entific descriptions are, of course, entwined with the spe- cific details of geometry and physical laws, which arise from the special order of the cosmic epoch in which we find ourselves. But the general principles of physics are exactly what we should expect as a specific exemplifica- tion of the metaphysics required by the philosophy of organism. It has been a defect in the modern philoso- phies that they throw no light whatever on any scientific principles. Science should investigate particular species, and metaphysics should investigate the generic notions under which those specific principles should fall. Yet, modern realisms have had nothing to say about scientific principles; and modern idealisms have merely contrib- uted the unhelpful suggestion that the phenomenal world is one of the inferior avocations of the Absolute.
The direct perception whereby the datum in the imme- diate subject is inherited from the past can thus, under an abstraction, be conceived as the transference of throbs of emotional energy, clothed in the specific forms provided by sensa. Since the vagueness in the experi- ment subject will veil the separate objectifications wherein there are individual contributions to the total satisfaction, the emotional energy in the final satisfaction wears the aspect of a total intensity capable of all grada- tions of ideal variation. But in its origin it represents the totality arising from the contributions of separate objects to that form of energy. Thus, having regard to its origin, a real atomic structure of each form of energy is discernible, so much from each objectified actual occa- sion; and only a finite number of actual occasions will be relevant.
This direct perception, characterized by mere subjec- tive responsiveness and by lack of origination in the higher phases, exhibits the constitution of an actual entity under the guise of receptivity. In the language of causa- tion, it describes the efficient causation operative in the actual world. In the language of epistemology, as framed by Locke, it describes how the ideas of particular
Organisms and Environment 179
existents are absorbed into the subjectivity of the percipi- ent and are the datum for its experience of the external world. In the language of science, it describes how the quantitative intensity of localized energy bears in itself the vector marks of its origin, and the specialities of its specific forms; it also gives a reason for the atomic quanta to be discerned in the building up of a quantity of energy. In this way, the philosophy of organism—as it should— appeals to the facts.
The current accounts of perception are the stronghold
of modern metaphysical difficulties. They have their
origin in the same misunderstanding which led to the
incubus of the substance-quality categories. The Greeks
looked at a stone, and perceived that it was grey. The
Greeks were ignorant of modern physics; but modern
philosophers discuss perception in terms of categories
derived from the Greeks.
The Greeks started from perception in its most elab- orate and sophisticated form, namely, visual perception. In visual perception, crude perception is most completely made over by the originative phases in experience, phases which are especially prominent in human experience. If we wish to disentangle the two earlier prehensive phases —the receptive phases, namely, the datum and the sub- jective response—from the more advanced originative phases, we must consider what is common to all modes of perception, amid the bewildering variety of originative amplification.
On this topic I am content to appeal to Hume. He writes: “But my senses convey to me only the impres- sions of coloured points, disposed in a certain manner. If the eye is sensible of anything further, I desire it may be pointed out to me.” * And again: “It is universally allowed by the writers on optics, that the eye at all times sees an equal number of physical points, and that a man
1Cf. Treatise, Part II, Sect. III. Italics not his.
180 Process and Reality
on the top of a mountain has no larger an image pre-
sented to his senses, than when he is cooped up in the
narrowest court or chamber.” *
In each of these quotations Hume explicitly asserts that the eye sees. The conventional comment on such a passage is that Hume, for the sake of intelligibility, is using common forms of expression; that he is only really speaking of impressions on the mind; and that in the dim future, some learned scholar will gain reputation by emending ‘eye’ into ‘ego.’ The reason for citing the pas- sages is to enforce the thesis that the form of speech is literary and intelligible because it expresses the ultimate truth of animal perception. The ultimate momentary ‘ego’ has as its datum the ‘eye as experiencing such and such sights.’ In the second quotation, the reference to the number of physical points is a reference to the excited area on the retina. Thus the ‘eye as experiencing such and such sights’ is passed on as a datum, from the cells of the retina, though the train of actual entities forming the relevant nerves, up to the brain. Any direct relation of eye to brain is entirely overshadowed by this intensity of indirect transmission. Of course this statement is merely a pale abstraction from the physiological theory of vision. But the physiological account does not pre- tend to be anything more than indirect inductive knowl- edge. The point here to be noticed is the immediate literary obviousness of ‘the eye as experiencing such and such sights.’ This is the very reason why Hume uses the expression in spite of his own philosophy. The conclu- sion, which the philosophy of organism draws, is that in human experience the fundamental fact of perception is the inclusion, in the datum, of the objectification of an antecedent part of the human body with such-and-such experiences. Hume agrees with this conclusion suffi- ciently well so as to argue from it, when it suits his pur- pose. He writes: “I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction
* Cf. Part III, Sect. 1X.
Organisms and Environment 181
of substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be derived from the impressions of sensation or reflection? If it be conveyed by our senses, I ask, which of them, and after what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses.” °
We can prolong Hume’s list: the feeling of the stone is
in the hand; the feeling of the food is the ache in the
stomach; the compassionate yearning is in the bowels,
according to biblical writers; the feeling of well-being is
in the viscera passim; ill temper is the emotional tone
derivative from the disordered liver.
