sion originates. He has also brought the body into its immediate association with the act of experience. Descartes, with Newton, assumes that the extensive con- tinuum is actual in the full sense of being an actual entity. But he refrains from the additional material bodies which Newton provides. Also in his efforts to guard his repre- sentative ‘ideas’ from the fatal gap between mental sym- bol and actuality symbolized, he practically, in some sentences, expresses the doctrine of objectification here put forward. Thus: “Hence the idea of the sun will be the sun itself existing in the mind, not indeed formally, as it exists in the sky, but objectively, ie. in the way in which objects are wont to exist in the mind; and this mode of being is truly much less perfect than that in which things exist outside the mind, but it is not on that account mere nothing, as I have already said.” °
Both Descartes and Locke, in order to close the gap between idea representing and ‘actual entity represented,’ require this doctrine of ‘the sun itself existing in the mind.’ But though, as in this passage, they at times casually state it in order to push aside the epistemological difficulty, they neither of them live up to these admis- sions. They relapse into the tacit presupposition of the mind with its private ideas which are in fact qualities without intelligible connection with the entities repre- sented.
But if we take the doctrine of objectification seriously, the extensive continuum at once becomes the primary factor in objectification. It provides the general scheme of extensive perspective which is exhibited in all the mutual objectifications by which actual entities prehend each other. Thus in itself, the extensive continuum is a scheme of real potentiality which must find exemplication in the mutual prehension of all actual entities. It also finds exemplification in each actual entity considered ‘formally.’ In this sense, actual entities are extensive,
“Cf. Reply to Objections I: I have already quoted this passage in my Science and The Modern World, note to Ch. IV.
The Extensive Continuum 119
since they arise out of a potentiality for division, which in actual fact is not divided (cf. Part IV). It is for this reason, as stated above, that the phrase ‘actual occasion’ is used in the place of ‘actual entity.’
Descartes’ doctrine of the physical world as exhibiting an extensive plenum of actual entities is practically the same as the ‘organic’ doctrine. But Descartes’ bodies have to move, and this presupposition introduces new obscurities. It is exactly at this point that Newton pro- vides a clear conception in comparison with that of Descartes. In the ‘organic’ doctrine, motion is not attributable to an actual occasion.
In the ‘organic’ theory, (i) there is only one type of temporal actual entity; (ii) each such actual entity is extensive; (ili) from the standpoint of any one actual entity, the ‘given’ actual world is a nexus of actual entities, transforming the potentiality of the extensive scheme into a plenum of actual occasions; (iv) in this plenum, motion cannot be significantly attributed to any actual occasion; (v) the plenum is continuous in respect to the potentiality from which it arises, but each actual entity is atomic; (vi) the term ‘actual occasion’ is used synonomously with ‘actual entity’; but chiefly when its character of extensiveness has some direct relevance to the discussion, either extensiveness in the form of temporal extensiveness, that is to say ‘duration,’ or exten- siveness in the form of spatial extension, or in the more complete signification of spatio-temporal extensiveness.
The baseless metaphysical doctrine of ‘undifferentiated
endurance’ is a subordinate derivative from the misappre-
hension of the proper character of the extensive scheme.
In our perception of the contemporary world via pres-
entational immediacy, nexus of actual entities are objec-
tified for the percipient under the perspective of their
characters of extensive continuity. In the perception of
a contemporary stone, for example, the separate indi-
120 Process and Reality
viduality of each actual entity in the nexus constituting the stone is merged into the unity of the extensive plenum, which for Descartes and for common sense, 1s the stone. The complete objectification is effected by the generic extensive perspective of the stone, specialized into the specific perspective of some sense-datum, such as some definite colour, for example. Thus the immediate percept assumes the character of the quiet undifferentiated endur- ance of the material stone, perceived by means of its quality of colour. This basic notion dominates language, and haunts both science and philosophy. Further, by an unfortunate application of the excellent maxim, that our conjectural explanation should always proceed by the utilization of a vera causa, whenever science or philosophy has ventured to extrapolate beyond the limits of the immediate deliverance of direct perception, a satisfactory explanation has always complied with the condition that substances with undifferentiated endurance of essential attributes be produced, and that activity be explained as the occasional modification of their accidental qualities and relations. Thus the imaginations of men are dominated by the quiet extensive stone with its relation- ships of positions, and its quality of colour—relationships and qualities which occasionally change. The stone, thus interpreted, guarantees the vera causa, and conjectural explanations in science and philosophy follow its model.
Thus in framing cosmological theory, the notion of con- tinuous stuff with permanent attributes, enduring with- out differentiation, and retaining its self-identity through any stretch of time however small or large, has been fundamental. The stuff undergoes change in respect to accidental qualities and relations; but it is numerically self-identical in its character of one actual entity through- out its accidental adventures. The admission of this fundamental metaphysical concept has wrecked the various systems of pluralistic realism.
This metaphysical concept has formed the basis of scientific materialism. For example, when the activities
The Extensive Continuum 121
associated with so-called empty space required scientific formulation, the scientists of the nineteenth century pro- duced the materialistic ether as the ultimate substratum whose accidental adventures constituted these activities.
