Sources and Critical Notes.
Fr, 1-5. The passage giving these fragments, as they have been galled, contains little that is not found in the remaining fragments, and in spite of the fact that it is given as a direct quotation, it seems best to regard it as a condensed statement of the opinions of Melissos. V. Zeller, Vorsokr. Phil. 607, n. 1, and Pabst, de Meliss. Fragmentis, Bonn 1889.
The Eleatic School: Melissos 121
(a2) Fraaments oF MELISsos MAINLY FROM SIMPLICIUS ON THE Puysics.
Simpl. Phys. 28 v 109, 20 (Fr. 7). ὅτε τοίνυν οὐκ
ἐγένετο, ἔστι δέ, ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ del ἔσται καὶ ἀρχὴν οὐκ
ἔχει οὐδὲ τελευτήν, GAN ἄπειρόν ἐστιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
ἐγένετο, ἀρχὴν ἂν εἶχεν ' ἤρξατο γὰρ ἄν ποτε γινόµενον *
καὶ τελευτήν ' ἐτελεύτησε γὰρ ἄν ποτε γινόµενον ' εὖ δὲ
µήτε ἤρξατο µήτε ἐτελεύτησεν ἀεί τε ἦν καὶ asl ἔσται,
οὐκ ἔχει ἀρχὴν οὐδὲ τελευτήν ' οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνυστὸν
ὅ τι μὴ wav ἐστι. 1.31. (Fr. 8.) ἀλλ) ὥσπερ ἔστιν ae,
οὕτω καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἄπειρον asi χρὴ εἶναι. Ἱ. 83. (Fr.
15.) εὖ γὰρ διῄρηται τὸ ἐόν, κινεῖται. κινούµενον δὲ οὐκ
ἂν sin ἅμα.
Phys. 241 110. 1. (Έτ. 16.) εἰ μὲν dv ein, δεῖ αὐτὸ av εἶναι ' ἓν δὲ ὃν δεῖ αὐτὸ σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν. (19 τ 87, ϐ) εἰ δὲ ἔχοι πάθος, ἔχοι ἂν µόρια καὶ οὐκέτι bv ein. 1. 8. (Fr. 9.) ἀρχήν τε καὶ τέλος ἔχον οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀίδιον οὔτε ἄπειρόν ἐστιν. Ἱ. δ. (Ετ. 10.) εἰ μὴ ἂν εἴη, περανεῖ πρὸς aXXo.
Phys. 24r 111, 19. (Fr. 11.) οὕτως οὖν aldsov ἐστι
καὶ ἄπειρον' καὶ ἂν καὶ ὅμοιον πᾶν. καὶ οὔτ ἂν ἁπ-
ὀλοιτο οὔτε μεῖζον γίνοιτο οὔτε µετακοσµέοιτο οὔτε ἀλγεῖ
οὔτε ἀνιᾶταυ. εἰ γάρ τι τούτων πάσχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι by
ein. εἰ γὰρ ἑτεροιοῦται, ἀνάγκη τὸ gov μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι,
ἀλλὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ πρόσθεν Zov, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γίνεσθαυ.
εἰ τοίνυν τριχὶ pin µυρίοις ἔτεσιν ἑτεροῖον γίνοιτο τὸ Trap,
Fr. 7. D omits καὶ . . . Ὑινόμενον. Simplicius writes γινόμενο», Diels would restore γενόµενο» regularly, and compares Spengel ad Eudem. fr. p. 18,18. DH ἔχει, aF ἔχον.
Fr. 15. af’ dua, Ε ἀλλὰ.
Fr. 16. aD bv εἴη, EF οὖν εἴη, Brandis suggests ὃν tors. Ε δὲ wh ὃν. Cf. 19 r 87, 6.
Fr. 11. af γίγνοιτο. E οὐκέτι, omits ἂν. E omits δὲ after τὸ. aD
(F) τριχὶ wii, 8 τρι μὴ H. = Vulg. from Brandis εἰ τοίνυν τρισμυρίοισι ἕτεσι. ΑΕ παρόντι for παντί.
