that a proposition be interesting than that it be true. The importance of truth is, that it adds to interest. The doctrine here maintained is that judgment-feelings form only one subdivision of propositional feelings; and arise from the special sort of integration of propositional feel- ings with other feelings. Propositional feelings are not, in their simplest examples, conscious feelings. Conscious- ness only arises in some integrations in which proposi- tional feelings are among the components integrated. Another point to notice is that the physical feeling, which is always one component in the history of an integral propositional feeling, has no unique relation to the propo- sition in question, nor has the subject of that feeling, which is also a subject prehending the proposition. Any subject with any physical feeling which includes in its objective datum the requisite logical subjects, can in a supervening phase entertain a propositional feeling with that proposition as its datum. It has only to originate a conceptual feeling with the requisite predicative pattern as its datum, and then to integrate the two feelings into the required propositional feeling.
Evidently new propositions come into being with the creative advance of the world. For every proposition involves its logical subjects; and it cannot be the propo- sition which it is, unless those logical subjects are the actual entities which they are. Thus no actual entity can feel a proposition, if its actual world does not include the logical subjects of that proposition. The proposition ‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon’ could not be felt by Han- nibal in any occasion of his existence on earth. Hannibal could feel propositions with certain analogies to this proposition, but not this proposition. It is, further, to be noticed that the form of words in which propositions are framed also includes an incitement to the origination of an affirmative judgment-feeling. In imaginative lit- erature, this incitement is inhibited by the general con- text, and even by the form and make-up of the material book. Sometimes there is even a form of words designed
Propositions and Feelings _ 397
to inhibit the formation of a judgment feeling, such as
‘once upon a time.’ The verbal statement also includes
words and phrases to symbolize the sort of physical feel-
ings necessary to indicate the logical subjects of the
proposition. But language is always elliptical, and de-
pends for its meaning upon the circumstances of its
publication. For example, the word ‘Caesar’ may mean
a puppy dog, or a negro slave, or the first Roman
emperor.
The actual entities whose actual worlds include the logical subjects of a proposition will be said to fall within the ‘locus’ of that proposition. The proposition is pre- hensible by them. Of those actual entities which fall within the locus of a proposition, only some will prehend it positively. There are two kinds of pure propositional feelings, namely, ‘imaginative feelings’ and ‘perceptive feelings.’ These kinds are not sharply distinguished, but their extreme instances function very differently.
A propositional feeling can arise only in a late phase of the process of the prehending subject. For it requires, in earlier phases: (a) a physical feeling whose objective datum includes the requisite logical subjects; and (6) a physical feeling involving a certain eternal object among the determinants of the definiteness of its datum; and (vy) the conceptual feeling of this eternal object, necessarily derivate from the physical feeling under head- ing (8), according to categoreal condition IV; and per- haps (8), some conceptual feeling which is a reversion from the former conceptual feeling, according to cate- goreal condition V, involving another eternal object as its datum.
The physical feeling under the heading (a) will be termed the ‘indicative feeling’; the physical feeling under heading (8) will be called the ‘physical recognition.’ The physical recognition is the physical basis of the concep- tual feeling which provides the predicative pattern.
398 Process and Reality
The ‘predicative pattern’ is either the eternal object which is the datum of the conceptual feeling under the heading (y), or it is the eternal object which is the datum of the conceptual feeling under the heading (6). In the former case, the second conceptual feeling, namely, that under the heading (8), is irrelevant to the considera- tion of the propositional feeling. In either case, that con- ceptual feeling whose datum is the predicative pattern is called the ‘predicative feeling.’
In this account of the origin of the predicative feeling, we are in general agreement with Locke and Hume, who hold that every conceptual feeling has a physical basis. But Hume lays down the principle that all eternal objects are first felt physically, and thus would only allow of the origination of the predicative feeling under heading (y). However he makes two concessions which ruin his gen- eral principle. For he allows the independent origination of intermediate ‘shades’ in a scale of shades, and also of new ‘manners’ of pattern. Both of these cases are allowed for by the principle of ‘reversion,’ which is appealed to under heading (6). The propositional feeling arises in the later phase in which there is integration of the ‘in- dicative feeling’ with the ‘predicative feeling.’ In this integration the two data are synthesized by a double elimination involving both data. The actual entities involved in the datum of the indicative feeling are re- duced to a bare multiplicity in which each is a bare ‘it’ with the elimination of the eternal object really constitut- ing the definiteness of that nexus. But the integration rescues them from this mere multiplicity by placing them in the unity of a proposition with the given predicate pattern. Thus the actualities, which were first felt as sheer matter of fact, have been transformed into a set of logical subjects with the potentiality for realizing an assigned predicative pattern. The predicative pattern has also been limited by elimination. For as a datum in the conceptual feeling, it held its possibility for reali- zation in respect to absolutely any actual entities; but in
Propositions and Feelings — 399
the proposition its possibilities are limited to just these logical subjects.
