against the Sankhya, and at present we have to do with the Vafceshika. — But, already once before (II, i, 3) a line of argument equally applicable to a second case was simply declared to extend to the latter also ; (why then do you not simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the Sankhya are equally valid against the Vaueshika ?) — Because here, we reply, at the beginning of the examina- tion of the Vai^eshika system we prefer to discuss the point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of the Vaireshikas.
12. In both cases also (in the cases of the adrzsh/a
inhering either in the atoms or the soul) action (of
the atoms) is not (possible) ; hence absence of that
(viz. creation and pralaya).
The Sutrakara now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the cause of the world. — This doctrine arises in the following manner. We see that all ordinary sub- stances which consist of parts as, for instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunc- tion co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We thence draw the general conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from those substances with which it is connected by the relation of inherence, conjunction co- operating. That thing now at which the distinction of whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of division into minuter parts is the atom. — This whole world, with its mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts ; because it is composed of parts it has a beginning and an end 1 ; an effect may not be assumed without a cause ; therefore the atoms are the cause of the world. Such is Ka/zada's doctrine. — As we observe four elementary substances con- sisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind), we have to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the limit of subdivision into minuter parts can-
1 Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which consists of parts.
Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pad a, 12. 387
not be divided themselves ; hence when the elements are destroyed they can be divided down to atoms only ; this state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the pralaya (the periodical destruction of the world). After that when the time for creation comes, motion (karman) springs up in the aerial atoms. This motion which is due to the unseen principle 1 joins the atom in which it resides to another atom ; thus binary compounds, &c. are produced, and finally the element of air. In a like manner are pro- duced fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus the whole world originates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in the atoms the qualities belonging to the binary compounds are produced, just as the qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads. — Such, in short, is the teaching of the followers of Ka;zada.
This doctrine we controvert in the following manner. — It must be admitted that the atoms when they are in a state of isolation require action (motion) to bring about their conjunction ; for we observe that the conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action again, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which it is brought about ; for unless some such cause exists, no original motion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative cause is assumed, we may, in the first place, assume some cause analogous to seen causes, such as endeavour or impact. But in that case original motion could not occur at all in the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at the time, im- possible. For in the pralaya state endeavour, which is a quality of the soul, cannot take place because no body exists then. For the quality of the soul called endeavour origi- nates when the soul is connected with the internal organ which abides in the body. The same reason precludes the assumption of other seen causes such as impact and the like. For they all are possible only after the creation of the world has taken place, and cannot therefore be the
1 Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms with the souls to which merit and demerit belong. — Adrzsh/apeksham adr/sh/avatkshetra^/zasa/rcyogapeksham iti yavat. An. Gi.
C C 2
388 VEDANTA-SIJTRAS.
causes of the original action (by which the world is produced). — If, in the second place, the unseen principle is assumed as the cause of the original motion of the atoms, we ask : Is this unseen principle to be considered as inhering in the soul or in the atom ? In both cases it can- not be the cause of motion in the atoms, because it is non- intelligent. For, as we have shown above in our examina- tion of the Sankhya system, a non-intelligent thing which is not directed by an intelligent principle cannot of itself either act or be the cause of action, and the soul cannot be the guiding principle of the adrishta. because at the time of pralaya its intelligence has not yet arisen 1. If, on the other hand, the unseen principle is supposed to inhere in the soul, it cannot be the cause of motion in the atoms, because there exists no connexion of it with the latter. If you say that the soul in which the unseen principle inheres is connected with the atoms, then there would result, from the continuity of connexion2, continuity of action, as there is no other restricting principle. — Hence, there being no definite cause of action, original action cannot take place in the atoms ; there being no action, conjunction of the atoms which depends on action cannot take place ; there being no con- junction, all the effects depending on it, viz. the formation of binary atomic compounds, &c, cannot originate.
How, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with another to be imagined ? Is it to be total interpenetration of the two or partial conjunction ? If the former, then no increase of bulk could take place, and consequently atomic size only would exist ; moreover, it would be contrary to what is observed, as we see that conjunction takes place between substances having parts (pradcra). If the latter, it would follow that the atoms are composed of parts. — Let then the atoms be imagined to consist of parts. — If so, imagined things being unreal, the conjunction also of the atoms would be unreal and thus could not be the non-
1 According to the Vai^eshikas intelligence is not essential to the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when the soul is joined to an internal organ.
2 The soul being all-pervading.
Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pad a, 1 3. 389
inherent cause of real things. And without non-inherent causes effected substances such as binary compounds, &c. could not originate. And just as at the time of the first creation motion of the atoms leading to their conjunction could not take place, there being no cause of such motion ; thus at the time of a general pralaya also no action could take place leading to their separation, since for that occur- rence also no definite seen cause could be alleged. Nor could the unseen principle be adduced as the cause, since its purport is to effect enjoyment (of reward and punishment on the part of the soul), not to bring about the pralaya. There being then no possibility of action to effect either the conjunction or the separation of the atoms, neither conjunc- tion nor separation would actually take place, and hence neither creation nor pralaya of the world. — For these reasons the doctrine of the atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.
13. And because in consequence of samav&ya
being admitted a regressus in infinitum results
from parity of reasoning.
You (the Vaweshika) admit that a binary compound which originates from two atoms, while absolutely different from them, is connected with them by the relation of inherence ; but on that assumption the doctrine of the atoms being the general cause cannot be established, ' because parity involves here a retrogressus ad infinitum.' For just as a binary compound which is absolutely different from the two con- stituent atoms is connected with them by means of the relation of inherence (samavaya), so the relation of inherence itself being absolutely different from the two things which it connects, requires another relation of inherence to connect it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases. For this second relation of inherence again, a third relation of inherence would have to be assumed and so on ad i n f i n i t u m. — But — the Vaueshika is supposed to reply — we are conscious of the so-called samavaya relation as eternally connected with the things between which it exists, not as
390 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
either non-connected with them or as depending on another connexion ; we are therefore not obliged to assume another connexion, and again another, and so on, and thus to allow ourselves to be driven into a regressus in infinitum. — Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it would involve the admission that conjunction (sa;/zyoga) also as being eternally connected with the things which it joins does, like samavaya, not require another connexion 1. If you say that conjunc- tion does require another connexion because it is a different thing 2, we reply that then samavaya also requires another connexion because it is likewise a different thing. Nor can you say that conjunction does require another connexion because it is a quality (gu^a), and samavaya does not because it is not a quality ; for (in spite of this difference) the reason for another connexion being required is the same in both cases3, and not that which is technically called ' quality' is the cause (of another connexion being required)4, — For these reasons those who acknowledge samavaya to be a separate existence are driven into a regressus in infini- tum, in consequence of which, the impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can be accounted for. — For this reason also the atomic doctrine is inadmissible.
14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity).
Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either
1 Which is inadmissible on Vai^eshika principles, because sa#z- yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by samavaya.
2 Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction. The argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each other in the way of conjunction.
3 Viz. the absolute difference of samavaya and sawyoga from the terms which they connect.
4 Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavaya relation to their substrates.
Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 1 5. 391
essentially active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither ; there being no fifth alternative. But none of the four alternatives stated is possible. If they were essentially active, their activity would be permanent so that no pralaya could take place. If they were essentially non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could take place. Their being both is impossible because self-con- tradictory. If they were neither, their activity and non- activity would have to depend on an operative cause, and then the operative causes such as the adrzshfe being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent activity would result ; or else the adrishfa. and so on not being taken as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent non-activity on the part of the atoms. — For this reason also the atomic doctrine is untenable.
15. And on account of the atoms having colour,
&c, the reverse (of the Vai^eshika tenet would take
place) ; as thus it is observed.
Let us suppose, the Vaueshikas say, all substances com- posed of parts to be disintegrated into their parts; a limit will finally be reached beyond which the process of disin- tegration cannot be continued. What constitutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent), belong to four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c, and are the originating principles of this whole material world with its colour, form, and other qualities.