Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 38 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part II (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

This fundamental assumption of the Vaueshikas we declare to be groundless because from the circumstance of the atoms having colour and other qualities there would follow the contrary of atomic minuteness and perma- nency, i.e. it would follow that, compared to the ultimate cause, they are gross and non-permanent. For ordinary experience teaches that whatever things possess colour and other qualities are, compared to their cause, gross and non- permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is gross compared to the threads of which it consists, and non-permanent ; and the threads again are non-permanent and gross com-

392 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

pared to the filaments of which they are made up. Therefore the atoms also which the VaLreshikas admit to have colour, &c. must have causes compared to which they are gross and non-permanent. Hence that reason also which Ka/zada gives for the permanence of the atoms (IV, i, i, 'that which exists without having a cause is permanent ') does not apply at all to the atoms because, as we have shown just now, the atoms are to be considered as having a cause. — The second reason also which Ka^ada brings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in IV, i, 4, 'the special negation implied in the term non- eternal would not be possible1' (if there did not exist some- thing eternal, viz. the atoms), does not necessarily prove the permanency of the atoms ; for supposing that there exists not any permanent thing, the formation of a negative com- pound such as ' non-eternal ' is impossible. Nor does the existence of the word * non-permanent ' absolutely pre- suppose the permanency of atoms ; for there exists (as we Vedantins maintain) another permanent ultimate Cause, viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of anything be established merely on the ground of a word commonly being used in that sense, since there is room for common use only if word and matter are well-established by some other means of right knowledge. — The third reason also given in the Vai^. Sutras (IV, i, 5) for the permanency of the atoms ('and Nescience') is unavailing. For if we explain that Sutra to mean ' the non-perception of those actually existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience/ it would follow that the binary atomic compounds also are permanent 2. And if we tried to escape from that difficulty by including (in the explanation of the Sutra as given above) the qualification ' there being absence of (originating) sub-

1 Our Vaiseshika-sutras read ' pratishedhabhava^ ; ' but as all MSS. of *Sankara have * pratishedhabhava^ ' I have kept the latter reading and translated according to Anandagiri's explanation: K&ryam anityam iti karye vweshato nityatvanishedho na sy&d yadi Mra«e*py anityatvam ato*;mna#z k&mn&nam nityateti sutrartha^.

2 Because they also are not perceptible ; the ternary aggregates, the so-called trasare/ms, constituting the minima perceptibilia.

Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pad a, 1 6. 393

stances,' then nothing else but the absence of a cause would furnish the reason for the permanency of the atoms, and as that reason had already been mentioned before (in IV, 1, 1) the Sutra IV, 1, 5 would be a useless restatement. — Well, then (the Vaireshika might say), let us understand by * Nescience ' (in the Sutra) the impossibility of conceiving a third reason of the destruction (of effects), in addition to the division of the causal substance into its parts, and the destruction of the causal substance ; which impossibility involves the permanency of the atoms1. — There is no neces- sity, we reply, for assuming that a thing when perishing must perish on account of either of those two reasons. That assumption would indeed have to be made if it were generally admitted that a new substance is produced only by the conjunction of several causal substances. But if it is admitted that a causal substance may originate a new substance by passing over into a qualified state after having previously existed free from qualifications, in its pure generality, it follows that the effected substance may be destroyed by its solidity being dissolved, just as the hard- ness of ghee is dissolved by the action of fire2. — Thus there would result, from the circumstance of the atoms having colour, &c, the opposite of what the VaiVeshikas mean. For this reason also the atomic doctrine cannot be main- tained.

16. And as there are difficulties in both cases.

Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour, and touch, and is gross ; water has colour, taste, and touch, and is fine ; fire has colour and touch, and is finer yet ; air is finest of all, and has the quality of touch only. The question now arises whether the atoms constituting the four elements are to be assumed to possess the same greater or smaller

1 As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated or destroyed.

2 This according to the Veddnta view. If atoms existed they might have originated from avidyd by a mere parkdma and might again be dissolved into avidyd, without either disintegration or destruction of their cause taking place.

394 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

number of qualities as the respective elements. — Either assumption leads to unacceptable consequences. For if we assume that some kinds of atoms have more numerous qualities, it follows that their solid size (murti) will be increased thereby, and that implies their being atoms no longer. That an increase of qualities cannot take place without a simultaneous increase of size we infer from our observations concerning effected material bodies. — If, on the other hand, we assume, in order to save the equality of atoms of all kinds, that there is no difference in the number of their qualities, we must either suppose that they have all one quality only ; but in that case we should not perceive touch in fire nor colour and touch in water, nor taste, colour, and touch in earth, since the qualities of the effects have for their antecedents the qualities of the causes. Or else we must suppose all atoms to have all the four quali- ties ; but in that case we should necessarily perceive what we actually do not perceive, viz. smell in water, smell and taste in fire, smell, taste, and colour in air. — Hence on this account also the atomic doctrine shows itself to be unac- ceptable.