122 the First Philosophers of Greece
ὀλεῖται ἂν ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ. Ἱ. 24. (Fr. 12.) ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ
µετακοσμηθῆναι ἀνυστόν' ὁ γὰρ κόσμος ὁ πρὀσθεν ἐἑὼν
? . / 4 « \ oN / σ XN /
οὖκ ἀπόλλυται οὔτε ὁ μὴ ἑὼν «γίνεται ὅτε δὲ µήτε
προσηίνεται μηδὲν µήτε ἀπόλλυται µήτε ἑτεροιοῦται,
πῶς ἂν μετακοσμηθὲν τῶν ἐόντων Te; εἰ μὲν γάρ τι
4 ε ον) 2 A \ / 2 9 Αα
ἐγίνετο ἑτεροῖον, ἤδη ἂν καὶ µετακοσμηθείη' οὐδὲ ἀληεῖξ
ov γὰρ ἂν πᾶν ein ἀληγέον' οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο ἀεὶ εἶναι
“A > έ WY. ἔ 2 δύ “A e Ma) Ww 9 OR
χρημα adyéov οὐδὲ ἔχει ἴσην ὀύναμιν τῷ Όγιει' OUT ἄν
φ ¥ >» ο ὧν ῃ / A 3 a.
ὅμοιον etn, εἰ ἀλγέοι ἀπογινομένου yap τευ ἂν ἀλγέοι ἢ
προσηινοµένου, κοὺὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὅμοιον εἴη. οὐδ' ἂν τὸ ὑγὼς
> “A δύ 9 λ \ a wv \ ο ΔΝ N N ΑΜ”
ἀλγῆσαι ὀύναιτο' aro yap ἄν 9λοιτο TO υγιες καὶ TO EOD,
Ν ΔΝ 3 9N 4 \ A “~ > a) e Ν
τὸ δὲ οὐκ ov «γένοιτο. καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀνιᾶσθαι ωὺτὸς
λόγος τῷ ἀλφέοντι. 1.6. (Fr. 14.) οὐδὲ κενεόν ἐστιν ovdév:
λ \ \ ’ ὃ έ b μ bd Λ 9 rf 4 δέ
τὸ γὰρ κενεὸν οὐδέν ἐστιν' οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη TO γε μηδέν.
ΦΑΝ A ‘ ς fel ΔΝ 3 # > - > Ν
οὐδὲ κινεῖται ὑποχωρῆσαι γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει οὐδαμῇ, ἀλλὰ
> XN \ 8 e nA aA ? Δ
πλέων ἑστίν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ κενεὸν ἦν, ὑπεχωρεῖ ἂν Eis τὸ
κενὀν' κενοῦ δὲ μὴ ἐόντος οὐκ ἔχει ὅκῃ ὑποχωρήσει.
πυκνὸν δὲ καὶ ἀραιὸν οὐκ ἂν ein τὸ γὰρ ἀραιὸν οὐκ
ἀνυστὸν πλέων εἶναι ὁμοίως τῷ πυκνῷῶ, GAN ἤδη τὸ
ἆραιόν ye κενεώτερον γίνεται τοῦ πυκνοῦ. κρίσιν δὲ
ταύτην χρὴ ποιήσασθαι τοῦ πλέω καὶ τοῦ μὴ πλέω" εὖ
Ν » Αα A 3 δέ 3 , 3 δὲ 4
μὲν οὖν χωρεῖ τι ἢ εἰσδέχεται, ov πλέων' εἰ δὲ µήτε
χωρεῖ µήτε εἰσδέχεται, πλέων. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν πλέων
εἶναι, εἰ κενὸν μὴ ἔστιν. εὖ τοίνυν πλέων ἐστίν, οὐ
κινεῖταιυ.
Phys. 94 v 162, 24. (Έτ. 6.) del ἦν ὅ τι ἦν καὶ aed
ἔσται. εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, avayxaioy ἔστι πρὶν γενέσθαι
, ce)
εἶναι μηδέν. tei τύχοι νῦν μηδὲν ἦν, οὐδαμὰ ἂν γένοιτο
οὐδὲν ἐκ µηδενό».
