His explanation however, though preferable to that of Simplicius, is not convincing either. “The many”
1 Theophr. Phys. Op. fr. 6 (Dox. p. 482; R. P. 121 a), κατὰ δόξαν δὲ τῶν
πολλῶν els τὸ γένεσιν ἀποδοῦναι τῶν φαινομένων δύο ποιῶν Tas ἀρχάς. For Alexander cf. Simpl. Phys. p. 38, 24.
2 Simpl. Phys. p. 39, 10 (R. P. 121 Ὁ). Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, p. 180. E. Meyer says (Gesch. des Alterth. iv. § 510, Anm.): ‘* How too can we think that a teacher of wisdom taught his disciples nothing as to the way in which they must take the existing sensible world, even if only as a deception?” This implies (1) that the distinction between Appearance and Reality had been clearly grasped ; and (2) that a certain hypothetical and relative truth was allowed to Appearance. These are palpable anachronisms. Both views are Platonic, and they were not held even by Plato in his earlier writings.
210 Early Greek Philosophy
are as far as possible from believing in an elaborate
dualism such as Parmenides expounded, and it is a
highly artificial hypothesis to assume that he wished
to show how the popular view of the world could best
be systematised. “The many” would hardly be
convinced of their error by having their beliefs
presented to them in a form which they would certainly
fail to recognise. This, indeed, seems the most
incredible interpretation of all. It still, however, finds
adherents, so it is necessary to point out that the
beliefs in question are called “the opinions of mortals”
simply because the speaker is a goddess. Further,
we have to note that Parmenides forbids two ways of
research, and we have seen that the second of these,
which is also expressly ascribed to “ mortals,” must be
the system of Herakleitos. We should surely. expect,
then, to find that the other way too is the system of
some contemporary school, and it seems hard to
discover any of sufficient importance except the
Pythagorean. Now it is admitted by every one that
there are Pythagorean ideas in the Second Part of the
poem, and it is therefore to be presumed, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, that the whole system
comes from the same source. It does not appear that
Parmenides said any more about Herakleitos than the
words to which we have just referred, in which he
forbids the second way of inquiry. He implies, indeed,
that there are really only two ways that can be thought
- of, and that the attempt of Herakleitos to combine
them was futile. In any case, the Pythagoreans
1 Cf. frs. 4 and 6, especially the words αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι ᾿ vojoat. The third way, that of Herakleitos, is only added as an after- thought—avrap ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς K.T.r.
Parmenides of Elea 211
were far more serious opponents at that date in Italy,
and it is certainly to them that we should expect
Parmenides to define his attitude. —
It is still not quite clear, however, why he should
have thought it worth while to put into hexameters a
view which he believed to be false. Here it becomes.
important to remember that he had been a Pythagorean
himself, and that the poem is a renunciation of his
former beliefs. In such cases men commonly feel the
necessity of showing where their old views were wrong.
The goddess tells him that he must learn of those
beliefs also “how men ought to have judged that the
»1 That is clear .
so far; but it does not explain the matter fully. We
things which seem to them really are.
get a further hint in another place. He is to learn
these beliefs “in order that no opinion of mortals may
ever get the better of him ” (fr. 8, 61). If we remember
that the Pythagorean system at this time was handed
down by oral tradition alone, we shall perhaps see
what this means. Parmenides was founding a dissi-
dent school, and it was quite necessary for him to
instruct his disciples in the system they might be called
upon to oppose. In any case, they could not reject
it intelligently without a knowledge of it, and this
Parmenides had to supply himself.”
11 read χρῆν δοκιμῶσ᾽ εἶναι in fr. 1, 32 with Diels, but I do not feel able to accept his rendering wie man bei griindlicher Durchforschung annehmen miisste, dass sich jenes Scheinwesen verhalte. We must, I think, take χρῆν δοκιμῶσαι (2.6. δοκιμάσαι) quite strictly, and χρῆν with the infinitive means ‘fought to have.” The most natural subject for the infinitive in that case is βροτούς, while εἶναι will be dependent on δοκιμῶσαι, and have τὰ δοκοῦντα for its subject. This way of taking the words is confirmed by fr. 8, 54, τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν, if taken as I have taken it with Zeller. See above, p. 201, ἢ. 1.
3 The view that the opinions contained in the Second Part are those of others, and are not given as true in any sense whatsoever, is that of Diels. The objections of Wilamowitz (Hermes, xxxiv. pp. 203 sqq.) do not appear
The dualist cosmology.
212 Early Greek Philosophy
91. The view that the Second Part of the poem of Parmenides was a sketch of contemporary Pytha- gorean cosmology is, doubtless, incapable of rigorous demonstration, but it can, I think, be made extremely probable. The entire history of Pythagoreanism up to the end of the fifth century B.C. is certainly conjectural ; but, if we find in Parmenides ideas which are wholly unconnected with his own view of the world, and if we find precisely the same ideas in later Pythagoreanism, the most natural inference will surely be that the later Pythagoreans derived these views from their pre- decessors, and that they formed part of the original stock-in-trade of the society to which they belonged. This will only be confirmed if nd that they are developments of certain featureg”in the old Ionian cosmology. Pythagoras came frém Samos, which always stood in the closest relations with Miletos ; and it was not, so far as we can see, in his cosmological views that he chiefly displayed his originality. It has been pointed out above (§ 53) that the idea of the world breathing came from Anaximenes, and we need not be surprised to find traces of Anaximander as well. Now, if we were
to me cogent. If we interpret him rightly, Parmenides never says that ‘“*this hypothetical explanation is . . . better than that of any one else” (E. Meyer, iv. § 510, Amm.). What he does say is that it is untrue altogether. It seem to me, however, that Diels has weakened his case by refusing to identify the theory here expounded with Pythagoreanism, .and referring it mainly to Herakleitos. Herakleitos was emphatically mot a dualist, and I cannot see that to represent him as one is even what Diels calls a ‘‘caricature” of his theory. Caricatures must have some point of likeness. It is still more surprising to me that Patin, who makes ἕν πάντα εἷναι the corner-stone of Herakleiteanism, should adopt this view (Parmenides im Kampfe gegen Heraklit, 1899). E. Meyer (loc. cit.) seems to think that the fact of Zeno’s having modified the δόξα ot Parmenides in an Empedoklean sense (Diog. ix. 29; R.P. 140) proves that it was supposed to have some sort of truth. On the contrary, it would only show, if true, that Zeno had other opponents to face than Parmenides had.
