Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 38 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part II (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

by other men ; so that, on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this difficulty by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or any- body else ; since we observe that even men of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as Kapila, Ka^ada, and other founders of philosophical schools, have contradicted one another.

But (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will fashion our reasoning otherwise, i. e. in such a manner as not to lay it open to the charge of having no proper foun- dation. You cannot, after all, maintain that no reasoning whatever is well-founded ; for you yourself can found your assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only; your assumption being that because some arguments are seen to be devoid of foundation other arguments as belonging to the same class are likewise devoid of foundation. Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the whole course of practical human life would have to come to an end. For we see that men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain in the future time, on the assumption that the past, the present, and the future are uniform. — Further, in the case of passages of Scripture (apparently) contradicting each other, the ascertainment of the real sense, which depends on a preliminary refutation of the apparent sense, can be effected only by an accurate definition of the meaning of sentences, and that involves a process of reasoning. Thus Manu also expresses himself : ' Perception, inference, and the jastra according to the various traditions, this triad is to be known well by one desiring clearness in regard to right. — He who applies reasoning not contradicted by the Veda to the Veda and the (Smrz'ti) doctrine of law, he, and no other, knows the law' (Manu Smrz'ti XII, 105, 106). And that ' want of foundation,' to which you object, really constitutes the beauty of reasoning, because it enables us to arrive at unobjection- able arguments by means of the previous refutation of objectionable arguments \ (No fear that because the

1 The whole style of argumentation of the Mima^sa would be

3 1 6 vedanta-sOtras.

purvapaksha is ill-founded the siddhanta should be ill- founded too ;) for there is no valid reason to maintain that a man must be stupid because his elder brother was stupid. — For all these reasons the want of foundation cannot be used as an argument against reasoning.

Against this argumentation we remark that thus also there results ' want of release.' For although with regard to some things reasoning is observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there will result ' want of release,5 viz. of the reasoning from this very fault of ill— foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts ; for, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception, because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to inference and the other means of right knowledge. — Or else (if we adopt another explanation of the word ' avimoksha ') all those who teach the final release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the cha- racteristic mark of uniformity, because it depends on accom- plished actually existing things ; for whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about such is called perfect knowledge ; as, for instance, the knowledge embodied in the proposition, 'fire is hot.5 Now, it is clear that in the case of perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known ; for we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be perfect knowledge ?— Nor can it be said that he who maintains the

impossible, if all reasoning were sound ; for then no purvapaksha view could be maintained.

Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, 12. 317

pradhana to be the cause of the world (i. e. the Sankhya) is the best of all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philoso- phers; which would enable us to accept his opinion as perfect knowledge. — Nor can we collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement) that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered perfect knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal and the source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly established things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is founded on the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the past, present, or future. We have thus established the perfection of this our know- ledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apart from it perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead to ' absence of final release' of the transmigrating souls. Our final position therefore is, that on the ground of Scrip- ture and of reasoning subordinate to Scripture, the intelli- gent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance of the world.

12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent persons are explained.

Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the Vedanta-texts which, based on reasoning, take their stand on the doctrine of the pradh&na being the cause of the world ; (which doctrine deserves to be refuted first), because it stands near to our Vedic system, is supported by somewhat weighty arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda. — But now some dull- witted persons might think that another objection founded on reasoning might be raised against the Vedanta, viz. on the ground of the atomic doctrine. The Sutrakara, therefore, extends to the latter objection the refutation of the former, considering that by the conquest of the most dangerous adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is already virtually accomplished. Other doctrines, as, for instance, the atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by

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either Manu or Vyasa or other authorities, are to be con- sidered as ; explained,' i. e. refuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhana doctrine. As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same, there is no room for further doubt. Such common argu- ments are the impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped ' otherwise ' (see the preceding Sutra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning, and so on.

13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the
objects of enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer
(and vice versa) there would result non-distinction
(of the two) ; we reply that (such distinction) may exist
(nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.

Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world. — Although Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of its grasp by other means of right knowledge ; just as mantras and arthavadas have occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of right knowledge1). Ana- logously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its legitimate sphere ; so, for instance, in the case of religious duty and its opposite2. — Hence Scripture cannot be acknow- ledged to refute what is settled by other means of right knowledge. And if you ask, * Where does Scripture oppose itself to what is thus established?'' we give you the fol-

1 The following arthavada-passage, for instance, 'the sacrificial post is the sun/ is to be taken in a metaphorical sense ; because perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its literal meaning,

2 Which are to be known from the Veda only.

Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, 1 3. 319

lowing instance. The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of enjoy- ment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versa. Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result from the doc- trine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only with regard to the present time when that distinc- tion is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established dis- tinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.

To the preceding objection we reply, ' It may exist as in ordinary experience.' Even on our philosophic view the dis- tinction may exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea, although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist, sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different from the sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other ; and, again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are not different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also. The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the unmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer (according to the passage, « Having created he entered into it/ Taitt. Up. II, 6), still after Brahman has entered into its effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting

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adjuncts. The conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non- different from Brahman, their highest cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates.

14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and
effect) results from such terms as * origin ' and the
like.