Process and Reality (Gifford Lectures, 1929) — Alfred North Whitehead

The breath of feeling which creates a new individual fact has an origination not wholly traceable to the mere data. It conforms to the data, in that it feels the data. But the how of feeling, though it is germane to the data, is not fully determined by the data. The relevant feeling is not settled, as to its inclusions or exclusions of ‘subjec- tive form,’ by the data about which the feeling is con- cerned. The concrescent process is the elimination of these indeterminations of subjective forms. The quality of feeling has to be definite in respect to the eternal objects with which feeling clothes itself in its self-defini- tion. It is a mode of ingression of eternal objects into the actual occasion. But this self-definition is analysable into two phases. First, the conceptual ingression of the eternal objects in the double role of being germane to the data and of being potentials for physical feeling. This is the ingression of an eternal object in the role of a conceptual lure for feeling. The second phase is the admission of the lure into the reality of feeling, or its rejection from this reality. The relevance of an eternal object in its réle of lure is a fact inherent in the data. In this sense the eternal object is a constituent of the ‘objective lure.’ But the admission into, or rejection from, reality of conceptual feeling is the originative deci- sion of the actual occasion. In this sense an actual occa- sion is causa sui. The subjective forms of the prehen-

1Cf, Ezekiel, xxxvii.

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sions in one phase of concrescence control the specific
integrations of prehensions in later phases of that
concrescence.

An example of the lure for feeling is given by Hume himself. In the first section of his Treatise he lays down the proposition, “That all our simple ideas in their first appearance, are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly rep- resent.” It must be remembered that in the organic philosophy the ‘data of objectifications’ are the nearest analogue to Hume’s ‘simple impressions.’ Thus, modify- ing Hume’s principle, the only lure to conceptual feeling is an exact conformation to the qualities realized in the objectified actualities. But Hume (loc. cit.) notes an exception which carries with it the exact principle which has just been laid down, namely, the principle of relevant potentials, unrealized in the datum and yet constituent of an ‘objective lure’ by proximity to the datum. The point is that ‘order’ in the actual world introduces a derivative ‘order’ among eternal objects. Hume writes: ‘There is however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed, that the several distinct ideas of colours, which enter by the eyes, of those of sounds, which are conveyed by the hearing, are really different from each other, though, at the same time, resembling. Now, if this be true of different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour, that each of them produces a distinct idea independent of the rest. . . . Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds, excepting one par- ticular shade of blue, for instance, which it has never been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the

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lightest; it is plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible that there is a greater distance in that place, between the contiguous colours, than in any other. Now I ask, whether it is possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and to raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been con- veyed to him by his senses. I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions; though the instances is so particular and singular, that it is scarce worth our observ- ing, and does not merit that, for it alone, we should alter our general maxim.”

This passage requires no comment, except for its final clause. Hume puts the ‘instance’ aside as being ‘particu- lar and singular’; it is exactly this estimate which is chal- lenged by the philosophy of organism. The analysis of concrescence, here adopted, conceives that there is an origination of conceptual feeling, admitting or rejecting whatever is apt for feeling by reason of its germaneness to the basic data. The gradation of eternal objects in respect to this germaneness is the ‘objective lure’ for feeling; the concrescent process admits a selection from this ‘objective lure’ into subjective efficiency. This is the subjective ‘ideal of itself’ which guides the process. Also the basic data are constituted by the actual world which ‘belongs to’ that instance of concrescent process. Feel- ings are ‘vectors’; for they feel what is there and trans- form it into what is here.

The term ‘potential difference’ is an old one in physi-
cal science; and recently it has been introduced in
physiology with a meaning diverse from, though generi-
cally allied to, its older meaning in physics. The ulti-
mate fact in the constitution of an actual entity which
suggests this term is the objective lure for feeling. In
the comparison of two actual entities, the contrast be-

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tween their objective lures is their ‘potential difference’; and all other uses of this phrase are abstractions deriva- tive from this ultimate meaning.

The ‘objectifications’ of the actual entities in the actual world, relative to a definite actual entity, constitute the efficient causes out of which that actual entity arises; the ‘subjective aim’ at ‘satisfaction’ constitutes the final cause, or lure, whereby there is determinate concrescence; and that attained ‘satisfaction’ remains as an element in the content of creative purpose. There is, in this way, transcendence of the creativity; and this transcendence effects determinate objectifications for the renewal of the process in the concrescence of actualities beyond that satisfied superject.

