Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 34 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part I (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

2 The first reason excludes animals, gods, and r/shis. Gods cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of which is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering meant for the gods, i&shis cannot perform sacrifices in the course of whose performance the ancestral rzshis of the sacrificer are invoked. — The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of sacrifices. — The third and fourth reasons exclude the Sudras who are indirectly disqualified for gastric works because the Veda in different places gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for whom the ceremony of the upanayana — indispensable for all who wish to study the Veda — is not prescribed.— Cp. Purva Mima/rasa Sutras VI, i.

1 98 vedAnta-s^tras.

teaches that the transmigrating soul which is of the size of a thumb is (in reality) Brahman. For the Vedanta- passages have a twofold purport; some of them aim at setting forth the nature of the highest Self, some at teaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self. Our passage teaches the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self, not the size of anything. This point is made clear further on in the Upanishad, ' The person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, is always settled in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self forth from his body with steadiness, as one draws the pith from a reed. Let him know that Self as the Bright, as the Immortal' (II, 6, 17).

26. Also (beings) above them, (viz. men) (are
qualified for the study and practice of the Veda),
on account of the possibility (of it), according to
Badaraya^a.

It has been said above that the passage about him who is of the size of a thumb has reference to the human heart, because men are entitled to study and act according to the .rastra. This gives us an occasion for the following discussion. — It is true that the ^astra entitles men, but, at the same time, there is no exclusive rule entitling men only to the know- ledge of Brahman ; the teacher, Badaraya^a, rather thinks that the .rastra entitles those (classes of beings) also which are above men, viz. gods, and so on. — On what account? — On the account of possibility. — For in their cases also the different causes on which the qualification depends, such as having certain desires, and so on, may exist. In the first place, the gods also may have the desire of final release, caused by the reflection that all effects, objects, and powers are non-permanent. In the second place, they may be capable of it as their corporeality appears from mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, pura/zas, and ordinary experience. In the third place, there is no prohibition (excluding them like »Sudras). Nor does, in the fourth place, the scriptural rule about the upanayana-ceremony annul their title ; for that

I Adhyaya, 3 Pada, 27. J 99

ceremony merely subserves the study of the Veda, and to the gods the Veda is manifest of itself (without study). That the gods, moreover, for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, undergo discipleship, and the like, appears from such scriptural passages as ( One hundred and one years Indra lived as a disciple with Pra^apati ' (Kk. Up. VIII, 11, 3), and ' Bhrzgu Va.ru/zi went to his father Varu/za, saying, " Sir, teach me Brahman" ' (Taitt. Up. Ill, 1). — And the reasons which have been given above against gods and rzshis being entitled to perform religious works (such as sacrifices), viz. the circumstance of there being no other gods (to whom the gods could offer sacrifices), and of there being no other rzshis (who could be invoked during the sacrifice), do not apply to the case of branches of knowledge. For Indra and the other gods, when applying themselves to knowledge, have no acts to perform with a view to Indra, and so on ; nor have Bhrigu and other rzshis, in the same case, to do anything with the circumstance of their belonging to the same gotra as Bhrzgu, &c. What, then, should stand in the way of the gods' and rzshis' right to acquire knowledge? — Moreover, the passage about that which is of the size of a thumb remains equally valid, if the right of the gods, &c. is admitted ; it has then only to be explained in each par- ticular case by a reference to the particular size of the thumb (of the class of beings spoken of).

27. If it be said that (the corporeal individuality
of the gods involves) a contradiction to (sacrificial)
works ; we deny that, on account of the observation
of the assumption (on the part of the gods) of several
(forms).

If the right of the gods, and other beings superior to men, to the acquisition of knowledge is founded on the assumption of their corporeality, &c, we shall have to admit, in conse- quence of that corporeality, that Indra and the other gods stand in the relation of subordinate members (anga) to sacrificial acts, by means of their being present in person

200 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

just as the priests are. But this admission will lead to 'a contradiction in the sacrificial acts,' because the circumstance of the gods forming the members of sacrificial acts by means of their personal presence, is neither actually observed nor possible. For it is not possible that one and the same Indra should, at the same time, be present in person at many sacrifices.

