knowledge ; for the fact of everything having its Self in Brahman cannot be grasped without the aid of the scriptural passage ' That art thou ' {Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7). Nor can it rightly be objected that instruction is purportless if not connected with something either to be striven after or shunned ; for from the mere comprehension of Brahman's Self, which is not something either to be avoided or endeavoured after, there results cessation of all pain, and thereby the attainment of man's highest aim. That passages notifying certain divinities, and so on, stand in subordinate relation to acts of devout meditation mentioned in the same chapters may readily be admitted. But it is impossible that Brahman should stand in an analogous relation to injunctions of devout meditation, for if the know- ledge of absolute unity has once arisen there exists no longer anything to be desired or avoided, and thereby the conception of duality, according to which we distinguish actions, agents, and the like, is destroyed. If the conception of duality is once uprooted by the conception of absolute unity, it cannot arise again, and so no longer be the cause of Brahman being looked upon as the complementary object of injunctions of devotion. Other parts of the Veda may have no authority except in so far as they are con- nected with injunctions ; still it is impossible to impugn on that ground the authoritativeness of passages conveying the knowledge of the Self; for such passages have their own result. Nor, finally, can the authoritativeness of the Veda be proved by inferential reasoning so that it would be dependent on instances observed elsewhere. From all which it follows that the Veda possesses authority as a means of right knowledge of Brahman.
Here others raise the following objection : — Although the Veda is the means of gaining a right knowledge of Brah- man, yet it intimates Brahman only as the object of certain injunctions, just as the information which the Veda gives about the sacrificial post, the ahavaniya-fire and other objects not known from the practice of common life is merely supplementary to certain injunctions1. Why so?
1 So, for instance, the passage * he carves the sacrificial post and
24 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
Because the Veda has the purport of either instigating to action or restraining from it. For men fully acquainted with the object of the Veda have made the following declaration, ' The purpose of the Veda is seen to be the injunction of actions' (Bhashya on Caimini Sutra I, i, 1) ; c Injunction means passages impelling to action ' (Bh. on Cairn. Su. I, i, 2) ; ' Of this (viz. active religious duty) the knowledge comes from injunction ' (part of Cairn. Su. I, i, 5) ; ' The (words) denoting those (things) are to be connected with (the injunctive verb of the vidhi-passage) whose pur- port is action ' (Cairn. Su. 1, 1, 25) ; 'As action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not refer to action is purport- less ' (Cairn. Su. I, 2, 1). Therefore the Veda has a purport in so far only as it rouses the activity of man with regard to some actions and restrains it with regard to others ; other passages (i. e. all those passages which are not directly injunctive) have a purport only in so far as they supplement injunctions and prohibitions. Hence the Vedanta-texts also as likewise belonging to the Veda can have a mean- ing in the same way only. And if their aim is injunc- tion, then just as the agnihotra-oblation and other rites are enjoined as means for him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined as a means for him who is desirous of immortality. — But — somebody might object — it has been declared that there is a difference in the character of the objects enquired into, the object of enquiry in the karma-ka^a (that part of the Veda which treats of active religious duty) being some- thing to be accomplished, viz. duty, while here the object is the already existent absolutely accomplished Brahman. From this it follows that the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman must be of a different nature from the fruit of the knowledge of duty which depends on the performance of actions1. — We reply that it must not be such because the
makes it eight-cornered/ has a purpose only as being supplementary to the injunction * he ties the victim to the sacrificial post/
1 If the fruits of the two jastras were not of a different nature, there would be no reason for the distinction of two jastras ; if they
I Adhyaya, I Pada, 4. 25
Vedanta-texts give information about Brahman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions of actions. We meet with injunctions of the following kind, ' Verily the Self is to be seen' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 5) ; 'The Self which is free from sin that it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand' (Kk. Up. VIII, 7, 1) ; ' Let a man worship him as Self (Br/. Up. I, 4, 7) ; ' Let a man worship the Self only as his true state ' (Bri. Up. 1,4, 15) ; ' He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9). These injunctions rouse in us the desire to know what that Brahman is. It, therefore, is the task of the Vedanta-texts to set forth Brahman's nature, and they perform that task by teaching us that Brahman is eternal, all-knowing, absolutely self-sufficient, ever pure, intelli- gent and free, pure knowledge, absolute bliss. From the devout meditation on this Brahman there results as its fruit, final release, which, although not to be discerned in the ordinary way, is discerned by means of the ^astra. If, on the other hand, the Vedanta-texts were considered to have no reference to injunctions of actions, but to contain statements about mere (accomplished) things, just as if one were saying ' the earth comprises seven dvipas,' 'that king is marching on,' they would be pur- portless, because then they could not possibly be connected with something to be shunned or endeavoured after. — Per- haps it will here be objected that sometimes a mere state- ment about existent things has a purpose, as, for instance, the affirmation, 'This is a rope, not a snake,' serves the purpose of removing the fear engendered by an erroneous opinion, and that so likewise the Vedanta-passages making statements about the non-transmigrating Self, have a pur- port of their own (without reference to any action), viz. in so far as they remove the erroneous opinion of the Self being liable to transmigration. — We reply that this might
are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same way as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world and the like.
