more exactly considered, Heraclitus meant by his Uni- versal Order, his Divine Lam xoci^6<: X6yo(:, etc. This inquiry fair criticism will probably not allow us to answer more concisely than has already been done. We have found^unple reason for rejecting the notion that it was of a logical nature, or any objectification of that which is inherent in human thought. Yet it was not without human attributes. As fiery essence, iti^ was identified with the universe and became almost material. As Order, it approached the idea of pure mathematical Relation or Form (cp. frag. 23jand Zel- ler. Vol. 1, p. 628, 3, and 620). ^^s Wisdom, it was pic- tured as the intelligent power or efficient force that produces the Order. When we reflect what difficulty even at the present day we find in answering the simple question. What is Order ? we are less surprised to find that the Ephesian philosopher did not always distinguish it from less difficult conceptions j We are, however, surprised and startled at the significance of the thought which this early Greek so nearly formu- lated, that the one permanent, abiding element in a imiverse of ceaseless change is mathematical relation. At any rate^^jrhile recognizing the want of perfect consistency and coordination in Heraclitus' system here, we shall be helped by keeping this in mind, that the system was pure pantheism.^ Too much stress cail- not be laid upon Teichmiiller's exposition of the history of the idea of Transcendent Reason, which first arose, not in Heraclitus, but in Anaxagoras. To the latter belongs the credit or the blame, whichever it may be, of taking the first step towards the doctrine of imma- teriality or pure spirit, which has influenced not only philosophy, but society to its foundations every to the present day. Heraclitus was guiltless of it. (^To
62 HERACLITUS.
him the world intelligence itself was a part of the world material — itself took part in the universal change.^ (jLn close connection with the Heraclitic Universal I /^ Order stands the doctrine of strife as the method of the evolution of the world, and the doctrine of the har- mony and ultimately the unity of opposites — thoughts which were not only central in Heraclitus' system, but which, being too advanced for his time, have waited to be taken up in no small degree by modern scienceT^It is unnecessary to repeat here the explana- tions of^ Schuster (above, pp. 15, 16), and particularly of Teichmiiller (above, p. 27), which we found to indi- cate the correct interpretation of these thoughts. These principles are to Heraclitus the mediation between absolute change and perfect law. That which appears to the senses as rest and stability is merely the tempo- \^ rary equilibrium of opposite striving forces/it is har- mony by tension (cp. frags. 45, 43, 46). This law, elementary in modern physics, is yet^s we shall pres- ently see, ^ot the whole content of the Heraclitic thought, although it is its chief import. But in the equilibrium of opposite forces we have at least relative rest, not motion. And of molecular motion Heraclitus knew nothing. How then did he conceive of apparent stability as absolute motion ? This question supposes niore exactness of thought than we look for in the Ephesian. The eternal flux was more generally con- ceived as absolute perishability) Nothing is perma- nently fixed. Cj^ll is involved in the ceaseless round of life and death, growth and decay. Strictly, however, there is no contradiction here, since the rest of balanced forces is only relative rest/^ It is possibly not going too far to accept an illustration given by Ernst Laas (Idealismus u. Positivismus 1, p. 200) of Heraclitus*
Reconstructive. 63
conception of absolute change under the dominion of
law. He compares it to the actual path of our planets,
which move neither in circles nor in exact ellipses, but
under the influence of the attractive forces of moons
and of other planets, or of comets, continually change
both their course and their velocity, and yet all accord-
ing to law.
In addition to the explanations now given, how-
ever, there is something more to be said concerning
A the unity or sameness of opposites. This teaching is
very prominent in the Heraclitic fragments (cp. frags.
35, 36, 39, 43, 45, 46, 52, 57, 58, 59, 67, 78)'!) This
prominence was no doubt less in the original work, as
the paradoxical character of these sayings has encour-
aged their preservation. Buj^U the critics have failed
to notice that we have in these fragments two distinct
classes of oppositions which, though confused in Hera-
clitus' mind,^led historically into different paths of
development. The first is that unity of opposites
which results from the fact that they are endlessly
passing into one another. It must not be forgotten
that this is a purely physical opposition, as has been
pointed out by Zeller, Schuster and others, in refuta-
tion of the opinion of Lassalle, who fancied that he
had found here a Hegelian logical identity of contra-
dictories. As examples of this class of oppositions
may be mentioned the identity of day and night (frag.