Thus an actual entity has a three-fold character: (i) it has the character ‘given’ for it by the past; (11) it has the subjective character aimed at in its process of con- erescence; (11) it has the superjective character, which is the pragmatic value of its specific satisfaction qualify- ing the transcendent creativity.

In the case of the primordial actual entity, which is God, there is no past. Thus the ideal realization of con- ceptual feeling takes the precedence. God differs from other actual entities in the fact that Humce’s principle, of the derivate character of conceptual feelings, does not hold for him. There is still, however, the same threefold character: (i) The ‘primordial nature’ of God is the con- crescence of an unity of conceptual feelings, including among their data all eternal objects. The concrescence is directed by the subjective aim, that the subjective forms of the feelings shall be such as to constitute the eternal objects into relevant lures of feeling severally appropriate for all realizable basic conditions. (ii) The ‘consequent nature’ of God is the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe. This primordial nature directs such perspectives of objectifi- cation that each novel actuality in the temporal world contributes such elements as it can to a realization in God

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free from inhibitions of intensity by reason of discord- ance. (iil) The ‘superjective’ nature of God is the char- acter of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances.

This is the conception of God, according to which he is considered as the outcome of creativity, as the founda- tion of order, and as the goal towards novelty. ‘Order’ and ‘novelty’ are but the instruments of his subjective aim which is the intensification of ‘formal immediacy.’ It is to be noted that every actual entity, including God, is something individual for its own sake; and thereby transcends the rest of actuality. And also it is to be noted that every actual entity, including God, is a creature transcended by the creativity which it qualifies. A temporal occasion in respect. to the second element of its character, and God in respect to the first element of his character satisfy Spinoza’s definition of substance, that it is causa sui. To be causa sui means that the process of concrescence is its own reason for the decision in respect to the qualitative clothing of feelings. It is finally responsible for the decision by which any lure for feeling is admitted to efficiency. The freedom inherent in the universe is constituted by this-element of self- causation.

In the subsequent discussion, ‘actual entity’ will be
taken to mean a conditioned actual entity of the tem-
poral world, unless God is expressly included in the dis-
cussion. The term ‘actual occasion’ will always exclude
God from its scope.

The philosophy of organism is the inversion of Kant’s philosophy. The Critique of Pure Reason describes the process by which subjective data pass into the appearance of an objective world. The philosophy of organism seeks to describe how objective data pass into subjective satis- faction, and how order in the objective data provides intensity in the subjective satisfaction. For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of

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organism, the subject emerges from the world—a ‘super- ject’ rather than a ‘subject.’ The word ‘object’ thus means an entity which is a potentiality for being a com- ponent in feeling; and the word ‘subject’ means the entity constituted by the process of feeling, and including this process. The feeler is the unity emergent from its own feelings; and feelings are the details of the process intermediary between this unity and its many data. The data are the potentials for feeling; that is to say, they are objects. The process is the elimination of indeter- minateness of feeling from the unity of one subjective experience. The degree of order in the datum is meas- ured by the degree of richness in the objective lure. The ‘intensity’ achieved belongs to the subjective form of the satisfaction.

It has been explained in the previous section that the notion of ‘order’ is primarily applicable to the objectified data for individual actual entities. It has been necessary to give a sketch of some categories applying to an actual entity in order to show how this can be the case. But there is a derivative sense of the term ‘order,’ which is more usually in our minds when we use that word. We speak of the ‘order of nature,’ meaning thereby the order reigning in that limited portion of the universe,’ or even of the surface of the earth, which has come under our observation. We also speak of a man of orderly life, or of disorderly life. In any of these senses, the term ‘order’ evidently applies to the relations among themselves en- joyed by many actual entities which thereby form a society. The term ‘society’ will always be restricted to mean a nexus of actual entities which are ‘ordered’ among themselves in the sense to be explained in this section.*

*Cf., The Fitness of the Environment, New York, Macmillan, 1913, and The Order of Nature, Harvard Univ. Press, 1917, and Blood, Har- vard Univ. Press, 1928, Ch. I, both by Professor L. J. Henderson.

These works are fundamental for any discussion of this subject. * Also ck, Part], (Ch. 10k Sectall:

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The point of a ‘society,’ as the term is here used, is that it is self-sustaining; in other words, that it is its own reason. Thus a society is more than a set of entities to which the same class-name applies: that is to say, it involves more than a merely mathematical conception of ‘order.’ To constitute a society, the class-name has got to apply to each member, by reason of genetic derivation from other members of that same society. The members of the society are alike because, by reason of their com- mon character, they impose on other members of the society the conditions which lead to that likeness.