63. HERAKLEITOS of Ephesos, son of Blyson, is said to Life of have “flourished” in Ol. LXIX. (504/3-501/0 BC);) that is to say, just in the middle of the reign of Dareios, with whom several traditions connected him.® We shall see that Parmenides was assigned to the same Olympiad, though for another reason (§ 84). It is more important, however, for our purpose to notice that, while Herakleitos refers to Pythagoras and Xenophanes by name and in the past tense (fr. 16), he is in turn referred to by Parmenides (fr. 6). These references are sufficient to mark his proper place in the history of philosophy. Zeller holds, indeed, that he cannot have published his work till after 478 B.c, on the ground that the expulsion of his friend Hermodoros, alluded to in fr. 114, could not have taken place before the downfall of Persian rule. ‘If that were so, it might be hard to see how Parmenides could have known the views of Herakleitos; but there is surely no difficulty in supposing that the Ephesians may have sent one of their foremost citizens into banishment at a time when they were still paying 1 Diog. ix. 1 (R. P. 29), no doubt from Apollodoros through some inter-
mediate authority. Jacoby, pp. 227 546. 3 Bernays, Die Herakiitischen Briefe, pp. 13 5644.
His book.
144 Early Greek Philosophy
tribute to the Great King. The Persians never took
their internal self-government from the Ionian cities,
and the spurious Letters of Herakleitos show the
accepted view was that the expulsion of Hermodoros
took place during the reign of Dareios.’
Sotion said that Herakleitos was a disciple of
Xenophanes,” which is not probable; for Xenophanes
seems to have left Ionia for ever before Herakleitos
was born. More likely he was not a disciple of
any one; but it is clear, at the same time, that he
was acquainted both with the Milesian cosmology
and with the poems of Xenophanes. He _ also
knew something of the theories taught by Pythagoras
(fr. 17).
Of the life of Herakleitos we really know nothing,
except, perhaps, that he belonged to the ancient royal
house and resigned the nominal position of Basileus
in favour of his brother.® The origin of the other
statements bearing on it is quite transparent.*
64. We do not know the title of the work of Herakleitos °—if, indeed, it had one at all—and it
1 Bernays, of. cit. pp. 20 sqq.
2 Sotion ap. Diog. ix. 5 (R. P. 29 c).
3 Diog. ix. 6 (R. P. 31).
4 See Patin, Heraklits Einheitslehre, pp. 3 sqq. Herakleitos said (fr. 68) that it was death to souls to become water ; and we are told accord- ingly that he died of dropsy. He said (fr. 114) that the Ephesians should leave their city to their children, and (fr. 79) that Time was a child play- ing draughts. We are therefore told that he refused to take any part in public life, and went to play with the children in the temple of Artemis. He said (fr. 85) that corpses were more fit to be cast out than dung ; and we are told that he covered himself with dung when attacked with dropsy. Lastly, he is said to have argued at great length with his doctors because of fr. 58. For these tales see Diog. ix. 3-5, and compare the stories about Empedokles discussed in Chap. V. § 100.
5 The variety of titles enumerated in Diog. ix. 12(R. P. 30 b) seems to show that none was authentically known. That of ‘‘ Muses” comes from Plato, Soph. 242 ἃ 7. The others are mere ‘‘ mottoes”’ (Schuster) prefixed
Herakleitos of Ephesos 145
is not very easy to form a clear idea of its contents.
We are told that it was divided into three discourses:
one dealing with the universe, one political, and one
theological.’ It is not likely that this division is
due to Herakleitos himself; all we can infer from the
statement is that the work fell naturally into these
three parts when the Stoic commentators took their
editions of it in hand.
The style of Herakleitos is proverbially obscure,
and, at a later date, got him the nickname of “the
Dark.”* Now the fragments about the Delphic god
and the Sibyl (frs. 11 and 12) seem to show that
he was quite conscious of writing an oracular style,
and we have to ask why he did so. In the first place,
it was the manner of the time.® The stirring events
of the age, and the influence of the religious revival,
gave something of a prophetic tone to all the leaders
of thought. Pindar and Aischylos have it too. They
all feel that they are in some measure inspired. It is
also the age of | great individualities, who are apt to be
solitary and disdainful. Herakleitos at>least was so.
If men cared to dig for the gold they might find it
(fr. 8); if not, they must be content with straw (fr.
51). This seems to have been the view taken by
Theophrastos, who said that the headstrong tempera-
ment of Herakleitos sometimes led him into incomplete-
ness and inconsistencies of statement.* But that is
by Stoic editors, and intended to emphasise their view that the subject of the work was ethical or political (Diog. ix. 15 ; R. P. 30 c).
1 Diog. ix. 5(R. P. 30). Bywater has followed this hint in his arrange- _ ment of the fragments. The three sections are 1-90, 91-97, 98-130.
2 R.P. 30a. The epithet ὁ σκοτεινός is of late date, but Timon of Phleious already called him αἰνικτής (fr. 43, Diels).
3 See the valuable observations of Diels in the Introduction to his Herakleitos von Ephesos, pp. iv. 544.
4 Cf. Diog. ix. 6 (R. P. 31).
The frag- ments.
146 Early Greek Philosophy
a very different thing from studied obscurity and the
disciplina arcanz sometimes attributed to him; if
Herakleitos does not go out of his way to make his
meaning clear, neither does he hide it (fr. 11).
65. I give a version of the fragments according to the arrangement of Mr. Bywater’s exemplary edition.’
(1) It is wise to hearken, not to me, but to my‘ Word, and to confess that all things are one. R. P. 4o.
