1 Plato, Phileb. 16 csqq. | ae
324 Early Greek Philosophy
a work by Protagoras.. He seems also to be the
original source of the story that Plato bought “three
Pythagorean books” from Philolaos and copied the
Timaeus out of them. According to this, the “three
books” had come into the possession of Philolaos;
and, as he had fallen into great poverty, Dion was
able to buy them from him, or from his relatives, at
Plato’s request, for a hundred mnae.” It is certain,
at any rate, that this story was already current in the
third century ; for the sillographer Timon of Phleious
addresses Plato thus: “ And of thee too, Plato, did the
desire of discipleship lay hold. For many pieces of
silver thou didst get in exchange a small book, and
starting from it didst learn to write Tzmaeus.”*
Hermippos, the pupil of Kallimachos, said that “some
writer” said that Plato himself bought the books from
the relatives of Philolaos for forty Alexandrian minae
and copied the 7zmaeus out of it; while Satyros, the
Aristarchean, says he got it through Dion for a
hundred mznae There is no suggestion in any of
these accounts that the book was by Philolaos himself ;
they imply rather that what Plato bought was.either a
book by Pythagoras, or at any rate authentic notes of
his teaching, which had come into the hands of
Philolaos. In later times, it was generally supposed
that the work entitled Zhe Soul of the World, by
Timaios the Lokrian, was meant;° but it has now
been proved beyond a doubt that this cannot have
1 Diog. iii. 37. For similar charges, cf. Zeller, Plato, p. 429, n. 7.
2 Tambl. V. Pyth. 199. Diels is clearly right in ascribing the story to Aristoxenos (Arch. iii. p. 461, n. 26).
3 Timon af. Gell. iii. 17 (R. P. 60 a).
4 For Hermippos and Satyros, see Diog. iii. 9; viii. 84, 85.
Ὁ So Iambl. iz Nicom. p. 105, 11; Proclus, ἐξ Zim. p. 1, Diehl.
The Pythagoreans 325
existed earlier than the first century A.D. We know
nothing of Timaios except what Plato tells us himself,
and he may even be a fictitious character like the
Eleatic Stranger. His name does not occur among
the Lokrians in the Catalogue of Pythagoreans
preserved by Iamblichos.' Besides this, the work
does not fulfil the most important requirement, that
of being in three books, which is always an essential
feature of the story.”
Not one of the writers just mentioned professes to
have seen the famous’“ three books” ;* but at a later
date there were at least two works which claimed to
represent them. Diels has shown how a treatise in
three sections, entitled Παιδευτικόν, πολιτικόν, φυσικόν,
was composed in the Ionic dialect and attributed to
Pythagoras. It was largely based on the Πουθαγορικαὶ
ἀποφάσεις of Aristoxenos, but its date is uncertain.*
In the first century B.c., Demetrios Magnes was able
to quote the opening words of the work published by
Philolaos.2 That, however, was written in Doric.
Demetrios does not actually say it was by Philolaos
himself, though it is no doubt the same work from
which a number of extracts are preserved under his
name in Stobaios and later writers. If it professed to
_ be by Philolaos, that was not quite in accordance with
the original story ; but it is easy to see how his name
Diels, Vors. p. 269.
* They are τὰ θρυλούμενα τρία βιβλία (lambl. Κ΄, Pyth. 199), τὰ διαβόητα τρία βιβλία (Diog. viii. 15).
® As Mr. Bywater says (J. Phil. i. p. 29), the history of this work ** reads: like the history, not so much of a book, as of a literary égnzs fatuus floating before the minds of imaginative writers.”’
* Diels, ‘* Ein gefalschtes Pythagorasbuch ” (Arch, iii. pp. 451 sqq-).
5 Diog. viii. 85 (R. P. 63 b). Diels reads πρῶτον ἐκδοῦναι τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν «βιβλία καὶ ἐπιγράψαι Περὶ» Φύσεως.
The
‘* Fragments
of Philolaos.”’
326 Early Greek Philosophy
may have become attached to it. We are told that
the other book which passed under the name of
Pythagoras was really by Lysis." Boeckh has shown
that the work ascribed to Philolaos probably consisted
of three books also, and Proclus referred to it as the
Bakchai, a fanciful title which recalls the “ Muses” of
Herodotos. Two of the extracts in Stobaios bear it.
