the only means of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i. e. in the Purva Mima//zsa), but scriptural texts on the one hand, and intuition 1, &c, on the other hand, are to be had recourse to according to the occasion : firstly, because intuition is the final result of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the enquiry is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the knowledge of Brahman were something to be accom- plished, there would be no reference to intuition, and text, &c, would be the only means of knowledge. The origina- tion of something to be accomplished depends, moreover, on man since any action either of ordinary life, or dependent on the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done in a different way. A man, for instance, may move on either by means of a horse, or by means of his feet, or by some other means, or not at all. And again (to quote examples of actions dependent on the Veda), we meet in Scripture with sentences such as the following : ' At the atiratra he takes the shodasm cup,' and ' at the atiratra he does not take the shodsLsin cup;' or, 'he makes the oblation after the sun has risen/ and, 'he makes the oblation when the sun has not yet risen.' Just as in the quoted instances, injunctions and prohibitions, allowances of optional pro- cedure, general rules and exceptions have their place, so they would have their place with regard to Brahman also (if the latter were a thing to be accomplished). But the fact is that no option is possible as to whether a substance is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. All option depends on the Motions of man ; but the knowledge of the real nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man, but only on the thing itself. For to think with regard to a post, 'this is a post or a man, or something else,' is not knowledge of truth ; the two ideas, 'it is a man or something else,' being false, and only the third idea, ' it
connection (vakya), &c., being the means of proof made use of in the Purva Mima/rcsa.
1 The so-called s&ksMtk&ra of Brahman. The &c. comprises inference and so on.
I Adhyaya, I Pada, 3. 1 9
is a post/ which depends on the thing itself, falling under the head of true knowledge. Thus true knowledge of all existing things depends on the things themselves, and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends altogether on the thing, i. e. Brahman itself. — But, it might be said, as Brahman is an existing substance, it will be the object of the other means of right knowledge also, and from this it follows that a discussion of the Vedanta-texts is purpose- less.— This we deny ; for as Brahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection with those other means of knowledge. For the senses have, according to their nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman. If Brahman were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is connected with Brahman as its effect; but as the effect only (i. e. the world) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through perception) whether it is connected with Brahman or something else. Therefore the Sutra under discussion is not meant to propound in- ference (as the means of knowing Brahman), but rather to set forth a Vedanta-text. — Which, then, is the Vedanta-text which the Sutra points at as having to be considered with reference to the characteristics of Brahman? — It is the passage Taitt. Up. Ill, i, ' Bhrzgu Vkruni went to his father Varu;za, saying, Sir, teach me -Brahman,5 &c, up to ' That from whence these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman.' The sentence finally determining the sense of this passage is found III, 6 : ' From bliss these beings are born ; by bliss, when born, they live ; into bliss they enter at their death.5 Other passages also are to be adduced which declare the cause to be the almighty Being, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom.
That Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer from it being shown that it is the cause of the world. To confirm this conclusion, the Sutrakara continues as follows :
3. (The omniscience of Brahman follows) from its being the source of Scripture.
20 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Brahman is the source, i. e. the cause of the great body of Scripture, consisting of the Rig-veda. and other branches, which is supported by various disciplines (such as grammar, nyaya, pura/za, &c.) ; which lamp-like illuminates all things ; which is itself all-knowing as it were. For the origin of a body of Scripture possessing the quality of omniscience can- not be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself. It is generally understood that the man from whom some special body of doctrine referring to one province of knowledge only originates, as, for instance, grammar from Pknini possesses a more extensive knowledge than his work, comprehensive though it be ; what idea, then, shall we have to form of the supreme omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being, which in sport as it were, easily as a man sends forth his breath, has produced the vast mass df holy texts known as the i£zg-veda, &c, the mine of all knowledge, consisting of mani- fold branches, the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and conditions of gods, animals, and men ! See what Scripture says about him, 'The i?/g-veda, &c, have been breathed forth from that great Being' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 10).