To this we reply, that there is no such contradiction. — Why ? — On account of the assumption of several (forms). For it is possible for one and the same divine Self to assume several forms at the same time. — How is that known ? — From observation. — For a scriptural passage at first replies to the question how many gods there are, by the declaration that there are ' Three and three hundred, three and three thou- sand,' and subsequently, on the question who they are, declares ' They (the 303 and 3003) are only the various powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 9, 1, 2) ; showing thereby that one and the same divine Self may at the same time appear in many forms. After that it proceeds to show that these thirty- three gods themselves are in reality contained in six, five, &c, and, finally, by replying to the question, 'Who is the one god ? ' that Breath is the one god, shows that the gods are all forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the same time appear in many forms. — Smrzti also has a similar statement, ' A Yogin, O hero of the Bharatas, may, by his power, multiply his Self in many thousand shapes, and in them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy the objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and, finally, he may again retract them all, just as the sun retracts the multitude of his rays.5 If such Smrzti pas- sages as the above declare that even Yogins, who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and the like, may animate several bodies at the same time, how much more capable of such feats must the gods be, who naturally possess all supernatural powers ? The gods thus being able to assume several shapes, a god may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation with many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the

I Adhyaya, 3 Pad a, 28. 201

while unseen by others, in consequence of his power to render himself invisible.

The latter part of the Sutra may be explained in a different manner also, viz. as meaning that even beings enjoying corporeal individuality are seen to enter into mere subordinate relation to more than one action. Sometimes, indeed, one individual does not at the same time enter into subordinate relation to different actions ; one Brahma^a, for instance, is not at the same time entertained by many enter- tainers. But in other cases one individual stands in subor- dinate relation to many actions at the same time ; one Brahma/za, for instance, may constitute the object of the reverence done to him by many persons at the same time. Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering) with a view (to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their respective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same individual divinity. The individuality of the gods does not, therefore, involve any contradiction in sacrificial works.

28. If it be said (that a contradiction will result)
in respect of the word ; we refute this objection on
the ground that (the world) originates from the
word, as is shown by perception and inference.

Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the corporeal individuality of the gods, no contradiction will result in the case of sacrificial works. Still a contradic- tion will result in respect of the 'word' (^abda). — How? — - The authoritativeness of the Veda has been proved ' from its independence,5 basing on the original (eternal) connexion of the word with its sense (' the thing signified ,)1. But now, although a divinity possessing corporeal individuality, such as admitted above, may, by means of its supernatural powers, be able to enjoy at the same time the oblations

1 The reference is to Purva Mima/rcsa Sutras I, 1, 5 (not to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir's Sanskrit Texts., III, p. 69),

202 vedanta-s6tras.

which form part of several sacrifices, yet it will, on account of its very individuality, be subject to birth and death just as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion of the eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a contradiction will arise with regard to the authoritative- ness proved to belong to the word of the Veda.

To this we reply that no such contradiction exists. — Why? — ' On account of their origin from it.' For from that very same word of the Veda the world, with the gods and other beings, originates. — But — an objection will be raised — in Sutra I, i, % ('That whence there is the origin, &c. of this world')it has been proved thatthe world originates from Brah- man ; how then can it be said here that it originates from the word ? And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from the word of the Veda be admitted, how is the contradiction in regard to the word removed thereby, inasmuch as the Vasus, the Rudras, the Adityas, the VLrvedevas, and the Maruts 1 are non-eternal beings, because produced ; and if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the non- eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them ? For it is known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadaita is born, the name Ya^/vadatta is given to him (lit. made for him)2. Hence we adhere to our opinion that a contradiction does arise with regard to the ' word.'

This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the eternity of the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and the things denoted by them. For, although the individuals of the (species denoted by the word) cow have an origin, their species3 does not have an origin, since of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and actions the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals, which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into that connexion. Hence, although

1 In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.

2 Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.

8 Akrz'ti, best translated by efdos.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 28.