Lr> <o
48 HBRACLITUS.
new truth were : 1. the absence of that stability in
Nature which the untrained senses perceive; 2. the
unsuspected presence of a universal law of order ; 3.
0^'^'\ , the law of strife which brings unity out of diversity.
In one sense this may be called a theory of knowledge,
and only in this sense was it his starting point.
But concerning the theory of knowledge itself, we cannot accept Pfleiderer's position. By placing it in speculative intuition and self -absorption, he has rushed to the very opposite extreme of Schuster's sensation- alism, and in so doing has equally misrepresented Heraclitus. Either extreme is forcing a modem theory of knowledge upon the Ephesian of which he was wholly innocent. What support has Pfleiderer for his " self -absorption " theory? None whatever. He alleges the fragment '' Ede^rjudfjyjv i/iewurdu (cp. frag. 80), which he arbitrarily renders, **I searched within myself" C'Ich forschte in mir selbst")- This frag- ment is from Plutarch (adv. Colot. 20, p. 1118), Diog- enes Laertius (ix. 5 ; cp. frag. 80, sources), and others. Plutarch understands it to refer simply to self-knowl- edge like the Fuajde aaozov at Delphi (similarly Julian, Or. vi. p. 185 A). Diogenes understands it as referring to self-instruction (similarly Tatian, Or. ad Graec. 3). Diogenes says, " He (Heraclitus) was a pupil of no one, but he said that he inquired for himself and learned all things by himself" {^xooae r obdei^b(:^ dXX abToi^ l<prj Scl^Tjaatrdac xai jutadeli^ ndvza Ttap kiouzou). The latter seems to be its true meaning, as is seen by comparing the passage from Polybius (xii. 27; cp. frag. 15), ''-The eyes are better witnesses than the ears." As here he means to say that men should see for themselves and not trust to the reports of others, so in the fragment in question he means only that he himself has inquired of
Historical and Critical. 49
himself and not of others (cp. also frags. 14, 13). But Pfleiderer, in order to support a theory, has taken these two innocent words and pressed them into a doc- trine of contemplative intuition, by giving them the meaning, " I wrapped myself in thought " (" Ich ver- senkte mich sinnend und forschend," etc., p. 47). So "^ far is it from the case that Heraclitus sought the 1^11^5^ source of knowledge by turning inward, that he ex- f C\ pressed himself directly to the contrary. Thus we read ^\ ^ ^^ in Plutarch (de Superst. 3, p. 166; =frag. 95): b'^Hpd- ' ,
x^erroc (pfj^Jiy Tdi(: iYpTjyopdaci^ ii^a xae xoci^oi^ x6(T/jloi^ ecvac^ riov ""^^S
8k xoe/jLWfiii^wi^ exaaTov e/c t8cov dizoaTpeipEaOacy the sense of which is well given by Campbell (Theaetetus of Plato, p. 246), " To live in the light of the universal X)rder is -^-
to be awake, to turn aside into our own toicrocosin is - - "^
to go to sleep." Again, the whole passage from Sextus
Empiricus (adv. Math. vii. 132, 133 ; cp. frags. 92, 2)
is conclusive. "For," says Sextus, "having thus
statedly shown that we do and think everything by
participation in the divine reason, he [Heraclitus]
adds, 'It is necessary therefore to follow the com-
mon, for although the Law of Reason is common, the T-v^
majority of people live as though they had an under- y standing of their own.' But this is nothing else than \ ^4! ' an explanation of the mode of the universal disposition , . ^ ^^ ^ of things. As far therefore as we participate in the • ..' ^ memory of this, we are true, but as far as we separate ourselves individually we are false, A more express denial of any self -absorption or a priori theory of knowledge would be impossible. Heraclitus is con- ^ stantly urging men to come out of themselves and place themselves in an attitude of receptivity to that which surrounds them, and not go about as if self- included (cp. frags. 94, 3, 2). But what does Hera-
HERACLIXnS.
