The most general examples of such societies are the regular trains of waves, individual electrons, protons, individual molecules, societies of molecules such as inor- ganic bodies, living cells, and societies of cells such as vegetable and animal bodies.
The Order of Nature 151
It is obvious that the simple classification (cf. Part I, Ch. III, Sect. II) of societies into ‘enduring objects,’ ‘corpuscular societies,’ and ‘non-corpuscular societies’ requires amplification. The notion of a society which includes subordinate societies and nextis with a definite pattern of structural inter-relations, must be introduced. Such societies will be termed ‘structured.’
A structured society as a whole provides a favourable environment for the subordinate societies which it har- bours within itself. Also the whole society must be set in a wider environment permissive of its continuance. Some of the component groups of occasions in a struc- tured society can be termed ‘subordinate societies.’ But other such groups must be given the wider designation of ‘subordinate nexis.’ The distinction arises because in some instances a group of occasions, such as, for example, a particular enduring entity, could have retained the dominant features of its defining characteristic in the general environment, apart from the structured society. It would have lost some features; in other words, the analogous sort of enduring entity in the general environ- ment is, in its mode of definiteness, not quite identical with the enduring entity within the structured environ- ment. But, abstracting such additional details from the generalized defining characteristic, the enduring object with that generalized characteristic may be conceived as independent of the structured society within which it finds it. For example, we speak of a molecule within a living cell, because its general molecular features are independent of the environment of the cell. Thus a molecule is a subordinate society in the structured soci- ety which we call the ‘living cell.’
But there may be other nexiis included in a structured
society which, excepting the general systematic charac-
teristics of the external environment, present no features
capable of genetically sustaining themselves apart from
152 Process and Reality
the special environment provided by that structured society. It is misleading, therefore, to term such a nexus a ‘society’ when it is being considered in abstraction from the whole structured society. In such an abstraction it can be assigned no ‘social’ features. Recurring to the example of a living cell, it will be argued that the occa- sions composing the ‘empty’ space within the cell exhibit special features which analogous occasions outside the cell are devoid of. Thus the nexus, which is the empty space within a living cell, is called a ‘subordinate nexus,’ but not a ‘subordinate society.’
Molecules are structured societies, and so in all proba-
bility are separate electrons and protons. Crystals are
structured societies. But gases are not structured socie-
ties in any important sense of that term; although their
individual molecules are structured societies.
It must be remembered that each individual occasion within a special form of society includes features which do not occur in analogous occasions in the external envi- ronment. The first stage of systematic investigation must always be the identification of analogies between occasions within the society and occasions without it. The second stage is constituted by the more subtle pro- cedure of noting the differences between behaviour within and without the society, difference of behaviour exhibited by occasions which also have close analogies to each other. The history of science is marked by the vehement, dogmatic denial of such differences, until they are found out.
An obvious instance of such distinction of behaviour
is afforded by the notion of the deformation of the shape
of an electron according to variations in its physical
situation.
A ‘structured society’ may be more or less ‘complex’
in respect to the multiplicity of its associated sub-societies
and sub-nexts and to the intricacy of their structural
pattern.
A structured society which is highly complex can be
The Order of Nature 153
correspondingly favourable to intensity of satisfaction
for certain sets of its component members. This inten-
sity arises by reason of the ordered complexity of the
contrasts which the society stages for these components
The structural relations gather intensity from this
intensity in the individual experiences. Thus the growth
of a complex structured society exemplifies the general
purpose pervading nature. The mere complexity of
givenness which procures incompatibilities has been
superseded by the complexity of order which procures
contrasts.
The doctrine that every society requires a wider social environment leads to the distinction that a society may be more or less ‘stabilized’ in reference to certain sorts of changes in that environment. A society is ‘stabilized’ in reference to a species of change when it can persist through an environment whose relevant parts exhibit that sort of change. If the society would cease to persist through an environment with that sort of heterogeneity, then the society is in that respect ‘unstable.’ A complex society which is stable provided that the environment exhibits certain features, is said to be ‘specialized’ in respect to those features. The notion of ‘specialization’ seems to include both that of ‘complexity’ and that of strictly conditioned ‘stability.’
An unspecialized society can survive through impor- tant changes in its environment. This means that it can take on different functions in respect to its relationship to a changing environment. In general the defining char- acteristic of such a society will not include any particu- lar determination of structural pattern. By reason of this flexibility of structural pattern, the society can adopt that special pattern adapted to the circumstances of the moment. Thus an unspecialized society is apt to be deficient in structural pattern, when viewed as a whole.
154 Process and Reality
Thus in general an unspecialized society does not secure conditions favourable for intensity of satisfaction among its members. Whereas a structured society with a high grade of complexity will in general be deficient in survival value. In other words, such societies will in general be ‘specialized’ in the sense of requiring a very special sort of environment.
Thus the problems for Nature is the production of
societies which are ‘structured’ with a high ‘complexity,’
and which are at the same time ‘unspecialized.’ In this
way, intensity is mated with survival.
There are two ways in which structured societies have solved this problem. Both ways depend on that enhance- ment of the mental pole, which is a factor in intensity of experience. One way is by eliciting a massive average objectification of a nexus, while eliminating the detailed diversities of the various members of the nexus in ques- tion. This method, in fact, employs the device of blocking out unwelcome detail. It depends on the funda- mental truth that objectification is abstraction. It uti- lizes this abstraction inherent in objectification so as to dismiss the thwarting elements of a nexus into negative prehensions. At the same time the complex intensity in the structured society is supported by the massive objectifications of the many environmental nexis, each in its unity as one nexus, and not in its multiplicity as many actual occasions.
