Locke’s ‘particular ideas’ are merely the antecedent actual entities exercising their function of infusing with their own particularity the ‘passing on, which is the pri- mary phase of the ‘real internal constitution’ of the actual entity in question. In obedience to a prevalent miscon- ception, Locke termed this latter entity the ‘mind’; and discussed its ‘furniture,’ when he should have discussed ‘mental operations’ in their capacity of later phases in the constitutions of actual entities. Locke himself flittingly expresses this fundamental vector function of his ‘ideas.’ In a paragraph, forming a portion of a quotation already

Process 325

made, he writes: “I confess power includes in it some
kind of relation,—a relation to action or change; as
indeed, which of our ideas, of what kind soever, when
attentively considered, does not?” *

The second phase, that of supplementation, divides itself into two subordinate phases. Both of these phases may be trivial; also they are not truly separable, since they interfere with each other by intensification or inhibi- tion. If both phases are trivial, the whole second phase is merely the definite negation of individual origination; and the process passes passively to its satisfaction. The actual entity is then the mere vehicle for the transference of inherited constitutions of feeling. Its private immedi- acy passes out of the picture. Of these two sub-phases, the former—so far as there is an order—is that of aesthetic supplement, and the latter is that of intellectual supplement.

In the aesthetic supplement there is an emotional appreciation of the contrasts and rhythms inherent in the unification of the objective content in the concrescence of one actual occasion. In this phase perception is heightened by its assumption of pain and pleasure, beauty and distaste. It is the phase of inhibitions and intensi- fications. It is the phase in which blue becomes more intense by reason of its contrasts, and shape acquires dominance by reason of its loveliness. What was received as alien, has been recreated as private. This is the phase of perceptivity, including emotional reactions to perceptivity. In this phase, private immediacy has welded the data into a new fact of blind feeling. Pure aesthetic supplement has solved its problem. This phase requires an influx of conceptual feelings and their integra- tion with the pure physical feelings.

But ‘blindness’ of the process, so far, retains an inde- termination. There must be either a determinate nega-

BOfe TI XXL. 1.

326 Process and Reality

tion of intellectual ‘sight,’ or an admittance of intellectual ‘sight.’ The negations of intellectual sight is the dis- missal into irrelevance, of eternal objects in their abstract status of pure potentials. ‘What might be’ has the capability of relevant contrast with ‘what is.’ If the pure potentials, in this abstract capacity, are dismissed from relevance, the second sub-phase is trivial. The process then constitutes a blind actual occasion, ‘blind’ in the sense that no intellectual operations are involved; though conceptual operations are always involved. Thus there is always mentality in the form of ‘vision,’ but not always mentality in the form of conscious ‘intellectuality.’

But if some eternal objects, in their abstract capacity, are realized as relevant to actual fact, there is an actual occasion with intellectual operations. The complex of such intellectual operations is sometimes termed the ‘mind’ of the actual occasion; and the actual occasion is also termed ‘conscious.’ But the term ‘mind’ conveys the suggestion of independent substance. This is not meant here: a better term is the ‘consciousness’ belonging to the actual occasion.

An eternal object realized in respect to its pure poten- tiality as related to determinate logical subjects is termed a ‘propositional feeling’ in the mentality of the actual occasion in question. The consciousness belonging to an actual occasion is its sub-phase of intellectual supple- mentation, when that sub-phase is not purely trivial. This sub-phase is the eliciting, into feeling, the full con-

trast between mere propositional potentiality and realized fact.

To sum up: There are two species of process, mascro-
scopic process, and microscopic process. The macroscopic
process is the transition from attained actuality to
actuality in attainment; while the microscopic process is
the conversion of conditions which are merely real into
determinate actuality. The former process effects the

Process 327

transition from the ‘actual’ to the ‘merely real’; and the latter process effects the growth from the real to the actual. The former process is efficient; the latter process in teleological. The future is merely real, without being actual; whereas the past is a nexus of actualities. The actualities are constituted by their real genetic phases. The present is the immediacy of teleological process whereby reality becomes actual. The former process provides the conditions which really govern attainment; whereas the latter process provides the ends actually attained. The notion of ‘organism’ is combined with that of ‘process’ in a twofold manner. The community of actual things is an organism; but it is not a static organism. It is an incompletion in process of production. Thus the expansion of the universe in respect to actual things is the first meaning of ‘process’; and the universe in any stage of its expansion is the first meaning of ‘organism.’ In this sense, an organism is a nexus.

Secondly, each actual entity is itself only describable
as an organic process. It repeats in microcosm what the
universe is in macrocosm. It is a process proceeding from
phase to phase, each phase being the real basis from
which its successor proceeds towards the completion of
the thing in question. Each actual entity bears in its
constitution the ‘reasons’ why its conditions are what
they are. These ‘reasons’ are the other actual entities
objectified for it.