17. And as the (atomic theory) is not accepted
(by any authoritative persons) it is to be disregarded
altogether.

While the theory of the pradhana being the cause of the world has been accepted by some adherents of the Veda — as, for instance, Manu — with a view to the doctrines of the effect existing in the cause already, and so on, the atomic doctrine has not been accepted by any persons of authority in any of its parts, and therefore is to be disregarded entirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.

There are, moreover, other objections to the VaLreshika doctrine. — The VaLreshikas assume six categories, which constitute the subject-matter of their system, viz. substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence. These six categories they maintain to be absolutely dif- ferent from each other, and to have different characteristics ;

Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, I 7. 395

just as a man, a horse, a hare differ from one another. Side by side with this assumption they make another which contradicts the former one, viz. that quality, action, &c. have the attribute of depending on substance. But that is altogether inappropriate ; for just as ordinary things, such as animals, grass, trees, and the like, being absolutely different from each other do not depend on each other, so the qualities, &c. also being absolutely different from sub- stance, cannot depend on the latter. Or else let the qualities, &c. depend on substance ; then it follows that, as they are present where substance is present, and absent where it is absent, substance only exists, and, according to its various forms, becomes the object of different terms and conceptions (such as quality, action, &c); just as Devadatta, for instance, according to the conditions in which he finds himself is the object of various conceptions and names. But this latter alternative would involve the acceptation of the Sankhya doctrine1 and the abandonment of the VaLreshika stand- point.— But (the VaLreshika may say) smoke also is different from fire and yet it is dependent on it. — True, we reply ; but we ascertain the difference of smoke and fire from the fact of their being apperceived in separation. Substance and quality, on the other hand, are not so apperceived ; for when we are conscious of a white blanket, or a red cow, or a blue lotus, the substance is in each case cognised by means of the quality ; the latter therefore has its Self in the sub- stance. The same reasoning applies to action, generality, particularity, and inherence.

If you (the VaLreshika) say that qualities, actions, &c. (although not non-different from substances) may yet depend on the latter because substances and qualities stand in the relation of one not being able to exist without the other (ayutasiddhi 2) ; we point out that things which are

1 The Sankhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as being the pradhana in various forms. — There is no need of assuming with Govindananda that by the Sankhya of the text we have to understand the Vedanta.

2 Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avina^yad aparamtam evava- tish/^ate tav ayutasiddhau yathavayavavayavinau.

396 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

ayutasiddha must either be non-separate in place, or non- separate in time, or non-separate in nature, and that none of these alternatives agrees with VaLreshika principles. For the first alternative contradicts your own assumptions ac- cording to which the cloth originating from the threads occupies the place of the threads only, not that of the cloth, while the qualities of the cloth, such as its white colour, occupy the place of the cloth only, not that of the threads. So the VaLreshika-sfitras say (I, i, 10), ' Substances originate another substance and qualities another quality.' The threads which constitute the causal substance originate the effected substance, viz. the cloth, and the qualities of the threads, such as white colour, &c, produce in the cloth new corresponding qualities. But this doctrine is clearly contra- dicted by the assumption of substance and quality being non-separate in place. — If, in the second place, you explain ajmtasiddhatva as non-separation in time, it follows also that, for instance, the right and the left horn of a cow would be ayutasiddha. — And if, finally, you explain it to mean ' non-separation in character,' it is impossible to make any further distinction between the substance and the quality, as then quality is conceived as being identical with substance. Moreover, the distinction which the Vaueshikas make between conjunction (sa^yoga) as being the connexion of things which can exist separately, and inherence (samavaya) as being the connexion of things which are incapable of separate existence is futile, since the cause which exists before the effect 1 cannot be said to be incapable of separate existence. Perhaps the Vaueshika will say that his defi- nition refers to one of the two terms only, so that samavaya is the connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is incapable of separate existence. But this also is of no avail ; for as a connexion requires two terms, the effect as long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be con- nected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing to say that the effect enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist ; for if the Vaueshika admits that the effect

1 The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavaya.

Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 1 7. 397

may exist previous to its connexion with the cause, it is no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of separate existence), and thereby the principle that between effect and cause con- junction and disjunction do not take place is violated1. And2 just as conjunction, and not samavaya, is the con- nexion in which every effected substance as soon as it has been produced stands with the all-pervading substances as ether, &c. — although no motion has taken place on the part of the effected substance — so also the connexion of the effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not sama- vaya.