Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 34 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part I (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

the individuals do not originate, no contradiction arises in the case of words such as cow, and the like, since the species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the case of such words as Vasu, and the like, since the species denoted by them are eternal. And that the gods, and so on, belong to different species, is to be concluded from the descriptions of their various personal appearance, such as given in the mantras, arthavadas, &c. Terms such as ' Indra ' rest on the connexion (of some particular being) with some particular place, analogously to terms such as ' army-leader ; ' hence, whoever occupies that particular place is called by that particular name. — The origination of the world from the ' word ' is not to be understood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material cause of the world, as Brahman does ; but while there exist the ever- lasting words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their eternal sense (i. e. the akrztis denoted), the accomplishment of such individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them is called an origina- tion from those words.

How then is it known that the world originates from the word ? — ' From perception and inference.' Perception here denotes Scripture which, in order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else). 'Inference' denotes Smr/ti which, in order to be authoritative, depends on something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that creation is preceded by the word. Thus a scriptural passage says, 'At the word these Pra^apati created the gods; at the words were poured out he created men ; at the word drops he created the fathers; at the words through the filter he created the Soma cups ; at the words the swift ones he created the stotra ; at the words to all he created the iastra ; at the word blessings he created the other beings.' And another passage says, 'He with his mind united himself with speech (i.e. the word of the Veda. — Bri. Up. I, 2, 4). Thus Scripture declares in different places that the word precedes the creation. — Smrz'ti also delivers itself as follows, 'In the beginning

204 vedanta-s6tras.

a divine voice, eternal, without beginning or end, formed of the Vedas was uttered by Svayambhu, from which all activities proceeded.' By the ' uttering' of the voice we have here to understand the starting of the oral tradition (of the Veda), because of a voice without beginning or end ' uttering ' in any other sense cannot be predicated. — Again, we read, * In the beginning Ma- he^vara shaped from the words of the Veda the names and forms of all beings and the procedure of all actions.' And again, ' The several names, actions, and conditions of all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of the Veda ' (Manu I, 21). Moreover, we all know from observa- tion that any one when setting about some thing which he wishes to accomplish first remembers the word denoting the thing, and after that sets to work. We therefore con- clude that before the creation the Vedic words became manifest in the mind of Pra^apati the creator, and that after that he created the things corresponding to those words. Scripture also, where it says (Taitt. Bra. II, a, 4, %) 'uttering bhur he created the earth,' &c, shows that the worlds such as the earth, &c. became manifest, i.e. were created from the words bhur, &c. which had become mani- fest in the mind (of Pra^apati).

Of what nature then is the ' word ' with a view to which
it is said that the world originates from the 'word?' — It
is the spho/a, the purvapakshin says1. For on the as-

1 The purvapakshin, i. e. here the grammarian maintains, for the reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of words a supersensuous entity called spho/a which is manifested by the letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself mani- fests the sense of the word. The term spho/a may, according as it is viewed in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which is manifested. — The spho/a is a grammatical fiction, the word in so far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we cannot identify it with the ' notion ' (as Deussen seems inclined to do, p. 80) follows from its being distinctly called va^aka or abhidhayaka, and its being represented as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word (arthadhihetu).

I Adhyaya, 3 Pada, 28. 205

sumption that the letters are the word, the doctrine that the individual gods, and so on, originates from the eternal words of the Veda could not in any way be proved, since the letters perish as soon as they are produced (i.e. pronounced). These perishable letters are more- over apprehended as differing according to the pronun- ciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are able to determine, merely from the sound of the voice of some unseen person whom we hear reading, who is reading, whether Devadatta or Ya^/zadatta or some other man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension of difference regarding the letters is an erroneous one; for we do not apprehend anything else whereby it is refuted. Nor is it reasonable to maintain that the ap- prehension of the sense of a word results from the letters. For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an assump- tion * ; nor that there takes place a simultaneous appre- hension of the whole aggregate of letters ; since the letters succeed one another in time. Nor can we admit the explan- ation that the last letter of the word together with the im- pressions produced by the perception of the preceding letters is that which makes us apprehend the sense. For the word makes us apprehend the sense only if it is itself apprehended in so far as having reference to the mental grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and the sense), just as smoke makes us infer the existence of fire only when it is itself apprehended ; but an apprehension of the last letter combined with the impressions produced by the preceding letters does not actually take place, because those impressions are not objects of perception 2. Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those im-

1 For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not observed ; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have to be declared useless.

2 In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the word, there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus the impressions of the preceding letters ; just as smoke enables us to

pressions are not objects of perception, yet they may be inferred from their effects, and that thus) the actual per- ception of the last letter combined with the impressions left by the preceding letters — which impressions are appre- hended from their effects — is that which intimates the sense of the word ; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the remembrance of the entire word, is itself something con- sisting of parts which succeed each other in time. — From all this it follows that the spho/a is the word. After the apprehending agent, i. e. the buddhi, has, through the ap- prehension of the several letters of the word, received rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have been matured through the apprehension of the last letter, the spho/a presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the object of one mental act of apprehension. — And it must not be maintained that that one act of apprehension is merely an act of remembrance having for its object the letters of the word ; for the letters which are more than one cannot form the object of one act of apprehension. — As that spho/a is recognised as the same as often as the word is pronounced, it is eternal ; while the apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the letters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the spho/a and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object denoted, i. e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results of action.

Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters only are the word. — But — an objection is raised — it has been said above that the letters no sooner produced pass away! — That assertion is not true, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time they are produced anew). — Nor can it be maintained that the recognition is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance ; for the fact of the recognition being a re- cognition in the strict sense of the word is not contradicted by any other means of proof. — Nor, again, can it be said

infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.

i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 28. 207

that the recognition has its cause in the species (so that not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a letter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before) ; for, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised. That the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be maintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. But this is actually not the case ; for the (same) individual letters are recognised as often as they are pronounced. If, for instance, the word cow is pronounced twice, we think not that two different words have been pronounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated. — But, our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are apprehended as different owing to differences of pronunciation, as appears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing the sound of Devadatta or Ya^vzadatta reading. — Although, we reply, it is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters ; but as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c), those differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the articulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters themselves. Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters are different have, in order to account for the fact of recogni- tion, to assume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by ex- ternal factors. Is it then not much simpler to assume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the intrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of recognition is that mental process which prevents us from looking on the apprehension of difference as having the letters for its object (so that the opponent was wrong in denying the existence of such a process). For how should, for instance, the one syllable ga, when it is pronounced in