the members of the nexus among each other, and to the additional fact that genetic relations include feelings of the common form. Thus the defining characteristic is inherited throughout the nexus, each member deriving it from those other members of the nexus which are antecedent to its own concrescence.
A nexus enjoys ‘personal order’ when (q) it is a ‘soci-
ety,’ and (6) when the genetic relatedness of its members
orders these members ‘serially.’
By this ‘serial ordering’ arising from the genetic
relatedness, it is meant that any member of the nexus—
excluding the first and the last, if there be such—con-
stitutes a ‘cut’? in the nexus, so that (a) this member
inherits from all members on one side of the cut, and
from no members on the other side of the cut, and (b)
if A and B are two members of the nexus and B inherits
from A, then the side of B’s cut, inheriting from B,
forms part of the side of A’s cut, inheriting from A,
and the side of A’s cut from which A inherits forms part
of the side of B’s cut from which B inherits. Thus the
nexus forms a single line of inheritance of its defining
characteristic. Such a nexus is called an ‘enduring object.’
It might have been termed a ‘person,’ in the legal sense