Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 38 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part II (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

To all this we (the Vedantins) make the following reply. — The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing cor- responding to the idea, whether it be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the words of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward thing, and that no such thing exists,

1 V&san&, above translated by mental impression, strictly means any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the present actual idea.

Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 28. 42 1

any more than we listen to a man who while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied? — If the Bauddha should reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of no object but only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of consciousness, we answer that he may indeed make any arbitrary statement he likes, but that he has no arguments to prove what he says. That the out- ward thing exists apart from consciousness, has necessarily to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. Nobody when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious of his perception only, but all men are conscious of posts and walls and the like as objects of their perceptions. That such is the consciousness of all men, appears also from the fact that even those who contest the existence of external things bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an internal object of cognition appears like something external. For they practically accept the general consciousness which testifies to the existence of an external world, and being at the same time anxious to refute it they speak of the external things as ' like something external/ If they did not them- selves at the bottom acknowledge the existence of the ex- ternal world, how could they use the expression 'like something external ? ' No one says, ' Vish^umitra appears like the son of a barren mother.' If we accept the truth as it is given to us in our consciousness, we must admit that the object of perception appears to us as something external, not like something external. — But — the Bauddha may reply — we conclude that the object of perception is only like something external because external things are impossible. — This conclusion we rejoin is improper, since the possibility or impossibility of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or non-operation of the means of right knowledge ; while, on the other hand, the operation and non-operation of the means of right knowledge are not to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities. Possible is whatever is apprehended by perception or some other means of proof; impossible is what is not so apprehended. Now the external things are,

42 2 VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.

according to their nature, apprehended by all the instru- ments of knowledge ; how then can you maintain that they are not possible, on the ground of such idle dilemmas as that about their difference or non-difference from atoms ? — ■ Nor, again, does the non-existence of objects follow from the fact of the ideas having the same form as the objects ; for if there were no objects the ideas could not have the forms of the objects, and the objects are actually appre- hended as external. — For the same reason (i. e. because the distinction of thing and idea is given in consciousness) the invariable concomitance of idea and thing has to be con- sidered as proving only that the thing constitutes the means of the idea, not that the two are identical. Moreover, when we are conscious first of a pot and then of a piece of cloth, consciousness remains the same in the two acts while what varies are merely the distinctive attributes of consciousness ; just as when we see at first a black and then a white cow, the distinction of the two perceptions is due to the varying blackness and whiteness while the generic character of the cow remains the same. The difference of the one per- manent factor (from the two — or more — varying factors) is proved throughout by the two varying factors, and vice versa the difference of the latter (from the permanent factor) by the presence of the one (permanent factor). Therefore thing and idea are distinct. The same view is to be held with regard to the perception and the remembrance of a jar ; there also the perception and the remembrance only are distinct while the jar is one and the same ; in the same wTay as when conscious of the smell of milk and the taste of milk we are conscious of the smell and taste as different things but of the milk itself as one only.

Further, two ideas which occupy different moments of time and pass away as soon as they have become objects of consciousness cannot apprehend — or be apprehended by — each other. From this it follows that certain doctrines forming part of the Bauddha system cannot be upheld ; so the doctrine that ideas are different from each other ; the doctrine that everything is momentary, void, &c. ; the doc- trine of the distinction of individuals and classes ; the

Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 28. 423

doctrine that a former idea leaves an impression giving rise to a later idea ; the doctrine of the distinction, owing to the influence of Nescience, of the attributes of existence and non-existence ; the doctrine of bondage and release (de- pending on absence and presence of right knowledge) \

Further, if you say that we are conscious of the idea, you must admit that we are also conscious of the external thing. And if you rejoin that we are conscious of the idea on its own account because it is of a luminous nature like a lamp, while the external thing is not so ; we reply that by main- taining the idea to be illuminated by itself you make your- self guilty of an absurdity no less than if you said that fire burns itself. And at the same time you refuse to accept the common and altogether rational opinion that we are conscious of the external thing by means of the idea different from the thing ! Indeed a proof of extraordinary philosophic insight! — It cannot, moreover, be asserted in any way that the idea apart from the thing is the object of our consciousness ; for it is absurd to speak of a thing as the object of its own activity. Possibly you (the Bauddha) will rejoin that, if the idea is to be apprehended by some- thing different from it, that something also must be appre- hended by something different and so on ad infinitum. And, moreover, you will perhaps object that as each cogni- tion is of an essentially illuminating nature like a lamp, the assumption of a further cognition is uncalled for ; for as they are both equally illuminating the one cannot give light to the other. — But both these objections are unfounded. As the idea only is apprehended, and there is consequently no necessity to assume something to apprehend the Self which witnesses the idea (is conscious of the idea), there re- sults nor egressus ad infinitum. And the witnessing Self and the idea are of an essentially different nature, and may therefore stand to each other in the relation of knowing subject and object known. The existence of the witness-

1 For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas which is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject in addition to the transitory ideas.

424 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

ing Self is self-proved and cannot therefore be denied. — Moreover, if you maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing in need of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain thereby that ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge, and which are without a knowing being ; which is no better than to assert that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks manifest themselves. And if you should maintain that thereby we admit your doctrine, since it follows from what we have said that the idea itself implies consciousness ; we reply that, as observation shows, the lamp in order to become manifest requires some other intellectual agent furnished with instruments such as the eye, and that therefore the idea also, as equally being a thing to be illuminated, becomes manifest only through an ulterior intelligent principle. And if you finally object that we, when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, merely express in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea is self-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your ideas have the attributes of originating, passing away, being manifold, and so on (while our Self is one and permanent). — We thus have proved that an idea, like a lamp, requires an ulterior intelligent principle to render it manifest.

29. And on account of their difference of nature
(the ideas of the waking state) are not like those of
a dream.

We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by the Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike. — The two sets of ideas, we maintain, cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the difference of their character. They differ as follows. — The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness. ' I wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man ; no such meeting took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so the

Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 30. 425

false idea arose/ In an analogous manner the things of which we are conscious when under the influence of a magic illusion, and the like, are negated by our ordinary con- sciousness. Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like, are never negated in any state. — Moreover, the visions of a dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are acts of immediate consciousness ; and the distinction between remembrance and immediate con- sciousness is directly cognised by every one as being founded on the absence or presence of the object. When, for instance, a man remembers his absent son, he does not directly perceive him, but merely wishes so to perceive him. As thus the distinction between the two states is evident to every one, it is impossible to formulate the inference that waking consciousness is false because it is mere consciousness, such as dreaming consciousness ; for we certainly cannot allow would-be philosophers to deny the truth of what is directly evident to themselves. Just because they feel the absurdity of denying what is evident to themselves, and are consequently unable to demonstrate the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those ideas themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their having certain attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming state. But if some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of the latter' s own nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the thing having certain attributes in common with some other thing. Fire, which is felt to be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of its having attributes in common with water. And the dif- ference of nature between the waking and the sleeping state we have already shown.

30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not
possible (on the Bauddha view) on account of the
absence of perception (of external things).

We now proceed to that theory of yours, according to which the variety of ideas can be explained from the

426 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.