292 Process and Reality
to the truth-value of the proposition in question. Hav- ing regard to the fact that judgment concerns the sub- jective form of an impure feeling arising from the inte- eration of simpler feelings, we note that judgments are divisible into two sorts. These are (i) intuitive judg- ments and (ii) derivative judgments. In an intuitive judgment the integration of the physical datum with the proposition elicits into feeling the full complex detail of the proposition in its comparison of identity, or diversity, in regard to the complex detail of the physical datum. The intuitive judgment is the consciousness of this com- plex detailed comparison involving identity and diversity. Such a judgment is in its nature correct. For it is the consciousness of what is.
In a derivative judgment the integration of the physi- cal datum with the proposition elicits into feeling the full complex detail of the proposition, but does not elicit into feeling the full comparison of this detail with the com- plex detail of the physical fact. There is some compari- son involving the remainder of the detail. But the sub- jective form embraces the totality of the proposition, instead of assuming a complex pattern which discrimi- nates between the compared and the uncompared com- ponents. In derivative judgments there can be error. Logic is the analysis of the relationships between proposi- tions in virtue of which derivative judgments will not introduce errors, other than those already attaching to the judgments on the premises. Most judgments are deriva- tive; such judgments illustrate the doctrine that the subjective form of a feeling is affected by the totality of the actual occasion. This has been termed the ‘sensi- tivity’ of feelings in one occasion. In an intuitive judg- ment the subjective form of assent or dissent has been restrained, so as to derive its character solely from the contrasts in the datum. Even in this case, the emotional force of the judgment, as it passes into purpose, is de- rived from the whole judging subject.
Further, the judging subject and the logical subjects
The Propositions 293
refer to a universe with the general metaphysical charac- ter which represents its ‘patience’ for those subjects, and also its ‘patience’ for those eternal objects. In each judg- ment the universe is ranged in a hierarchy of wider and wider societies, as explained above (cf. Part II, Ch. III). It follows that the distinction between the logical sub- jects, with their qualities and relations, and the universe as systematic background, is not quite so sharply defined as the previous explanation suggests. For it is a matter of convention as to which of the proximate societies are reckoned as logical subjects and which as background. Another way of stating this shading off of logical subjects into background, is to say that the patience of the uni- verse for a real fact in a judging subject is a hierarchical patience involving systematic gradations of character. This discussion substantiates the statement made above (cf. Part I, Ch. I, Sect. V), that a verbal statement is never the full expression of a proposition.
We now recur to the distinction between a proposition and a judgment. A proposition emerges in the analysis of a judgment; it is the datum of the judgment in abstraction from the judging subject and from the sub- jective form. A judgment* is a synthetic feeling, embracing two subordinate feelings in one unity of feel- ing. Of these subordinate feelings one is propositional, merely entertaining the proposition which is its datum. The same proposition can constitute the content of diverse judgments by diverse judging entities respec- tively. The possibility of diverse judgments by diverse actual entities, having the same content (of ‘proposition’ in contrast with ‘nexus’), requires that the same complex of logical subjects, objectified via the same eternal objects, can enter as a partial constituent into the ‘real’ essences of diverse actual entities. The judgment is a decision of feeling, the proposition is what is felt; but it is only part of the datum felt.
But, since each actual world is relative to standpoint,
*@f, Part U0, Ch, Viz
294 Process and Read Ety
it is only some actual entities which will have the stand- points so as to include in their actual world, the actual entities which constitute the logical subjects of the prop- osition. Thus every proposition defines the judging sub- jects for which it is a proposition. Every proposition presupposes some definite settled actual entities in the actual world of its judging subject; and thus its possible judging subjects must have these actual entities in the actual world of each of them. All judgment requires knowledge of the presupposed actual entities. Thus in addition to the requisite composition of the actual world presupposed by a proposition, there must be the requi- site knowledge of that world presupposed by a judgment, whether the judgment be correct or incorrect. For actual entities, whose actual worlds have not the requisite com- position, the proposition is non-existent; for actual entities, without the requisite knowledge, the judgment is impossible. It is quite true that a more abstract proposition can be modelled on the lines of the original proposition, so as to avoid the presupposition of some or all of these settled actual entities which are the logical subjects in the original proposition. This new proposi- tion will have meaning for a wider group of possible sub- jects than the original proposition. Some propositions seem to us to have meaning for all possible judging sub- jects. This may be the case; but I do not dare to affirm that our metaphysical capacities are sufficiently devel- oped to warrant any certainty on this question. Perhaps we are always presupposing some wide society beyond which our imaginations cannot leap. But the vagueness of verbal statements is such that the same form of words is taken to represent a whole set of allied propositions of various grades of abstractness.
A judgment weakens or strengthens the decision
whereby the judged proposition, as a constituent in the
lure, is admitted as an efficient element in the concres-
cence, with the reinforcement of knowledge. A judgment
is the critique of a lure for feeling.