The subjective form of the propositional feeling will depend on circumstances, according to categoreal condi- tion VII. It may, or may not, involve consciousness; it may, or may not, involve judgment. It will involve aversion, or adversion, that is to say, decision. The sub- jective form will only involve consciousness when the ‘af- firmation-negation’ contrast has entered into it. In other words, consciousness enters into the subjective forms of feelings, when those feelings are components in an in- tegral feeling whose datum is the contrast between a nexus which 7s, and a proposition which in its own nature negates the decision of its truth or falsehood. The logi- cal subjects of the proposition are the actual entities in the nexus. Consciousness is the way of feeling that par- ticular real nexus, as in contrast with imaginative free- dom about it. The consciousness may confer importance upon what the real thing is, or upon what the imagina- tion is, or upon both.
A proposition, as such, is impartial between its pre- hending subjects, and in its own nature it does not fully determine the subjective forms of such prehensions. But the different propositional feelings, with the same propo- sition as datum, in different prehending subjects, are widely different according to differences of their histories in these subjects. They can be divided into two main types, here termed, respectively, ‘perceptive feelings’ and ‘imaginative feelings.’ This difference is founded on the comparison between the ‘indicative feeling’ from which the logical subjects are derived, and the ‘physical recog- nition’ from which the predicative pattern is derived.
Thirdly, and lastly, the predicative feeling may have
arisen in the prehending subject by reversion, according
to the heading (8) of the previous section. In this case
the predicate has in it some elements which really con-
400 Process and Reality
tribute to the definiteness of the nexus; but it has also some elements which contrast with corresponding ele- ments in the nexus. These latter elements have been introduced in the concrescence of the prehcnding subject. The predicate is thus distorted from the truth by the subjectivity of the prehending subject. Such a perceptive feeling will be termed ‘unauthentie.’
These physical feelings are either identical or differ- ent. If they be one and the same feeling, the derived propositional feeling is here called a ‘perceptive feeling.’ For in this case, as will be seen, the proposition predi- cates of its logical subjects a character derived from the way in which they are physically felt by that prehending subject.
If the physical feelings be different, the derived propo- sitional feeling is here called an ‘imaginative feeling.’ For in this case, as will be seen, the proposition predi- cates of its logical subjects a character without any guar- antee of close relevance to the logical subjects. Since these physical feelings are complex, there are degrees of difference between them. Two physical feelings may be widely diverse or almost identical. Thus the distinction between the two types of propositional feelings is not as sharp-cut as it might be. This distinction is still further blurred by noting that three distinct cases arise which differentiate perceptive feelings into three species, which in their turn shade off into each other.
Since we are now dealing with perceptive feelings, we have on hand only one physical feeling which enjoys the rdle both of the indicative feeling, and of the physical recognition. In the first place, suppose that the predica- tive pattern is derived straight from the physical recog- nition under the heading (vy), so that there is no rever- sion and the heading (8) is irrelevant. In this case the derived propositional feeling will be termed an ‘authen- tic perceptive feeling.’ Such a feeling, by virtue of its modes of origination, has as its datum a proposition whose predicate is in some way realized in the real nexus of its
Propositions and Feelings 401
logical subjects. Thus the proposition felt proposes a predicate derived from the real nexus, and not refracted by the prehending subject. But nevertheless the propo- sition need not be true, so far as concerns the way in which it implicates the logical subjects with the predi- cate. For the primary physical feeling of that nexus by the prehending subject may have involved ‘transmuta- tion’ according to categoreal condition VI. In this case, the proposition ascribes to its logical subjects the physical enjoyment of a nexus with the definition of its predicate; whereas that predicate may have only been enjoyed conceptually by these logical subjects. Thus, what the proposition proposes as a physical fact in the nexus, was in truth only a mental fact. Unless it is understood for what it is, error arises. Such understanding belongs to the subjective form.
But if the primary physical feeling involves no rever- sion in any stage, then the predicate of the proposition is that eternal object which constitutes the definiteness of that nexus. In this case, the proposition is, without qualification, true. The authentic perceptive feeling will then be terined ‘direct.’ Thus there are ‘indirect’ per- ceptive feelings (when ‘reversion’ is involved), and ‘direct’ perceptive feelings; and feelings of both these species are termed ‘authentic.’ In the case of these ‘authentic’ feelings, the predicate has realization in the nexus, physically or ideally, apart from any reference to the prehending subject.
Unauthentic feelings are feelings derived from a ‘tied’
imagination, in the sense that there is only one physical
basis for the whole origination, namely, that physical
feeling which is both the ‘indicative’ feeling, and the
‘physical recognition.’ The imagination is tied to one
ultimate fact.
Imaginative feelings belong to the general case when the indicative feeling and the physical recognition differ.
402 Process and Reality
But there are degrees of difference, which can vary from the case when the two nexis, forming the objective data of the two feelings respectively, enjoy the extreme of remote disconnection, to the case at the other extreme when the two nexis are almost identical. But in so far as there is diversity between the feelings, there is some trace of a free imagination. The proposition which is the objective datum of an imaginative feeling has a predi- cate derived, with or without reversions, from a nexus which in some respects differs from the nexus providing the logical subjects. Thus the proposition is felt as an imaginative notion concerning its logical subjects. The proposition in its own nature gives no suggestion as to how it should be felt. In one prehending subject it may be the datum of a perceptive feeling, and in another pre- hending subject it may be the datum of an imaginative feeling. But the subjective forms of the two feelings will differ according to the differences in the histories of the origination of those feelings in their respective subjects.