Or else we may interpret the Sutra to mean that Scripture consisting of the Rig-veda, &c, as described above, is the source or cause, i. e. the means of right knowledge through which we understand the nature of Brahman. So that the sense would be : through Scripture only as a means of know- ledge Brahman is known to be the cause of the origin, &c, of the world. The special scriptural passage meant has been quoted under the preceding Sutra ' from which these beings are born/ &c. — But as the preceding Sutra already has pointed out a text showing that Scripture is the source of Brahman, of what use then is the present Sutra ? — The words of the pre- ceding Sutra, we reply, did not clearly indicate the scriptural passage, and room was thus left for the suspicion that the origin, &c, of the world were adduced merely as determining an inference (independent of Scripture). To obviate this suspicion the Sutra under discussion has been propounded.
But, again, how can it be said that Scripture is the means
of knowing Brahman? Since it has been declared that
Scripture aims at action (according to the Purva Mima^sd
I Adhyaya, I Pada, 3. 21
Sutra I, 2, 1, c As the purport of Scripture is action, those scriptural passages whose purport is not action are purport- less'), the Vedanta-passages whose purport is not action are purportless. Or else if they are to have some sense, they must either, by manifesting the agent, the divinity or the fruit of the action, form supplements to the passages en- joining actions, or serve the purpose of themselves enjoining a new class of actions, such as devout meditation and the like. For the Veda cannot possibly aim at conveying information regarding the nature of accomplished substances, since the latter are the objects of perception and the other means of proof (which give sufficient information about them ; while it is the recognised object of the Veda to give information about what is not known from other sources). And if it did give such information, it would not be connected with things to be desired or shunned, and thus be of no use to man. For this very reason Vedic passages, such as c he howled, &c.,' which at first sight appear purposeless, are shown to have a purpose in so far as they glorify certain actions (cp. Pu. Mt. Su. I, 2, 7, ' Because they stand in syntac- tical connection with the injunctions, therefore their purport is to glorify the injunctions '). In the same way mantras are shown to stand in a certain relation to actions, in so far as they notify the actions themselves and the means by which they are accomplished. So, for instance, the mantra, ' For strength thee (I cut ; ' which accompanies the cutting of a branch employed in the darcapunzamasa-sacrifice). In short, no Vedic passage is seen or can be proved to have a meaning but in so far as it is related to an action. And injunctions which are defined as having actions for their objects cannot refer to accomplished existent things. Hence we maintain that the Vedanta-texts are mere supplements to those passages which enjoin actions; noti- fying the agents, divinities, and results connected with those actions. Or else, if this be not admitted, on the ground of its involving the introduction of a subject-matter foreign to the Vedanta-texts (viz. the subject-matter of the Karmaka^a of the Veda), we must admit (the second of the two alternatives proposed above, viz.) that the
2 2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Vedanta-texts refer to devout meditation (upasana) and similar actions which are mentioned in those very (Vedanta) texts. The result of all of which is that Scripture is not the source of Brahman.
To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies as follows :
4. But that (Brahman is to be known from Scrip-
ture), because it is connected (with the Vedanta-texts)
as their purport
The word ' but ' is meant to rebut the purva-paksha (the prima facie view as urged above). That all-knowing, all- I powerful Brahman, which is the cause of the origin, sub- jsistence, and dissolution of the world, is known from the Vedanta-part of Scripture. How? Because in all the Vedanta-texts the sentences construe in so far as they have for their purport, as they intimate that matter (viz. Brahman). Compare, for instance, ' Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second' {Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1) ; ' In the beginning all this was Self, one only ' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1); c This is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside ; this Self is Brahman perceiving everything ' {Bri. Up. II, 5, 19) ; ' That immortal Brahman is before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); and similar passages. If the words contained in these passages have once been determined to refer to Brahman, and their purport is understood thereby, it would be improper to assume them to have a different sense; for that would involve the fault of abandoning the direct statements of the text in favour of mere assumptions. Nor can we con- clude the purport of these passages to be the intimation of the nature of agents, divinities, &c. (connected with acts of religious duty) ; for there are certain scriptural passages which preclude all actions, actors, and fruits, as, for instance, Bri. Up. II, 4, 13, 'Then by what should he see whom?' (which passage intimates that there is neither an agent, nor an object of action, nor an instrument.) Nor again can Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished thing, be the object of perception and the other means of
I ADHYAYA, I pAdA, 4.