(2) Though this Word? is true evermore, yet men are as unable to understand it when they hear it for the first time as before they have heard it at all. For, though all things come to pass in accordance with this Word, men seem as if they had no experience of them, when they make trial of words and deeds such as I set forth, dividing each thing according to its nature and showing how it truly is. But other men know not what they are doing when awake, even as they forget what they do in sleep. R. P. 32.
1 Tn his edition, Diels has given up all attempt to arrange the fragments according to subject, and this makes his text unsuitable for our purpose. I think, too, that he overestimates the difficulty of an approximate arrange- ment, and makes too much of the view that the style of Herakleitos was ‘*aphoristic.” That it was so, is an important and valuable remark ; but it does not follow that Herakleitos wrote like Nietzsche. For a Greek, however prophetic in his tone, there must always be a distinction between an aphoristic and an incoherent style. See the excellent remarks of Lortzing in Berl. Phil. Wochenschr. 1896, pp. I 546.
2 Both Bywater and Diels accept Bergk’s λόγου for δόγματος and Miller’s εἶναι for εἰδέναι. Cf. Philo, “eg. all. iii. c, quoted in Bywater’s note.
3 The Adyos is simply the discourse of Herakleitos himself; though, as he is a prophet, we may call it ‘“‘the Word.” It can neither mean a discourse addressed to Herakleitos nor yet ‘‘reason.” (Cf. Zeller, p. 630, n, 1; Eng. trans. ii. p. 7, n. 2.) A difficulty has been raised about the words ἐόντος αἰεί. How could Herakleitos say that his discourse had always existed? The answer is that in Ionic ἐών means ‘‘ true” when coupled with words like λόγος. Cf. Herod. i. 30, τῷ ἐόντι χρησάμενος λέγει ; and even Aristoph. Frogs, 1052, οὐκ ὄντα λόγον. It is only by taking the words in this way that we can understand Aristotle’s hesitation as to the proper punctuation of the fragment (Δ᾽ οί. Τ' 5. 1407 b15; R. P. 30a). The Stoic interpretation given by Marcus Aurelius, iv. 46 (R. P. 32 b), must be rejected altogether. The word λόγος was never used like that till post- Aristotelian times.
Herakleitos of Ephesos 147
- (2) Fools when they do hear are like the deaf: of them
does the saying bear witness that they are absent when
present. R. P. 31 ἃ.
-- (4) Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men if they have
souls that understand not their language. R. P. 42.
(5) The many do not take heed of such things as those
they meet with, nor do they mark them when they are taught,
though they think they do, i
(6) Knowing not how to listen nor how to speak.
(7) If you do not expect the unexpected, you will not find it; for it is hard to be sought out and difficult.!
-(8) Those who seek for gold dig up much earth and find a little. Ἐς P. 44 Ὁ.
..(10) Nature loves to hide. R. P. 34 f.
-(11) The lord whose is the oracle at Delphoi neither utters nor hides his meaning, but shows it bya sign. R. P. 30 ἃ.
(12) And the Sibyl, with raving lips uttering things mirth- less, unbedizened, and unperfumed, reaches over a thousand years with her voice, thanks to the god in her. R. P. 30 ἃ.
(13) The things that can be seen, heard, and learned are what I prize the most. R. P. 42.
(14) . . . bringing untrustworthy witnesses in support of disputed points.
(15) The eyes are more exact witnesses than the ears.” RP, 42. Ὁ.
--(16) The learning of many things teacheth not understand- ing, else would it have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hekataios. R. P. 31.
(17) Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchos, practised inquiry
beyond all other men, and choosing out these writings, claimed
for his own wisdom what was but a knowledge of many
things and an art of mischief.2 R. P. 31 a.
1 I have departed from the punctuation of Bywater here, and supplied a fresh object to the verb as suggested by Gomperz (A7ch. i. 100).
2 Cf. Herod. i. 8, The application is, no doubt, the same as that of the last two fragments. Personal inquiry is better than tradition.
3 See Chap. II. p. 107, n. 1. The best attested reading is ἐποιήσατο, not ἐποίησεν, and ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ means ‘‘claimed as hisown.”” The words ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφάς have been doubted since the time of Schleiermacher, and Diels has now come to regard the whole fragment as
_ a ol mn ted -
148 Early Greek Philosophy
(18) Of all whose discourses I have heard, there is not one who attains to understanding that wisdom is apart from all. πὸ Py πα
-- (10) Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things. R. P. 40.
(20) This world,! which is the same for all, no one of gods or men has made; but it was ever, is now, and ever shall be an ever-living Fire, with measures kindling, and measures going out. R. P. 35.”
(21) The transformations of Fire are, first of all, sea ; and half of the sea is earth, half whirlwind? .. . R. P. 35 b.
-- (22) All things are an exchange for Fire, and Fire for
all things, even as wares for gold and gold for wares.
ἘΚ,
(23) It becomes liquid sea, and is measured by the same tale as before it became earth.* R. P. 39.
(24) Fire is want and surfeit. R. P. 36 a.
spurious. This is because it was used to prove that Pythagoras wrote books (cf. Diels, Avch. iii. p. 451). As Mr. Bywater has pointed out, however, the fragment itself makes no such statement ; it only says that he read books, which we may presume he did. I would further suggest that the old-fashioned cvyypadds is rather too good for a forger, and that the omission of the very thing to be proved is remarkable. The last suggestion of a book by Pythagoras disappears with the reading ἐποιήσατο for ἐποίησεν. Of course a late writer who read of Pythagoras making extracts from books would assume that he put them into a book of his own, just as people did in his own days. For the rest, I understand ἱστορίη of science, which is contrasted with the κακοτεχνίη which Pythagoras derived from the συγγραφαί of men like Pherekydes of Syros.