A feeling can be genetically described in terms of its process of origination, with its negative prehensions whereby its many initial data become its complex objec- tive datum. In this process the subjective form origi- nates, and carries into the feeling its own history trans- formed into the way in which the feeling feels. The way in which the feeling feels expresses how the feeling came into being. It expresses the purpose which urged it for- ward, and the obstacles which it encountered, and the indeterminations which were dissolved by the originative decisions of the subject.
There are an indefinite number of types of feeling according to the complexity of the initial data which the feeling integrates, and according to the complexity of the objective datum which it finally feels. But there are three primary types of feeling which enter into the forma-
The Theory of Feelings 355
tion of all the more complex feelings. These types are: (i) that of simple physical feelings, (ii) that of concep- tual feelings, and (ili) that of transmuted feelings. In a simple physical feeling, the initial datum is a single actual entity, in a conceptual feeling, the objective datum is an eternal object, in a transmuted feeling, the objec- tive datum is a nexus of actual entities. Simple physical feelings and transmuted feelings make up the class of physical feelings.
In none of these feelings, taken in their original purity
devoid of accretions from later integrations, does the
subjective form involve consciousness. Although in a
propositional feeling the subjective form may involve
judgment, this element in the subjective form is not
necessarily present.
One final remark must be added to the general descrip- tion of a feeling. A feeling is a component in the con- crescence of a novel actual entity. The feeling is always novel in reference to its data; since its subjective form, though it must always have reproductive reference to the data, is not wholly determined by them. The process of the concrescence is a progressive integration of feelings controlled by their subjective forms. In this synthesis, feelings of an earlier phase sink into the components of some more complex feeling of a later phase. Thus each phase adds its element of novelty, until the final phase in which the one complex ‘satisfaction’ is reached. Thus the actual entity, as viewed morphologically through its ‘satisfaction,’ 1s novel in reference to any one of its com- ponent feelings. It presupposes those feelings. But conversely, no feeling can be abstracted either from its data, or its subject. It is essentially a feeling aiming at that subject, and motivated by that aim. Thus the sub- jective form embodies the pragmatic aspect of the feel- ing; for the datum is felt with that subjective form in order that the subject may be the superject which it is.
In the analysis of a feeling, whatever presents itself as also ante rem is a datum, whatever presents itself as
356 Process and Reality
exclusively in re is subjective form, whatever presents itself in re and post rem is ‘subject-superject. This doctrine of ‘feeling’ is the central doctrine respecting the becoming of an actual entity. In a feeling the actual world, selectively appropriated, is the presupposed datum, not formless but with its own realized form selec- tively germane, in other words ‘objectified.’ The sub- jective form is the ingression of novel form peculiar to the new particular fact, and with its peculiar mode of fusion with the objective datum. The subjective form in abstraction from the feeling is merely a complex eternal object. In the becoming, it meets the ‘data’ which are selected from the actual world. In other words, the data are already ‘in being.’ There the term ‘in being’ is for the moment used as equivalent to the term ‘in realization.’
Section Xi
A subjective form has two factors, its qualitative pat- tern and its pattern of intensive quantity. But these two factors of pattern cannot wholly be considered in abstraction from each other. For the relative intensities of the qualitative elements in the qualitative pattern are among the relational factors which constitute that quali- tative pattern. Also conversely, there are qualitative relations among the qualitative elements and they con- stitute an abstract qualitative pattern for the qualitative relations. The pattern of intensities is not only the vari- ety of qualitative elements with such-and-such intensi- ties; but it is also the variety of qualitative elements, as in such-and-such an abstract qualitative pattern, with such-and-such intensities. Thus the two patterns are not really separable. It is true that there is an abstract qualitative pattern, and an abstract intensive pattern; but in the fused pattern the abstract qualitative pattern lends iself to the intensities, and the abstract intensive pattern lends itself to the qualities.
Further, the subjective form cannot be absolutely dis-
The Theory of Feelings 357
jomed from the pattern of the objective datum. Some
elements of the subjective form can be thus disjoined;
and they form the subjective form as in abstraction from
the patterns of the objective datum. But the full sub-
jective form cannot be abstracted from the pattern of the
objective datum. The intellectual disjunction is not a
real separation. Also the subjective form, amid its own
original elements, always involves reproduction of the
pattern of the objective datum.
As a simple example of this description of a feeling,
consider the audition of sound. In order to avoid unnec-
essary complexity, let the sound be one definite note.
The audition of this note is a feeling. This feeling has
first an auditor, who is the subject of the feeling. But
the auditor would not be the auditor that he is apart
from this feeling of his.
Secondly, there is the complex ordered environment composed of certain other actual entities which, how- ever vaguely, is felt by reason of this audition. This environment is the datum of this feeling. It is the ex- ternal world, as grasped systematically in this feeling. In this audition it is felt under the objectification of vague spatial relations, and as exhibiting musical quali- ties. But the analytic discrimination of this datum of the feeling is in part vague and conjectural, so far as con- sciousness is concerned: there is the antecedent physio- logical functioning of the human body, and the presen- tational immediacy of the presented locus.