35), gods and men (frag. 67), alive and dead, asleep and
awake (frag. 78). The identity of these oppositions
means that they are not in themselves abiding condi-
tions, but are continually and reciprocally passing
into one another. As Heraclitus plainly says, they are
the same because they are reciprocal transmutations
of each other (frag. 78). But now we have another
64 HERACLITUS.
class of opposites to which this reasoning will not apply. "Good and evil," he says, "are the same" (frag. 57). This is simply that identity of opposites which developed into the Protagorean doctrine of relativity. The same thing may be good or evil according to the side from which you look at it. The passage f rom Hippoly tus\ (Ref . haer. ix. 10 ; cp. frag. 52, sources)^ates the doctrine of relativity as plainly as it can be stated. " Pure and impure, he [Heraclitus] says, are one and the same, and drinkable and undrink- able are one and the same. ^ Sea water,' he says, * is very pure and very foul, for while to fishes it is drink- able and healthful, to men it is hurtful and unfit to drink.^ " (Compare the^pposition of just and unjust, frag. 61 ; young and old, frag. 78 ; beauty and ugli- ness, frag. 99 ; cp. frags. 104, 98, 60, 61, 51, 53.) This simple truth is so prominent in the Heraclitic sayings that we see how Schuster could have mistaken it for the whole content of the theory of opposites and ig- nored the more important doctrine of the other class. We see further that Plato's incorrect supposition that the Protagorean subjectivism was wholly an outgrowth of the Heraclitic flux, resulted from his insufficient acquaintance with the Ephesian's own writings.) It was a characteristic of Heraclitus that, in a degree surpassing any other philosopher of antiquity, and comparable only to the discoveries of Greek mathema- ticians and of modern physical philosophers^^he had an insight into truths beyond his contemporaries, but he knew not how to coordinate or use them. Having hit upon certain paradoxical relations of opposites, he hastened to group under his new law all sorts of oppo- sitions^ Some that cannot be included under either of the above classes appear in a passage from Aristotle
Reconstructive. 65
(de Mundo, 6, p. 396 b 12 ; cp. frag. 69, sources ; cp.
Eth. Eud. vii. 1, p. 1235 a 26 ; frag. 43), where in the
case of the opposites sharps and flats, male and female,
the opposition becomes simple correlation and the
unity, harmony. rv V^
The order of treatmenT' brings us now tc(the Hera-
clitic fluxf^ut we have been compelled so far to anti-
cipate this in discussing the Universal Order and the
Law of Opposites that but one or two points need be
considered here. As we have seen in the study of
Schuster and TftiV.hmnnftr^.hp Hftrg^Ji'tifi <^opf.ri^ift of
the flux was a thoroughly radical one< Heaven and
earth and all that they contain were caught in its fatal
whirlpool. It exempted no iftiKiortal gods of the poets
above us, no unchangeable realm of Platonic ideas
around us, no fixed Aristotelian earth beneath us.
It banished all permanence from the universe, and
banished therewith all those last supports which men
are accustomed to cling to. It introduced alarm into
philosophy, and set men, even to the present day,
asking. What can be saved from this general wreck ?
What is there absolutely permanent in the universe ?
This question) as we have seenj^id not trouble Hera-
clitus himself, for, consistently or inconsistently, he
had a foundation rock in his Universal Law, Reason
or Order, which was his theoretical starting-point.
Furthermore, concerning the flux, it is doubtful
whether he ever pictured to himself such absolute
instability as his words imply .^
But we are tempted to ast. Is his system here
really, as it first appears, inconsistent ? Mr. Borden
P. Bowne in his Metaphysics (p. 89) says that the
Heraclitic theory of change thus extremely conceived
** is intelligible and possible only because it is false.'*
66 HERACLITUS.
Let US look at Mr. Bowne's argument. He has first
shown in the same chapter that the Eleatic conception
of rigid being without change is impossible, since in a
world of absolute fixity, even the illusion of change
would be impossible. Furthermore, he has shown that
the vulgar conception of changeless being with
changing states is untenable, since the "state of a
thing expresses what the thing is at the time."