Uh,
~Parmenides of Elea 213
confined to what Aristotle tells us on this subject, it would be almost impossible to make out a case; but his statements require, as usual, to be examined with a certain amount of care. He says, first of all, that the two elements of Parmenides were the Warm and the Cold." In this he is so far justified by the fragments that, since the Fire of which Parmenides speaks is, of course, warm, the other “form,” which has all the opposite qualities, must of necessity be cold. But, never- theless, the habitual use of the terms “ 24 warm” and “the cold” is an accommodation to Aristotle’s own system. In Parmenides himself they were simply one pair of attributes amongst others.
. Still more misleading is Aristotle’s identification of
these with Fire and Earth. It is not quite certain that
he meant to say Parmenides himself made this identifica-
tion ; but, on the whole, it is most likely that he did,
and Theophastros certainly followed him in this.’ It is
another question whether it is accurate. Simplicius,
who had the poem before him (§ 85), after mentioning
Fire and Earth, at once adds “or rather Light and
Darkness” ;* and this is suggestive enough. Lastly,
Aristotle’s identification of the dense element with
“ what is not,” * the unreal of the First Part of the poem,
is not very easy to reconcile with the view that it is
1 καί. 986 Ὁ 34, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν ; Phys. A, 5. 188 a 20; Gen. Corr. A, 2. 4ι8ῦ6; B, 3. 330 Ὁ 14.
2 Phys. A, 5. 188 ἃ 21, ταῦτα δὲ (θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν) προσαγορεύει πῦρ καὶ γῆν ; Met. A, 5. 986 Ὁ 34, οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν λέγων. Cf. Theophr. Phys. Op. fr. 6 (Dox. p. 482; R. P. 121 a). [Plut.] Strom. fr. 5 (Dox. p. 581), λέγει δὲ τὴν γῆν τοῦ πυκνοῦ Karappuévros ἀέρος γεγονέναι. Zeller, p. 568, n. I (Eng. trans. p. 593, n. 2).
8 Phys. p. 25, 15, ὡς Παρμενίδης ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δόξαν πῦρ καὶ γῆν (ἢ μᾶλλον φῶς Kal σκότοϑ).
4 Met. A, 5. 986 Ὁ 35, τούτων δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὃν τὸ θερμὸν τάττει, θάτερον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν. See above, p. 208, n. 2.
214 Early Greek Philosophy
earth. On the other hand, if we suppose that the
second of the two “forms,” the one which should not
have been “named,” is the Pythagorean Air or Void, we
get a very good explanation of Aristotle’s identifica-
tion of it with “what is not.” We seem, then, to be
justified in neglecting the identification of the dense
element with earth for the present. Ata later stage,
we shall be able to see how it may have originated.’
The further statement of Theophrastos, that the Warm
was the efficient cause and the Cold the material or
passive,” is intelligible enough if we identify them with
the Limit and the Unlimited respectively ; but is not,
of course, to be regarded as historical.
We have seen that Simplicius, with the poem of
Parmenides before him, corrects Aristotle by substituting
Light and Darkness for Fire and Earth, and in this he
is amply borne out by the fragments which he quotes.
Parmenides himself calls one “ form” Light, Flame, and
Fire, and the other Night, and we have now to consider
whether these can be identified with the Pythagorean
Limit and Unlimited. We have seen good reason to
believe (§ 58) that the idea of the world breathing
belonged to the earliest form of Pythagoreanism, and
there can be no difficulty in identifying this “ bound-
less breath” with Darkness, which stands very well
for the Unlimited. “ Air” or mist was always regarded
as the dark element.* And that which gives definite-
1 See below, Chap. VII. § 147.
2 Theophr. Phys. Of. fr. 6 (Dox. p. 482; R. P. 121 a), followed by the doxographers.
3 Note the identification of the dense element with “air” in [Plut.] Strom., quoted p. 213, n. 2; and for the identification of this ‘‘air” with ‘‘ mist and darkness,” cf. Chap. I. § 27, and Chap. V.§ 107. It is to be observed further that Plato puts this last identification into the mouth of a Pythagorean (Zim. 52 d).
Parmenides of Elea 215
ness to the vague darkness is certainly light or fire, and this may account for the prominence given to that element by Hippasos.! We may probably conclude, then, that the Pythagorean distinction between the Limit and the Unlimited, which we shall have to consider later (Chap. VII.), made its first appearance in this crude form. If, on the other hand, we identify darkness with the Limit, and light with the Unlimited, as most critics do, we get into insuperable difficulties.
92. We must now look at the general cosmical view The heavenly
expounded in the Second Part of the poem. The ἤρα:
. fragments are scanty, and the doxographical tradition
hard to interpret; but enough remains to show that
here, too, we are on Pythagorean ground. All
discussion of the subject must start from the following
important passage of Aetios :-—