2 6 vedanta-s6tras.
be so if just as the mere hearing of the true nature of the rope dispels the fear caused by the imagined snake, so the mere hearing of the true nature of Brahman would dispel the erroneous notion of one's being subject to transmigration. But this is not the case ; for we observe that even men to whom the true nature of Brahman has been stated continue to be affected by pleasure, pain, and the other qualities attaching to the transmigratory condition. Moreover, we see from the passage, Br/. Up. II, 4, 5> ' The Self is to be heard, to be considered, to be reflected upon/ that con- sideration and reflection have to follow the mere hearing. From all this it results that the jastra can be admitted as a means of knowing Brahman in so far only as the latter is connected with injunctions.
To all this, we, the Vedantins, make the following reply: — The preceding reasoning is not valid, on account of the different nature of the fruits of actions on the one side, and of the knowledge of Brahman on the other side. The enquiry into those actions, whether of body, speech, or mind, which are known from 5ruti and Smrz'ti, and are comprised under the name 'religious duty' (dharma), is carried on in the Gaimini Sutra, which begins with the words 'then therefore the enquiry into duty ;' the opposite of duty also (adharma), such as doing harm, &c, which is defined in the prohibitory injunctions, forms an object of enquiry to the end that it may be avoided. The fruits of duty, which is good, and its opposite, which is evil, both of which are defined by original Vedic statements, are generally known to be sensible pleasure and pain, which make them- selves felt to body, speech, and mind only, are produced by the contact of the organs of sense with the objects, and affect all animate beings from Brahman down to a tuft of grass. Scripture, agreeing with observation, states that there are differences in the degree of pleasure of all em- bodied creatures from men upward to Brahman. From those differences it is inferred that there are differences in the degrees of the merit acquired by actions in accord- ance with religious duty; therefrom again are inferred differences in degree between those qualified to perform
I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 2j
acts of religious duty. Those latter differences are more- over known to be affected by the desire of certain results (which entitles the man so desirous to perform certain religious acts), worldly possessions, and the like. It is further known from Scripture that those only who perform sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the pre-eminence of their knowledge and meditation, on the northern path (of the sun ; Kh. Up. V, 10, 1), while mere minor offerings, works of public utility and alms, only lead through smoke and the other stages to the southern path. And that there also (viz. in the moon which is finally reached by those who have passed along the southern path) there are degrees of pleasure and the means of pleasure is understood from the passage ' Having dwelt there till their works are con- sumed.' Analogously it is understood that the different degrees of pleasure which are enjoyed by the embodied creatures, from man downward to the inmates of hell and to immovable things, are the mere effects of religious merit as defined in Vedic injunctions. On the other hand, from the different degrees of pain endured by higher and lower embodied creatures, there is inferred difference of degree in its cause, viz. religious demerit as defined in the pro- hibitory injunctions, and in its agents. This difference in the degree of pain and pleasure, which has for its antecedent embodied existence, and for its cause the difference of de- gree of merit and demerit of animated beings, liable to faults such as ignorance and the like, is well known — from vSruti, Smrz'ti, and reasoning — to be non-eternal, of a fleeting, changing nature (sa^sara). The following text, for instance, 'As long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain ' (Kk. Up. VIII, 12, 1), refers to the sa//z- sara-state as described above. From the following passage, on the other hand, ' When he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him/ which denies the touch of pain or pleasure, we learn that the unembodied state called ' final release ' (moksha) is declared not to be the effect of religious merit as defined by Vedic injunctions. For if it were the effect of merit it would not be denied that it is subject to pain and pleasure. Should it be said
2 8 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.