Come now, I will tell thee—and do thou hearken to my saying and carry it away—the only two ways of search that can be thought of. The first, namely, that J? zs, and that it is impossible for it not to be, is the way of belief, for truth is
1 See below, p. 211, ἢ. 1. .
2 I read μῦθος as in the parallel passage fr. 8 ad init. Diels’s inter- pretation of θυμὸς ὁδοῖο (the MS. reading here) as ein lebendiger Weg does not convince me, and the confusion of the two words is fairly common.
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5 its companion. The other, namely, that 72 zs mot, and that it must needs not be,—that, I tell thee, is a path that none can learn of at all. For thou canst not know what is not—that is impossible—nor utter it; for it is the same thing that can be thought and that can Ὀ6.: R. P. 114.
It needs must be that what can be thought and spoken of is; for it is possible for it to be, and it is not possible for what is nothing to be.? This is what I bid thee ponder. I hold thee back from this first way of inquiry, and from this
5 other also, upon which mortals knowing naught wander two-faced ; for helplessness guides the wandering thought in their breasts, so that they are borne along stupefied like men deaf and blind. Undiscerning crowds, in whose eyes it is, and is not, the same and not the same,? and all things travel in opposite directions! R. P. στὰς.
For this shall never be proved, that the things that are not
11 read with Zeller (p. 558 n. 1, Eng. trans. p. 584, ἢ. 1) τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι. Apart from the philosophical anachronism of making Parmenides say that ‘‘ thought and being are the same,” it is a granimatical anachronism to make him use the infinitive (with or without the article) as the subject of a sentence. On the other hand, he does use the active infinitive after elvac in the construction where we usually use a passive infinitive (Monro, ..7. Gr. § 231 sub fin.). Cf. fr. 4, εἰσὶ νοῆσαι, ‘* are for thinking,” z.e. ‘* can be thought.”
2 The construction here is the same as that explained in the last note. It is surprising that good scholars should acquiesce in the translation of τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν re as ““ to say and think this.” Then ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι means ‘it can be,” not ““ being is,” and the last phrase should be construed οὐκ ἔστι μηδὲν (εἷναι).
3 I construe οἷς νενόμισται τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν καὶ οὐ ταὐτόν. The subject of the infinitives πέλειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι is the 22, which has to be supplied also with ἔστιν and οὐκ ἔστιν. This way of taking the words makes it unnecessary to believe that Parmenides said (τὸ) οὐκ εἶναι instead of (τὸ) μὴ εἶναι for ‘‘not-being.” There is no difference between méXew and εἶναι except in rhythmical value.
41 take πάντων as neuter and understand παλίντροπος κέλευθος as equivalent to the ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω of Herakleitos. I do not think it has anything to do with the παλίντονος (or maNivrpotos) ἁρμονίη. See Chap. IIT. p. 150, ἢ. 2.
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are; and do thou restrain thy thought from this way of inquiry. R. P. 116.
One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that J¢ zs. In it are very many tokens that what is is uncreated and indestructible ; for it is complete,! immovable, and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now 22 zs, all at once, a continuous one. For what kind of origin for it wilt thou look for? Ina what way and from what source could it have drawn its increase? I shall not let thee say nor think that it came from what is not; for it can neither be thought
nor uttered that anythingis not. And, if it came from nothing, ©
what need could have made it arise later rather than sooner? Therefore must it either be altogether or be not at all. Nor will the force of truth suffer aught to arise besides itself from that which is not.2_ Wherefore, Justice doth not loose her fetters and let anything come into being or pass away, but holds it fast. Our judgment thereon depends on this: “ Zs zt or zs it not?” Surely it is adjudged, as it needs must be, that we are to set aside the one way as unthinkable and nameless (for it is no true way), and that the other path is real and true. How, then, can what zs be going to be in the future? Or how could it come into being? If it came into being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future. Thus is becoming extinguished and passing away not to be heard of. R, P. 117.
Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike, and there is no more *
' T still prefer to read ἔστι γὰρ οὐλομελές with Plutarch (adv. Col.
1114 6). Proklos (2 Parm. 1152, 24) also read οὐλομελές, Simplicius, who has μουνογενές here, calls the One of Parmenides ὁλομελές elsewhere (Phys. p. 137, 15). The reading of [Plut.] Strom. 5, μοῦνον μουνογενές helps to explain the confusion. We have only to suppose that the letters μην, Ὕ were wfitten above the line in the Academy copy of Parmenides by some one who had 77%. 31 Ὁ 3 in mind. . ® Diels formerly read ἔκ πη ἐόντος, ‘from that which in any way is” ; but he has now reverted to the reading ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος, supposing that the other horn of the dilemma’has dropped out. In any case, ‘‘ nothing but what is not can arise from what is not” gives a perfectly good sense.
