Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 38 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part II (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

variety of mental impressions, without any reference to external things, and remark that on your doctrine the existence of mental impressions is impossible, as you do not admit the perception of external things. For the variety of mental impressions is caused altogether by the variety of the things perceived. How, indeed, could various impressions originate if no external things were perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad i nf i n i t u m, sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish your position. — The same argu- ment, i. e. the one founded on the impossibility of mental impressions which are not caused by external things, refutes also the positive and negative judgments, on the ground of which the denier of an external world above attempted to show that ideas are caused by mental impressions, not by external things. We rather have on our side a positive and a negative judgment whereby to establish our doctrine of the existence of external things, viz. ' the perception of external things is admitted to take place also without mental impressions,' and 'mental impressions are not ad- mitted to originate independently of the perception of external things.' — Moreover, an impression is a kind of modification, and modifications cannot, as experi- ence teaches, take place unless there is some substratum which is modified. But, according to your doctrine, such a substratum of impressions does not exist, since you say that it cannot be cognised through any means of knowledge.

31. And on account of the momentariness (of the
alayavi^ana, it cannot be the abode of mental
impressions).

If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition (alayavi^ana 1) assumed by you may constitute the abode

1 The vi^zanaskandha comprises vi^/zanas of two different kinds, the alayavigTzana and the pravrz'ttivi^zana. The alayavi^ana com- prises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer to the ego ; the pravMtivi^Tzana comprises those ideas which refer to apparently external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas of the

Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pa Da, 32. 427

of the mental impressions, we deny that, because that cognition also being admittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode of impressions any more than the quasi-external cognitions (pravrztti-vi^ana). For unless there exists one continuous principle equally connected with the past, the present, and the future 19 or an absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time, and cause. If, on the other hand, you declare your alayavi^/zana to be something permanent, you thereby abandon your tenet of the alayavi^Tzana as well as everything else being momentary. — Or (to explain the Sutra in a different way) as the tenet of general momen- tariness is characteristic of the systems of the idealistic as well as the realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward against the doctrines of the former all those arguments dependent on the principle of general momentariness which we have above urged against the latter.

We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the doctrine which maintains the (momentary) reality of the ex- ternal world, and the doctrine which asserts that ideas only exist. The third variety of Bauddha doctrine, viz. that everything is empty (i. e. that absolutely nothing exists), is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and therefore requires no special refutation. For this apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all the means of know- ledge, cannot be denied, unless some one should find out some new truth (based on which he could impugn its existence) — for a general principle is proved by the absence of contrary instances.

32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability.

No further special discussion is in fact required. From

latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the antecedent ideas of the former class.

1 Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents itself to consciousness is not non-existent.

428 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

whatever new points of view the Bauddha system is tested with reference to its probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foun- dation whatever to rest upon, and hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of life are mere folly. — Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, has himself made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly confused. — So that — and this the Sutra means to indicate — Buddha's doctrine has to be entirely dis- regarded by all those who have a regard for their own happiness.

33. On account of the impossibility (of contra-
dictory attributes) in one thing, (the Gaina doctrine
is) not (to be accepted).

Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn to the system of the Gymnosophists (Gainas).

The Gainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz. soul (^iva), non-soul (a^iva), the issuing outward (asrava), restraint (sawvara), destruction (nir^-ara), bondage (bandha), and release (moksha)1. Shortly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories, viz. soul and non-soul, since the five other categories may be subsumed under these two. — They also set forth a set of categories different from the two mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called

1 Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects of their enjoyment; asrava is the forward movement of the senses towards their objects ; sazrcvara is the restraint of the activity of the senses; nirg-ara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed; the works constitute bondage ; and release is the ascending of the soul, after bondage has ceased, to the highest regions. — For the details, see Professor Cowell's translation of the Arhata chapter of the Sarvadar,ra7zasa#zgraha.

Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pad a, 33. 429

astikayas (' existing bodies,' i. e. categories), viz. the cate- gories of soul (^iva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and space (alcana). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful ways1. — To all things they apply the following method of reasoning, which they call the saptabhangtnaya : somehow it is; somehow it is not ; somehow it is and is not ; somehow it is indescrib- able ; somehow it is and is indescribable ; somehow it is not and is indescribable ; somehow it is and is not and is indescribable.

To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such conceptions as that of unity and eternity2.

This doctrine we meet as follows. — Your reasoning, we say, is inadmissible ' on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing ; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many and such or not be so many and such ; the third alternative expressed in the words 'they either are such or not such ' results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself some- thing, falls as such under the alternative predications ' some- how it is/ ' somehow it is not,' and so ceases to be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion and to the result of the assertion ; partly they are, partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the Tirthakara (Cina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether

1 Cp. translation of Sarvadanra#asa#zgraha, p. 59.

2 And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.

430 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

indeterminate ? Observation shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doc- trine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman. — Again, if we apply the Caina reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view they are not five ; from which latter point of view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be described ; but, as a matter of fact, they are described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person. — If you further maintain that the heavenly world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is implied in such statements will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release. And, moreover, it follows from your doctrine that soul, non- soul, and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute indeter- mination. — As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories — being excluding non-being and vice versa non-being ex- cluding being — the doctrine of the Arhat must be rejected, — The above remarks dispose likewise of the assertions made by the Camas as to the impossibility of deciding whether of one thing there is to be predicated oneness or plurality, permanency or non-permanency, separateness or non-separateness, and so on. — The Caina doctrine that

Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 34. 43 1

aggregates are formed from the atoms — by them called
pudgalas — we do not undertake to refute separately as its
refutation is already comprised in that of the atomistic
doctrine given in a previous part of this work.

34. And likewise (there results from the £aina doctrine) non-universality of the Self.