This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force, on account of its being a mere negation. If you negative the existence of the effect previous to its actual origina- tion, your negation is a mere negation without an object to be negatived. The negation (implied in * non-existent 5) can certainly not have for its object the existence of the effect previous to its origination, since the effect must be viewed as l existent,' through and in the Self of the cause, before its origination as well as after it ; for at the present moment also this effect does not exist independently, apart from the cause ; according to such scriptural passages as, i Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6). In so far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self of the cause, its existence is the same before the actual be- ginning of the effect (as after it). — But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities such as sound, &c, is the cause of this world (possessing all those qualities) ! — True, but the effect with all its qualities does not exist without the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning (of the effect) ; hence it cannot be said that (according to our doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual begin- ning.— This point will be elucidated in detail in the section treating of the non-difference of cause and effect.
8. On account of such consequences at the time
3 1 0 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
of reabsorption (the doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable.
The purvapakshin raises further objections. — If an effect which is distinguished by the qualities of grossness, con- sisting of parts, absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, &c, is admitted to have Brahman for its cause, it follows that at the time of reabsorption (of the world into Brah- man), the effect, by entering into the state of non-division from its cause, inquinates the latter with its properties. As therefore — on your doctrine — the cause (i. e. Brahman) as well as the effect is, at the time of reabsorption, character- ised by impurity and similar qualities, the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to which an omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.- — Another ob- jection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all distinctions passing at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction there would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of the world, and con- sequently the new world could not arise with all the distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which are actually observed to exist). — A third ob- jection is that, if we assume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all works, &c. (which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying souls which enter into the state of non-difference from the highest Brahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which have obtained final release again appear in the new world. — If you finally say, ' Well, let this world remain distinct from the highest Brahman even at the time of reabsorption,' we reply that in that case a reabsorption will not take place at all, and that, moreover, the effect's existing separate from the cause is not possible. — For all these reasons the Vedanta doctrine is objectionable.
To this the next Sutra replies.
9. Not so ; as there are parallel instances.
There is nothing objectionable in our system. — The objection that the effect when being reabsorbed into its
Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, 9. 3ii
cause would inquinate the latter with its qualities does not damage our position ' because there are parallel instances/ i. e. because there are instances of effects not inquinating with their qualities the causes into which they are re- absorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots, &c, which in their state of separate existence are of various descriptions, do not, when they are reabsorbed into their original matter (i.e. clay), impart to the latter their in- dividual qualities ; nor do golden ornaments impart their individual qualities to their elementary material, i. e. gold, into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the fourfold complex of organic beings which springs from earth impart its qualities to the latter at the time of re- absorption. You (i. e. the purvapakshin), on the other hand, have not any instances to quote in your favour. For re- absorption could not take place at all if the effect when passing back into its causal substance continued to subsist there with all its individual properties. And 3 that in spite of the non-difference of cause and effect the effect has its Self in the cause, but not the cause in the effect, is a point which we shall render clear later on, under II, 1, 14.
Moreover, the objection that the effect would impart its qualities to the cause at the time of reabsorption is formu- lated too narrowly because, the identity of cause and effect being admitted, the same would take place during the time of the subsistence (of the effect, previous to its reabsorption). That the identity of cause and effect (of Brahman and the world) holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time (not only the time of reabsorption), is declared in many scriptural passages, as, for instance, ' This everything is that Self (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6) ; < The Self is all this ' (Kk. Up. VII, 25, 2) ; * The immortal Brahman is this before ' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11) ; < All this is Brahman ' {Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1).
With regard to the case referred to in the Sruti-passages we refute the assertion of the cause being affected by the
1 Nairn pralayakale karyadharmaj ken navatishMeran na tarhi kararcadharma api tish/Zzeyus tayor abhedat tatrahananyatve*piti. An. Gi.
3 T 2 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
effect and its qualities by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious superimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good with reference to reabsorption also. — We can quote other examples in favour of our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is un- real, so the highest Self is not affected by the world- illusion. And as one dreaming person is not affected by the illusory visions of his dream because they do not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep; so the one permanent witness of the three states (viz. the highest Self which is the one unchanging witness of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world) is not touched by the mutually exclusive three states. For that the highest Self appears in those three states, is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the rope is mistaken in the twilight. With reference to this point teachers knowing the true tradition of the Vedanta have made the following declaration, 'When the individual soul which is held in the bonds of slumber by the beginningless Maya awakes, then it knows the eternal, sleepless, dream- less non-duality' (Gau^ap. Kar. I, 16).
So far we have shown that — on our doctrine — there is no danger of the cause being affected at the time of reabsorp- tion by the qualities of the effect, such as grossness and the like. — With regard to the second objection, viz. that if we assume all distinctions to pass (at the time of reabsorption) into the state of non-distinction there would be no special reason for the origin of a new world affected with dis- tinctions, we likewise refer to the 'existence of parallel instances.' For the case is parallel to that of deep sleep and trance. In those states also the soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction ; nevertheless, wrong knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old state of distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakes from its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage, ' All these creatures when they have become merged in the True, know not that they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a
Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, Io. 313
wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a musquito, that they become again J (Kk. Up. VI, 9, 2 ; 3). For just as during the subsistence of the world the phe- nomenon of multifarious distinct existence, based on wrong knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like the vision of a dream, although there is only one highest Self devoid of all dis- tinction ; so, we conclude, there remains, even after re- absorption, the power of distinction (potential distinction) founded on wrong knowledge. — Herewith the objection that — according to our doctrine — even the finally released souls would be born again is already disposed of. They will not be born again because in their case wrong know- ledge has been entirely discarded by perfect knowledge. — The last alternative finally (which the purvapakshin had represented as open to the Vedantin), viz. that even at the time of reabsorption the world should remain distinct from Brahman, precludes itself because it is not admitted by the Vedantins themselves. — Hence the system founded on the Upanishads is in every way unobjectionable.
10. And because the objections (raised by the
S&rikhya against the Ved&nta doctrine) apply to his
view also.
The doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same objections which he urges against us, viz. in the following manner. — The objection that this world cannot have sprung from Brahman on account of its difference of character applies no less to the doctrine of the pradhana being the cause of the world ; for that doctrine also assumes that from a pradhana devoid of sound and other qualities a world is produced which possesses those very qualities. The beginning of an effect different in character being thus admitted, the Sankhya is equally driven to the doctrine that before the actual beginning the effect was non-existent. And, moreover, it being admitted (by the Sankhya also) that at the time of reabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction from the cause, the case of the Sankhya here also is the same as ours. — And, further, if
3 1 4 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
(as the Sankhya also must admit) at the time of reabsorp- tion the differences of all the special effects are obliterated and pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the different worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new creation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for them ; and if you assume them to be determined without a cause, you are driven to the admission that even the released souls have to re-enter a state of bondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in the case of the released and the non-released souls). And if you try to avoid this conclusion by assuming that at the time of reabsorption some individual differences pass into the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply that in that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the pradhana1. — It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised by the Sankhya) apply to both views, and cannot therefore be urged against either only. But as either of the two doctrines must necessarily be accepted, we are strengthened — by the outcome of the above discussion — in the opinion that the alleged difficulties are no real difficulties 2.
ii. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill-
foundedness of reasoning, we must frame our con-
clusions otherwise ; (we reply that) thus also there
would result non-release.
In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments, which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn
1 For if they are effects of the pradhana they must as such be reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption.
2 And that the Vedanta view is preferable because the nullity of the objections has already been demonstrated in its case.