3 For the difficulties which have been felt about μᾶλλον here, see Diels’s note. If the word is to be pressed, his interpretation is admissible ; but it
Ly
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‘of it in one place than in another, to hinder it from holding together, nor less of it, but everything is full of what is.
25 Wherefore it is wholly continuous; for what is, is in contact | with what is.
_ Moreover, it is immovable in the bonds of mighty chains, without beginning and without end; since coming into being and passing away have been driven afar, and true belief has cast them away. It is the same, and it rests in the self-same
30, place, abiding in itself. And thus it remaineth constant in “its place; for hard necessity keeps it in the bonds of the ‘limit that holds it fast on every side. Wherefore it is not per- ‘mitted to what is to be infinite; for it is in need of nothing ; ' while, if it were infinite, it would stand in need of everything. R. P. 118. The thing that can be thought and that for the sake of 35 which the thought exists is the same ;* for you cannot find thought without something that is, as to which it is uttered.® And there is not, and never shall be, anything besides what is, since fate has chained it so as to be whole and immovable. Wherefore all these things are but names which mortals have 40 given, believing them to be true—coming into being and passing away, being and not being, change of place and alteration of bright colour. R. P. 119. ’ Since, then, it has a furthest limit, it is complete on every side, like the mass of a rounded sphere, equally poised from 45 the centre in every direction; for it cannot be greater or smaller in one place than in another. For there is no nothing
seems to me that this is simply an instance of ‘‘ polar expression.” It is true that it is only the case of there being less of what is in one place than
another that is important for the divisibility of the One; but if there is less in one place, there is more in another ¢han ix that place. The Greek language tends to express these implications, The position of the relative clause makes a difficulty for us, but hardly for a Greek.
1 Simplicius certainly read μὴ ἐὸν δ᾽ ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο, which is metrically impossible. I have followed Bergk in deleting μή, and have interpreted with Zeller. So too Diels.
2 For the construction of ἔστι νοεῖν, see above, p. 198, ἢ. 1.
3 As Diels rightly points out, the Ionic φάτίζειν is equivalent to ὀνομάζειν. The meaning, I think, is this, We may name things as we choose, but there can be no thought corresponding to a name that is not the name of something real.
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that could keep it from reaching out equally, nor can aught that is be more here and less there than what is, since it is all inviolable. For the point from which it‘is equal in every direction tends equally to the limits. R. P. 120.
THE Way OF OPINION
Here shall I close my trustworthy speech and thought 50
about the truth. Henceforward learn the opinions of mortals,
giving ear to the deceptive ordering of my words.
Mortals have made up their minds to name two forms, one of which they should not name,! and that is where they go astray from the truth. They have distinguished them as 55 opposite in form, and have assigned to them marks distinct from one another. ‘To the one they allot the fire of heaven, gentle, very light, in every direction the same as itself, but not the same as the other. The other is just the opposite to it, dark night, a compact and heavy body. Of these I tell thee 60 the whole arrangement as it seems likely; for so no thought of mortals will ever outstrip thee. R. P. 121.
Now that all things have been named light and night, and the names which belong to the power of each have been assigned to these things and to those, everything is full at once of light and dark night, both equal, since neither has aught to do with the other.
And thou shalt know the substance of the sky, and all the signs in the sky, and the resplendent works of the glowing sun’s pure torch, and whence they arose. And thou shalt learn likewise of the wandering deeds of the round-faced moon, and
1 This is Zeller’s way of taking the words, and still seems to me the best. Diels objects that ἑτέρην would be required, and renders mur eine derselben, das sei unerlaubt, giving the words to the “mortals.” This seems to me to involve more serious grammatical difficulties than the use of μίαν for τὴν ἑτέραν, which is quite legitimate when there is an emphasis on the number. Aristotle must have taken it so; for he infers that one of - the μορφαί is to be identified with τὸ ἐόν.
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of her substance. Thou shalt know, too, the heavens that sur- round us, whence they arose, and how Necessity took them and bound them to keep the limits of the stars . . . how the earth, and the sun, and the moon, and the sky that is common to all, and the Milky Way, and the outermost Olympos, and the burning might of the stars arose. R. P. 123, 124.
The narrower rings are filled with unmixed fire, and those next them with night, and in the midst of these rushes their portion of fire. In the midst of these circles is the divinity that directs the course of all things; for she is the beginner of all painful birth and all begetting, driving the female to the embrace of the male, and the male to that of the female. Re P.. 225.
First of all the gods she contrived Eros. R. P. 125.
Shining by night with borrowed light,! wandering round the earth.
Always looking to the beams of the sun.
'For just as thought finds at any time the mixture of its erring organs, so does it come ‘to men; for that which thinks is the same, namely, the substance of the limbs, in each and every man; for their thought is that of which there is more in them.? R. P. 128.
1 Note the curious echo of 71. v. 214. Empedokles has it too (v. 154). It appears to be a joke, made in the spirit of Xenophanes, when it was first discovered that the moon shone by reflected light.