It must be confessed that the whole story is very
suspicious ; but, as some of the best authorities still
regard the fragments as partly genuine, it is necessary
to look at them more closely.
141. Boeckh argued with great learning and skill
that all the fragments preserved under the name of
Philolaos were genuine; but no one will now go so
far as this. The lengthy extract on the soul is given
up even by those who maintain the genuineness of the
rest.” It cannot be said that this position is plausible
on the face of it. Boeckh saw there was no ground
for supposing that there ever was more than a single
work, and he drew the conclusion that we must accept
all the remains as genuine or reject all as spurious.*
As, however, Zeller and Diels still maintain the
genuineness of most of the fragments, we cannot
ignore them altogether. Arguments ‘based. on the
doctrine contained in them would, it is true, present
1 Diog. viii. 7.
2 Proclus, zz πεῖ, p. 22, 15 (Friedlein). Cf. Boeckh, Phz/olaos, pp- 36sqq. Boeckh refers toa sculptured group of ¢hvee Bakchai, whom he supposes to be Ino, Agaue, and Autonoe.
3 The passage is given in R. P. 68. For a full discussion of this and the other fragments, see Bywater, ‘*On the Fragments attributed to Philolaus the Pythagorean” (/. PAz/. i. pp. 21 sqq.).
* Boeckh, Phz/olaos, p. 38. Diels ( Vors. p. 246) distinguishes the Bakchat from the three books Περὶ φύσιος (24. p. 239). As, however, he identifies
the latter with the ‘‘ three books” ‘bought from Philolaos, and regards it as genuine, this does not seriously affect the argument.
The Pythagoreans 327
the appearance of a vicious circle at this stage. It is
only in connexion with our other evidence that these
can be introduced. But there are two serious
objections to the fragments which may be mentioned
at once. They are sufficiently strong to justify us in
refusing to use them till we have ascertained from
other sources what doctrines may fairly be attributed
to the Pythagoreans of this date.
In the first place, we must ask a question which
has not yet been faced. Is it likely that Philolaos
should have written in Doric? Ionic was the dialect
of all science and philosophy till the time of the
Peloponnesian War, and there is no reason to suppose
that the early Pythagoreans used any other.’ ee:
goras was himself an Ionian, and it is by no mea
clear that in his time the Achaian States in which
founded his Order had already adopted the ene
dialect.2 Alkmaion of Kroton seems to have written
in Ionic.* Diels says, it is true, that Philolaos and
then Archytas were the first Pythagoreans to use the
dialect of their homes ;* but Philolaos can hardly be
said to have had a home,’ and the fragments of
1 See Diels in Arch. iii. pp. 460 sqq.
2 On thé Achaian dialect, see O. Hoffmann in Collitz and Bechtel, Dialekt-Inschrifien, vol. ii. p. 151. How slowly Doric penetrated into the Chalkidian states may be seen from the mixed dialect of the inscription of Mikythos of Rhegion (Déal.-Juschr. iii. 2, p. 498), which is later than 468-67 B.c. There is no reason to suppose that the Achaian dialect of Kroton was less tenacious of life.
8 The scanty fragments contain one Doric form, ἔχοντι (fr. 1), but Alkmaion calls himself Kporwvujrns, which is very significant; for Κροτωνιάτας is the Achaian as well as the Doric form. He did not, therefore, write a mixed dialect like that referred to in the last note. It seems safest to assume with Wachtler, De A/cmaeone Crotontata, pp. 21 sqq:, that he used Ionic.
4 Arch. iii. p. 460.
5 He is distinctly called a Krotoniate in the extracts from Menon’s Ἰατρικά (cf. Diog. viii. 84). It is true that Aristoxenos called him and
328 Early Greek Philosophy
Archytas are not written in the dialect of Taras, but
in what may be called “common Doric.” Archytas
may have found it convenient to use that dialect ; but
he is at least a generation later than Philolaos, which
makes a great difference. There is evidence that, in
the time of Philolaos and later, lonic was still used
even by the citizens of Dorian states for scientific
purposes. Diogenes of Apollonia in Crete and the
Syracusan historian Antiochos wrote in Ionic, while
the medical writers of Dorian, Kos and Knidos,
continue to use the same dialect. The forged work
of Pythagoras referred to above, which some ascribed
to Lysis, was in Ionic; and so was the work on the
Akousmata attributed to Androkydes; which shows
that, even down to Alexandrian times, it was still
believed that Ionic was the proper dialect for Pytha-
gorean writings.