Ἐγ. 12. D μετὰ τὸ κοσµηθῆναι: a ἀπολεῖται: DF µετακοσμηθέντων ἐόντων: a γάρ, DFE γε: a ἄλγεινόν (twice): D οὐκ for κοὺκ: DF ὀντὸς, ak ὁ αὐτὸς,
Fr. 14. Cf. Simpl. 40, 12. Ἅ πλέον et passim, Text follows aD: DF κενώτερο», EL κοινότερον: & omits οὖν.
Fr. 6. E εἰ τύχοι νῦν, Dei τύχη, aF' ei τοίνυν. Diels suggests ὅτε τοίνυ»; cf. 109, 20. DEH οὐδὲν, ak under.
τηε Eleatic School: Melissos 123
Simpl. de Coelo, 187r; Schol. Aristot. 509b18; cf. Aristokl. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 17. (Fr. 17.) µέγχιστον μὲν 4 a ee ) ο / / > \ \ οὖν σημεῖον οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἓν µόνον ἐστίν. ἁτὰρ καὶ , πα 9 \ \ α α 9 4 τάδε σημεῖα": εἰ γὰρ ἦν πολλὰ, τοιαῦτα χρῆν αὐτὰ εἶναι, ΄ 4 N > N cd ον \o@ : οἷόν περ ἐγώ dnt τὸ bv εἶναι. εὖ γὰρ ἔστι yh καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ 2Α A / \ λ “A XN N A \ Q anp καὶ σίδηρος καὶ χρυσὸς καὶ wip καὶ τὸ μὲν S@ov τὸ δὲ τεθνηκὸς καὶ µέλαν καὶ λευκὸν καὶ τὰ ὅσα φασὶν οἱ ” > ce) ? \ A ¥ ο α 2 a“ ἄνθρωποι εἶναι ἀληθῆ,--εὐ δὴ ταῦτα ἔστι Kal ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, εἶναι χρὴ ἕκαστον τοιοῦτον οἷόν περ τὸ πρῶτον ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, καὶ μὴ µεταπίτπτειν μηδὲ / ε A > 9 > N 9 a Lo 4 γίνεσθαι ἕτεροῖον, ANN’ αὐεὶ εἶναι ἕκαστον oloy περ ἔστιν. νῦν δέ hapev ὀρθῶς ὁρᾷν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ συνιέναι, δοκεῖ δὲ ἡμῖν τό τε θερμὸν ψυχρὸν γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν μαλθακὸν καὶ τὸ μαλθακὸν N \ Ν “ 3 4 4 Αι σκληρὸν, καὶ τὸ ζφῷον ἀποθνήσκειν καὶ ἐκ pn ζῶντος γίνεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἑτεροιοῦσθαι, καὶ ὅ τι ἦν τε Ν “A 20 ef > > 9 ϱ / \ καὶ ὃ νῦν οὐδὲν ὅμοιον εἶναι, ANN’ ὅ τε σίδηρος σκληρὸς gov τῷ δακτύλ (βεσθαι Ἱ ὁμοῦ ῥέ ὶ ὸ é @ κατατρίβεσθαι Ἱ ὁμοῦ ῥέων καὶ χρυσὸς καὶ λίθος καὶ ἄλλο ὅ τι ὐσχυρὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι πᾶν, ὥστε / / e ~ [ή \ ww ’ ὠ σ / συμβαίνει µήτε opay µήτε τὰ ὄντα γινώσκειν ἐξ ὕδατός τε yh καὶ λίθος γίνεσθαι. ov τοίνυν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις ὁμολοηγεῖ ΄ φαµένοις γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀίδια καὶ εἴδη τε καὶ ἴσχυν ἔχοντα, πάντα ἑτεροιοῦσθαι ἡμῖν δοκεῖ καὶ µεταπίπτειν ἐκ τοῦ ἑκάστοτε ὁρωμένου. δῆλον τοίνυν ιά > > A « A ΦΟΝ 9 A \ 9 A A ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἑωρῶμεν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πολλὰ ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ εἶναι. οὗ γὰρ ἂν µετέπιπτεν εἰ ἀληθῆ ἦν, ἀλλ ἦν οἷόν περ ἐδόκει ἕκαστον τοιοῦτον τοῦ γὰρ ἐόντος ἀληθινοῦ “ δέ. a \ Δ Ν ‘ bd / κρεῖσσον οὐδέν. Hv δὲ µεταπέσῃ, τὸ μὲν ἐὸν ἀπώλετο, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γέγονεν. οὕτως οὖν εὖἰ πολλὰ εἴη, τοιαῦτα χρὴ εἶναι οἷόν περ τὸ ἕν.