An ‘object’ is a transcendent element characterizing that definiteness to which our ‘experience’ has to conform. In this sense, the future has objective reality in the pres- ent, but no formal actuality. For it is inherent in the constitution of the immediate, present actuality that a future will supersede it. Also conditions to which that future must conform, including real relationships to the present, are really objective in the immediate actuality.

Thus each actual entity, although complete so far as
concerns its microscopic process, is yet incomplete by
reason of its objective inclusion of the mascroscopic

8 Process and Beality

process. It really experiences a future which must be
actual, although the completed actualities of that future
are undetermined. In this sense, each actual occasion
experiences its own objective immortality.

Norn. The function here ascribed to an ‘object’ is in general agree- ment with a paragraph (p. 249, 2d edition) in Professor Kemp Smith’s Commentary on Kant’s Critique, where he is considering Kant’s ‘Objec- tive Deduction’ as in the first edition of the Critique: “When we examine the objective, we find that the primary characteristic dis- tinguishing it from the subjective is that it lays a compulsion upon our minds, constraining us to think about it in a certain way. By an object is meant something which will not allow us to think at haphazard.”

There is of course the vital difference, among others, that where Kemp Smith, expounding Kant, writes ‘thinking,’ the philosophy of organism substitutes ‘experiencing.’

PART III THE THEORY OF PREHENSIONS

CuaptTer I. Frenines

XII.

Genetic and Morphological Analysis; Genetic Consideration is Analysis of the Concrescence, The Actual Entity Forma- liter; Morphological Analysis is Analysis of the Actual Entity as Concrete, Spatialized, Objective.

Finite Truth, Division into Prehensions; Succession of Phases, Integral Prehensions in Formation; Five Factors: Subject, Initial Data, Elimination, Objective Datum, Subjective Form; Feeling is Determinate.

. Feeling cannot be Abstracted from its Subject; Subject, Aim

at the Feeler, Final Cause, Causa Sut.

. Categories of Subjective Unity, of Objective Identity, of

Objective Diversity.

. Category of Subjective Unity; The One Subject is the Final

End Conditioning Each Feeling, Episode in Self-produc-
tion; Pre-established Harmony, Self-Consistency of a Prop-
osition, Subjective Aim; Category of Objective Identity,
One Thing has one Role, no Duplicity, One Ground of
Incompatibility; Category of Objective Diversity, No
Diverse Elements with Identity of Function, Another
Ground of Incompatibility.

. World as a Transmitting Medium; Explanation; Negative

Prehensions, with Subjective Forms.

. Application of the Categories. . Application (Continued).

Nexus.

. Subjective Forms; Classification of Feelings according to

Data; Simple Physical Feelings, Conceptual Feelings, Trans-
muted Feelings; Subjective Forms not Determined by
Data, Conditioned by them.

Subjective Form, Qualitative Pattern, Quantitative Pattern; Intensity; Audition of Sound.

Prehensions not Atomic, Mutual Sensitivity; Indefinite Num- ber of Prehensions; Prehensions as Components in the Sat- isfaction and Their Genetic Growth; Justification of the Analysis of the Satisfaction, Eighth and Ninth Categories of Explanation.

CuHapter II]. Tue Primary FEELINGS

It;

Il.

Simple Physical Feeling, Initial Datum is One Actual Entity, Objective Datum is one Feeling Entertained by that one Actual Entity; Act of Causation, Objective Datum the Cause, Simple Physical Feeling the Effect; Synonymously ‘Causal Feelings’; Primitive Act of Perception, Initial Datum is Actual Entity Perceived, Objective Datum is the Perspective, In general not Conscious Perception; Reason for ‘Perspective’; Vector Transmission of Feeling, Re-en- action, Conformal; Irreversibility of Time; Locke; Eternal Objects Relational, Two-Way Réle, Vector-Transference, Reproduction, Permanence; Quanta of Feeling Transferred, Quantum Theory in Physics, Physical Memory; Atomism, Continuity, Causation, Memory, Perception, Quality, Quan- tity, Extension.

. Conceptual Feelings, Positive and Negative Prehensions; Cre-

ative Urge Dipolar; Datum is an Eternal Object; Exclusive-
ness of Eternal Objects as Determinants, Definiteness,
Incompatibility.

Subjective Form of Conceptual Prehension is Valuation; Inte- gration introduces Valuation into Impure Feelings, Inten- siveness; Three Characteristics of Valuation: (i) Mu- tual Sensitivity of Subjective Forms, (11) Determinant of Procedure of Integration, (111) Determinant of Intensive Emphasis.

Consciousness is Subjective Form; Requires its Peculiar
Datum; Recollection, Plato, Hume; Conscious Feelings
Always Impure, Requires Integration of Physical and Con-
ceptual Feelings; Affirmation and Negative Contrast; Not
all Impure Feelings Conscious.