In this list, Hume’s and its prolongation, for some
cases—as in sight, for example—the supplementary phase
in the ultimate subject overbalances in importance the
datum inherited from the eye. In other cases, as in
touch, the datum of ‘the feeling in the hand’ maintains
its importance, however much the intensity, or even the
character, of the feeling may be due to supplementation
in the ultimate subject: this instance should be con-
trasted with that of sight. In the instance of the ache
the stomach, as datum, is of chief importance, and the
food though obscurely felt is secondary—at least, until
the intellectual analysis of the situation due to the doc-
tor, professional or amateur. In the instances of com-
passion, well-being, and ill temper, the supplementary
feelings in the ultimate subject predominate, though
there are obscure references to the bodily organs as
inherited data.
This survey supports the view that the predominant
basis of perception is perception of the various bodily
organs, as passing on their experiences by channels of
transmission and of enhancement. It is the accepted
doctrine in physical science that a living body is to be
interpreted according to what is known of other sections
of the physical universe. This is a sound axiom; but it
3 Cf. Part I, Sect. VI.
182 Process and Reality
is double-edged. For it carries with it the converse
deduction that other sections of the universe are to be
interpreted in accordance with what we know of the
human body.
It is also a sound rule that all interpretation should be based upon a vera causa. Now the original reliance upon ‘the grey stone’ has been shown by modern physics to be due to a misapprehension of a complex situation; but we have direct knowledge of the relationship of our central intelligence to our bodily feelings. According to this interpretation, the human body is to be conceived as a complex ‘amplifier-—to use the language of the tech- nology of electromagnetism. The various actual entities, which compose the body, are so coordinated that the experiences of any part of the body are transmitted to one or more central occasions to be inherited with enhancements accruing upon the way, or finally added by reason of the final integration. The enduring person- ality is the historic route of living occasions which are severally dominant in the body at successive instants. The human body is thus achieving on a scale of concen- trated efficiency a type of social organization, which with every gradation of efficiency constitutes the orderliness whereby a cosmic epoch shelters in itself intensity of satisfaction.
The crude aboriginal character of direct perception is inheritance. What is inherited is feeling-tone with evi- dence of its origin: in other words, vector feeling-tone. In the higher grades of perception vague feeling-tone differentiates itself into various types of sensa—those of touch, sight, smell, ete-—each transmuted into a definite prehension of tonal contemporary nexus by the final percipient.
In principle, the animal body is only the more highly
organized and immediate part of the general environment
for its dominant actual occasion, which is the ultimate
Organisms and Environment 183
percipient. But the transition from without to within the body marks the passage from lower to higher grades of actual occasions. The higher the grade, the more vigorous and the more original is the enhancement from the supplementary phase. Pure receptivity and trans- mission gives place to the trigger-action of life whereby there is release of energy in novel forms. Thus the transmitted datum acquires sensa enhanced in relevance or even changed in character by the passage from the low-grade external world into the intimacy of the human body. The datum transmitted from the stone becomes the touch-feeling in the hand, but it preserves the vector- character of its origin from the stone. The touch-feeling in the hand with this vector origin from the stone is transmitted to the percipient in the brain. Thus the final perception is the perception of the stone through the touch in the hand. In this perception the stone is vague and faintly relevant in comparison with the hand. But, however dim, it is there.
In the transmission of inheritance from A to B, to C, to D, A is objectified by the eternal object S as a datum for B; where S is a sensum or a complex pattern of sensa. Then B is objectified for C. But the datum for B is thereby capable of some relevance for C, namely, A as objectified for B becomes reobjectified for C; and so on to D, and throughout the line of objectifications. Then for the ultimate subject M the datum includes A as thus transmitted, B as thus transmitted, and so on. The final objectifications for M are effected by a set S, of eternal objects which is a modification of the original group S. The modification consists partly in relegation of elements into comparative irrelevance, partly in enhancement of relevance for other elements, partly in supplementation by eliciting into important relevance some eternal objects not in the original S. Generally there will be vagueness in the distinction between A, and B, and C, and D, etc., in their function as components in the datum for M. Some of the line, A and C for instance, may stand out
184 Process and Reality
with distinctness by reason of some peculiar feat of orig- inal supplementation which retains its undimmed im- portance in subsequent transmission. Other members of the chain may sink into oblivion. For example, in touch there is a reference to the stone in contact with the hand, and a reference to the hand; but in normal, healthy, bodily operations the chain of occasions along the arm sinks into the background, almost into complete oblivion. Thus M, which has some analytic consciousness of its datum, is conscious of the feeling in its hand as the hand touches the stone. According to this account, perception in its primary form is consciousness of the causal efficacy of the external world by reason of which the percipient is a concrescence from a definitely constituted datum. The vector character of the datum is this causal efficacy.