But the interpretation of the stone, on which the whole concept is based, has proved to be entirely mistaken. In the first place, from the seventeenth century onwards the notion of the simple inherence of the colour in the stone has had to be given up. This introduces the further diffi- culty that it is the colour which is extended and only inferentially the stone, since now we have had to separate the colour from the stone. Secondly, the molecular theory has robbed the stone of its continuity, of its unity, and of its passiveness. The stone is now conceived as a society of separate molecules in violent agitation. But the metaphysical concepts, which had their origin in a mistake about the stone, were now applied to the indi- vidual molecules. Each atom was still a stuff which retained its self-identity and its essential attributes in any portion of time—however short, and however long—pro- vided that it did not perish. The notion of the undiffer- entiated endurance of substances with essential attributes and with accidental adventure was still applied. This is the root doctrine of materialism: the substance, thus conceived, is the ultimate actual entity.
But this materialistic concept has proved to be as mis- taken for the atom as it was.for the stone. The atom is only explicable as a society with activities involving rhythms with their definite periods. Again the concept shifted its application: protons and electrons were con- ceived as materialistic electric charges whose activities could be construed as locomotive adventures. We are now approaching the limits of any reasonable certainty in our scientific knowledge; but again there is evidence that the concept may be mistaken. The mysterious quanta of energy have made their appearance, derived, as it would seem, from the recesses of protons, or of electrons. Still worse for the concept, these quanta seem to dissolve
122 Process and Reality
into the vibrations of light. Also the material of the
stars seems to be wasting itself in the production of the
vibrations.
Further, the quanta of energy are associated by a
simple law with the periodic rhythms which we detect in
the molecules. Thus the quanta are, themselves, in their
own nature, somehow vibratory; but they emanate from
the protons and electrons. Thus there is every reason to
believe that rhythmic periods cannot be dissociated from
the protonic and electronic entities.
The same concept has been applied in other connections
where it even more obviously fails. It is said that ‘men
are rational.’ This is palpably false: they are only inter-
mittently rational—merely liable to rationality. Again
the phrase ‘Socrates is mortal’ is only another way of
saying that ‘perhaps he will die.’ The intellect of
Socrates is intermittent: he occasionally sleeps and he
can be drugged or stunned.
The simple notion of an enduring substance sustaining persistent qualities, either essentially or accidentally, expresses a useful abstract for many purposes of life. But whenever we try to use it as a fundamental statement of the nature of things, it proves itself mistaken. It arose from a mistake and has never succeeded in any of its applications. But it has had one success: it has entrenched itself in language, in Aristotelian logic, and in metaphysics. For its employment in language and in logic, there is—as stated above—a sound pragmatic defence. But in metaphysics the concept is sheer error. This error does not consist in the employment of the word ‘substance’; but in the employment of the notion of an actual entity which is characterized by essential qual- ities, and remains numerically one amidst the changes of accidental relations and of accidental qualities. The con- trary doctrine is that an actual entity never changes, and that it is the outcome of whatever can be ascribed to it in the way of quality or relationship. There then remain two alternatives for philosophy: (i) a monistic universe
The Extensive Continuum 123
with the illusion of change; and (ii) a pluralistic universe
in which ‘change’ means the diversities among the actual
entities which belong to some one society of a definite
type.
We can now, in a preliminary way, summarize some
of the agreements and disagreements between the philoso-
phy of organism and the seventeenth-century founders of
the modern philosophic and scientific traditions.
It is the basis of any realistic philosophy, that in per- ception there is a disclosure of objectified data, which are known as having a community with the immediate experi- ence for which they are data. This ‘community’ is a community of common activity involving mutual impli- cation. This premise is asserted as a primary fact, implicitly assumed in every detail of our organization of life. It is implicitly asserted by Locke in his statement (II, X XIII, 7, heading), ‘Power, a great part of our com- plex ideas of substance.” The philosophy of organism extends the Cartesian subjectivism by affirming the ‘ontological principle’ and by construing it as the defi- nition of ‘actuality.’ This amounts to the assumption that each actual entity is a locus for the universe. Accordingly Descartes’ other statement, that every attribute requires a substance is merely a special, limited example of this more general principle.
Newton, in his treatment of space, transforms poten- tiality into actual fact, that is to say, into a creature, instead of a datum for creatures. According to the phi- losophy of organism, the extensive space-time continuum is the fundamental aspect of the limitation laid upon abstract potentiality by.the actual world. A more com- plete rendering of this limited, ‘real’ potentiality is the ‘physical field.” A new creation has to arise from the actual world as much as from pure potentiality: it arises from the total universe and not solely from its mere abstract elements. It also adds to that universe. Thus
124 Process and Reality
every actual entity springs from that universe which
there is for it. Causation is nothing else than one out-
come of the principle that every actual entity has to house
its actual world.
According to Newton, a portion of space cannot move. We have to ask how this truth, obvious from Newton’s point of view, takes shape in the organic theory. Instead of a region of space, we should consider a bit of the physical field. This bit, expressing one way in which the actual world involves the potentiality for a new crea- tion, acquires the unity of an actual entity. The physical field is, in this way, atomized with definite divisions: it becomes a “nexus” of actualities. Such a quantum (i.e. each actual division) of the extensive continuum is the primary phase of acreature. This quantum is constituted by its totality of relationships and cannot move. Also the creature cannot have any external adventures, but only the internal adventure of becoming. Its birth is its end.