Tees Oroslelons 295
It now remains to consider the sense in which the actual world, in some systematic aspect, enters into each proposition. This investigation is wholly concerned with the notion of the logical subjects of the proposition. These logical subjects are, in the old sense of the term, ‘particulars.’ They are not concepts in comparison with other concepts; they are particular facts in a potential pattern.
But particulars must be indicated; because the propo-
sition concerns just those particulars and no others.
Thus the indication belongs to the proposition; namely,
‘Those particulars as thus indicated in such-and-such a
predicative pattern’ constitutes the proposition. Apart
from the indication there is no proposition because there
are no determinate particulars. Thus we have to study
the theory of indication.
Some definitions are required:
A ‘relation’ between occasions is an eternal object illus-
trated in the complex of mutual prehensions by virtue
of which those occasions constitute a nexus.
A relation is called a ‘dual relation’ when the nexus in which it is realized consists of two, and only two, actual occasions. It is a ‘triple relation’ when there are three occasions, and so on.
There will, in general, be an indefinite number of eter-
nal objects thus illustrated in the mutual prehensions
of the occasions of any one nexus; that is to say, there
are an indefinite number of relations realized between the
occasions of any particular nexus.
A ‘general principle’ is an eternal object which is only illustrated through its ‘instances,’ which are also eternal objects. Thus the realization of an instance is also the realization of the general principle of which that eternal object is an instance. But the converse is not true; namely, the realization of the general principle does not involve the realization of any particular instance, though
296 Process and Reality
it does necessitate the realization of some instance. Thus the instances each involve the general principle, but the general principle only involves at least one instance. In general, the instances of a general principle are mutually exclusive, so that the realization of one instance involves the exclusion of the other instances. For example, colour is a general principle and colours are the instances. So if all sensible bodies exhibit the general principle, which is colour, each body exhibits some defi- nite colour. Also each body exhibiting a definite colour is thereby ‘coloured.’
A nexus exhibits an ‘indicative system’ of dual rela-
tions among its members, when (i) one, and only one,
relation of the system relates each pair of its members;
and (ii) these relations are instances of a general prin-
ciple; and (iii) the relation (in the system) between
any member A and any other member B does not also
relate A and a member of the nexus other than B; and
(iv) the relations (in the system) between A and B and
between A and C suffice to define the relation (in the
system) between B and C, where A, B, and C are any
three members of the nexus.
Thus if A and X be any two members of the nexus, and if X has knowledge of A’s systematic relation to it and also of A’s systematic relations to B, C, and D, where B,C, and D are members of the nexus, then X has knowl- edge of its own systematic relations to B, C, and D, and of the mutual systematic relations between B, C, and D. Such a nexus admits of the precise indication of its mem- bers from the standpoint of any one of them. The rela- tive ‘where’ presupposes a nexus exhibiting an indicative system. More complex types of indicative systems can be defined; but the simplest type suffices to illustrate the principle involved. We have been defining Aristotle’s category of ‘position.’ It will be noticed that in a nexus with an indicative system of relations, the subjective aspect of experience can be eliminated from propositions involved. For a knowledge of B and C and D as from A
Erg Propositions 297
yields a proposition concerning C and D as from B.
Thus the prevalent notion, that the particular subject
of experience can, in the nature of the case, never be
eliminated from the experienced fact, is quite untrue.
Every proposition presupposes some general nexus with an indicative relational system. This nexus includes its locus of judging subjects and also its logical subjects. This presupposition is part of the proposition, and the proposition cannot be entertained by any subject for which the presupposition is not valid. Thus in a propo- sition certain characteristics are presupposed for the judging subject and for the logical subjects. This pre- supposition of character can be carried further than the mere requirements of indication require. For example, in ‘Socrates is mortal’ the mere spatio-temporal indica- tive system may be sufficient to indicate ‘Socrates.’ But the proposition may mean “The man Socrates is mortal,’ or “The philosopher Socrates is mortal.’ The superfluous indication may be part of the proposition. Anyhow, the principle that a proposition presupposes the actual world as exhibiting some systematic aspect has now been explained.
This discussion can be illustrated by the proposition, ‘Caesar has crossed the Rubicon.’ This form of words symbolizes an indefinite number of diverse propositions. In its least abstract form ‘Caesar’ stands for a society of settled actual entities in the actual world from the stand- point of the judging subject, with their objectifications consciously perceived by the subject. The whole theory of perception will come up for further discussion in a later chapter (cf. Part III); at this point it can be assumed. The word ‘Rubicon’ is to be explained in the same way as the word ‘Caesar.’ The only points left ambiguous respecting ‘Caesar’ and ‘Rubicon’ are that these societies—either or both, and each with its defining characteristic—may be conjecturally supposed to be pro- longed up to the world contemporary with the judging subject, or, even more conjecturally, into the future