There is also an emotional sensory pattern, the sub- jective form, which is: more definite and more easily analysable. The note, in its capacity of a private sensa- tion, has pitch, quality, and intensity. It is analysable into its fundamental tone, and a selection of its over- tones. This analysis reveals an abstract qualitative pat- tern which the complex relatedness of the fundamental tone-quality with the tone-qualities of its select over- tones. This qualitative pattern may, or may not, include relations of a spatial type, if some of the overtones come
358 Process and Reality
from instruments spatially separate, for example, from a spatial pattern of tuning forks.
The fundamental tone, and its overtones, have, each of them, their own intensities. This pattern of intensi- ties can be analysed into the relative intensities of the various tones and the absolute intensity which is the total loudness. The scale of relative intensities enters into the final quality of the note, with some independence of its absolute loudness.
Also the spatial pattern of the tuning forks and the resonance of the music chamber enter into this quality. But these also concern the datum of the feeling. Also in this integration of feeling we must include the qualita- tive and quantitative auditory contributions derived from various nerve-routes of the body. In this way the animal body, as part of the external world, takes a par- ticularly prominent place in the pattern of the datum of the feeling. Also in the subjective form we must reckon qualities of joy and distaste, of adversion and of aversion, which attach integrally to the audition, and also differentially to various elements of the audition. In an earlier phase of the auditor, there is audition divested of such joy and distaste. This earlier, bare audition does not in its own nature determine this additional qualifica- tion. It originates as the audition becomes an element in a higher synthesis, and yet it is an element in the final component feeling. Thus the audition gains complexity of subjective form by its integration with other feelings. Also, though we can discern three patterns, namely, the pattern of the datum, the pattern of emotional quality, and the pattern of emotional intensity, we cannot analyse either of the latter patterns in complete separation either from the pattern of the datum, or from each other.
The final concrete component in the satisfaction is
the audition with its subject, its datum, and its emo-
tional pattern as finally completed. It is a particular
fact not to be torn away from any of its elements.
The Theory of Feelings 359
Section Xii
Prehensions are not atomic; they can be divided into other prehensions and combined into other prehensions. Also prehensions are not independent of each other. The relation between their subjective forms is constituted by the one subjective aim which guides their formation. This correlation of subjective forms is termed ‘the mutual sensitivity’ of prehensions (cf. Part I, Ch. II, Sect. ITI, Categoreal Obligation VII, ‘The Category of Subjective Harmony’).
The prehensions in disjunction are abstractions; each of them is its subject viewed in that abstract objectifica- tion. The actuality is the totality of prehensions with subjective unity in process of concrescence into concrete unity.
There are an indefinite number of prehensions, over-
lapping, subdividing, and supplementary to each other.
The principle, according to which a prehension can be
discovered, is to take any component in the objective
datum of the satisfaction; in the complex pattern of the
subjective form of the satisfaction there will be a com-
ponent with direct relevance to this element in the
datum. Then in the satisfaction, there is a prehension
of this component of the objective datum with that com-
ponent of the total subjective form as its subjective form.
The genetic growth of this prehension can then be traced by considering the transmission of the various elements of the datum from the actual world, and—in the case of eternal objects—their origination in the con- ceptual prehensions. There is then a growth of prehen- sions, with integrations, eliminations, and determination of subjective forms. But the determinations of succes- sive phases of subjective forms, whereby the integrations have the characters that they do have, depends on the unity of the subject imposing a mutual sensitivity upon the prehensions. Thus a prehension, considered geneti- cally, can never free itself from the incurable atomicity
360 Process and Reality
of the actual entity to which it belongs. The selection
of a subordinate prehension from the satisfactlon—as
described above—involves a hypothetical, propositional
point of view. The fact is the satisfaction as one. There
is some arbitrariness in taking a component from the
datum with a component from the subjective form, and
in considering them, on the ground of congruity, as
forming a subordinate prehension. The justification is
that the genetic process can be thereby analysed. If no
such analysis of the growth of that subordinate prehen-
sion can be given, then there has been a faulty analysis
of the satisfaction. This relation between the satisfac-
tion and the genetic process is expressed in the eighth
and ninth categories of explanation (cf. Part I, Ch. II,
Sect. IT).
The Primary Feelings
A ‘SIMPLE physical feeling’ entertained in one subject is a feeling for which the initial datum is another single actual entity, and the objective datum is another feeling entertained by the latter actual entity.
Thus in a simple physical feeling there are two actual entities concerned. One of them is the subject of that feeling, and the other is the initial datum of the feeling. A second feeling is also concerned, namely, the objective datum of the simple physical feeling. This second feel- ing is the ‘objectification’ of its subject for the subject of the simple physical feeling. The initial datum is objectified as being the subject of the feeling which is the objective datum: the objectification is the ‘perspective’ of the initial datum.
A simple physical feeling is an act of causation. The actual entity which is the initial datum is the ‘cause,’ the simple physical feeling is the ‘effect,’ and the subject entertaining the simple physical feeling is the actual entity ‘conditioned’ by the effect. This ‘conditioned’ actual entity will also be called the ‘effect.’ All complex causal action can be reduced to a complex of such primary components. Therefore simple physical feelings will also be called ‘causal’ feelings.
But it is equally true to say that a simple physical feeling is the most primitive type of an act of perception, devoid of consciousness. The actual entity which is the initial datum is the actual entity perceived, the objective datum is the ‘perspective’ under which that actual entity is perceived, and the subject of the simple physical feeling