Changing states would be uncaused and undetermined
except as the being changes. There can be therefore
no fixed useless core of being. In general there is no
changeless being. All is change, all is becoming. Is
there then, he asks, any permanence or identity what-
ever, or is the extreme Heraclitic position true ? It is
false. Why? Because, as in a world of Eleatic
fixity, even the illusion of change would be impos-
sible, so in a world of absolute change ^ even the appea r-
ance of rest would be impos sible. There must be some
abiding factor, that change may be known as change.
There must be something permanent somewhere to
make the notion of fiow possible. This permanent
something Mr. Bowne finds in the knowing subject —
the conscious self. Having proceeded plainly up to
this point, here he becomes mystical. The permanence
of the conscious self, he continues, does not consist in
any permanent substance of the soul. The soul forever
changes equally with other being. The permanence
consists in memory or self -consciousness. "How this
is possible," he says, " there is no telling." The per-
manence and identity of the soul consists, however,
only in its ability " to gather up its past and carry it
with it."
In this argument, Mr. Bowne's first fallacy is in saying that in a world of absolute change there must
Reconstructive. 67
be some permanent factor in order that the change
itself may "be known. This is meaningless. Perma-
nent as regards what ? Permanence as regards other
moving factors is simply relative difference of change.
Mr. Bowne seems to have committed the primitive ^"Sx. rVsl
error of supposing that because all things seem to vv^ ^ ^ move, he alone is fixed — like the earth in the Ptole- "* , •'^ ^] maic astronomy. According to his argument, if he j
were in a moving car and should meet another moving
car, the perception of movement would be impossible.
His reasoning assumes that by absolute change is
meant uniform change all in one way, which would
not be change at all, but absolute fixity. Difference ^
is the essential element in change, and difference is
all that is necessary to the idea of change. The
assumption of permanent personality in order to make
change itself possible is unnecessary. Mr. Bowne says
that what constitutes permanence in the conscious
self is its ability to gather up its past and carry it with
it. But a stratifying rock or growing tree gathers
up its past and carries it with it. But the apparent
permanence in the case of the rock or tree is a tempo-
rarily abiding form or temporarily abiding spacial
relations. The apparent permanence of personality
may similarly consist wholly in a temporarily abiding
form or relation, must in fact consist in this, since
Mr. Bowne rejects any abiding soul substance. But
temporarily abiding relations, the extreme Heracli-
teans do not deny, certainly not Heraclitus, to whom
apparent rest was due to the temporary equilibrium
of opposite balancing forces. We conclude, therefore,
that Mr. Bowne's charge of falsity against the theory
of the Heraclitic fiux is not well substantiated. Here
as ever we see the difference between modern and
68 HERACLITUS.
ancient philosophy. The former looks within, the
latter without. Mr. Bowne seeks the abiding within
himself. (jEeraclitus looked away from himself to the
Universal Order without, which determined all things
and himself./
But thougl^the Heraclitic absolute flu:y is vindicated
from objections of the above character, the question
/^still remains unanswered whether the doctrine is con-
sistent with his conception of absolute Order. Did
not Heraclitus make the common mistake of hyposta-
sizing law ? Did he not conceive of law as something
by which the action of things is predetermined, rather
than as a mere abstraction from the action of things ?
No doubt he did even worse than this) for he ascribed
to his xoc]^b(: Xoyo^, attributes which led Bernays and
Teichmiiller to believe that it was a self-conscious
being, (a conclusion questioned by Zeller, Vol. 1, p.
609, 3). ^ut yet again he saved his consistency here
by identifying his Absolute with fire and thereby
i (^ bringing it after all into the all-consuming vortex of
endless change. But in the face of this all-embracing
flux, the one idea which stands out most prominent in
Heraclitus is the deep rationality of the world — the
eternal Order. Nor in the last analysis are these two
at variance, for any world must be rational to the
beings in it, for the rationality of the world to us is
only our adaptation to the world, which is involved in
the very fact of our existence^