Cuapter III. Tur TRANSMISSION OF FEELINGS

. Ontological Principle, Determination of Initiation of Feeling;

Phases of Concrescence; God, Inexorable Valuation, Sub-
jective Aim; Self-Determination Imaginative in Origin,
Re-enaction.

Pure Physical Feelings, Hybrid Physical Feelings; Hybrid
Feelings Transmuted into Pure Physical Feelings; Disas-
trous Separation of Body and Mind Avoided; Hume’s Prin-
ciple, Hybrid Feelings with God as Datum.

Application of First Categoreal Obligation; Supplementary Phase arising from Conceptual Origination; Application of Fourth and Fifth Categoreal Obligations; Conceptual Reversion; Ground of Identity, Aim at Contrast.

Abstract 333

IV. Transmutation; Feeling a Nexus as One, Transmuted Physi- cal Feeling; Réle of Impartial Conceptual Feeling in Trans- mutation, Category of Transmutation, Further Explana- tions; Conceptual Feelings Modifying Physical Feelings; Negative Prehensions Important. V. Subjective Harmony, the Seventh Categoreal Obligation.

Cuaprer [V. Proposirions AND FEELINGS

I. Consciousness, Propositional Feelings, Not Necessarily Con- scious; Propositional Feeling is Product of Integration of Physical Feeling with a Conceptual Feeling; Eternal Objects Tell no Tales of Actual Occasions, Propositions are Tales That Might be Told of Logical Subjects; Proposition, True or False, Tells no Tales about Itself, Awaits Reasons; Conceptual Feeling Provides Predicative Pattern, Physical Feeling Provides Logical Subjects, Integration; Indication of Logical Subjects, Element of Givenness Required for Truth and Falsehood.

II. Proposition Not Necessarily Judged, Propositional Feelings
Not Necessarily Conscious; New Propositions Arise; Pos-
sible Percipient Subjects within the ‘Scope of a Propo-
sition.’

III. Origination of Propositional Feeling, Four (or Five) Stages, Indicative Feeling, Physical Recognition, Predicative Pat- tern (Predicate), Predicative Feeling; Propositional Feel- ing Integral of Indicative and Predicative Feelings.

IV. Subjective Forms of Propositional Feelings, Dependent on Phases of Origination; Case of Identity of Indicative Feel- ing with the Physical Recognition, Perceptive Feelings: Case of Diversity, Imaginative Feelings; Distinction not Necessarily Sharp-cut; The Species of Perceptive Feel- ings: Authentic, Direct Authentic, Indirect Authentic, Un- authentic; Tied Imagination.

V. Imaginative Feelings, Indicative Feeling and Physical Recog- nition Diverse, Free Imagination; Subjective Form Depends on Origination, Valuation rather than Consciousness; Lure to Creative Emergence; Criticism of Physical Feelings, Truth, Critical Conditions.

VI. Language, Its Functon; Origination of the Necessary Train of Feelings.

CuHuaprer V. THE HIGHER PHASES OF EXPERIENCE

I. Comparative Feelings, Conscious Perceptions, Physical Pur- poses; Physical Purposes More Primitive Than Proposi-

tional Feelings.

334 Process and Reality

II. Intellectual Feelings, Integration of Propositional Feeling with Physical Feeling of a Nexus Including the Logical Subjects; Category of Objective Identity, Affirmation-Negation Con-

trast; Consciousness is a Subjective Form.

III. Belief, Certainty, Locke, Immediate Intuition.

IV. Conscious Perception, Recapitulation of Origin; Direct and Indirect Authentic Feelings, Unauthentic Feelings; Trans- mutation; Perceptive Error, Novelty; Tests, Force and Vivacity, Analysis of Origination; Tests Fallible.

V. Judgment, Yes-Form, No-Form, Suspense-Form; In Yes-
Form Identity of Patterns, in No-Form Diversity and
Incompatibility, In Suspense Form Diversity and Incom-
patibility, In Suspense Form Diversity and Compatibility;
Intuitive Judgment, Conscious Perception.

VI. Affirmative Intuitive Judgment Analogous to Conscious Per-
ception, Difference Explained; Inferential Judgment;
Divergence from Locke’s Nomenclature; Suspended Judg-
ment.

VII. Physical Purposes, Primitive Type of Physical Feeling;
Retaining Valuation and Purpose, Eliminating Indetermin-
ateness of Complex Eternal Object; Responsive Re-enac-
tion; Decision.

VIII. Second Species of Physical Purposes, Reversion Involved; Eighth Categoreal Obligation, Subjective Intensity; Imme- diate Subject, Relevant Future; Balance, Conditions for Contrast; Reversion as Condition for Balanced Contrast; Rhythm, Vibration; Categoreal Conditions; Physical Pur- poses and Propositional Feelings Compared,

The Theory of Feelings

The philosophy of organism is a cell-theory of actual-
ity. Each ultimate unit of fact is a cell-complex, not
analysable into components with equivalent complete-
ness of actuality.