Fr. 17. Vulg. χρή: Simpl. (gov, Aristokl. (ῶν (twice): Aristokl. εἶναι ἐχρῇῆ», καὶ τὸ eddy τοιοῦτον, οἷον πρῶτον ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν εἶναι, Simpl. omits πάντα and ἀληθῆ: Aristokl. ἕτερον, AA’ εἶναι ὅμοιον, οἷόν περ ἐστὶ ἕκαστον, Simpl. omits ἔστιν: Bergk ὁμουρέω», digito conterminus, aptatus, MSS. τὸ µέσο», corr. Brandis, Gesch. d. Phil. i. 403: Vulg. εἴη.
124 the First Philosophers of Greece
Simpticius’s AccouNT OF MELISs0s, INCLUDING THE TRANSLATION OF THE FRAGMENTS.
22; 105, 18. Now let us glance at Melissos’ argu- ment, which we ran across a few lines back. Melissos, making use of the axioms of the physicists, in regard to generation and destruction, begins his book as follows : (Fr. 1) If nothing is, how could this be spoken of as though something is? And if anything is, either it has come into being, or else it always has been. If it came into being, it sprung either from being or from not-being; but it is impossible that any such thing should have sprung from not-being (for nothing else that is could have sprung from it, much less pure being) ; nor could it have sprung from being, for in that case it < would simply be, and » would not have come into existence. Ρο then being is not generated ; being always is, nor will it be destroyed. For being could not be changed into not-being (this also 18 conceded by the physicists), nor into being; for then it would abide as it is,and would not be destroyed. Accordingly being was not generated, nor will it be destroyed ; so it always was and always will be. (Fr. 2) But while that which comes into existence has a beginning, that which does not come into existence does not have a beginning, and being which did not come into existence would not have a beginning. Farther, that which is destroyed has an end ; but if anything is not subject to destruction, it does not have an end ; and that which has neither begin- ning nor end is of course infinite; so being is infinite. (Fr. 8) And if it 16 infinite, it is one; for if being were two, both parts could not be infinite, but each would be limited ‘by the other. But being is infinite; there could not be several beings; accordingly being is one. (F'r. 4) Farther, if being is one it does not move; for the
The Eleatic School: Melissos 125
one is always homogeneous [lit. like itself]; and that which is homogeneous could not perish or become greater or change its arrangement or suffer pain or annoyance. If it experienced any of these things it would not be one ; for that which is moved with any sort of motion changes something from one thing into something different ; but there is nothing else except being, so this will not be moved. (Fr. 5) To follow another line of argument : there is no place void of being, for the void is nothing ; but that which is nothing could not exist; so. then being is not moved: it is impossible for it to go anywhere, if there is no void. Nor is it possible for it to contract into itself, for in that case different degrees of density would arise, and this is impossible; for it is impossible that the rare should be as full as the dense ; but the rare is more empty than the dense, and there is no such thing as emptiness. It is necessary to judge whether being is full or not by its capacity to receive something else: if it will not receive anything it is full; if it will receive something it is not full. Now if the void does not exist, it must of necessity be full; and if this is the case it does not move, not because it is im- possible for it to move through space already filled, as we say of bodies, but because all being cannot be moved into being (for there is nothing besides itself), nor can being be moved into not-being, for not-being does not - exist.
23; 109, 7. Melissos also is blamed because in his
frequent references to the beginning he does not use
‘the word to mean a beginning in time which applies to
that which comes into existence, but rather to mean
a logical beginning which does not apply to the things
‘that are changing collectively. He seems to have
.seen clearly before Aristotle that all matter, even that
-which is eternal, being limited has a limited capacity,