In the second place, there can be no doubt that
one of the fragments refers to the five regular solids,
four of which are identified with the elements of
Empedokles.? Now Plato gives us to understand, in
a well-known passage of the Republic, that stereometry
had not been adequately investigated at the time he
wrote,” and we have express testimony that the five
“ Platonic figures,” as they were called, were discovered
in the Academy. In the Scholia to Euclid we read
Eurytos Tarentines (Diog. viii. 46), but this only means that he settled at Taras after leaving Thebes. These variations are common in the case of migratory philosophers. Eurytos is also called a Krotoniate and a Meta- pontine (Iambl. V. Pyth. 148, 266). Cf. also p. 380, ἢ. 1 on Leukippos, and p. 406, n. 1 on Hippon.
? For Androkydes, see Diels, Vors. p. 281. As Diels points out (Arch. ili, p. 461), even Lucian has sufficient sense of style to make Pythagoras speak Ionic.
2 Cf. fr. 12=20 M. (R. P. 79), τὰ ἐν τᾷ σφαίρᾳ σώματα πέντε ἐντί.
3 Plato, Rep. 528 b.
The Pythagoreans 329
that the Pythagoreans only knew the cube, the
pyramid (tetrahedron), and the dodecahedron, while the
octahedron and the icosahedron were discovered by
Theaitetos.' This sufficiently justifies us in regarding
the “fragments of Philolaos” with something more
than suspicion. We shall find more anachronisms as
we go on. |
142. We must look, then, for other evidence.
From what has been said, it will be clear that we
cannot safely take Plato as our guide to the original
meaning of the Pythagorean theory, though it is
certainly from him alone that we can learn to regard
it sympathetically. Aristotle, on the ‘other hand, was
quite out of sympathy with Pythagorean ways of
thinking, but took a great deal of pains to understand
them. This was just because they played so great a
part in the philosophy of Plato and his successors, and
he had to make the relation of the two doctrines as
clear as he could to himself and his disciples. What
we have to do, then, is to interpret what Aristotle tells
us in the spirit of Plato, and then to consider how the
doctrine we arrive at in this way is related to the
systems which had preceded it. It is a delicate
operation, no doubt, but it has been made much safer
1 Heiberg’s Euclid, vol. v. p. 654, 1, Ἔν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ, τουτέστι τῷ vy’, γράφεται τὰ λεγόμενα Πλάτωνος ὃ σχήματα, ἃ αὐτοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, τρία δὲ τῶν προειρημένων € σχημάτων τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἐστίν, ὅ τε κύβος καὶ ἡ πυραμὶς καὶ τὸ δωδεκάεδρον, Θεαιτήτου δὲ τό τε ὀκτάεδρον καὶ τὸ εἰκοσάεδρον. It isno objection to this that, as Newbold points out (Arch. xix. p. 204), the inscription of the dodecahedron is more difficult than that of the octahedron and icosahedron. The Pythagoreans were not confined to strict Euclidean methods. It may further be noted that Tannery comes to a similar conclusion with regard to the musical scale described in the fragment of Philolaos. He says: “Il n’y a jamais eu, pour la division du tétracorde, une tradition pythagoricienne ; on ne peut pas avec sfireté remonter plus haut que Platon ou qu’Archytas” (Rev. de Philologie, 1904,
The Proble
330 εαβιυ Greek Philosophy
by recent discoveries in the early history of mathematics and medicine.
Zeller has cleared the ground by eliminating the
purely Platonic elements which have crept into later
accounts of the system. These are of two kinds.
First of all, we have genuine Academic formulae, such
as the identification of the Limit and the Unlimited
with the One and the Indeterminate Dyad;* and
secondly, there is the Neoplatonic doctrine which
represents it as an opposition between God and
Matter.” It is not necessary to repeat Zeller’s
arguments here, as no one will any longer attribute
these doctrines to the Pythagoreans of the fifth
century.
This simplifies the problem very considerably, but
it is still extremely difficult. According to Aristotle,
the Pythagoreans said Things are numbers, though that
does not appear to be the doctrine of the fragments of
“ Philolaos.” According to them, things Zave number,
which make them knowable, while their real essence is
something unknowable.* That would be intelligible
enough, but the formula that things ave numbers seems
meaningless. We have seen reason for believing that
it is due to Pythagoras himself (§ 52), though we did
not feel able to say very clearly what he meant by it.