cHtus mean by participation in the divine or universal Reason ? Is not this just Pfleiderer's position when he Bays that the Epheaian as little as Fichte or Hegel looked to himself as individual, but rather to that abso- lute reason in which the individual participates ? The | difference is radical and vital, but Pfleiderer, like Lassalle, failed to see it because he did not free himself from strictly modern theories of knowledge. The dif- ference is simply this. The universal reason of which Pfleiderer is speaking is that in which man necessarily and by his intellectual nature participates. That of Heraclitus is the divine Reason, in which man ought to participate but may not. Pfleiderer's universal reason is universal in man. That of Heraclitus, out- side of and independent of man. The latter, ao far from being necessarily involved in thought, is inde- pendent of thought, It is that pure, fiery and godlike essence, the apprehension of which gives rationality in the measure in which it is possessed. No reader. therefore, who can think of only two theories of knowledge, a strictly a priori theory and a strictly empirical theory, can understand Heraclitus, But, it may be asked, if knowledge does not come from with- out through the senses, nor from within from the- nature of thought, whence does it come ? Heraclitus, however, would not be disturbed by such a modem dilemma. There is reason, in fact, to believe, though it sounds strange to us, that he supposed this divine rational essence to be inhaled in the air we breathe i (cp. Sextue Emp. adv. Math, vii. 137, 133). It exists ' in that which surrounds us (zE/tiiym), and the measure of our rationality depends on the degree in which we can possess ourselves of this divine flame. There was no conciseness of thought here, however, and Heracli-
Historical and Critical. 51
tus seemed to think that it was partly apprehended
through the senses, that is, the most perfect condition
of receptivity to truth was the condition in which a man
was most awake. The stupidest man is he who is
asleep, blind, self-involved, and we may add, self-
absorbed (cp. frags. 95, 90, 77, 3, 2, 94). Hence, if
we have rightly interpreted Heraclitus here, a man
might wrap himself in thought forever and be no
nearer to truth. The source of knowledge did not lie
in that direction to any pre-Socratic Greek philosopher.
Absorption into one's inner self, which Pfleiderer thinks
was Heraclitus' source of absolute knowledge, was the
one thing he most despised. ^
Let us now consider the connection of Heraclitus with the Greek Mysteries, which Pfleiderer makes the basis of his interpretation of the whole philosophy. Pfleiderer has done a good work in emphasizing the religious character of the philosophy of the Ephesian. Lassalle and Teichmiiller had already pointed it out. Failure to recognize this is the gravest fault in the critical work of Zeller. But as in Lassalle we found over-systemization of the logical idea, in Schuster of the empirical, in Teichmiiller of the physical, so in Pflei- derer there is great over-systemization of the religi- ous element. More strictly, it is a vast over-emphasis of one thought, namely, the indestructibility of life, or the alternating identity of life and death, which Pflei- derer claims to b^ a religious truth taken from the Mysteries, and out of which, as we have seen, he spins the whole philosophy of Heraclitus, including the doctrine of the eternal flux, the unity of opposites, and the fire. The slight grounds on which all this is based must have already impressed the reader with surprise that Pfleiderer should make so much out
^ PI. ••■•■• • :■' '. /'HT- '•^' ^A- :■•.