This mode of solution requires the intervention of men-
tality operating in accordance with the Category of
Transmutation (ie., Categoreal Obligation VI). It
ignores diversity of detail by overwhelming the nexus
by means of some congenial uniformity which pervades
it. The environment may then change indefinitely so far
as concerns the ignored details—so long as they can be
ignored.
The close association of all physical bodies, organic and
Pee Ior Drop Nature 155
inorganic alike, with ‘presented loci’ definable*® by straight lines, suggests that this development of mental- ity is characteristic of the actual occasions which make up the structured societies which we know as ‘material bodies.’ This close association is evidenced by the impor- tance of ‘acceleration’ in the science of Dynamics. For ‘acceleration’ is nothing else than a mode of estimating the shift from one family of ‘presented loci’ to another such family (cf. Part IV).
Such mentality represents the first grade of ascent
beyond the mere reproductive stage which employs noth-
ing more than the Category of Conceptual Reproduction
(.e., Categoreal Obligation IV). There is some initia-
tive of conceptual integration, but no originality in con-
ceptual prehension. This initiative belongs to the Cate-
gory of Transmutation, and the excluded originality
belongs to the Category of Reversion.
These material bodies belong to the lowest grade of
structured societies which are obvious to our gross appre-
hensions. They comprise societies of various types of
complexity—crystals, rocks, planets, and suns. Such
bodies are easily the most long-lived of the structured
societies known to us, capable of being traced through
their individual life-histories.
The second way of solving the problem is by an ini- tiative in conceptual prehensions, i.e., in appetition. The purpose of this initiative is to recerve the novel elements of the environment into explicit feelings with such sub- jective forms as conciliate them with the complex experi- ences proper to members of the structured society. Thus in each concrescent occasion its subjective aim originates novelty to match the novelty of the environment.
In the case of the higher organisms, this conceptual
initiative amounts to thinking about the diverse experi-
ences; in the case of lower organisms this conceptual
initiative merely amounts to thoughtless adjustment of
aesthetic emphasis in obedience to an ideal of harmony.
15 Cf, Ch. IV of this ‘part’ and also Part IV.
156 Process and Reality
In either case the creative determination which tran-
scends the occasion in question has been deflected by an
impulse original to that occasion. This deflection in
general originates a self-preservative reaction through-
out the whole society. It may be unfortunate or inade-
quate; and in the case of persistent failure we are in the
province of pathology.
This second mode of solution also presupposes the
former mode. Thus the categories of Conceptual Re-
version and of Transmutation are both called into
play.
Structured societies in which the second mode of solu-
tion has importance are termed ‘living.’ It is obvious
that a structured society may have more or less ‘life,’
and that there is no absolute gap between ‘living’ and
‘non-living’ societies. For certain purposes, whatever
‘life’ there is in a society may be important; and for
other purposes, unimportant.
A structured society in which the second mode is
unimportant, and the first mode is important will be
termed ‘inorganic.’
In accordance with this doctrine of ‘life,’ the primary meaning of ‘life’ is the origination of conceptual novelty —novelty of appetition. Such origination can only occur in accordance with the Category of Reversion. Thus a society is only to be termed ‘living’ in a derivative sense. A ‘living society’ is one which includes some ‘living occa- sions.’ Thus a society may be more or less ‘living,’ according to the prevalence in it of living occasions. Also an occasion may be more or less living according to the relative importance of the novel factors in its final satisfaction.
Thus the two ways in which dominant members of structured societies secure stability amid environmental novelties are (i) elimination of diversities of detail, and (41) origination of novelties of conceptual reaction. As the result, there is withdrawal or addition of those details of emphasis whereby the subjective aim directs the
Beeiordervof Nature 157
integration of prehensions in the concrescent phases of dominant members.
There is yet another factor in ‘living’ societies which requires more detached analysis. A structured society consists in the patterned intertwining of various nexis with markedly diverse defining characteristics. Some of these nexus are of lower types than others, and some will be of markedly higher types. There will be the ‘sub- servient’ nexts and the ‘regnant’ nextis within the same structured society. This structured society will provide the immediate environment which sustains each of its sub-societies, subservient and regnant alike. In a living society only some of its nexiis will be such that the men- tal poles of all their members have any original reactions. These will be its ‘entirely living’ nexiis, and in practice a society is only called ‘living’ when such nexis are reg- nant. Thus a living society involves nextis which are ‘Inorganic,’ and nextis which are inorganic do not need the protection of the whole ‘living’ society for their sur- vival in a changing eternal environment. Such nexts are societies. But ‘entirely living’ nexis do require such protection, if they are to survive. According to this con- jectural theory, an ‘entirely living’ nexus is not a ‘society.’ This is the theory of the animal body, including a uni- cellular body as a particular instance. A complex inor- ganic system of interaction is built up for the protection of the ‘entirely living’ nexis, and the originative actions of the living elements are protective of the whole sys- tem. On the other hand, the reaction of the whole sys- tem provide the intimate environment required by the ‘entirely living’ nexiis. We do not know of any living society devoid of its subservient apparatus of inorganic societies.
‘Physical Physiology’ deals with the subservient inor-
ganic apparatus; and ‘Psychological Physiology’ seeks
to deal with ‘entirely living’ nexis, partly in abstraction