». N . t
52 HERACLITUS.
of it. The fact that Heraclitus lived in Ephesus and that Ephesus was a very religious city, is a fair speci- men of the arguments by which he would establish a connection with the Mysteries. There have been pre- served only three fragments in which Heraclitus makes any direct reference to the Greek Mysteries, all taken from Clement of Alexandria (Protrept. 2, pp. 19, 30 ; cp. frags. 124, 125, 127), and in these three passages other critics have found no sympathy with, but stem condemnation of the mystic cult. In the first passage where the wxrcnoXoe^ f^f^T^h ^^X'^h ^^o,^ and phaxat are threatened with future fire, Pfleiderer admits con- demnation of mystic abuses. But the third fragment, relating to the Dionysiac orgies, is the one upon which he most relies to establish the sympathy of our philo- sopher with the Mysteries. The passage is as follows : Ei fjL^ yap JcowtTCjL tto/uttju inoeeuuTO xai Ufri^eov hafia alboiotat^ duacdetrrara ecpyatTT du* (bwroc dk* '"AiStj^; xai JiowiTOf;, oreqj fiaiuourac xai Xifji^at^oijae, *' For were it not Dionysus to whom they institute a procession and sing songs in honor of the pudenda, it would be the most shameful action. But Dionysus, in whose honor they rave in bacchic frenzy, and Hades, are the same.'* Although this has usually been interpreted (by Schlei- ermacher, Lassalle, and Schuster) to mean that the excesses practiced in these ceremonies will be atoned for hereafter, since Dionysus under whose name they are carried on is identical with Pluto, the god of the lower world, Pfleiderer, interpreting it in a wholly different spirit, believes it to mean that these rites, although in themselves considered they would be most shameful, nevertheless have at least a partial justification from the fact that they are celebrated in honor of Dionysus, because since Dionysus and Pluto are the same, the
Historical and Critical. 53
rites are really a symbolism expressing the power of
life over death and the indestructibility of life even
in death. These vile phallus songs are in fact songs
of triumph of life over death (Pfleiderer, p. 28).
Although somewhat far-fetched, this is a possible in-
terpretation of this obscure passage. This explanation
is perhaps not more strained than the others that have
been given (see below, frag. 127, crit. note). Granting
it, and granting that Heraclitus here expresses a cer-
tain sympathy with, or at least does not express
condemnation of the Mysteries, what follows ? Surely,
Pfleiderer would not seriously ask us to conclude from
a single passage friendly to the religion of the Myste-
ries, that Heraclitus' whole philosophy or any part of
it was drawn from them.
But this fragment has another and more important use for Pfleiderer. In the religious truth here expressed of the identity of Dionysus and Hades, that is, the identity of life and death, he flnds the germ of all the Heraclitic philosophy. But the serious question immediately arises whether the philosophy of oppo- sites grew out of this identity, or whether this identity was merely another illustration of the law of oppo- sites. As Pfleiderer has produced no sufficient reason for believing differently, the natural conclusion is that, as elsewhere we find the unity of day and night, up and down, awake and asleep, so here we have t\\e unity of the god of death and the god of life, as another illustration of the general law. To reverse this and say that in this particular antithesis we have the parent of all antitheses is very fanciful. Still further, we should infer from Pfleiderer's argument that the identity of Dionysus and Hades was a well known and accepted truth among the Mysteries, and that in the
54 HERACLITUS.
above fragment we find it in the very act of passing
into the philosophy of the Ephesian. How much truth
is there in this ? So little that there is no record of the
identity of these two gods before the time of Hera-
' — ^ clitus. Later, to be sure, something of the kind ap-
pears. Dionysus represented at least five diflferent
- .^. . gods, and in diflferent times and places seems to have
been identified with modt of the principal deities. In
I . Crete and at Delphi we hear of Zagreus, the winter
"-i^tf ^* ^ / Dionysus of the lower world. No doubt other instances
j^.^r^ might be shown where Dionysus was brought into
. ^j ^ some relation or other with a chthonian deity. But
^^.^ Heraclitus, if he had wished to develop a philosophy
ViC • • ( C f ^^^^ ^^^ alternation of summer and winter and the
-. mystic symbolism of life and death therein contained,
would hardly have chosen so dubious an expression of
it as the unity of Dionysus and Hades. We have no
" • reason to regard this as anything else than one of the
many paradoxical statements which he loved, of his
.^^ \ law of opposites. Indeed, the genesis of this law is not
, . , so obscure that we need to f oi'ce it out of a hidden
■ s'"^ 'V V mystic symbolism. Zeller in his introduction to Greek
U J, rcjj\\,> 5/ philosophy has well said that "philosophy did not